*3
lishing
in United
District
Company
States
GODBOLD,
POLITZ,
and
Before
HILL
Mississip-
Court for
Southern District
Judges.
Circuit
6, 1973,
September
pi
and
on June
based on di-
respectively. Jurisdiction was
HILL,
Judge:
Circuit
versity2 and the suits were consolidated.
Memphis,
The
Appeal
Commercial
the Brew-
jury
1974the first
found for
In
following
Tennessee
item in its
included
$400,000.
plaintiff
“People”
1972:
and awarded each
September
column
ers
notification,
article,
newspaper
requires
jury
Mississippi
if
law
and the
finds that the
such
correction,
published
days prior
apology
bringing
least ten
civil action
a “full
fair
and
notice,
op
days
publication,
newspaper
retraction”
for
portunity
within ten
of such
afford a
plaintiff
prior
“only
to make
to suit.
then the
damages.”
shall recover
actual
corrections
appears
provides
The
if it
Ann. 95-1-5.
§
statute further
Miss.Code
good
trial
. at
that the article
faith,
falsity
Mississippi
to an honest
2. Plaintiffs
that its
was due
residents when
pub-
facts,
the article was
filed suit and when
mistake of
were reasonable
there
they alleged
complaints
grounds
their
believing
lished.
statements
judge
The
found
figure
district
the amount of the
past
can
private
retreat
granted
unconscionable
verdicts
a new
status and obtain the benefit of the lesser
damages
trial on
alone.
jury
The second
standard
proof
required for damages
$250,000
awarded Anita Brewer
and John
injury
from libel.
$150,000; they
Brewer
accepted a remitti-
Co.,
Brewer v. Memphis
Inc.,
Pub.
538 F.2d
$100,000
$50,000,
tur to
respectively.
(5th
1976).
Cir.
appealed
defendant
cross-
The third
also
trial
resulted in verdicts
appealed. This
court reversed
remand-
plaintiffs, $150,000
for the
ed, holding that
to Anita
finding
liability
Brewer
trial,
$60,000
the first
held before
the decision in
to John Brewer.
appeal
On
Welch,Inc.,
Gertz v. Robert
(1)
defendant asserts:
under
law
1245
adding
damages.
that a
by
statement
a statement
Assuming that plaintiffs did not
positively
plead
prove
even
it
person is divorced
when
special damages, we must
knew that was untrue.
determine
Mississippi
whether
law would
bar recovery. Appellant vigorously asserts
complaint,
In her
Anita Brewer
that
the article
question
is at best libel
conveyed that she
claimed that
the article
per quod; appellee responds by arguing at
relationship
in a
with
“openly involved
length
per
that
it is libel
se. Appellant
urges
she
that
appeal
a married man.” On
cites Holliday Maryland Casualty Co.,
v.
meant
“unmistakably
the article
that an
Miss.
So. 764
and Barton v.
Presley
affair
Elvis
and Anita
between
Barnett, 226
F.Supp.
(N.D.Miss.1964),
Vegas
at the Las
Hil
Brewer
occurred
proposition
Mississippi
law dis-
Appellee
Ap
ton Hotel.” Brief for
tinguishes between these
types
two
of libel.
argues
pellant
that the article described an
Barton
Holliday
relies on
as the sole source
proper”
innocent and
“entirely
reunion of
Mississippi
proposition.
law for such a
Appellant
Brief
two old friends.
at 20.
Holliday may
interpretation,
bear such an
law,
Mississippi
the trial
Under
court must
years
but three
Holliday,
after it ruled in
initially
language
determine whether
is ac
Mississippi
clearly
stat-
tionable,
“ambiguous,
and if
is
language
ed that all libel
per
is actionable
se:
import,
susceptible
of doubtful
two
may
It
generally
be
stated
interpretations,
actionability
more
its
must
printed
written or
language which tends
ordinarily be
jury
decided
under
injure
to
reputation,
one’s
and thereby
appropriate instructions
from the court.”
expose
hatred,
him public
contempt, or
Posey,
Cameron Bros. v.
