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John Magnuson, D/B/A John Magnuson Associates, Plaintiff-Appellee-Cross-Appellant v. Video Yesteryear, Defendant-Appellant-Cross-Appellee
85 F.3d 1424
9th Cir.
1996
Check Treatment

*1 BAP, hold, Arnold as did the provide plan

Baker FmHA with the does equivalent of its claim

indubitable secured

required by Bankruptcy Code. judgment reversing BAP

bankruptcy confirming plan court’s order

is AFFIRMED. MAGNUSON,

John John d/b/a

Associates, Plaintiff-Appellee-Cross-

Appellant, YESTERYEAR,

VIDEO Defendant-

Appellant-Cross-Appellee. 94-16787,

Nos. 94-17019 and 95-15369. Appeals,

United States Court

Ninth Circuit.

Argued April and Submitted 1996.

Decided June *2 Hy- Hyman, Allen Law Offices

Allen man, California, City, for defendant- Studio appellant-eross-appellee. Cohen, AND

Thomas A. Law Offices Thomas FACTUAL PROCEDURAL Francisco, California, Cohen, A. BACKGROUND San plaintiff-appellee-eross-appellant. rights “Lenny appeal This involves the

Bruce,” film black-and-white created *3 Magnuson and John the American satirist Lenny film, In the which Bruce. was shot 1965, night in Magnuson a New York club in sought convey Bruce to and Bruce’s version gave of the events that to his arrest rise NELSON, obscenity. conviction The film was FERGUSON, and for Before: D.W. produced by corporation, the FERNANDEZ, California Judges. and Circuit

Imagination, (“Imagination”), Inc. of whiсh Magnuson the was chief executive officer. NELSON; by Judge Opinion D.W. Imagination paid production post- the by Judge Dissent FERNANDEZ. production expenses employed the cam- NELSON, Judge: film, D.W. Circuit era and sound crews for the while of Bruce the sole author the material OVERVIEW existing used film. There is no writ- (“VY’) Yesteryear appeals Video dis- Bruce, agreement Magnuson ten between holding court’s of Magnu- trict favor John Imagination concerning rights to film. Magnuson son John Associates for d/b/a Bruce, Following suggestion a made copyright infringement the Copyright under Magnuson up corporatiоn, set Columbus 4, 320, 1909, ofAct 1909. Act of March ch. Productions, (“Columbus”), pur- Inc. for the (codified 17 Stat. as amended at pose of owning the film. Columbus was cre- § Mag- seq.). et VY contends that U.S.C. 10,1966, subsequent ated October Len- standing lacks for copyright nuson to sue creation, ny Bruce’s At of death. the time its infringement because he does own Magnuson was sole shareholder and chief issue, rights to the work film entitled of executive officer Columbus. On October “Lenny argues Bruce.” VY also 17, 1966, Magnuson screening public held a refusing at- erred award of the film in San Francisco order torney’s part post-оffer fees as of costs under copyright protection secure Copy- -under the 68, Fed.R.Civ.P. 68. Under Rule right Act applied of then 1909. Columbus rejects a settlement offer made at least film, copyright registration listing for the days prior pay trial post-offer ten must film, itself the “author” and of “owner” of if damages do costs offeror awarded March, copyright registration secured Magnu- not exceed the amount of offer. 1968. cross-appeals son the district court’s refusal The district court found that Columbus attorney’s him to award under 17 fees U.S.C. performed Magnuson often business as John 505, permits which the district court to Magnuson changed Associates and that attorney’s award costs and “in fees its discre- Magnuson name to John Columbus Associ- tion.” He also asserts that VY is not entitled Magnuson, ates in the 1970s. Aside from to costs under Rule 68 because the offer was any had regular employees. Columbus never defectively served. seventies, Magnuson In the Len- licensed the distributors, affirm ny We the decision of the district Bruce film a number Films, respect Magnuson’s copyright including with in- Kino Internation- Times/Life al, fringement Virgin Video, claim and the denial VYs re- EEN and Rhino Home Vid- quest attоrney’s pursuant fees agreement concerning to Rule 68. eo. He also made an We reverse royalties the district court’s award of VYs the division of with the Bruce estate agreements We costs. remand reconsideration on in 1975. These were made un- question Magnuson whether should have der the name of Associates. John attorney’s pursuant suspend- been awarded fees On October Columbus was pay corporate U.S.C. ed for failure to California 3,1993, attorney’s Copyright fees award a Memo- On March taxes. franchise Rights Co- Act is for abuse of discretiоn. Fan- Assignment from reviewed randum of Productions, tasy, Fogerty, Inc. Inc. to John lumbus (9th Cir.1993), Copyright grounds, Office. rev’d on with the U.S. other was recorded 1023, 127 114 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d U.S. Lenny copy purchased a VY (1994). include a which did not Bruce film the U.S. conducted a search with notice. VY any ANALYSIS to determine whether

