John Coffin v. Stacy Brandau

appeal. over this We therefore after diction order reviewing severance this legal appeal. dismiss destroy their would judgment final no And, have made Plaintiffs rights. FOR WANT OF JURIS- DISMISSED case, alle- which involves that this showing DICTION. Plain- defrauded Defendants gations that $170,000,000,is where one tiffs of over alleged damage will amount of

per-plaintiff impossi- filing separate suits

make the

ble. allow view and accept

To the Plaintiffs’ every interlocutory appeal of

an automatic un- impose order would Rule 21 severance COFFIN, Cynthia Coffin, John mon- in terms of time and acceptable costs Plaintiffs-Appellants, court, and the district ey parties, on the Spanning year over this court. BRANDAU, individually, Stacy f.k.a. court, litigation district this half in federal Stacy Ferris, Lutz, James individ pretrial motions multiple has included ually, Defendants-Appellees. allow au- docket entries. To hundreds of sever- interlocutory review of the tomatic No. 08-14538. is al- would down what ance order slow Appeals, Court of United States will ready slow-moving case. This we Circuit. Eleventh not do. that Plaintiffs did June noting

We conclude other recognized not invoke rule. judgment final

exceptions to the

They not ask the district court did inter- issue of law for

certify controlling 1292(b). § 28 U.S.C.

locutory appeal under final

They not ask the court enter did “an

judgment on the claims severed just that there is no

express determination di- delay upon express

reason for judgment,” which for the

rection appeal when

authorizes an immediate See are or claims dismissed. parties

some 54(b). And, have Plaintiffs

Fed.R.Civ.P. action, a class so this case as litigated

discretionary appeal of a class-certification 23(f) Rule is not available.

decision under

III. CONCLUSION order in this case the severance

Because doc- final and collateral order

is not Rule 21 interlocu- apply to a

trine does claims, juris- lack

tory severing we order

ANDERSON, Judge: Circuit case, Cynthia attempted In this Coffin prevent her door to two shut County deputies, Sheriffs James Sarasota Brandau, Stacy serving Lutz husband, court on her John Coffin.1 order attempted Ms. close the As Coffin stepped Brandau threshold, breaking electronic-eye safety and caus- beam the to its open position. the door to retreat Deputies, possess who did either warrant, search warrant an arrest en- tered the Coffins’ and arrested Ms. for obstruction of Coffin then justice. sought damages The Coffins against Lutz and Brandau under 42 U.S.C. grounds Deputies’ § on that entry warrantless into their and Ms. Coffin’s arrest violated their Fourth rights. Amendment im- Deputies argued qualified that Buckman, II, Amiee Yardley Drake liability. from munity them Re- shielded Buckman, Buckman, & Ruth Buckman specting the two claims before the P.A., Sarasota, FL, Cynthia for and John challenge to her ar- court —Ms. Coffin’s Coffin. challenge rest and both Plaintiffs’ to the Marchbank, Jr., entry Deputies’ L. Dickinson & into the dis- Ralph —the PA, FL, Gibbons, Sarasota, Stacy for granted summary judgment trict court to Brandau. Deputies. The district court concluded that, although Deputies violated the Weiner, Weiner, A. Alan Nevin

Nevin rights Fourth Amendment en- Coffins’ P.A., Garland, R. Dickinson & Richard tering right garage, that was clear- P.A., FL, Gibbons, Sarasota, for James ly there at established. And because Lutz. arguable probable cause to arrest

