Belom was company counsel for LFG (we’ve shortened its name), a registered Futures Commission Merchant and a member of the National Futures Associa *797 tion (NFA), an assoсiation registered with the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). Joy Ju, an LFG customer, filed an arbitration demand against LFG and Belom for damages allegedly resulting from the wrongful termination of Ju’s ability to place orders directly with LFG’s personnel at the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. Ju sought significant damages (about $7.3 million) against LFG and Be-lom for what was claimеd to be negligence, recklessness, conversion, constructive fraud, and the violation of numerous federal and state statutes and regulations. Whether any of these claims have merit, of course, is not before us.
Belom sought to avoid arbitration, alleging that he had not consented to resolve Ju’s dispute in that forum. The NFA denied his request, determining that its rules required Belom’s participation in arbitration as an employee of LFG. Belom then filed a complaint against the NFA and Ju in federal court seеking declaratory and injunctive relief excluding him from the Ju arbitration proceeding. The district court dismissed his complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim for which rеlief can be granted, a decision that we review
de novo. Antonelli v. Sheahan,
NFA rules allow a customer to initiate arbitration against any NFA member and its employees for disputes involving commоdity future contracts. Belom argues that the NFA rules in this regard violate the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA). Congress amended the CEA in 1974 to establish a comprehensive regulatory structure. To implement this structure, Congress created the CFTC as an independent agency vested with broad authority to adopt rules that, in its judgment, are necessary to carry оut the purposes of the CEA.
See Geldermann, Inc. v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n,
Mandatory Arbitration.
(1) Claims. Except as provided in Sections 5 and 6 of this Code with resрect to timeliness requirements, the following disputes shall be arbitrated under this Code if the dispute involves commodity futures contracts:
(i) a dispute for which arbitration is sought by a сustomer against a Member or employee thereof ... [.]
Belom argues that this provision violates the CEA and CFTC regulations because they require a member’s consеnt to arbitrate. This argument is undermined by the plain language of the CEA. The CEA provides that an association cannot be registered as a futures association unless the CFTC finds thаt
the rules of the association provide a fair, equitable, and expeditious procedure through arbitration or otherwise for the settlement of customers’ claims and grievances against any member or employee thereof: Provided, That (A) the use of such procedure by a customer shall be voluntary[.]
7 U.S.C. § 21(b)(10) (emphasis in original). This languаge requires the consent only of the customer, not of the futures association member or employee. The plain language of the CFTC regulation implementing this stаtutory provision also indicates that only the customer’s consent to arbitrate is necessary:
A futures association must be able to demonstrate its capability tо promulgate rules and to conduct proceedings that provide a fair, equitable and expeditious procedure, through arbitration or other *798 wise, for the vоluntary settlement of a customer’s claim or grievance brought against any member of the association or any employee of a member of the association.
17 C.F.R. § 170.8. Belom argues that the C.F.R. section’s use of the term “voluntary settlement” applies to both the customer and the futures association member or employee. This interpretation, however, is undermined by the plain language of the CEA provision that the C.F.R. regulation was meant to implement. As noted, the CEA’s plain language makes it crystal clear that only the customer’s consent is required.
Our case law dealing with a parallel provision of the CEA undermines Belom’s consent argument. In
Geldermann,
the plaintiff argued that 7 U.S.C. § 7a(11),
1
which required a rеgistered contract market to provide for customer initiated arbitration, required a member’s consent to arbitrate. In holding that the statute did not require a member’s consent to arbitrate, we relied on the canon that courts should accord considerable weight to an executive department’s construction of a stаtutory scheme that it has been entrusted to administer.
See Geldermann,
Our analysis in
Geldermann
is persuаsive here because the CEA provision and CFTC regulation that were at issue there are nearly identical to the futures market provisions at issue here.
2
We can аssume that Congress intended the same terms used in different parts of the same statute to have the same meaning.
See Taracorp v. NL Indus., Inc.,
Belom attempts to distinguish his case from Geldermann by noting that he, unlike the Geldermann plaintiff, is a “non-registered individual” who is not a member of an еxchange or futures association. We did not distinguish between registered members and nonregistered employees in Geldermann. Additionally, the plain language of the CEA and the CFTC regulations requires futures markets and their employees to participate in arbitration. See 7 U.S.C. § 21(b)(10); 17 C.F.R. § 170.8.
Belom also argues that the NFA’s arbitration provision deprives him of his right to an Article III forum without his
*799
consent. This, however, is a new argument, one that was not еxplicitly before the district court, and as we have often observed, arguments not raised in the district court are waived on appeal.
See Pond v. Michelin North America, Inc.,
Even had Belom presеrved the issue for appeal, it would not have helped him because he waived his Article III rights through his voluntary employment with an NFA member. Article III of the United States Constitution safeguards a party’s right to have claims decided by a judge who cannot be controlled by other branches of government.
See Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor,
Here, LFG’s application for membership in thе NFA included “an express agreement by the Applicant that, if admitted to NFA membership, the Applicant shall become and remain bound by all NFA requirements as then and therеafter in effect.”
See
NFA Form 7R at ¶ 8. One of NFA’s requirements was § 2(a) of its code of arbitration, which explicitly requires that customer disputes involving commodity futures contracts agаinst members and their employees be arbitrated. Under ordinary principles of contract and agency, Belom agreed to be bound by this code provision when he accepted employment with LFG.
See Pritzker v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
The district court’s decision dismissing Belom’s complaint for failure to state a claim is Affirmed.
Notes
. 7 U.S.C. § 7a(11) was latеr repealed by Pub.L. 106-554, § 1(a)(5) [Title I, § 110(2)], Dec. 21, 2000.
. Section 7a(ll) required a contract market to
[p]rovide a fair and equitable procedure through arbitration or otherwise for the settlement of customers' claims and grievаnces against any member or employee thereof: Provided, that (i) the use of such procedure by a customer shall be voluntary
See Geldermann,
. Belom attempts to overcome his waiver by citing Amcast Indus. Corp. v. Detrex Corp., 2 F.3d 746 (7th Cir.1993), in which we exercised our power of lenity to allow the appellee to raise on appeal a pure question of statutory interpretation not raised before the district court. See id. at 749-50. We held in Amcast only that we had the power, not the obligation, to exercise such lenity under certain circumstances. Here, Belom has not presented us with a reason to overlook his waiver, and we decline to do so.