MASON ET AL. v. CONTINENTAL GROUP, INC., ET AL.
No. 85-847
Supreme Court of the United States
January 21, 1986
474 U.S. 1087
C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.
In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit ruled that beneficiaries of an Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) plan must exhaust internal plan remedies before suing plan fiduciaries on the basis of an alleged violation of duties imposed by the statute. Although this ruling is consistent with the law of the Seventh Circuit, see Kross v. Western Electric Co., 701 F. 2d 1238 (1983), it is at odds with a decision of the Ninth Circuit, Amaro v. Continental Can Co. 724 F. 2d 747 (1984), which held that plaintiffs alleging a statutory violation (as opposed to a mere denial of benefits owing under an ERISA plan) need not exhaust internal remedies.* The Third Circuit has noted the existence of this conflict but failed to take a direct position on it, see Barrowclough v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 752 F. 2d 923, 939, n. 15 (1985), although that court‘s acceptance of the notion that statutory ERISA claims are normally not arbitrable seems to reflect agreement with the Ninth Circuit‘s approach. See id., at 941.
I believe that the Court should grant certiorari in this case in order to resolve the uncertainty over the existence of an exhaustion requirement in cases of this kind. The increasing significance of ERISA litigation is apparent from the growing number of such cases that appear on our docket; in a field so productive of federal litigation, the need for clear procedural rules governing access to the federal courts is imperative. Moreover, because the coverage of particular ERISA plans frequently extends to beneficiaries in more than one State—and, no doubt, in more than one judicial circuit—differences in the rules governing access to federal court for the purpose of pressing a claim under ERISA may have the troubling effect of encouraging forum shopping by plaintiffs. Accordingly, the conflict among the Circuits over the issue of an exhaustion requirement under ERISA can hardly be passed
MESSER v. KEMP, WARDEN
No. 85-5571
Supreme Court of the United States
January 21, 1986
474 U.S. 1088
C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. JUSTICE BLACKMUN dissents from the denial of the petition for writ of certiorari.
Petitioner in this case, James Messer, was sentenced to death by a jury that was unable in any meaningful fashion to give him the “individualized consideration” to which he has a constitutional right, Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U. S. 586, 605 (1978) (plurality opinion), because of egregiously unprofessional assistance by his trial counsel. I believe that petitioner has clearly met the standard that this Court set in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (1984), for establishing ineffective assistance during the sentencing phase of his trial, and I would accordingly grant the petition and vacate petitioner‘s sentence.
I
Petitioner was convicted of kidnaping and murdering his 8-year-old niece. After his conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct review, he sought a writ of habeas corpus in state court, alleging, inter alia, ineffective assistance of counsel. The court declined to hold a hearing, made no findings, and denied the writ. Petitioner then sought federal habeas relief. The Magistrate to whom the case was referred recommended that the writ be granted as to the sentence, concluding that petitioner had received ineffective assistance during the penalty phase. The District Court nevertheless denied the writ. It concluded that petitioner had not established prejudice, as required by Strickland, supra, and therefore did not reach the question whether counsel gave adequate assistance. The Court of Appeals affirmed, 760 F. 2d 1080 (CA11 1985), with one judge dissenting, id., at 1093 (Johnson, J.).
II
The only factfinder that has considered the question, the Federal Magistrate, found that petitioner has met the first Strickland criterion—that counsel‘s performance at the sentencing phase was “outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance,”