least obstructing legal Ms. Coffin service Deputies process, were entitled qualified immunity on both Ms. Coffins’ DUBINA, Judge, and Before Chief the Plaintiffs’ chal- arrest claim TJOFLAT, EDMONDSON, CARNES, lenge garage. On MARCUS, WILSON, BARKETT, HULL, initial affirmed. PRYOR, MARTIN, appeal, we ANDERSON and Coffin Brandau, (11th Cir.2010). BLACK, Judges. 609 F.3d 1204 Circuit convenience, we refer lies." For sometimes collectively, Depu- as “the Lutz Brandau rary that injunction upon This court then vacated decision as Respondent soon granted rehearing possible en banc address after its issuance.” seizure of whether warrantless Ms. The Coffins’home faces street and Deputies Coffin inside her proximity close to the sidewalk. Brandau and Lutz violated Coffins’ also the street faces and, so, rights if fully Deputy the time Lutz rights clearly whether those were estab- arrived, exposing its interior. The drive- occurred, lished this incident such when way directly leads street to Deputies stripped should be garage, pathway left and a veers from the Brandan, qualified immunity. Coffin driveway up to the front door. Between (11th Cir.2010). 614 F.3d 1240 We hold front door and the the house although Deputies’ entrance into bay has a front which large window had its did violate the Coffins’ Fourth curtains drawn at the time Lutz ar- rights, the boundaries of the rived. violated here were not estab- and, thus, lished the Deputies are arrival, entitled Upon approached his Lutz qualified immunity. Accordingly, the rang Coffins’ front door and the bell. properly district granted summary court Cynthia Coffin answered the door and judgment favor both on Lutz explained papers he had to deliv- Ms. Coffin’s arrest claim and on the Plain- er to Mr. Ms. responded Coffin.3 Coffin challenge tiffs’ to the entrance of the ga- that Mr. was in Coffin the bathroom and rage. Lutz would have to wait. She then shut and locked front waiting the door. After 1. Facts minutes, few Lutz walked back down the Deputy Lutz arrived at the pathway facing and, Coffins’ the bay front window 18, 2006, shortly home April on before believing 6:30 he had made contact eye with PM, daylight during window, hours. Lutz Ms. through Coffin the waved the there to Mr. paperwork serve Coffin with an Order of his above head as reminder Injunction Temporary Against Repeat Vio- waiting. he was the impres- Under lence, Mr. which him, Coffin’s tenant had ob- sion that Ms. Coffin had seen Lutz days tained six earlier the Circuit walked toup back the front expecting door Court County, for Charlotte Florida.2 give The her to it and update. him an As injunction required door, Mr. approached Coffin to surren- he the front he over- any der ammunition firearms or in his heard a asking, man’s voice “What did he possession County to the Sarasota Sheriff want?” then rang Lutz either the bell or - and ordered of “[t]he Sheriff Sarasota knocked on the front door for a second County, other authorized law en- time but received no answer. He then forcement officer ... to tempo- serve this up walked to the front to try window to injunction by 2. The against had been petitioner issued the Cir- or [an] immediate fami- County, pursuant ly 784.046(l)(b), cuit of Court Charlotte § to member.” Fla. Stat. Ann. (West 2011). § Fla. Stat. Ann. 784.046 Sec- (2). petitioner tion 784.046 allows to obtain an "injunction protection repeat for in cases of It undisputed that Lutz did not know that violence” after "two of incidents violence or opened the woman who the door was Ms. stalking respondent, [are] committed opened Coffin at the moment she the door but one of which must following have been within 6 identity months her events this made filing petition, of which are clear directed to him. Coffin, go and knock on the interior up- Ms. Brandau door attention. get Coffins’ walking through kitchen, her that Lutz was garage whereupon set from the to the bushes, get shouting for him to out began garage into Ms. Coffin came out her property her and off bushes yelled Deputies get at both to off her Lutz backed police. to call the threatened property. announced to Ms. Brandau Cof- to his from window and walked over up fin an intention to arrest her for obstruct- car, parked on the street patrol process. service backup in order to call for be- driveway, Coffin, According opened to Ms. she trying were to cause he felt Coffins possibility and there was kitchen the garage, avoid service door from the to obstruction. pushed reached out and the automatic but- the garage ton to close at which time eight calling

