John E. Branagh & Sons v. WitcoskyJohn E. Branagh & Sons v. Witcosky
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Sims
Cross-defendant George E. Witcosky, doing business as Tara Manufacturing Company, a subcontractor, hereinafter referred to as Tara, has appealed from a judgment which awarded cross-complainant John E. Branagh & Sons, a general contractor, hereinafter referred to as Branagh, indemnification for the sum of $24,142.28 which was paid by Branagh in satisfaction of one-half the amount of judgments obtained against Tara and Branagh by an employee of another subcontractor and the latter’s workmen’s compensation insurance carrier, and for the additional sum of $10,480.68 for attorneys’ fees, court costs and other expenses necessary and incidental to Branagh’s defense of the principal action. 1
The trial court found: “That it is true that pursuant to the express terms of the aforesaid subcontrаct agreement, which terms were clear, definite and certain, that cross-defendant Tara did agree to fully indemnify and save cross-complainant Branagh harmless from any and all loss, damage, liability, claim, demand, suit or cause of action resulting from injury or harm to any person arising out of or in any way connected with the performance of work under the subcontract except such injury or harm causеd solely and exclusively by the fault or negligence of the contractor Branagh;[ 2 ] that it is further true that it was the intention of Branagh and Tara, that Tara would indemnify and hold harmless Branagh from any and all loss, damage, liability, claim, demand suit, or cause of action resulting from injury or harm to any person arising out of or in any way connected with the performance of work under the subcontract except such injury or harm *837 сaused solely and exclusively by the fault or negligence of the contractor Branagh; that it is true that the agreement by Tara to indemnify and hold Branagh harmless was not contrary to public policy. ’ ’
The court further found: “That it is true that the plaintiff, Fay Clifton Bay, was injured on the 1st day of March, 1961; that it is further true that said injury arose out of and was connected with the performance of the work of the cross-defendant Tara pursuant to its subcontract agreement with cross-complainant Branagh; it is further true that the active negligence of cross-defendant Tara was a proximate cause of the injury and damages suffered by plaintiff; it is further true that cross-complainant Branagh was itself actively negligent in that it violated electrical safety orders of the Division of Industrial Safety of the State of California and its negligence сoncurred with the active negligence of cross-defendant Tara in proximately causing the injury and damages to plaintiff.' ’
Tara’s sole contention on appeal is that Branagh is precluded from recovery under the indemnity agreement because an agreement of a private party (as distinguished from an insurance company) to indemnify another for a liability predicated upon negligenсe which consists of a violation of a state safety order is against public policy and unenforceable. It attacks the last clause of the finding first quoted, a similar conclusion of law, and the judgment insofar as they express and are dependent upon the principle that such an agreement is not contrary to public policy. An examination of the applicable authorities leads to a determination that the learned trial judge correctly found and concluded that the agreement was valid, and that the judgment should be affirmed.
Tara, in reliance upon
Tunkl
v.
Regents of University of California
(1963)
This approach fails to consider the distinction between what may be termed a true exculpatory agreement whereby the promisee seeks to avoid liability to the promisor who has suffered damage because of the former’s negligence, and an indemnity agreement whereby the promisee seeks to enforce the promisor’s agreement to indemnify him if and when a claim is asserted against the promisee. (Cf.
In
Goldman
the court concluded that an indemnification agreement calling for financial protection against one’s own negligence could not rest upon language “so loose and obscure’ ’ as that of the contract before it. (
The subcontractor seeks to avoid the appliсation of the foregoing principles on several grounds. He properly notes that the statement first quoted from
Goldman
is dictum in view of the finding that the terms of the agreement did not cover indemnification if the negligence of the general contractor contributed to the injury, and would apply only if the injury resulted from the sole negligence of the subcontractor (
Yielding to the importunities of the subcontractor for reconsideration of what appears to be established by the foregoing authorities produces no change in doctrine. He points to the public policy which precludes assertion of the doctrine of assumption of risk where injury results from a violation of law as incоrporated in a statute, ordinance, rule or regulation
(Bragg
v.
Mobilhome Co.
(1956)
Tara further asserts that a distinction should be made between a situation where separate active negligence of the indemnitee-contractor concurs with other active negligence of
*842
the indemnitor-subcontractor (as found by the court herein), and cases of mere passive negligence, as found in some of the authоrities referred to above, whereby the indemnitee merely acquiesces in dangerous conditions or acts, which it was the primary duty of the indemnitor to correct or prevent. (See
Harvey Machine Co.
v.