Copyright Office had “Lenny Bruce Concert” film entitled Magnuson’s Right to Copyright I. Sue for question although the film in registered, been Infringement gone by that title. The search has never *4 argues in VY that the district erred VY, results, concluding that and produced no finding Magnuson owner the that is the of in do- Lenny public Bruce film was the the copyright Lеnny film that to the Bruce and tape film main, marketing the on video began copy- for standing he therefore has to sue The was not authorized in video 1979. (1) right infringement. VY that contends notice Magnuson copyright and contains a copyright was valid of there not a transfer VY. copyright belonging to claiming a 1983 (2) Columbus; Lenny to from Bruce and in- copyright filed action for Magnuson an Lenny if valid from even was a transfer there against and trial was sched- fringement VY Columbus, not a Bruce to there was valid 7, 1994, pre- a begin uled on March with to Magnuson transfer from Columbus to John 2, March 1994. On trial set for сonference argument is without merit. Associates. VY’s 22, 1994, Ex- February VY sent Federal (“fax”) of offer press facsimile an and Lenny Bruce to Colum- A. Transfer from for judgment pursuant to 68 Fed.R.Civ.P. bus $3,000. attorney rejected the Magnuson’s untimely, having been it offer because was argues Lenny alone was the VY that Bruce days the than before ‍​‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​​​‌​‌​‌​​‌​‌​​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​​​​​‍less ten served Lenny of film and that author the Bruce held trial date. The district court scheduled ownership Imagination of the never shared Magnuson copyright the claim in of on favor film as Even if copyright the a coauthor. to damages. rejected in It and awarded $375 film, Imagination a to the copyright did hold request attorney’s pur- Magnuson’s for fees asserts, copyright that it did transfer VY rejected It 17 505. also suant to U.S.C. on prior publication to the film’s to Columbus to attorney’s pursuant for request fees VY’s 17,1966. October but awarded costs Fed.R.Civ.P. rule, finding been that the offer had that correctly held that The district court hold- appeals district court’s timely. VY the applicable Act of 1909 is the Copyright the infringement ing respect copyright with copyright was in this case because the law attorney’s request and of for its denial VY’s adoption рrior in the secured Magnuson challenges cross-appeal, fees. On Ranger v. Act. Lone Television See of and the award costs to VY district court’s Corp., F.2d 719-20 Program Radio attorney’s fees. request the of its denial Cir.1984) Act (applying the 1909 where original to 1954 and copyright dated back the