About five to minutes after she saw Brandau followed Lutz walk at the backup, Deputy for Brandau arrived into trip Around the time Brandau’s ar- the electronic scene. rival, saw a man that he assumed was Lutz causing sensor door return window.4 through Mr. Coffin front open position. She then into its walked super- her phone Brandau was on the with Brandau, feeling talk with Lutz her of apprising visor while talking more comfortable to a female.5 at the Coffin house. situation parties agree Deputies at- Lutz, According Deputies were tempted to Ms. arrest Coffin obstruc- in front of the door standing process strug- tion and that a of service of talking phone while Brandau was gle Deputies attempted as the ensued what to do supervisor about next struggle handcuff Ms. Coffin. began heard the interior door when Deputies between the and Ms. Coffin and the rolling and close the garage, and when Mr. Coffin inter- interrupted to close. Brandau start vened included both and both call, open ga- and walked phone expanded garage Coffins and from the to rage, tripping the electronic sensor and the deputies house.6 Additional arrived to causing the door retreat its followed, position. and and Mr. Ms. ulti- Lutz saw both and Coffin were expectation paperwork privacy, of the 4. to be served contained a Plaintiffs’ facts of subsequent struggle the description in the of Mr. Coffin that the man inside Similarly are not relevant. the appeared house Fourth to fit. consequences the Amendment of arrest de- cause, pend upon probable probable arguable preceding 5. To the extent the versions in the cause, any illegal entry the fruit of into and/or differ, paragraphs two the differences are not garage. Again the details of the subse- material. Thus, quent struggle are not relevant. appellants’ dissent’s extensive recitation of present only ap- Coffins two claims struggle version of and in peal, struggle the details of the are not legal is house not relevant issues on ap- either claim. It clear that relevant is Barkett, J., concurring appeal. See only challenges appeal pellants' on this are: (hereinaf- dissenting part, at 3-5 infra 1) Deputies’ entry into initial whether "Dissenting Op.”). ter shutting as violated 2) appellants’ rights; bad, as If here were the Plain- violated sug- whether the arrest of Ms. Coffin her struggle facts tiffs’ version of the irrelevant, bad, rights. gest, Amendment Because Fourth those but facts should consequences Dep- application Amendment us an Fourth lead inaccurate precedent. entry open garage depend upon uties’ into the mately arrest, ble probable arrested.7 cause for which is all required qualified immunity for are no longer required We to follow purposes. difficulty Id. 1195. The two-step process once mandated Sauci the arrest in this case turns on the Katz, er 121 S.Ct. v. U.S. probable question, ques cause but on the (2001). Thus, 150 L.Ed.2d we are free tion of whether the officers were entitled question to address the of whether the enter the in order to make that plaintiff alleged facts showed warrantless arrest. See Minnesota Ol right violation of constitutional or the son, 91, 95, 1684, 1687, 495 U.S. 110 S.Ct. question of whether the at issue was (1990) (“It 109 L.Ed.2d 85 was held in clearly ap established the order most Payton York that suspect New should propriate for the case at hand. not be in his arrested house without an noted, present As Coffins two warrant, arrest though prob even there is challenge Depu- claims. Both Coffins omitted); (citation him.”) able cause to arrest entry garage; only ties’ into the Ms. Coffin Edmondson, ited States v. Un her challenges arrest.8 We first address (11th Cir.1986) (“A F.2d finding Ms. claim for Coffin’s an unlawful arrest. probable justi cause alone ... does not Then we address whether entry fy a warrantless arrest suspect’s at a violated the Coffin’s Fourth home.”). below, For the reasons discussed rights. Because we conclude we clearly hold that it was not established entry did violate Fourth Amend- that the garage here would violate rights, finally ment we address whether Amendment, the Fourth and because the there was a violation established Deputies had probable cause to arrest Ms. Fourth Amendment law. obstruction, Coffin they are entitled to qualified immunity on this claim. II. Ms. Claim Ar- Coffin’s for Unlawful rest Probable cause to arrest exists

