In this divеrsity case, Green Plumbing and Heating appeals the district court’s summary judgment and directed verdict in favor of Turner Construction Company. The main issues on appeal are the effect to be given a “nо-damage-for-delay” clause in Green’s construction contract with the City of Detroit and the adequacy of Green’s proof of damages.
Green Plumbing was the plumbing and fire-sprinkler contractor for сonstruction of the new Detroit General Hospital. Turner Construction was the construction manager for the project. As such, its duties included reviewing work schedules for the *966 project to eliminate pоtential conflicts between the various contractors and conducting job-site meetings to resolve those conflicts which did arise despite all precautions. Green’s contract with the City of Detroit Building Authority included a “no-damage-for-delay” clause. 1 This clause prevented Green from collecting damages for delay caused by anyone connected with the project, including Turner.
In carrying оut its duties under its contract, Green claims to have encountered numerous problems caused by Turner’s mismanagement of its oversight responsibilities: contractors were doing work out-of-sequence, no tеmporary heat was provided, and design changes took too long to be approved. Some of these problems, like the slow approval of design changes, simply caused a delay in the completion of Green’s work. Other problems, like the lack of temporary heat and the out-of-sequence work, caused Green to employ more manpower resources to get the job done. As a result of these difficulties, Green claims to have lost a great deal of money.
In ■ 1979, some three years after the project began, Green filed suit against Turner on two separate theories of liability: (1) Turner intentionally interfered with Green’s contractual relationship with the City of Detroit; and (2) Turner negligently performed its construction management duties. The trial judge granted summary judgment in favor of Turner оn the second count,
see John E. Green Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Turner Construction Co.,
No-damage-for-delay clauses “are commonly used in the construction industry and generally recognized as valid and enforceable.”
W.C. James, Inc. v. Phillips Petroleum Co.,
We agree with Green. In this context, Green is not arguing that it suffered dam *967 ages from delay, but rather that it suffered damages from оbstacles created by Turner. 3 And because at least a portion of Green’s claimed damages related to extra manpower costs incurred as a result of Turner’s hindrances — failure to prоperly coordinate work on the project and failure to ensure that temporary heat was provided — , it was error for the trial judge to grant summary judgment against Green on this issue.
We note that our reаding of this clause is not inconsistent with results reached in other cases where “no-damage-for-delay” clauses were used to deny recovery. In many of those cases, the damages being sought were simрly delay damages. Moreover, the clauses being construed often barred damages resulting from any delay or
hindrance. See, e.g., Chicago College of Osteopathic Medicine v. George A. Fullеr Co.,
Nonetheless, we do not believe that the triаl judge’s error requires a reversal of the ultimate decision in this case. Green was still allowed to go to trial on its first theory of liability, intentional interference with contract. After reviewing the record, we аre confident that Green did not remove from its case any of its damage claims because of the trial judge’s erroneous ruling on the negligence count. Instead, it is apparent that Green simply attempted to prove that all of Turner’s wrongful acts were done intentionally rather than negligently. Our conclusion in this matter is supported by Green’s trial allegations that Turner was responsible for the entire 98,-000 hours wоrked by Green employees in excess of the 76,000 originally budgeted.
Moreover, we agree with the trial judge that a verdict should have been directed against Green because it failed in its proof as to the damages caused by Turner. For example, one Green witness testified that neither he, nor anyone else, could determine how much of the extra work Green performed on the project wаs caused by change orders (for which Green was reimbursed by the City) and how much was caused by the interferences of Turner. Furthermore, Green’s damage witness, John Roose did not provide any evidence as to how he arrived at his estimates for the increase in total hours worked on the project caused by each of Turner’s alleged wrongful acts. For example, Roose estimated that Turner’s failure to ensure the provision of temporary heat caused a twenty-five percent overrun in manpower on the project. However, he offered no testimony about the kinds of work affected by the lаck of temporary heat or the amount of time the job would have required had temporary heat been provided. The same criticism extends to the other sixteen alleged causes of delаy. Turner’s failure to prevent the masonry contractor from bricking in the utility shafts before Green finished installing the plumbing allegedly caused a fifteen percent increase in manpower expended. Yet thеre are no figures provided for how much time installation of the plumbing in the shafts would have taken absent the premature masonry work. And *968 so forth. It appears that Roose simply took the total figure for inсreased hours spent on the project and divided it into seventeen rather arbitrary categories. 4
We recognize that “the law does not require impossibilities” when it comes to proof of damages, but it does require whatever “degree of certainty tha[t] the nature of the case admits.”
Schankin v. Buskirk,
Accordingly, the decision of the district court is affirmed.
Notes
. The relevant clause reads as follows:
Should the Contractor [Green] be delayed in the commencement, prosecution or completion of the work by the act, omission, neglect or default of the Managеr [Turner], Owner and/or anyone employed by the Manager, Owner or any other contractor or subcontractor on the Project, ... then the Contractor shall be entitled to an extension of time only, suсh extension to be for a period equivalent to the time lost by reason of any and all of the aforesaid causes____
(emphasis added).
. The trial judge seemed to assume that a direct, contractual relationshiр between Green and Turner was not necessary to create a duty in Turner to Green. This assumption is correct. Turner’s contract with the city of Detroit made Green a third-party beneficiary of that cоntract. Any failure on Turner’s part to carry out its management duties under the contract would make it liable for Green's economic losses incurred in reliance upon adequate performance of those duties.
See Williams v. Polgar,
. One example of an alleged hindrance will suffice. The mechanical and electrical systems on each floor of the hospital were connected to each other through numerous vertical shafts running from the top to the bottom of the building. The masonry contractor was allowed to brick in many of these shafts before the plumbing work was completed. As a result, Green's plumbers were required to finish the job dangling from rope ladders suspended from the top. This required a much greater expenditure of manpower than originally planned although it did not necessarily delay Greеn’s completion of the work.
. Roose’s original estimates for Green’s damages was based on a manpower overrun of 125%. However, on cross-exam, it became apparent that the incrеase in manpower cost over the bid estimate was actually 128%. Undaunted, Roose proceeded to add two percentage points to lack of temporary heat and a third to another category.