237 Miss.
ridicule, degrade
society,
him in
lessen
(1959).
is, the
So.2d 138
That
court must
esteem,
him public
or lower him in the
language
decide whether the
is capable of
community,
confidence of the
is actiona-
the defamatory meaning asserted
ble per
.
se
so,
plaintiff;
if
decides
jury
that, Wrought
Boltz,
Range
readers
Iron
Co. v.
understood
article mean
Miss.
Bearing
(1920). Subsequent
id.
in mind that a statement
So. 354
cases
defamatory
Mississippi
al
have
view
under
law
reaffirmed the
stated in Boltz.
though
Rankin,
the integrity
Liberty
it does not attack
or Heralds of
v.
130 Miss.
plaintiff,
(1922); Hodges
moral character
we find
So.
Cunningham,
(1931); Conroy
susceptible
this article was
a defam
160 Miss.
So.
Breland,
atory meaning.
Whether or not it indicated
185 Miss.
ic.10 falsely One publishes who matter defam- atory of another in such manner as Appellant Mississippi asserts subject publication make a libel distinguishes per quod defamation law libel although special no liability other per requires from libel se publication; harm results plead special damages par ticularity presum Fidelity in the former case while States Morehead United & Guar- ing damages According Co., (1939); anty in the latter. Miss. So. appellant, special Danigan, 221 under law Natchez Times Pub. Co. v. (1954); *8 damages pecuni material and 72 681 Cameron include Miss. So.2d ary 432, damages, Posey, 115 138 injury, not emotional and Bros. v. 237 Miss. So.2d plaintiffs pled proved special (slander case). neither nor case, Garnett, in of the the statement Interstate v. 154 Miss. the circumstances (1929), orally calling imputed unchastity. So. 373 the court held se; per a woman a “bitch” constituted slander statements, compensation injury. for actual to be actiona-
(Defamatory
direct,
as
ble,
charged
injury,”
to be
in a
need not define “actual
trial
do not have
open
framing
manner.
Indirect im-
experience
have wide
positive
courts
may
and insinuations
suffice
putations
in tort
jury instructions
ac-
appropriate
. . A distinction seems to be made
actual
say
injury
tions. Suffice it to
imputations
and written
between oral
out-of-pocket
not limited to
loss. In-
is
frequently
broadly
It is
stated
. .
deed,
customary types of actual
the more
words,
spoken, are
defamatory
when
by defamatory falsehood
harm inflicted
per se unless
not actionable
ordinarily
impairment
reputation
include
crime,
written or
but that
they impute
community, personal
standing hu-
when
are actionable
printed words
miliation,
anguish
and mental
and suffer-
ridicule,
disgrace,
person to
subject the
course,
ing.
juries
must be limited
Of
contempt in the estimation
odium or
instructions, and all
appropriate
awards
pub-
acquaintances or the
friends and
by competent
supported
must be
evidence
lic,
concerning
injury, although
there
9);
AmJur., Libel and Slander
quoting
§
assigns
need be no evidence which
Collins,
253 Miss.
So.2d
Henry v.
the injury.
actual dollar value to
(1963),
grounds,
rev’d on other
court in this case
In its instructions the trial
(1965).
Al-
13 L.Ed.2d
and the
followed the mandates of Gertz
Court uses
though in some cases the
prior opinion of this court. We find that
se,”
so to
it does not do
phrase
per
“libel
competent
concerning injury to
evidence
but,
per quod
distinguish that from libel
humiliation,
reputation
personal
mental
instead,
stating that
libel is
way
anguish,
suffering supported an award
se,
damages
pre-
are
per
actionable
damages
in this case.11
plead
need not
plaintiff
sumed and the
Defendant asserts that before Gertz
if
damages
particularity
prove special
permit recovery
Mississippi law would
a libel.
the statements constitute
fact
defendant acted
defamation
if the
an article is libel
question
The
of whether
malice,
presumed
though
malice
we ad-
per
question
se is
to the
identical
argues that Missis
libel cases. Defendant
above,
is defam-
dressed
whether the article
ruling
sippi,
in Gertz that
responding
atory.
unconstitutional, would
presumed fault
in the earlier
As this court noted
choose to retain the malice standard
case,
Memphis
appeal of
Brewer v.
this
malice; the
require
plaintiff prove
(5th
Co.,
702-03
Publishing
F.2d
its fault standard to
change
state would not
Welch, Inc.,
1976),
Cir.
v. Robert
Gertz
negligence.
jury
Here the
was instructed
1247
fault,
and,
liability
“presum-
so,
without
ing
appeared
if
whether
the evidence
Brewer, supra
fault.
ing”
702. The
convincing clarity
showed with
either
that
overwhelming majority of state
re-
the
courts
defendant acted with reckless disregard
Gertz have
to this
of
sponding
mandate
of
the
article was false or not or
negligence
the
adopted
liability.
as
rule of
that
the
high
defendant had a
degree of
Memphis
Nichols,
Co.