STANDARD OF REVIEW 1979). alleged infringement place the took Act, copyright law the a common find the district court’s Under We review or authors of work clear vested the author ings following a bench trial for of fact of Copyright Act time of its creation. de novo. the and its conclusions lаw error Copy 1909, § 52(a); reprinted in 5 Nimmer Price v. States Fed.R.Civ.P. United Nimmer) (hereinafter 6; (9th Cir.1994). Appendix see 1011, 1021 right We Navy, F.3d A § 2.02 at 2-18.1. construc 1 Nimmer novo district court’s review de the production of paid County and Herrington commissioned Rule 68. tion of (9th Cir.1993). author and held Sonoma, work considered an F.3d Lin- the work. copyright common law court’s decision as to whether Gertler, Magnuson Hardware v. B. Transfer from Columbus to Brook Builders (9th Cir.1965). 298, 300 argues next even if held VY Columbus copyright, owner- valid it did transfer Here, the district court found that ship copyright Magnuson before Imagination deci and Bruce made mutual suspеnded in Columbus was film, sion that Bruce took “clear to create the asserts, copyright the true owner of the directing undertaking” initiative Columbus, which, suspended corpora- aas (the filming, Magnuson and that owner tion, capacity does not have the Cal. sue. Imagination) produced paid film and VY challenges Bus. & Tax.C. 23301. testi- equipment produc the crews and used its mony by Magnuson “[a]t offered findings clearly tion. Because these are not dissolution, Productions, time of Columbus erroneous, properly the district court held assigned right, Inc. all title and interest Imagination Bruce аnd both held Lenny film] [to Bruce original copyright in film as common law John John d/b/a commissioning parties. validity It Associates.” also contests the of a Assignment February Memorandum dated Lenny found The district court also 1, 1993, registered with the United film to Bruce transferred his interest *5 Copyright in States Office which the transfer subsequently, Imagina- Imagination and that from to is docu- Columbus John copyright tion law to transferred the common argues VY that there is mented. no evidence copyrights “Common law could Columbus. therefore, that Columbus ever dissolved and orally, byor implication be either transferrеd that not the transfer could have occurred. 1 parties.” from the conduct of the Nimmer Data, § (citing at 5-46 Real Estate Act, 5.03[B] Copyright the 1976 the Like Co., Inc. v. F.2d Sidwell 809 374 provided Copyright assign Act of 1909 that Cir.1987)). The district court that concluded a in copyright ment of had to be writ made suggesting However, in that ing. Copyright create a new 1909 Act of corporation purpose owning for the of the case law holds under circum that some film, prior grant a oral that Bruce indicated his intent to transfer stances is confirmed addition, by writing a later rights Imagination. his In it becomes valid as (Co- grant, writing thе oral even if by time of the is creating corporation held that such subsequent litigation to the initiation of lumbus) transferring the film the copyright infringement. the See 3 Nimmer entity, Imagina- corporate books of the new 10-39; at 10.03[A] Valente-Kritzer Video tion effected a valid transfer of the common (9th Cir.1989); Pinckney, v. 881 F.2d 775 copyright law to Columbus. Toys, Eden Inc. Undergarment v. Florelee (2d Cir.1982). Co., 36 The district found court that after the ownership transfer Columbus in rights of Toys, provi- In Eden the court addressed film, Lenny published the Bruce Columbus analogous the sion in 1976 Act one at to the work, thereby losing the its common law hеre, which provides issue that an exclusive Act, copyright. Under the 1909 common law copyright only conveyed license can be copyright pub terminated a work when writing. 697 of purpose F.2d at 36. The the lished, point eligi at which work the became requirement writing, that a transfer be the copyright. 1 statutory ble for federal See explained, protect copyright was to the § 2.02 Nimmer at 2-18.1. then Columbus persons fraudulently claiming holder from applied statutory for and 1968 a received However, out, pointed hold licenses. it registered copyright, in the name of Colum сopyright appears where “the holder to have bus. has VY offered no evidence that indi matter, dispute with little its licensee on this findings cates the district court’s on these permit it would be a third anomalous clearly transfers were Co erroneous infringer provision against invoke this the statutory copy Thus, held, lumbus did not hold a valid an licensee.” Id. oral right by as of 1968. it transfer was valid where was affirmed

