173 Ga. 443 | Ga. | 1931
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting. J. D. Davis Jr. brought his petition against John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company and Mrs. T. E. Edwards, and prayed for injunction to restrain the company from renting certain property for any purpose in violation of a restrictive covenant in a deed limiting the use of the property in question to residential purposes. He sought also injunction against Mrs. Edwards, the tenant of the company, to restrain her from operating a boarding-house on the premises. Davis purchased a house and lot in Druid Hills, Atlanta. The insurance company was the owner of the house and lot next to that of Davis, and rented the same to Mrs. Edwards for a period of two years. She was operating the house as a boarding-house. The premises occupied by Mrs. Edwards fall within the provision of a covenant in a deed from a former owner from whom title to the property is derived. The covenant referred to is as follows: “Said land shall not be used otherwise than for residence purposes, and shall not be used for a sanatorium, hospital or infirmary, and no apartment-house shall be erected thereon.” And the only question presented for consideration in this record is whether or not the operation of a boarding-house is in violation of the covenant just quoted. The court below held that it was, and granted the injunction.
When one purchases a house and lot in a residential section, a section that can be used for residential purposes only, it is evi
I am not unmindful of the rule that restrictive covenants are to be strictly construed; and the largest possible use of property falling within the restrictive covenants is to be accorded to the owners of the property. But, with that principle before me, I can reach
Other courts have dealt with the question which we have before us. In Sayles v. Hall, 210 Mass. 281 (96 N. E. 712, 41 L. R. A. (N. S.) 625, Ann. Cas. 1912D, 475), the Supreme Court of Massachusetts held: “A restriction in a deed limiting the building upon the premises to a ‘dwelling-house to be used exclusively as a residence for a private family’ is violated by the keeping of boarders and roomers to the number of twelve at a time upon the premises.” And the court said: “We are of the opinion that the keeping of boarders and letting of rooms to the extent set forth in the agreed facts is a violation of the restriction in the defendant’s deed.” In the note to the decision last referred to are collected a number of cases in which the same question is considered and discussed. In Trainor v. LeBeck, 99 N. J. Eq. 673 (134 Atl. 355), the Court of Chancery of New Jersey held as follows: “Taking in guests who paid proportionate cost of their living expenses, though not use of premises as inn, tavern, or boarding-house, held violation of restriction requiring use of premises for single dwelling-house exclusively.” The Florida Supreme Court said, in a case before it: “The word ‘residence’ is one of multiple meaning, but the context in which it is used in this instance clearly indicates its meaning to be a dwelling-house where a person lives in settled abode. The word, in this instance, relates solely to the use or mode of occupancy to which the property may be put. . . When so employed and understood, it necessarily excludes all uses of the property other than for residence purposes, and the interposition of other negative terms specifically prohibiting the use of the property for business, mercantile, or other similar purposes are unnecessary.” Moore v. Stevens, 90 Fla. 879 (106 So. 901, 43 A. L. R. 1127). It may be remarked in reference to this last case that the question was as to whether a vocal studio could be maintained in violation of a
Lead Opinion
This case presents only one question to be decided by this court; and that is, whether or not the operation of a boarding-house is in violation of a covenant in a deed reading as follows: “Said land shall not be used otherwise than for residence purposes, and shall not be used for a sanatorium, hospital or infirmary, and no apartment-house shall be erected thereon.” Held, that the operation of a boarding-house is not in violation of the covenant quoted above; and the court erred in granting an injunction in this case, which could only be based upon the conclusion that the operation of the boarding-house referred to was in violation of the covenant.
Judgment reversed.