Hatzel & Buehler, Inc., supra,
Tara’s reliance on
Otis Elevator Co.
v.
Maryland Casualty Co.
(1934)
The last-mentioned case does lead to consideration of one more approach advanced by the subcontractor. In Tunkl the following criteria were set forth as establishing a public interest which rendered an exculpatory agreement invalid: “It concerns a business of a type generally thought suitable for public regulation. The party seeking exculpation is engaged in performing a service of great importance to the public, which is often a matter of practical necessity for some members of the public. The party holds himself out as willing to рerform this service for any member of the public who seeks it, or at least for any member coming within certain established standards. As a result of the essential nature of the service, in the economic setting of the transaction, the party invoking exculpation possesses a decisive advantage of bargaining strength against any member of the public who seeks his services. In exercising a superior bargaining power the party confronts the public with a standardized adhesion contract of exculpation, and makes no provision whereby a purchaser may pay additional reasonable fees and obtain protection against negligence. Finally, as a result of the transaction, the person or property of the purchaser is placed under the control of the seller, subject to thе risk of carelessness by the seller or his agents.” (60 Cal.2d at pp. 98-101, fns. omitted; and see Comment, op. cit., 52 Cal.L.Rev. 350, 352-355.)
Despite
Goldman’s
indication to the contrary (62 Cal.2d at pp. 48-49), Tara would apply the foregoing to defeat the indemnity agreement. The arguments advanced establish that the general contractor has the type of business which should be prevented from attempting to exculpate itself from liability to employees or others on thе job who are injured by its negligence, but in no sense establish that it should not carry insurance or otherwise provide for indemnity for its potential liability to such persons. The relative bargaining power between the contractor and the subcontractor is not a decisive factor. If each competing subcontractor bids on the same terms and has an equal opportunity to secure for himself proteсtion for the indemnity requested, the successful bidder has not been subjected to abuse by-a superior bargaining power. The relationship between general contractor and subcontractor, as distinguished from contractor and employee, or hospital and
*844
patient, would appear to be that of parties bargaining at arms’ length. (See
Delta Air Lines, Inc.
v.
Douglas Aircraft Co., supra,
“ ‘Neither law nor public policy prevents the ordinary contractor from buying from a third party indemnity from the pecuniary result of his own negligence. This is legitimate as insurance. How does the same process, with identical result, become illicit simply because they are those of the original and basic contract rather than a collateral one for conventional insurance?”
(Minneapolis-Moline Co.
v.
Chicago etc. R.R. Co.
(8th Cir. 1952)
“It is also suggested that it would be contrary to public policy to extend the clause of this type to include indemnity for violation of the safe-place statute because it would tend to discourage the discharge of Seaman’s duties in that respect. It may well be that Seaman could not contract with members of the general public and employees of Worden that it would not be liable for its own failure to maintain a safe place for frequenters and employees. That is not what it did, however. It simply purchased insurance from plaintiff and exacted an indemnity contract from defendant, the latter to cover cases where defendant’s defаult contributed actively to Seaman’s liability. If there were anything to defendant’s contention, automobile and public liability insurance policies would be void.”
(Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co.
v.
Worden-Allen Co.
(1941)
The judgment is affirmed.
Sullivan, P. J., and Molinari, J., concurred.
Appellant’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied August 24, 1966.
Notes
Hermann Meyer, an employee of Tara who was named as a defendant in the principal action, is named as an appellant in the notice of appeal. Sinсe he was not named as a cross-defendant in the cross-complaint, nor mentioned in the findings of fact, conclusions of law or judgment on the cross-complaint, the former reference is disregarded as a clerical error.
The express words of the subcontract are: “i. Subcontractor further agrees: ... To fully indemnify and save harmless the Contractor and Owner against any and all loss, damage, liability, claim, demand, suit or cause of action resulting from injury or harm to any person or property arising out of or in any way connected with the performance of work under this subcontract, excepting only such injury or harm as may be caused solely and exclusively by the fault or negligence of Contractor. ”
Civil Code section 1668 provides: "All contracts which have for their object, directly or indirectly, to exempt anyone from responsibility for his own fraud, or willful injury to the person or property of another, or violation of law, whether willful or negligent, are against the policy of the law.”
Any suggestion that Cahill precludes recovery under an express indemnity agreement if the indemnitee was actively negligent is not supported by a reading of the case which has no reference to any provisions whereby the defendant expressly agreed to indemnify the plaintiff. (Cf. Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (1965 Supp.) Torts, § 22D, p. 343, Express Indemnity.)