1429 days prior [actual] than ten to the commence- transfer execut- subsequent of memorandum However, ment the trial.” Id. of by owner. ed position court declined take а to wheth- particu Toys is logic of Eden by Express permitted er Federal service case, con in this where the larly compelling procedure or local of civil federal rules Magnuson as John CEO veyance is between compu- might such service affect the how Columbus, Magnuson as owner and John of tation the date should of which offer Thus, we find Magnuson Associates. of John any have served. It also failed to cite been conveyance satis of the memorandum support proposition case law of requirement of writing fied pro- actual notice suffices where service of Act, it though was not exe Copyright even cess is defective. Further, transfer.1 cuted the time find made factual the district court several offers, involving In Rule cases clearly indicating not ings that are erroneous comply process with Fed. service must did, fact, copy transfer its that Columbus 5(b).2 Brienen, 801 R.Civ.P. Grosvenor v. in the Magnuson Associates right to John (7th Cir.1986) (holding that an particular, the district court seventies. satisfy require oral not offer does service Magnuson changed name found that 5(b) 68); Rule in the context of Rule in ments of Magnuson Associаtes to John Columbus Sonoma, County F.Supp. seventies, licensing v. making several Stewart (N.D.Cal.1986). agreement in concluding an fax does agreements and Service 5(b). Bruce name. satisfy with the estate Fed.R.Civ.P. Mushroom dis Mushrooms, Inc., of whether Columbus regardless Monterey v. Assocs. seventies, court did the district (N.D.Cal.1992), solved U.S.P.Q.2d 1304 1992 WL clearly when found Columbus err Governors, *4; Salley Board *6 copyright to John the transferred 417, (M.D.N.C. of N.C., 136 419 Univ. F.R.D. result, Magnuson a is the As Associates. 1991). Thus, correctly the district court held is entitled to sue party in interest and real process by that of fax of Rule 68 service the infringement. inadequate, though Magnuson offer even was the apparently copy did a faxed of receive II. Service VY’sRule 68 Offer erred, however, in The district court offer. Rule of- VY’s 68 contends that by holding that service of the offer Federal therefore, served,' defectively fer was Express adequate. eases was The handful of attorney’s nor fees should that costs neither by that have addressed the issue service agree. We be awarded VY. entirely from Express come almost Federal circuit, they courts of this outside that while service The district court held Therefore, pro are consistent. we will by inadequate, of the by fax service offer was the law that vide a brief overview of scant acceptable Express was because Federal area. received more exists in this reality “the that the offer was occurred, Int'l, Rice, ing actually or the Konigsberg whether the transfer Inc. 355 Further, 1994) distinguishable from this case. to the Cir. is on which it occurred. terms There, alleged was between the au might transfer language Konigsberg that some extent party, author and the thor where the and another contemporaneous interpreted requiring as a be disputed party the transfer had other whether case, writing it is even under the facts this occurred, if and the terms on which it occurred clearly dicta. subsequent writing on did. which the it The directly acknowledge plaintiffs did not relied 5(b) provides part: in relevant 2. Fed.RXiv.P. any specific indicate a transfer had occurred or writing problem with the terms. attorney upon party upon the shall or a Service it was con not so much that case was attorney by delivering copy to or a be made temporaneous agreement with the but that it mailing attоrney party to the or or it by writing contemplated type section "not the address, attorney’s party’s or last known provide any late to 204" because it “came far too known, or, by leaving with if address is no parties’ disputes.” point license reference by mail is Service the clerk court.... Here, dispute no be 16 F.3d at 357. there is upon mailing. complete and the transferee concem- tween the transferor Under the Federal Rules of cases, Civil On the basis of these two the au Procedure, manner of process practice service of thors of the guide Federal Civil addressed in both Procedure general Rule and Rule 5. Trial make Rule Before “[d]elivery by statement procedure addresses the Ex to be Federal followed press private overnight other delivery serving complaint. when ser specifies Rule 5 vice does not by constitute ‘service mail’ un procedure serving to be followed when der the Federal Rules.” William W. papers, other including judgments. offers of al., Sehwarzer et Federal Civil Procedure provisions Both rules by contain for service Trial, (1996). However, 12:84 However, 4, 5, mail. Before Rule unlikе Rule allows 1993, practice late as guide stated that litigant opt procedures ‍​‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​​​‌​‌​‌​​‌​‌​​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​​​​​‍for state law “[o]vemight delivery (e.g. services Federal serving complaint instead of the federal Express) probably should be treated as the 4(c)(2)(C)(i). procedure. Fed.R.Civ.P. The equivalent of mailing purposes of ser serviee-by-mail provisions of Rule 4 are a Id., (1993). vice.” 12:84 This reversal re relatively innovation, recent adopted in a degree flects the of uncertainty that charac