Deputies are qualified entitled to under both federal and Florida law when immunity on claims of false long arrest so “objectively arrest reasonable based probable had arguable Lee, cause or totality on the the circumstances.” probable cause for the arrest. See v. 284 Lee F.3d at 1195. “This standard is met Ferraro, (11th Cir. when the facts and within circumstances 2002). easily We Depu conclude that the the officer’s knowledge, of which he or she ample had probable ties reasonably information, cause to arrest has trustworthy Ms. Coffin for believe, misdemeanor of prudent obstruction would cause person to justice. least, very At the they had argua- shown, under the circumstances arrest, charged Ms. Coffin was with the charges, misde- Mr. Coffin's these with the justice meanor of obstruction of without vio- exception § charge, 843.025 were § under lence Fla. Stat. Ann. 843.02. Mr. 13, 2007, dropped. On March Mr. Coffin charged Coffin was with several felonies: two pled charge no contest to that and was sen- battery of counts a law on enforcement officer Meanwhile, days’ tenced to six confinement. 784.07(2)(b) § under Fla. Stat. Ann. and against § charge 843.02 Ms. Coffin was 784.03(1); § resisting an officer with violence dismissed. 843.01; § under Fla. Stat. Ann. two counts of weapon use of a on a law enforcement officer 8. The challenge Coffins do not the arrest of 790.054; § under Fla. Stat. depriv- Ann. and Coffin, challenge Deputies' Mr. and do not ing an protection officer of means of or com- entry into the home itself. § munication under Fla. Stat. Ann. 843.025. Because the lacked a for warrant committed, wilfully refusing face to committing, or is the officer’s and has suspect (citations an Id. process.”). to commit offense.” service of While there accept about omitted). cause Probable quotations and Florida cases that have indicated are some suspicion, than mere but requires more accept personal that courts will less than necessary convincing proof of the level attempt to people in the event that service Arguable a conviction. Id. support service, quite the law in this area is avoid of- cause exists where reasonable probable certainly clearly es- and could not sparse and with in the same circumstances ficers a lesser under what circumstances tablish defendant knowledge as the the same See, e.g., is acceptable. method of service cause probable have believed that could that, (holding Haney, 245 So.2d 672-74 Id. existed. deputy sheriff observed husband where process for provides Florida service doorway back to standing and wife fled to be person made on the to be yelling front “no” and the home’s served, spouse, person their or a above after identified him- closed the door sheriff living respondent.9 fifteen age of deputy present process, serve self other statutory provides law no Florida identifying actions of himself sheriffs individual; serving unlike methods voice, copies announcing he had loud states, pro- do not Florida statutes some summons, reading loudly them outside the to be proper process service of vide for leaving and he was them announcing affixing a to the door copy made delivery doorstep was sufficient with a mailed following up residence process); to effect valid service of papers § 48.031 Compare Fla. Ann. copy. Stat. Nat’l Bank Liberman Commercial 2011) (West § 308 with N.Y. C.P.L.R. (Fla. Cnty., 256 So.2d 63-64 Broward 2010) for “nail and (McKinney (providing 1971) personal ser- (holding 4th DCA “in man- and for such mail” service service perfected on where vice was defendant court, no- upon motion without as the ner defendant re- deputy sheriff observed the directs, un- tice, impracticable if service is mail papers left in his box after trieve one, four of this two and paragraphs der by running attempting avoid service section”). into his away process server home law, has person Under Florida lim- “this outer noting approaches but legal obligation accept service its”). attempted reason when service is process Lutz, fully Sher- uniformed Sarasota 245 So.2d Haney Corp., ably. See Olin arrived at the Coffins’ house deputy iffs (Fla. 1971) (“An officer’s 4th DCA validly restraining order with a executed ser attempt personal reasonable effect injunction against repeat temporary own upon a his process person vice of violence, law is some- which under Florida reasonably should person when ordinary from an summons what different identity purpose, know the officer’s deposi- He in his complaint. testified expedi simple cannot be frustrated must be restraining in tion that orders person closing the front door ent 48.03l(2)(a) 48.03l(l)(a) provides § that provides § Ann. then that Stat. Stat. Ann. 9. Fla. original process by deliv- may is made be made on the of service '‘[s]ervice "[s]ubstitute ..., person served ering copy of it to the to be person if spouse served of to be leaving her by copies at his or ... or adversary proceed- of action is not an cause residing any person place abode with usual spouse person to and the be between years age is 15 or older therein who served.” Fla. informing person contents.” of their on person served named therein upon respondent as soon as thereafter that simply restraining possible he had never left a on any day the week and at performed order at a residence or time day night.” substi- Fla. Stat. 784.046(8)(a)(l) added). § tute service on a Ann. person present (emphasis different at the residence. The few Florida cases that allowed for some alternative form of service involved The notion serving a restraining delivery of a standard summons and com- order differently should be treated than plaint, and not a repeat petition violence serving ordinary process finds some sup- restraining required order that port in procedural both Florida’s rules and securing of firearms.11 language used Section 784.046. In Lutz’s first interaction regard with Ms. Cof- restraining With orders ac- fin, at the front door of the by violence, Coffin repeat tions victims of Lutz legitimate stated his reason procedural relevant Florida provide rules being for property their serve Mr. personal there must be service and —to Coffin this restraining order. At that that service can only by be made a law time, Ms. Coffin unequivocally indicated enforcement officer. See Fla. R. Fam. that Mr. Coffin was home but that Lutz 12.610(b)(2)(B)(with Law R. Proc. respect would have to wait. After waiting a few to a petition repeat for “[pjersonal violence minutes, with no contact from either of the by service a law enforcement agency is Coffins, Lutz tried get to Ms. Coffin’s at- required”); see also Fla. R. Fam. Law. R. through window, tention the front 12.160(c)(3)(A)(“A assum-

