Jоhn Edward MILLER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Kevin R. DUGAN; Jerrod Wayne Scott; City of Barling, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 13-2653.
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
August 21, 2014
763 F.3d 826
Submitted: June 11, 2014.
The district court properly granted judgment on the pleadings and summary judgment for the officials as to K.B.‘s negligence claims, because the officials are entitled to official immunity under Missouri law.
*
*
*
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
Stephen Joseph Capron, argued, Tulsa, OK, for appellant.
Clyde Burt Newell, argued, Hot Springs, AR, for appellee.
Before MURPHY, COLLOTON, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.
COLLOTON, Circuit Judge.
Miller appeals the district court‘s denial of prejudgment interest on his state law claims. He also disputes the district court‘s denial of an evidentiary hearing on his motion for attorney‘s fees and costs, and the court‘s ultimate award of attorney‘s fees. We affirm.
I.
Miller sued Dugan, Scott, and the City in July 2011. His amended complaint, filed in August 2012, alleged that the officers had violated his First and Fourth Amendment rights in an April 2010 encounter by conducting unlawful searches and seizures, using excessive force, and retaliating against him for his speech. He also brought claims of negligence, assault, battery, wrongful arrest, abuse оf process, and malicious prosecution under Arkansas tort law based on the officers’ conduct.
In November 2012, after the parties had begun discovery, the officers and the City tendered an offer of judgment under
The district court, after considering filings from the parties, granted Miller‘s motion in part and denied it in part. The court declined to award Miller prejudgment interest. The court awarded Miller $2,115.80 in costs pursuant to
II.
A.
Miller first argues that prejudgment interest should have been awarded, at least as to his state-law tort claims. Arkansas law, he posits, provides for prejudgment interest where the amount of damages is certain or аmenable to precise calculation. See Woodline Motor Freight, Inc. v. Troutman Oil Co., 327 Ark. 448, 938 S.W.2d 565, 568 (1997). State law, however, does not control whether prejudgment interest should accompany a judgment entered pursuant to a settlement under
Any prejudgment interest to which Miller may have been entitled on his state tort claims was encompassed in the $40,000 judgment entered by the district court. “Prejudgment interest is not a ‘cost’ in th[e] narrow sense” that
B.
Miller next argues that the district court contravened
C.
Miller contends that the district court‘s award of $35,875 in attorney‘s fees was unreasonable. We review the district court‘s award of attorney‘s fees for abuse of discretion. See Hanig v. Lee, 415 F.3d 822, 825 (8th Cir.2005). “The most useful starting point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee is the number of hоurs
1.
Miller challenges the district court‘s decision that $250 per hour, not the requested $300 per hour, was a reasonable hourly rate. “A reasonable hourly rate is usually the ordinary rate fоr similar work in the community where the case has been litigated.” Emery v. Hunt, 272 F.3d 1042, 1048 (8th Cir.2001). “When determining reasonable hourly rates, district courts may rely on their own experience and knowledge of prevailing market rates.” Hanig, 415 F.3d at 825. Based on its experience, the court identified the prevailing market rate in the community as $250 per hour.
Miller argues that the district court abused its discretion by relying on the prevailing market rate for civil rights litigation in the area of Fort Smith, Arkansas, because it should have applied Capron‘s standard rate in Tulsa, Oklahoma, of $300 per hour. Miller cites Casey v. City of Cabool, Missouri, 12 F.3d 799 (8th Cir.1993), in which this court reasoned that “the opportunity cost of the lawyer‘s time provides the starting point for determining a presumptively correct hourly rate,” but continued that “[o]ther considerations, including the complexity of the litigation and the relevant market for legal services from which the plaintiff had to choose are also of relevance.” Id. at 805. Casey does not preclude a district court from considering the prevailing rate in the local community. More recently, this court discussed Casey while applying the rule that “a reasonable hourly rate generally means the ordinary fee for similar work in the community.” Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Arkansas, 674 F.3d 990, 997 (8th Cir.2012) (per curiam).
Miller contends that the district court should have looked to a broader community than Fort Smith when determining the prevailing rate for similar litigation. It is true that we have considered the prevailing rate in the market from which attorneys have traveled where the attorneys were “leaders in the field” with “extensive experience,” “able to handle the case in a shorter length of time than a local lawyer, without comparable experience, would have needed.” Planned Parenthood, Sioux Falls Clinic v. Miller, 70 F.3d 517, 519 (8th Cir.1995). But this flexibility does not mean that a district court is forbidden in the ordinary case to focus оn the community in which the case was litigated.