contrast, In amendment. Rule 5 has terizes this area of the law. permitted by service adoption, mail since its fact, In two district court cases have held in 1937. that Rule 5 allows service Federal Ex The Seventh Circuit delivery has held that press. In Service, Edmond v. U.S. Postal Express Federal is not “mail” for the 7, 727 F.Supp. (D.D.C.1989), the court purposes of Enterprises, Rule 4. Audio Inc. held plaintiff that a validly had been served Loudspeakers, v. B & W 957 F.2d 409 by 5(b). Express Federal under Rule (7th Cir.1992). Enterprises, Audio authority court cited no provided no 4(e)(2)(C)(ii) court reasoned that speci “Rule explanation of reasoning. its In another mail, postage fies first class prepaid. Feder casе, United States v. Certain Property Real Express al is not first class mail.” Id. Simi and Premises Knoum as 63-29 Trimble larly, the Fifth Road, Circuit held that has Federal F.Supp. (E.D.N.Y.1992), Express is not purposes mail for Edmond, of Fed. the court followed finding that ser 25(a).4 R.App.P. Poulos, Prince v. vice Express Federal satisfied Fed. (5th Cir.1989). 5(b). 32 n. 1 R.Civ.P. The Prince court The court in Trimble Road rejected explained appellant’s argument Rule contrast to Rule *7 appellee’s prohibit does not by brief should have been service Express delivered Federal by because it Express specify Federal does not satisfy to that require service must 25(a) by mail, be made ment first class postage prepaid, of Rule “expeditious that the most as does Rule 4. Id. It delivery by distinguishes form of also mail” be utilized. The Prince v. by Poulos noting that that upon relied case the definition of “mail” in Fed.R.App.P. involved 25 and whether ser Collegiate (1973), Webster’s New Dictionary by Express vice Federal required, rath which defines mail as ... conveyed “letters permitted. er than Id. public authority.” Id. at 32 n. 1. Be cause Express delivery Federal service is not If any question there is of whether the public authority, reasoned, the court it is not term “mail” encompasses private delivery mail. today, services there is little doubt that 4(c)(2)(C) 3. provides Fed.R.Civ.P. in relevant by rule is days received the sender within 20 part: mailing, after the date of service of such complaint summons and (C) shall be made un- complaint A may summons and be served (A) (B) subparagraph der para- or of this upon a defendant ... graph prescribed (d)(1) (ii) by the manner by mailing or copy of the summons and of (d)(3). mail, complaint (by postage first-class served, prepaid) person together to the to be 25(a) copies Fed.R.App.P. providеs, with two acknowledg- part, of a notice and in relevant conforming substantially ment that “briefs ... shall day to be deemed form 18-A filed on the envelope, mailing and a postage prepaid, expeditious return if the most ad- form of deliv- mail, acknowledg- ery by dressed to the excepting special sender. If no delivery, is uti- ment of service under this subdivision of this lized.” Rule the local rules for the Northern District of mail” when “mail” “U.S. meant suggestion provision allowing in fail- that California added a service adopted. 5 was class, by mail must be ing private delivery to that “first service or fax with the specify Rule 5 was intended to postage prepaid” receiving party. written consent of See by private delivery 5-3.) service authorize service Local Rule overnight modern predates in' an that era Thus, question the next must we Thus, makes little sense. delivery services address is actual notice whether this case by the Road drawn Trimble distinction suffices. hold that it does not. We Sal scrutiny, and this not withstand does ley, the court that stated rule panel adopt of Trimble declines Road Edmond. by actual notice a means other than that 5(b) by not authorized Rule dоes constitute level, Nor, it make practical does exception valid service and is not an to the approach interprets adopt sense an Therefore, party rule. must advance differently for purposes the term “mail” circumstance, compelling some other in ad within the Federal Rules of different rules dition actual notice order have the If we were hold that Civil Procedure. noncompliance Court excuse with Rule purposes “mail” for the Express is Federal 5(b). 4), (even though it is not for Rule we Rule 5 to address whether Federal would then have case, plaintiff 136 F.R.D. In that at 420. 6(e), Rule Express “mail” under which is discovery request by alleged that of a service computations days to of time adds three fax was Id. at 420. The court found invalid. by mail. Given Federal where is service “exceptional good cause” because receiv- overnight Express generally used de- ing party explicitly consented to had service livery, argue Congress did not could one discovery requests by previ- fax on several 6(e) apply Rule service intend that adopt the ous occasions. Id. We rule i.e., Express that Federal Express, Federal Salley require that a demonstrate It Rule 6. seems clear that is not mail under failing exceptional comply good cause differently “mail” interpreting the term 5(b). with Rule purposes of different rules within the Here, good is no indication of cause. there Procedure, courts are Federal Rules of Civil Magnuson’s argu- VY declined to address likely great confusion. we to cause served, validly not or ment the offer was Express satisfy hold does not that Federal alternatively, untimely, opening in either its 5(b). of