Proc. temporary injunc- ing this prompt would her to offer an tion protection against repeat ... vio- update. Coffin, Ms. aware that Lutz had served.”) lence ... personally must be paperwork that he had added). impor- described as (emphasis contrast, By service of tant, then began yelling through Lutz other documents need not by be served the front get window to out of her bushes law enforcement officer. See Fla. Stat. and off her property. attempt And her §Ann. 48.021 (outlining the general guide- close the appeared to the may lines for who process).10 serve Sec- Deputies as a further effort to avoid ser- tion 784.046 provides, also with respect to vice. restraining orders concerning repeat vio-

lence, that after the clerk of court furnish- reasonably It appeared to copy es a of the documents to a law en- that Ms. Coffin tried to thwart Depu- officer, forcement the officer “shall serve ability ties’ process Coffin, to serve on Mr. contrast, by 10. Also Florida statutes allow for 1003-04. The cases cited did not involve a substitute types service of other restraining documents. repeat Top order for violence. See § See Fla. (outlining general Too, Stat. Ann. 48.031 Dollar King, Pawn Inc. v. 861 So.2d guidelines process). for how to (Fla. serve It 2003); is not 4th DCA Palamara v. clear that substitute Yachts, Inc., service is sufficient for World Class 824 So.2d proper restraining service of a (Fla. order 2002) in an curiam). (per 4th DCA The dis- action repeat victim of violence. sent language both overlooks clear procedural (indicating Florida rules that re- peat petitions The dissent violence support personally states that there must is no officer) restraining the Florida law that served law enforcement order for and fails that, repeat differently recognize violence is treated from a decisions of an interme- court, standard complaint summons and diate state cites cases it cites—which two decisions of ap- incidentally an intermediate point court of are not on not clear- —could peal general for the notion ly general service-of- establish that the process service of process applies law to service temporary applies of a law to service restraining of a order restraining Dissenting Op. order. See against repeat any violence in event.

