11 N.J. Misc. 316 | N.J. | 1933
This writ of certiorari brings up an award in favor of a petitioner in a workmen’s compensation ease, the prosecutor being the employer. The only question for determination is the sufficiency of a notice served by the prosecutor on its employes, including the respondent Lieb, for the purpose of putting an end to its liability under section (or division) 2 of the Compensation act, entitled "elective compensation.”
The petitioner had been employed by the prosecutor as an outside insurance agent collecting his premiums in the usual manner. This employment had been on the basis of a tacit acceptance of the provisions of section 2 a.s provided by the
Paragraph 10 provides as follows: “The contract for the operation of the provisions of section 2 of this act may be terminated by either party upon sixty days’ notice in writing prior to any accident.”
Now the notice given by the company reads as follows:
“Workmen’s Compensation Act Notice to Employees.
In accordance with the provisions of section 10 of the Workmen’s Compensation law of the State of New Jersey, you are hereby notified of this company’s withdrawal, effective February 1st, 1930, of its acceptance of the obligations imposed by the said Workmen’s Compensation act.
John Hancock Mutual Life Insukance Company,
November 19, 1929. . Michael J. Lieb,
8365 (Signature of Employee.)
Date November 20, 1929.
This copy to be signed, dated and returned.”
It will be observed that the foregoing notice undertakes to effect the withdrawal of the company, not only from the obligations imposed by section 2 of the Workmen’s Compensation act (elective compensation), but to withdraw its acceptance of the obligations imposed by the act itself. The commissioner held in effect that the company had undertaken to withdraw entirely from its amenability to the Workmen’s Compensation act and that this it could not do. It is true
The presumption of acceptance of section 2 is one which is fundamental in the theory of the statute and there should be no substantial ambiguity either in the refusal of an employer to accept the provisions of section 2, or in a notice by the employer for the termination of such acceptance before an accident. It is noticeable that the statute both in regard to notice of non-acceptance and in regard to a notice of termination of that acceptance, is careful to speak specifically of section 2 of the act. It was a simple matter for the company to follow the statutory language, and this it did not do. While the defense is substantially a meritorious one; we feel constrained to hold that the notice was not good, and, therefore, that the writ must be dismissed, with costs.