Rule requirements explained why reply It briefs. has Furthermore, local rules for district personally eould have served District of courts in the Northern California presented Magnu- has not evidence at the time of service applicable that were by fax or to service Federal son consented permit this also did not service Fed case Express. not serve its Rule Because VY did *8 in Prior to their amendment Express. eral 5(b) in Fed.R.Civ.P. compliance 68 offer with 1995, by rules allowed service mail but these for its good and did not offer cause failure However, “mail.” explicitly did define not offer, validly wе reverse serve papers they required to specify “[a]ll did pursuant court’s of costs to VY award shall, mail, by served be be when served Rule 68. priority by first class or mail....” served Practice for the United States Local Rules of Magnuson’s Request At- III.- Denial Northern District of District for the Court § torney’s Fees under U.S.C. (1994). California, court Rule 210-2 As the the district Magnuson asserts that court Enterprises, Ex stated in Audio “Federal attorney’s un- have him fees mail.” at should awarded press first class 957 F.2d is not (In argues 1995, § He that while der 17 505.5 priority it mail. U.S.C. 409. Neither is any party ery by against other provides: § full costs 5. 17 U.S.C. Act], or an offiсer thereof. than the United States Copyright any [the civil action title, may Except provided this recov- as otherwise in its discretion allow the court FERNANDEZ, it is in the discretion the district court to Judge, dissenting: Circuit fees, attorney’s award the court should have Yesteryear’s Video behavior far from Fogerty considered the factors listed appealing, finding writing that the late 517, - n. 19, Fantasy, 510 U.S. 114 S.Ct. help Magnuson. was sufficient does It does (1994) 1023, 19, 1033 n. 127 L.Ed.2d 455 help general. not authors I believe that making Instead, its determination. he con decision of this case is controlled tends, only the district court cоnsidered Int'l, Rice, Konigsberg Inc. v. 16 F.3d 355 denying whether VY acted bad faith in his (9th Cir.1994). I recognize that there are request attorney’s fees. factual differences between this case and that emphasized This court has one, always but there are factual differences considering attorney’s motions fees under instance, between cases. In this I do not Act, Copyright 505 of the the district court think distinguish that those differences promote Copyright should “seek to Act’s principles involved. objectives.” Cabral, Historical Research v. just Konigsberg is not about direct con (9th Cir.1996) (remand 80 F.3d 378-79 apрarent copyright flicts between holders ing for reconsideration the denial of attor rights and those who claim to have in the ney’s fees under 505 where the district Indeed, copyright. hardly it could be. It is correctly Fogerty court recited the factors marketability protecting also about third erroneously Fogerty prohibits but stated that parties who want to deal with the true owner. an award of “exceptional fees absent circum stances”). Magnuson’s theory, Under parties third Relying can Fogerty, this has really not copyright. They know who owns a enumerated sevеral factors which the district consider, dragged through litigation can be per including degree should “the obtained; frivolousness; any son who apparent of success does have motiva owner tion; objective ship rights, might eventually ... but who unreasonableness and the be able particular need in obtain some kind of circumstances to memorandum which advance may compensation considerations of confirm an and deter earlier transfer. For that Axton, matter, they might rence.” Jackson v. apparent deal with an (9th Cir.1994); owner, Fogerty, see alsо something U.S. at who later writes n. 19, 114 - might S.Ct. at 1033 n. 19. be called a memorandum of an earlier agreement. They might plunged be into liti case, particularly In this we are con gation, might and it turn appar out that the cerned that damages the small award for owner, surprise, ent rights to his had no this case is copy insufficient to deter future all. None of that Congress’s goal advances right infringements such as the one at issue enhancing “predictability certainty here. The district court concluded that “Vid Assocs., ownership....” Effects Yesteryear suspected eo should have the film Cir.1990), Cohen, Inc. v. print bought it was unauthorized.” More denied, rt. 498 U.S. 111 S.Ct. ce over, upon VY’s entire defense rested (1991). Instead, 112 L.Ed.2d 1086 fact that corporate fortuitous Columbus’s sta open leaves the matter until a time far in the lapsed, tus had a fact of which VY was not years future —here 17 in the future. It ad litigation ‍​‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​​​‌​‌​‌​​‌​‌​​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​​​​​‍aware until this commenced and goals lunch, vances the of those who “do way which in copy no contributed to VY’s contracts.” Id. at 556. right infringement. appar Because it is not *9 ent from the district court’s decision that it agree Congress I do pro- wanted to considered the in Fogerty, par factors listed Perhaps tect authors. Congress’s that was ticularly goal deterring copy future primary However, goal. Mag- the rule that right infringements, we remand for reconsid argued nuson has for does not do that at all. eration of this issue. Indeed, prior both of our cases which PART,