Pub.
See
probable
569
of its
falsity.
awareness
Respond-
(Tenn.1978),
ing
special
and cases cited
to
interrogatories
S.W.2d
the jury found
to that
Note,
State
Reactions
plaintiff
therein
neither
figure
was a
on
Welch, Inc.,
v. Robert
Gertz
29 Vand.L.Rev.
that date and that clear and convincing
(1976),
proof
and cases cited
We
therein.
showed that
defendant
reject appellant’s
following
contention that
knowing
article either
it to be false or
Gertz
Mississippi
require
plaintiff
knowledge
would
a
with
probable
of its
falsity.
malice;
libel
agree
in a
action to
we
It was for
judge,
the trial
appellee
Mississippi
adopt
that
would
jury,
to determine whether
the evidence
negligence standard.12
plaintiff
showed that either
was a
figure.13 After a review of the law and the
Constitutional Law
record, we find for the reasons discussed
judge
below,
The trial
submitted to the
jury
undisputed portions
of the evi
plaintiff,
both,
issues
whether either
or
required
judge
dence
the trial
to find both
public figure
was a
the time
the article Anita
public figures
and John Brewer
for
13. Defendant
tion of the constitutional
aor
quent
answers to the
tort
much,
physical injury
rule into libel for mental
rule
physical injury only for malicious or intentional
damages
on emotional
permitted
damages
pain. Such a remand would enable us to avoid
gence
sissippi
torts.
form of an
be
age
no
nesses,
sentially holding
ruling on the constitutional issues in the case
(1957).
quasi-public figure
under
privileged
crat
“fair comment” is limited to criticism in the
Appellant
required
required)
reputation injury. Noting
future
Publishing Co.,
law
purported
in the event that another
jury.
unlikelihood
Mississippi
interest. This conditional
If
if
also
this issue
see note
plaintiffs’
courts
This article
because the
we were
for
presumed
any,
(in
jury’s
opinion.
The district
as a
reject appellant’s argument
also
which case
objected
negligence
damages,
remand
would
and thus
to be
allows
verdict would
news
that while
special interrogatories
law
argues
this
reputations
supra,
230 Miss.
malice
to
jury
facts,
Edmonds v. Delta Demo-
then
clearly
agree
this
mental
report
recover
award
a matter of
contrary Mississippi
judge,
proof
absent
issues,
submitting
pain only,
did not
testified about
yet
import
after
article is
jury’s
substituting
given
made statements
jury
about a
that several wit-
a fourth trial
damages
was for mental
and the conse-
of malice would
opinions.
be,
mental distress
law.
Gertz the
we decline to
proof
indicate
appellant,
this
privilege
verdict
based
were to
our resolu-
trial
qualifiedly
we would
legitimate
this issue
So.2d
tort
absent
stated
solely
negli-
court
in its
dam-
was,
how
Mis-
find
law
for
es-
jury
that he
mit this
Cf.
minations
opinion
punish
course will both lessen the
nize, however,
marked
not the
cases cited therein. In
treated this
an
quired
ed.
L.Ed.2d 597
Inc.,
status.
clined to decide whether in
duty
Brewer, supra
Clearly
Times,
judge,
generally
instance
as is
show
under
Defendant
In an earlier
appellate
Speiser
1964),
will
580 F.2d
Harper
1332, 1341,
unpopular
jury.
interpreted
respondent
ais
question
in the first
resolve the
proper
use the cloak of a
Restatement
trial
review of
same considerations
U.S. at
it is for
question
public figure;
case with
court the record
&
Rosanova v.