1009 effects, houses, persons, papers, cause ar- their and, thus, they probable had to justice, setting of her for obstruction against rest unreasonable searches and sei- Const, Fourth Amend- any moment aside the “[Pjhysi- IV. zures.” U.S. amend. Depu- from the arising implications ment cal of the is the chief evil entry home as noted in the into the entry ties’ the of the against wording which Fourth of service paragraph.12 Obstruction next Payton New Amendment is directed.” v. Fla. offense. is a misdemeanor process of York, 573, 585, 100 S.Ct. 445 U.S. § The obstruction oc- Ann. 843.02.13 Stat. (1980) (citation 1379-80, 63 L.Ed.2d officers, the presence curred in the of State, omitted); Riggs quotations to an thus authorized make they were (Fla.2005) (quoting So.2d warrant, immediately or arrest without Payton). is Fourth Never Amend- § Fla. Ann. 901.15 pursuit. in fresh Stat. clearly privacy ment of more defined “zone (“A (1) may officer law enforcement & than unambiguous when bounded a warrant without when person arrest physical of an dimensions individual’s or person felony has committed [t]he Payton, home.” U.S. at 100 S.Ct. municipal or violated a or misdemeanor county in the of the presence ordinance at 1381-82. for the commission of a

officer. An arrest of a munici- misdemeanor or violation argued The Coffins both the dis shall be made county or ordinance pal trict and on appeal court their immediately pursuit.”). or fresh adjacent garage part unambig of “the below in Part For the reasons discussed physical uous dimensions” of their home although Deputies’ opinion, TV of this and, therefore, to the was entitled absolute garage violated entry into the Coffins’ protection Payton. of a home under The rights, their Fourth Amendment there was that, difficulty argument with this is while of established law. not violation attached, is garage here covered Thus, qualified Deputies are entitled roof, compatible hip and does share one respect entry and the immunity with house, it is common wall with the different Deputies deprive not of does living the home are areas of immunity for otherwise lawful qualified easily categorized “unambig as of of arrest Ms. Coffin. uous home. physical dimensions” Garage; Entry very large III. Fourth The has a exterior door Amendment Violated raised, left facing fully the street that was exposing neighbors thus the interior to protects The Fourth Amendment passersby. in or people of the be secure “[t]he provides; § Ann. “Who- properly points out that the Fla. Stat. 843.02 dissent 13. occupants resist, obstruct, deny a house free to are oppose any ever shall or offi- request to enter their and are officer’s personnel representative cer ... or through a free to talk to the officers closed Enforcement; Department Law or other Dissenting Op. (citing door. at 1004 n.2 Ken person legally process authorized to execute -, tucky King, 536 U.S. 131 S.Ct. legal process in the execution of or in the (2011); States v. To 179 L.Ed.2d 865 United any legal duty, execution of without lawful bin, (11th Cir.1991) (en F.2d doing person offering to the violence However, banc)). dissent overlooks officer, guilty a misdemeanor of shall fact that the did enter the here punishable provided degree, first home; rather, they entered an 775.083.” 775.082 or access and knock the visible kitchen. 1010 car

only momentarily respect open ga- order for a to whether an attached enter; open Depu- from rage it before is home. ties arrived until the moment Ms. Coffin Supreme Both the States United Court with it. In contrast attempted close have, and our Court some circum- reiterating high law abundance case stances, pro- extended Fourth Amendment protection of Fourth Amendment af- level v. garages, Taylor tection to see United addressing forded a case law States, 1, 466, 286 76 U.S. 52 S.Ct. L.Ed. Fourth Amendment status of an attached Sokolow, (1932); 951 v. 450 United States quite sparse,