AFFIRMED subject IN REVERSED IN touched on attempts this were PART, AND away REMANDED. rights. Konigs- take the author’s See may attorney's prevailing part also award a reasonable fee to the of the costs. (2d Inc., Cir.1982), (attempt that a simi- to claim

berg, 16 F.3d at years point later way and a half lar cases. Those cases toward written three letter writing); requisite of this Ko- was the Valente-Kritzer destabilization area law. Pinckney, nigsberg right v. 774-75 was Video and should be followed. denied, Cir.1989), contrary copyright’s cert. U.S. could create course (1990) (claim 107 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. cockatrice. lawyer requisite a letter from a respectfully I dissent. requires writing—

writing). The rule Konigsberg’s pro Congress’s rule and rule — thing is worst tects authors. What essentially contemporaneous happen if an

can Well,

writing required? is in the absence prior owner will be deemed writing copyright; protected. he will be

to have the that, subjected only will not

Not he be stray writing of his con claims that some America, UNITED STATES of agreement which trans firms an ancient ‍​‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​​​‌​‌​‌​​‌​‌​​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​​​​​‍oral Plaintiff-Appellee, By else. copyright ferred the someone token, parties protect third will be the same

ed. Craig GEORGE, Bradley aka: Steve Only in as unusual as this can a case one Eugene Johnson, Defendant- protection is less for the seem that there Appellant. here, Konigsberg all author. And even No. 93-50707. owner, is that record provide rule would Columbia, not so the owner. That is is still Appeals, United Court of States absolute If does have terrible. Ninth Circuit. Columbia, he exercise that control over can Argued March Submitted proper contemporaneous control and obtain require corpo- Perhaps transfer. that will 11, 1996. Decided June See, e.g., or dissolution. rate revitalization 23301.5, §§ 23301, Cal.Rev.Tax Code bad;

and 23304.1. Even that would not be so seriously corporate form

it would take the the rules of California law

and would enforce corporate form

regarding corporations. The economy upon one much of our which nothing requiring I bad about

rests. see princi- corporation follow state

ples goes as he about his business. uncertainty short, difficulties that supply parties and to

causes authors third Congress’s requirement of a

the reason for

writing supply a reason for us to em finding ways to Konigsberg

brace rather than long Again, the statute.

undermine se approach presents

run alternative authors, danger subjected who can

vere be they lost claims that somehow ‍​‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​​​‌​‌​‌​​‌​‌​​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​​​​​‍inventive protections by oral

their some Therefore, I

agreement years made earlier.

agree Konigsberg’s with doubts about Eden Co.,

Toys, Undergarment Florelee Inc. v.

Case Details

Case Name: John Magnuson, D/B/A John Magnuson Associates, Plaintiff-Appellee-Cross-Appellant v. Video Yesteryear, Defendant-Appellant-Cross-Appellee
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Date Published: Jun 11, 1996
Citation: 85 F.3d 1424
Docket Number: 94-16787, 94-17019 and 95-15369
Court Abbreviation: 9th Cir.
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