determine whether the
that the
Randall,
entitled to
case,
judge
James,
instructions
for
ideas
2 L.Ed.2d
861-62
liability
to be a
the trial
jury
appeal
as one
to determine whether the
constitutional
statement
majority
Rosenblatt
panel
Torts
questions
Torts,
requiring
determination.
speakers,
Playboy Enterprises,
have
(5th
all
669, 671, 677,
general verdict to
of this case that
for the
possibility
judge
‘public
1460;
§ 5.29
of this court de-
as
cases it was
panel
§ 619. Such
Cir.
apply
damage
of courts have
at 728.
jury,
513, 525,
findings
him to sub-
and assure
New York
1978),
p. 823
did
Court re-
court and
decisions.
official’
Baer,
privilege
to deter
not the
panel’s
official
proofs
recog-
issues
law,
first
(3d
re
*10
and that
In
Anita
of this suit14
defend-
Wood married
Brewer
John
purposes
and,
exception
possibly
with the
one tele-
knowledge
falsity
or reckless disre-
ant’s
newspaper
shortly
vision and one
interview
supported by
clear
truth
gard for the
thereafter, did not seek media
attention
convincing evidence.
professional
continue as a
entertainer from
showed that Ani-
testimony
Exhibits and
filing
that time to the
of this suit.
was,
and sometimes
Brewer
at various
ta
relationship with Pres-
We note that her
times, a
known entertainer
overlapping
well
ley
entertain-
during
occurred
her active
areas),
Memphis
(in
Jackson and
locally
publications
after her
ment career
mid-South), and national-
(in the
regionally
past relationship
marriage referred to her
national
fame
attained
ly. She also
with him. There is some conflict in the
Presley.
Elvis
relationship with
through her
arranged
ever
evidence as to whether she
won
early to mid 1950’s Anita
In the
Record,
Presley,
photographed
with
Vol.
a
beauty contests and worked as
talent and
I,
190;
testified,
IV,
Vol.
1054. Anita
at
at
of Anita” show
jockey on the “Antics
disc
anyone
any-
“I
had
don’t think
ever
to call
Jackson,
in
Tennessee
with a
station
radio
automatically
body. They [photographers]
in Memphis.
and the “Anita Wood Show”
up.”
reporter
turned
One
testified that
“Hollywood
a
Star Hunt”
In 1957 she won
any-
Anita
him to write
while
never asked
picture
was awarded a motion
contest and
thing,
co-operative
“she was
and she wasn’t
her
provided
The studio
with
contract.
for me to write stories. She
unreluctant
appeared in a mo-
agent.
talent
She never
Record,
ambitious,”
Ill,
Vol.
was
did,
perform
picture.
tion
She
and that most of
stories about her were
his
appearances in New
promotional
and make
relationship
her
connection with
Texas,
Chicago
cities in
plus
Orleans and
Presley “but
matters
also often included
Ohio,
Mississippi.
aAs
vocalist she
herself,”
her talent
an
about
as
individual
recordings
made
on various labels.
several
clearly
id.
in this case
at 770.
exhibits
addition,
appeared
plays
tele-
In
she
coverage
demonstrate that
of her ca-
In
Memphis.
vision
the mid
commercials
coverage
relationship
reer was tied to
of her
television
appeared
1950’s she
on
first
fact,
Presley.
according
In
Memphis
Jackson and then in
where she
articles,
large part
due in
successwas
program
approxi-
was co-hostess of
relationship.
mately
she
year.
one
From 1962
Brewer
member
the Ole
John
was a
sang
Memphis television
weekly on another
year it
Miss football team the
was ranked
exposure
show. Her nationwide television
number one in the nation. He was named
appearances
two
on the “Jack
consisted of
time
still
an
and at the
of trial
All-SEC
Show,”
appearance
Paar
Tonight
played profes-
Miss
He
held an Ole
record.
Fair,”
“Country
four
Bert Parks’
or five
Browns
sional football with the Cleveland
Show,”
appearances
“Andy
Williams
was
approximately
from
1967 and
singer.
as a
sometimes
New Orleans Saints from 1968
with the
Anita testified that
dated Elvis Pres-
she
until near the end of the
season.
ley
relationship
lasted for
quoted
say-
their
he was
as
interview
five
years,
approximately
until
1960 ing
six
his
career had made his
football
generated very
or 1961.
relationship
enough
open
This
well-known
business
name
life;
including opportunities for
his
publicity,
extensive nationwide
him for
rest of
magazines.
agreed
articles
state-
in Time and Life
Sev-
trial he
he
made the
Presley
saying
retiring
professional
eral
After
quoted
articles
ment.