Implicit in the district court‘s reasoning here is the view that a local lawyer, adequately versed in civil rights litigation, would have sufficed to attain the result that Miller received while charging the ordinary Arkansas rate. In other words, Miller‘s attorney “did not display thе excellence, or achieve the time savings, implied by [his] higher rate[].” Gusman v. Unisys Corp., 986 F.2d 1146, 1151 (7th Cir.1993). Miller did inform the court that he had faced difficulty finding a local attorney to take his case, but the district court—presumed to be “intimately familiar with its local bar,” Emery, 272 F.3d at 1048—reasonably could have determined that qualified counsel was available in the area to handle this
2.
Miller also argues that the district court abused its discretion in declining to award him attorney‘s fees for several blocks of time billed by attorney Capron. “[H]ours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary’ must be excluded” from the district court‘s determination of reasonable time expended on the case. El-Tabech v. Clarke, 616 F.3d 834, 842 (8th Cir.2010) (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434).
Miller challenges the district court‘s rejection of Capron‘s time spent relating to a separate civil сase in which Miller testified as a non-party witness. Miller argues that because that case involved allegations against Dugan and the City that were similar to his, the time invested was analogous to time spent in a hearing or deposition for his own case. The district court acknowledged that fees could be awarded for time devoted to separate litigation, if the effort resulted in work product that was actually used in the instant case, the time spent was inextricably linked to issues raised in the instant case, and the plaintiff was not otherwise compensated for counsеl‘s work in the ancillary proceeding. R. Doc. 45, at 9 (citing Gulfstream III Assocs., Inc. v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., 995 F.2d 414, 420 (3d Cir.1993)). But the court found that Miller presented no evidence that his testimony in the separate case, or Capron‘s work in preparation for that case, was actually used in Miller‘s lawsuit. Miller has not shown that the court‘s finding was clearly еrroneous, and we see no abuse of discretion in the court‘s conclusion that the time was not reasonably expended on this case.
The district court also rejected as unreasonable Miller‘s claim for 3.5 hours spent on an “ill-advised and unnecessary” motion to compel attendance at depositions. When it first denied the motion to compel, the court explained that the motion failed because the parties had not yet agreed when to hold the defendants’ depositions. Miller contends that the district court should not discount time spent on аny motion, even one that is ill-advised, because he ultimately prevailed in obtaining a favorable judgment. Miller‘s categorical position, however, is inconsistent with the Supreme Court‘s admonition that “excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary” time should be excluded from an award of attorney‘s fees. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434.
Miller next contests the district court‘s award of attorney‘s fees for only one half the time Capron spent responding to two motions to compel discovery responses filed by the officers and the City. The court allowed compensation for 5.15 hours; Miller seeks payment for 10.3 hours. The court concluded that the full amount of time was not reasonably expended, in part because both motions were resolved largely in favor of the defendants. We see no abuse of discretion. The district court has a “superior understanding of the litigation,” id. at 437, and Miller has shown no error in the court‘s reasoning that the time spent was excessive in light of the unfavorable result.
Miller challenges the district court‘s rejection of 8.7 hours that Capron spent on discovery issues. The district court awarded Miller attorney‘s fees for 2.9 out of 5.8 hours requested for drafting discovery responses, and rejected altogether another 5.8 hours Capron spent “on the same discovery issues” prior to a hearing on one of the defendants’ motions to compel. The district court reasonably declined to compensate all of the 5.8 hours
Finally, Miller argues that the district court abused its discretion in rejecting 4.3 hours spent on research for his motion for fees and in awarding fees for only half of the 5.1 hours requested for drafting the motion and preparing a reply to the defendants’ opposition. The district court noted that Capron‘s normal hourly rate—proffered as reasonable in part due to his “great deal of experience working on Civil Rights Act cases“—was inconsistent with the number of hours spent researching and preparing the motion and the reply. Miller cites the infrequency with which cases of this type require motions for fees (because, he says, parties typically settle), but we find this argument unavailing in the face of the district court‘s familiarity with this case and with civil rights litigation more generally.
*
*
*
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.