114 Mich. 337 | Mich. | 1897
The complainant’s bill alleges that:
1. The complainant issued a life policy of $2,000 on the life of John J. Dick, payable to the defendant, wherein it was stipulated that, if any installment should not be paid when due, the policy should be void, except as to its paid-up value. The company was accustomed to accept past-due installments, and to reinstate the policy, provided the insured would furnish a proper certificate of good health; said certificate stating further that the insured agrees that the payment is received and policy reinstated on condition of the truth of such certificate.
2. This practice was followed by Dick, who defaulted habitually.
3. January 8, 1896, an installment became due, notwithstanding two notices to pay, and the policy lapsed, except for its paid-up value.
4. Thirty-eight days after default, Dick became- ill, and died within 48 hours.
5. “ He called his family doctor that day, Dr. Judson, to attend him; and the same day Dick’s son, learning of his father’s illness and of the physician’s visit, went to the company’s agent, and, concealing the facts of illness and doctor’s attendance, offered to pay up. The agent, suspecting nothing, said a health certificate must be furnished, and handed the son a printed form, which insured signed; and on the same 18th of February the son’s wife took the form, which was signed by the patient, to the
Copy of certificate:
“Detroit, Mich., Feb. 18, 1896.
“I, John J. Dick, of Detroit, Mich., being the person whose life is insured under policy No. 28,251 in the John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company, do hereby certify that I am in as good health as when first examined on my application for said policy, and that my family record is unchanged. I also understand and agree that the payment of premium due January 8,1896, is received, and said policy is now reinstated, by said company, on condition of the truth of the above statement.
[Signed] “John J. Dick.
‘ ‘ Witness: -.
“Note any change in family record below.
“I witness the above.
[Signed] “H. C. Judson, M. D.,
“Physician of Family.”'
The next day, February 20th, the insured died of the said illness.
6. “The bill charges that the representations in the certificate were false, and were known to be so by the insured, his son, his son’s wife, and his physician; and that they confederated to defraud the company by. preparing and delivering the certificate to the agent, with intent, by means thereof, to procure the acceptance of the past-due quarterly premium; and that the agent relied on the false certificate, and accepted and receipted for the money in ignorance of the facts.
7. “April 11, 1896, the agent, having ascertained the fraud, tendered the quarterly premium back, and also the paid-up value, and offered to pay the same (and same is paid into court). Defendant refused the tender, and has sued the company at law in Wayne circuit court, although she is bound, in equity, to surrender the policy and receipt.
8. Action was commenced on the policy, and was enjoined in these proceedings pending the suit.
This bill was demurred to (1) for want of equity; (2) because a legal remedy exists. The demurrer was overruled, and the defendant has appealed from the order.
There is no doubt that the alleged fraud, if proved, should defeat the claim of the plaintiff to any sum beyond the paid-up value of the policy in a court of law. Such court could not, however, have canceled or compelled the surrender of the renewal receipt, though there is force in the. suggestion that such cancellation would be of little importance after an adjudication that it was void. It is urged that the case falls within the general rule that equity has no jurisdiction where there is an adequate remedy at law, especially when the latter has been resorted to by the opposite party. Counsel for defendant cites two cases
“It appears to me quite impossible, in the face of the objection taken and insisted on, to sustain this decree without sanctioning the right to come into equity in all cases to recover damages where the grievance asserted is a fraud committed by one upon another in a dealing in personal property. If the right contended for and carried out by the decree can be maintained, no reason is perceived why, upon the same principle, a party claiming to have been cheated in a horse trade, or in a purchase of any chattels, where the amount is sufficient, may not, at his election, proceed to sue in chancery for damages, and preclude an investigation before a jury.”
We must therefore consider the question settled in this State in accord with complainant’s clairq. We see no occasion to disturb the order of the circuit court in chancery, which is therefore affirmed.
Insurance Co. v. Bailey, 13 Wall. 616; Ætna Life Ins. Co. v. Smith, 73 Fed. 318.