New
girlfriend.”
she was
football he: ran an advertisement in a
his “number one
Rosenblatt,
supra
bring
Times
14. The
re-
claim
the New York
note
his
outside
possibility
open
noting
trial
held
and the record
manded the case
that the
was
rule
left
Sullivan,
proofs
so or to
before
he could have adduced
to do
New York Times v.
“malice,”
present
jury question
there-
L.Ed.2d
shape
presentation
fore
In Rosenbloom v.
warning in the same
light
in
of the Court’s
1811, L.Ed.2d 296
91 S.Ct.
press
adequately
is not
opinion that
New York
extended
plurality opinion
court to
protected by a rule that allows a
involv-
publications
all
protection
Times
to
interest,”
article is
determine whether a
ing
general
or
public
matters “of
general
private
public
individual
relevant
to an issue of
even
those that defame
Gertz,
they
supra
dangers;
gen-
opportunities
at 337
S.Ct. at
[418 U.S.]
[94
are
to
uinely
and
3006], quoted
surely
And
as a class
this].
informational.
“public figures”
ready
these
have as
access
opinion,
concurring
Chief Justice
In his
public
of commu-
as
to mass media
officials”
are often as con-
Warren stated that citizens
nication,
policy and to
both to influence
public figures’ “views and actions
cerned with
of their views and activi-
counter criticism
respect
public
with
issues and events” as
citizenry
legitimate
and sub-
ties. Our
has
officials,
public
id. at
those of
per-
such
stantial interest in the conduct of
sons,
view,
govern-
persons
at 1995. In his
outside
engage
in
and freedom of the
increasingly
ment were
in
involvement
uninhibited debate about their
intimately
resolution of im-
involved in the
public
as it
and events is as crucial
issues
or, portant public questions
reasons of
“public
in the case of
officials.”
fame, shape
their
in
of concern
events
areas
Id. at
standard
nications
to act
media are entitled
on the
of
notoriety
who
reason
[t]hose
assumption
pub-
officials and
public
vigor
or the
suc-
their achievements
'
figures
lie
voluntarily
exposed
have
they
public’s
cess
seek the
themselves
injury
to increased risk of
attention,
public
classed
properly
are
from defamatory
concerning
falsehood
figures,
them .
Id. groups
at 3008. Both
private
whereas a
individual “has relin-
(1)
“usu-
must
“malice” because
quished
part
protec-
no
of his interest
of
access to channels
ally enjoy greater
id.
name,”
tion of his own
In
good
deciding
and hence have a
effective communication
figure,
public
was not a
to counteract
opportunity
more realistic
the Court restated the definition:
private individuals
false statements
than
designation
That
on either
may rest
of
they are
vul-
normally enjoy;” because
less
two alternative
In some
bases.
instances
state’s
injury,
nerable
interest
per-
an
such
individual
achieve
less;
more
protecting them is
notoriety,
suasive fame
that he
be-
important
those
normative consideration:
purposes
comes a
for all
figure
must
accept
who seek
office
certain
commonly,
in all
contexts. More
indi-
necessary consequences
involvement
injects
vidual
himself or
voluntarily
affairs,
specifically
risk of closer
into
particular public
drawn
controver-
public scrutiny including public
interest
sy
thereby becomes
personal
ought
his or
attributes
for a
range
limited
of issues.
either
Similarly public
touch on fitness for office.
persons
special promi-
case such
assume
figures,
act
part,
voluntarily.
for the most
public ques-
nence in the resolution of
figures
classed as
stand in
Those
Id. tions.
at 3012.
position. Hypothetically, may
similar
of the descriptions
Some
or definitions of
possible
pub-
for someone
become a
in Gertz
public figure category
clearly
through
purposeful
lic
figure
no
action
in this case
indicate that
own,
truly
the instances of
but
invol-
fame, at the
their
height
least
untary public figures
exceeding-
must be
formulations, especial-
category;
other
ly
part,
rare. For the most
those who
influence,
ly
referring
power,
those
have
roles of
attain this status
assumed
controver-
society,”
“affairs
especial prominence in the affairs of soci-
sies,
questions
raise
about
enter-
ety.
