409 U.S. 959 | SCOTUS | 1972
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
I dissent. I think petitioner’s guilty plea entered in New York state court was clearly involuntary, particularly after our decision last Term in Santobello v. New York, 404 U. S. 257 (1971).
On October 23, 1968, petitioner was charged in an indictment returned in New York state court with one count of criminally selling a dangerous drug in the second degree
On February 17, 1969, the State moved for trial. Before the proceedings commenced, the prosecutor, the defense counsel, and the trial judge met in the judge’s
“The Court: Wait a minute. Third Degree?
“[Prosecutor]: The second count, your Honor, of [the first indictment].
“[Defense Counsel]: There are two counts of Second Degree and one of Third Degree.
“The Court: That is not what I understood.
“(Whereupon a conversation was had off the record).
“The Court: . . . [A]s far as I am concerned, it may be that two indictments were to be disposed of through one plea, but it was not a plea to Selling a Dangerous Drug in the Third Degree. That was no part of our talk.
“[Defense Counsel]: It was this afternoon, Judge.
“The Court: It was not part of our talk.”
Unable to obtain the plea he had expected, defense counsel requested a one-day adjournment because he was “not prepared to go to trial.”
“The Court: The case will proceed to trial or disposition right now.
“[Defense Counsel]: . . . This case was answered ready by my office at the February calendar, but I was not informed until this morning that we were proceeding. And I would again respectfully request*961 that the court grant me until at least tomorrow morning.
“The Court: Application denied.”
When the defense counsel subsequently turned to the prosecutor — the same prosecutor who only a moment before had stated in open court that he understood the defendant wished to change his pleas of not guilty to a plea of guilty to the third degree charge — for assistance in clearing up the confusion, the only response was, “No comment.”
Defense counsel indicated that he was going to withdraw “because I can’t adequately defend this man without some preparation, and I think the District Attorney should at least give me that kind of notice.” Defense counsel was given a few moments to speak with petitioner. Faced with the dilemma of either proceeding immediately to trial on all three charges with unprepared counsel or pleading guilty to one count of selling a dangerous drug in the second degree, petitioner not unexpectedly chose the latter course as the lesser of two evils. The usual litany of the plea then followed.
Last Term in Santobello we emphasized the importance of the plea-bargaining process: "If every criminal charge were subjected to a full-scale trial, the States and Federal Government would need to multiply by many times the number of judges and court facilities,” 404 U. S., at 260. But a guilty plea necessarily involves the waiver of a variety of fundamental constitutional rights, see, e. g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145 (1968) (right to jury trial); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U. S. 400 (1965) (right to confront one’s accusers), and the process by which it is obtained must therefore be governed by a standard of absolute fairness. The plea must be the result of "a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant.” North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U. S. 25, 31 (1970). See also Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U. S. 238, 242 (1969); Machibroda v. United States, 368 U. S. 487, 493 (1962). I think it clear that this petitioner was denied such a choice. To be sure, it is in the nature of the plea-bargaining process that some pressure is brought to bear on the defendant to enter a plea. But here the normal pressures inherent in the plea-bargaining process were improperly augmented by both the prosecutor and the trial judge.
In Santobello, supra, at 262, we said “that when a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled.” In that decision, we condemned a prosecutor’s failure to abide by the agreement of an associate who had promised to make no recommendation as to sentence in return for the guilty plea. What occurred here was far more serious. It would be naive to deny that, at least as between defense counsel and the prosecutor, a clear understanding had been reached in the judge’s chambers
I would not stop in this case, however, with the prosecutor. For the trial judge saw fit to become a party to the plea negotiations and agreement. Whatever the considerations when the judge is not a participant in the plea-bargaining process, it seems to me that once he has injected himself into that process he must be held to the same strict standard of fairness as the prosecutor. This is not to say that the trial judge should be deprived of his traditional discretion to reject a plea of guilty; I agree that “[t]here is ... no absolute right to have a guilty plea accepted,” Santobello, supra, at 262, citing Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U. S. 705, 719 (1962). By the same token, though, a trial judge cannot be allowed to use his discretion to apply undue pressures on a defendant. Nothing could be more destructive of the integrity — and ultimately the viability — of the plea-bargaining process. I do not doubt that in this instance there was a misunderstanding between the prosecutor and defense counsel, on the one hand, and the trial judge, on the other, as to the charge to which petitioner would be allowed to plead guilty. In light of this confusion over the plea agreement, the trial judge was justified in refusing to accept the plea to the third-degree
It is no answer that defense counsel should have been prepared to proceed to trial at once because his office had answered ready to the call of the February calendar. First, it is not disputed that defense counsel was not informed until the morning of the proceeding that the case was to be heard. We cannot ignore that in these days of crowded dockets, attorneys — as well as judges — are often forced to juggle unreasonably large case loads. Moreover, regardless of whether defense counsel technically should have been ready for trial because the case had previously been answered ready at the call of the February calendar, counsel undoubtedly could have made valuable use of the time between the conference in the judge’s chambers and the formal disposition of the case had he not been under the misim-pression that a bargain had been struck.
“The matter of continuance is traditionally within the discretion of the trial judge, and it is not every denial of a request for more time that violates due process even if the party fails to offer evidence or is compelled to defend without counsel. . . . Contrariwise, a myopic insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for delay can render the right to defend with counsel an empty formality. . . .” Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U. S. 575, 589 (1964).
And the alternative to proceeding with unprepared counsel was the waiver of a variety of important constitutional rights by way of a plea of guilty to a charge as to which, as a matter of unfettered choice, petitioner was obviously not prepared to concede guilt. Therefore, I think — as I have already indicated — granting of the short continuance
Hence, I would grant the petition for certiorari and remand the case with instructions that petitioner’s plea be vacated and he be allowed to replead to the original charges. In Santobello, the Court declined to direct that the guilty plea there at issue be vacated and simply remanded for reconsideration. The broken promise in Santobello, however, affected only the petitioner’s sentence, not the charge to which he had pleaded guilty. Here, by contrast, the conduct of the prosecutor and the trial judge improperly coerced petitioner to plead guilty to the second-degree charge.
N. Y. Penal Law § 220.35 (Supp. 1972-1973).
N. Y. Penal Law § 220.30 (Supp. 1972-1973).
See N. Y. Penal Law §70.00, subds. 2 (c)-(d) (1967).
Indeed, there was only a single slip by petitioner when he indicated that he had been told what sentence he would receive. Defense counsel quickly denied this, and petitioner naturally corrected himself.
People v. Martinez, 34 App. Div. 2d 174, 311 N. Y. S. 2d 117 (1970), leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals was denied, and a petition for a writ of certiorari was denied by this Court, 401 U. S. 941 (1971).
Although the record is not entirely clear on this point, it does appear that a substantial amount of time elapsed between the conference in the judge’s chambers and when petitioner’s ease was called for formal disposition.
The Court of Appeals majority, in discounting the unpreparedness of defense counsel and the importance of the continuance, suggested that “the very request for merely an overnight adjournment would indicate the lack of complexity of the defense.” We have noted, though, that whether or not a continuance would in fact “have been useful to the accused, . .. the importance of the assistance of counsel in a serious criminal charge after arraignment is too large to permit speculation on its effect.” Hawk v. Olson, 326 U. S. 271, 278 (1945).
Lead Opinion
C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.