John Kindler Co. v. First National BankJohn Kindler Co. v. First National Bank
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Caldwell
Action on a promissory note, brought by appellee as endorsee and holder against appellant as maker. It is alleged that The John Kindler Company is a partnership, and that Elizabeth Kindler is a member thereof. A copy of -the note is exhibited with the complaint and is as follows:
“$1,074.00. Anderson, Ind., Dec. 27, 1909.
June 1, 1910, after date we or either of us promise to pay to the order of the Anderson *81Carriage Manufacturing Company Ten Hundred Seventy-Four 00/100 Dollars. Negotiable and payable at Citizens Bank of Anderson, Ind. Value received without relief whatever from valuation or appraisement laws, with interest at 6 per cent after maturity and attorney’s fees. The drawers and endorsers severally waive presentment, protest, notice of protest and non-payment of this note.
*81John Kindler Company,
P. O. Huntington, Ind. Charles P. Kindler.”
*82A trial by jury resulted in a verdict and judgment for appellee. The errors assigned are that the court erred in overruling the motion for a new trial, and in overruling the demurrer to the second paragraph of reply. Under the first assignment, the sufficiency of the evidence and the action of the court in refusing certain instructions and in giving others is challenged.
The argument is advanced that the fact that two handwritings appeared in the body of the note was sufficient to put appellee on inquiry in the purchase of the note, and therefore to undermine appellee’s standing as a good-faith purchaser for value as it might otherwise exist. The evidence on this question was heard by the jury, and the note was submitted to them for inspection. The circumstances were such as to bring the question within the province of the jury as a question of fact, and it having determined it in appellee’s favor, its finding is binding on us. In other respects the evidence tending to show that appellee was a good-faith purchaser for value was uneontradicted, and the jury having so found, we shall further consider the case from that viewpoint.
Bowen v. Laird (1906), 166 Ind. 421, 77 N. E. 852, is closely in point here. That case turns on the sufficiency of the reply to an asnwer of non est factum. The reply in that case admitted that the note when executed was not in the same condition as when sued on, and alleged that when executed it was as follows, omitting date and signature: “One year after day, I promise to pay to the order of Bernard & Hunter $144, at -value received. Interest at 8 per cent per annum after *84due until paid.” Further facts were averred respecting the filling of the blank in the note by the insertion of the name of a bank of this State, and respect- • ing the circumstances under which the holder became the owner of the note, very similar to the facts shown by the evidence here, the chief difference being that it was alleged in said reply that the blank was filled in the same handwriting as that appearing in the other portions of the note. As we have indicated, the mere fact that the note involved in the case at bar contained the different handwritings could not, as matter of law, be held to constitute a suspicious circumstance disclosed by the face of the note, effective to destroy appellee’s claim of a good-faith holding for value. Rather the existence of such circumstance was evidentiary matter for the consideration of the jury. The fact that the jury considered it and determined the involved question in favor of appellee has the effect of removing the distinction that might otherwise exist between the Bowen case and the case at bar. The court, in the Bowen ease, in holding the reply sufficient and that under the facts therein alleged the note was valid in the hands of a good-faith purchaser for value, reviews the authorities, and after stating that the insertion of the name of the bank constituted such a material alteration as to invalidate the note in the hands of the payee, for the reason that thereby the character of the instrument was changed, uses this further language, applicable here: “Appellee executed to Bernard & Hunter a perfect note, except when delivered it contained the word ‘at’ standing at the left end of a blank line and space extending across the paper. This space after the word was unseored and left blank, and appeared in the instrument as indicating an intention to fix the place of payment, but which had not been determined when the note was placed in the *85hands of the payee. Without cancelation the word and line were meaningless upon any other theory. If the purpose had been to make the note payable wherever it might be found, when due, it could have been clearly accomplished, only by marking out the word ‘at’ and the following line. In any aspect, appellee delivered his note with an uncanceled word and space which irresistibly suggested incompleteness in the- instrument for want of the place of payment, and which made it easy to effect an alteration without exciting the suspicion of a reasonably cautious person.” The Supreme Court in the Bowen ease disposes of such cases as McCoy v. Lockwood (1880), 71 Ind. 319, Cronkhite v. Nebeker (1882), 81 Ind. 319, 42 Am. Rep. 127, cited by appellants, by applying a distinction expressed in the following language: “When a note is, before delivery, made complete in accordance with its general character, and is free from words and unscored blanks reasonably indicating incompleteness, the unauthorized addition of words or figures by the filling .of unoccupied blanks or parts of blanks, or otherwise, is such an alteration, if material, as will make the paper void in the hands of the forger, or any one claiming under him.” In each of those eases the note as executed bore on its face no evidence of incompleteness. In the Bowen case the court cites, among other decisions, as controlling under the circumstances presented there, Marshall v. Drescher (1879), 68 Ind. 359, and Cason v. Grant County Deposit Bank (1895), 97 Ky. 487, 31 S. W. 40, 53 Am. St. 418. The facts in each of these cases are very similar to those presented in the ease at bar. In the Cason ease the note when executed was in the following form: “Three months after date I promise to pay to the order of G. W. Siddons $200, at-=--- value received.” . In that *86case, the holder subsequently filled the blank by inserting the name of a bank, and the court, after reviewing the authorities, held the note not thereby to have been invalidated in the hands of a good-faith purchaser for value.
It is” apparent from our discussion of legal propositions in connection with our consideration of the evidence that the court did not err in overruling the demurrer to the second paragraph of reply.
Some question is made respecting certain instructions tendered by appellant and refused by the court, and also respecting certain instructions given by the court on its own motion. We would not feel *90justified in extending this opinion by setting out such instructions and discussing them. It is sufficient to say that we have carefully considered the tendered instructions and also the instructions given by the court as to all questions raised concerning them, and from such consideration it is apparent that the jury was correctly and clearly instructed. Judgment affirmed.
Noth. — Reported in 109 N. E. 66. As to law governing altered paper, see 4 Am. St. 25. As to implied authority to fill in blanks so as to complete signed instrument, see Ann. Cas. 1912 B 1010. See, also, under (1) 8 Cyc 155, 201; (2) 7 Cyc 950; (3) 7 Cyc 619-622; (4) 7 Cyc 620, 622; (5) 2 Cyo 180; (6) 2 C. J. 1289 ; 2 Cyc 252; (7) 2 C. J. 1243; 2 Cyc 159.