occupy
per-
positions
such
Some
entertainers,
tainers, “girlfriends”
*15
they are
power
suasive
and influence that
figures
so classified.
sports
properly
are
figures
purposes.
for all
public
deemed
shows that both
The evidence in this case
public
classed
commonly, those
as
More
vigorously
one time or another
figures
have thrust
themselves to
sought
public’s
atten-
successfully
particular
forefront of
controver-
gained
for
their own
notoriety
tion or
sies
to influence
resolution of
in order
“pervasive
Both achieved
achievements.
event, they
In either
issues involved.
regionally;
least
notoriety,”
fame
Id. invite
and comment.
attention
fame
was “such
pervasive
it
tiffs
wife of
plaintiff, the former
Court held that
articles, public
purposes of some
and for
America’s wealthier
scion of one of
“the
who,
such,
must
defend-
figures
at
families,” id. at
industrial
“malice,”
they are to be
not because
ant’s
had not
figure. She
was not a
press attention
punished
having sought
prominence
special
role of
“assume[d]
but, rather, because the first amendment
perhaps
other than
society,
in the affairs of
pro-
press
afforded the
requires that the
“thrust
had not
society”
Beach
Palm
vis-a-vis
of the “malice” standard
tection
any particular
forefront of
herself to the
coverage, either
sought
who have
its
those
the resolu-
influence
public controversy to
by participating
through direct invitation
it,”
id.
the issues involved
tion of
depends
large
in activities whose success
pro-
divorce
964, (her celebrated
its role
performing
part
publicity.
“pub-
the sort
ceeding
not constitute
did
only political events
covers not
referred, id.,
controversy” to which Gertz
lic
controversies,
sports but also
have dis-
965). As we
96 S.Ct. at
(and sports
Entertainers
entertainment.
plaintiffs
cussed,
figure status
entertainers)
more
typically put
figures as
rest on
present case does
public view than their
of themselves in the
but, in-
of Gertz
controversy prong
particular performances; both
Fire-
stead,
The Court
their fame.
Anita was in the
certainly
this case
did.
the fame of
further discuss
stone did not
of her entertain-
spotlight
because
proceedings
the divorce
plaintiff before
who was
ing
as the entertainer
but also
*17
Both
district and
subject
appellate
of the
Evi-
article.23
courts
that were
plaintiffs’
plaintiff
had held that
was public
case of
ex- Wolston
present
dence in the
argument
figure
rejected
that,
and had
his
coverage
exposure
media
public
tensive
was,
if he
passage
even
once
a case
of time
plain-
where a
distinguish this
had restored him to the status of
prominence
private
to
limited
may
tiff’s
fame
purposes.
person
first amendment
He
community.
a local
in the
argument
abandoned this
Assoc.,
Digest
Reader's
Wolston
Court. For
that reason
because the
Because
relative of a
to whom a
libelous
may
and failed to show
defend-
statement
refers
have a cause
quired
although
of action for libel
printing
“malice” in
cited
acted with
ant
(from
court)
case
a federal district
article,
judgments
says the
must be
the verdict
Mississippi
question.
law is uncertain on this
here for
judgment
entered
set aside
No other Mississippi state cases can be
defendant.
majority opinion,
found. See
n.7.
REVERSED.
dispute
3. A
over whether the material
in this case
per
per quod
was libel
se
libel
GODBOLD,
Judge, specially
Circuit
con-
holding
Mississippi
resolved
curring:
does
recognize
plain-
the distinction —
Law section
I concur in the Constitutional
required
plead
tiffs were not
and prove
opinion
and in the result.
I cannot
special damages
because under
join
We usually
Law section.
State
per
law whether a statement
is libelous
se is
questions
potentially dispositive
address
question
the same
it is
as whether
defama-
reaching consti-
state and local law before
tory at all.1
issues because this
make con-
tutional
4. After the decision in Gertz v. Robert
unnecessary.
stitutional
decision
Welch, Inc.,
unnecessary
avoidance of
decisions on con-
(1974) Mississippi
permit
L.Ed.2d 789
would
grounds
policy, not an iron-
stitutional
is a
libel,
recovery
negligent
although
for a
be-
requires
bound rule of decision that
district
Mississippi required
(or
fore Gertz
malice
jump through
appellate
courts to
state
*21
presumed malice).
authority
giv-
No case
hoops
nicety. Applica-
law
the sake of
support
en to
this conclusion.
principle
tion of the
in this case elevates
This
through
Mississippi
excursion
form over substance.
law is
hypothetical.
little more
do
than
deciding
I would
assume without
not know whether the
choice of
correct
law
under state
in this case
plaintiffs
law the
is that of
Mississippi.
Tennessee or of
This
recover,
would be entitled
and I then
length
is discussed
in footnote 6 to the
would directly address the constitutional
is- majority opinion.
is inconsistent with
It
which,
agree,
sue
we all
bars
go through
federalism to
a mere ritual of
recovery.
orderly,
This
be an
sensi-
would
vindicating
principle
addressing
state
solution, saving
judicial
ble and direct
first, predicating
upon
law
the formal rite
doing
injury
time and effort and
no
an assumption that the law to be examined
majority
law of Mississippi. The
eschew
particular
is that of a
state. The courts of
jugular
they
this direct route to the
because
right
primary
state have the
estab-
immutably
consider that
are
bound to
body
lish and
of law. More-
construe its
consider state law
to determine wheth-
first
over, pronouncements unnecessarily made
required.
er
constitutional decision is
may adversely
rights
in this case
affect the
aim,
pursuit
acknowledging
of this
litigants
of future
parties
to this suit
difficulties,
majority
their
decide
by Mississippi
who find themselves bound
following questions Mississippi
least the
by
law and faced
citation of this decision as
law:
majority recog-
precedent.
Ironically, the
1. A
person
statement
that a
is divorced
nize that
if we had decided that
the action
or is
capable
Amendment,
a cuckold is
of law
as a matter
was not barred
the First
of a defamatory meaning.
majority might
necessary
“explore
then
have been
question.
find no Mississippi
applica-
cases on this
further” to find out if the assumed
majority
sissippi
logical way
1. The cases
\
to resolve the
discussed
do not
cases.
clearly
confusing
per quod,
decide that libel
in which
case law would be to hold
lan-
special damages
proved,
guage susceptible
must be
does not exist
of both innocent and defama-
See,
Mississippi.
Walley,
tory meanings
language
g.,
in this
e. Manasco v.
was the
—as
(1953).
per
216 Miss.
actionable
se.
See This stands on principle deciding
its head the issues of
state law first. KINGERY, Coe
Francia Goodwin
Plaintiff-Appellee, COMPANY, OIL
CONTINENTAL
Defendant-Appellant. Phillip
Lillian Blanche BRENT and
Thompson, Individually Trustees, and as
Etc., al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, et
NATURAL GAS PIPELINE COMPANY AMERICA, Defendant-Appellee.
OF HAWLEY, Independent
J. M. Executor Tay
and Trustee of the Estate of W. H.
lor, deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, *22 NATURAL GAS PIPELINE COMPANY Browder, Jr., Midland, Tex., W. B. Fred AMERICA, Defendant-Appellee. OF Hull, Houston, Tex., O. for Continental Oil 78-1015, Nos. 78-3245 and 78-3246. Co.
United Appeals, States Court of Brown, Jr., Earl A. curiae. pro se amicus
Fifth Circuit. Harmon, Botts, Frank Baker & G. Ste- Hackerman, Houston, Tex., phen M. Leo Oct. Hoffman, Dallas, Tex., Hudspeth, M. C. Houston, Tex., Harlan, Amarillo, Tex., Joe Norwood, Tex., Liberty, E. R. Charles L. Tex., Houston, Aycock, Black for LaGloria Assn., Inc. Royalty Owners & Mounce, Sims, Hardie, Grambling, Galat- Birkelbach, Harris, William zan & John S. Tex., Mounce, Paso, Kingery. El J. Saunders, Nickum, Ronald D. Howard F. Tex., et Amarillo, Thompson, for Brent Hawley. al. and Antonio, Bobbitt, Jr., Robert Lee San Tex., Foundation Sealy and Smith Hospital. Sealy the John