but (5th Cir.1971) curiam); (per F.2d 324 Kauz country. but throughout in Florida States, (5th United 473 Cir. rely primarily Payton, Coffins 1938). However, these cases are distin- its predecessors, progeny for their and, guishable from the instant case there- argument violated the fore, today. do control our outcome they Fourth Amendment when entered the cite, garage. example, States, The cases Taylor In v. United Louisiana, 635, Kirk v. 536 U.S. 122 S.Ct. Court held whiskey recovered offi- 2458, (2002), 153 L.Ed.2d 599 Oliver cers from a garage closed and locked States, 170, United 466 U.S. 104 S.Ct. suppressed prod- should have been as the 1735, (1984), 214 80 L.Ed.2d and Silver uct of an 286 at unreasonable search. U.S. States, 505, man v. United 365 81 U.S. 5-6, officers, 52 S.Ct. at 467. The after (1961), S.Ct. 5 734 all L.Ed.2d reiter smelling whisky emanating ga- from the ate principle that homes are entitled to rage seeing a number of cardboard greatest protec appeared jars boxes that contain Kirk, tion. See 536 at 122 U.S. S.Ct. liquor by peering through opening, a small (“As at Payton plain, police 2459 makes door,” the fastening upon forcibly “broke a need a officers either warrant or probable entering garage. once locked Id. at plus exigent cause circumstances in order at Taylor S.Ct. thus holds that a home.”); to make lawful into a entitled to Fourth Amendment Oliver, 466 U.S. at at 1741 S.Ct. locked, protection when is closed and (“[T]he Court since the enactment the maintaining expectation of pri- owner’s Fourth Amendment has stressed the over- vacy, says nothing but about an ga- riding respect sanctity for the of the home rage. that has been in our embedded traditions Likewise, Sokolow, which also extended (cita- origins since Republic.”) Fourth protection quotations omitted); Silverman, tion and cannot control the outcome of this case. (“At at at U.S. S.Ct. Sokolow, In police officer followed car very core [of Fourth Amendment] suspected cigarettes to contain stolen stands the of a man to retreat the Sokolow residence where the car his own home and there free from up intrusion.”). garage.” “backed to Sokolow’s unreasonable governmental cases, however, F.2d at 325. arresting suspect, “While These do not address the case, crucial the officer of air question saw number condition- this which is ing units garage.” whether an stacked Id. The is enti- tled to the officer then protection. same level of entered the and re- De- spite repeated insistence, the dissent’s corded serial air numbers condi- Payton simply did not involve a tioning units without a search warrant. Thus, all. Payton holding made no Id. The do not make facts Sokolow testimony The Kauz Court held open or door was garage clear whether inadmissible, (plural) was into the of the officers could see the officer whether that, id. in indicating a window. See addition to second through garage closed entry forcible into the home officer’s was garage The fact that Coffins’ Amendment, the violation of the Fourth period of time is for an indefinite open left was also garage first officer’s of the Sokolow, with in this case. crucial fact a Amendment violation. Id. Kauz a Fourth facts, wholly is cursory statement its way in much the same as distinguishable analysis here. control our insufficient to no indication in the There is Sokolow. Sokolow, if Further, even garage was visible at that the interior door opinion passageway not have a visible did open, driveway; garage all from the garage outer threshold from the feet. Accord- open only about three was access door to an interior through holding respect makes no with ingly, Kauz enter to use did not and the officer garage entering open officer to an to knock on order pathway such a door to the home. knock on a visible access make contact with door and interior Further, the tes- while the Court excluded homeowner, here. See did officers, the focus of the timony of both id.14 holding rationale and was sec- Court’s In not control. Finally, Kauz does door, “broke in the entered ond officer who Kauz, neigh- patrolling were two officers through went appellant’s living quarters, to be a a car known and noticed borhood them, way ga- into the forced his [and] “which car” in front of “liquor (“There rage.” Id. is no doubt whatever Kauz, 95 about three feet.” in the record appearing the facts then wit- The officers F.2d at 473-74. premises was for- appellant’s the search of co-defendant, Butler, exit the one nessed warrant cibly made without either search jug in a sack carrying five-gallon her constitutional authority and violated two other alongside it into the car put and Fifth Amend- rights under the Fourth Butler saw the Id. at 474. jugs. identical ments.”). Thus, cannot control this Kauz garage. and tried to reenter officers case. ga- Butler into the officer followed One Sokolow, and Kauz establish Taylor, outside, ar- him rage, brought back is af- protection him. Someone then closed rested garages under certain forded to certain Fol- the inside. bolted circumstances, but cannot and do this, then “broke lowing the other officer question the answer to the control appellant’s liv- entered [front] was entitled to Fourth them, whether this through forced quarters, went ing under the circum- protection garage, and there saw way his into the of this case. stances appellant.” Id. description page long entirety, its assumption, in its Contrary our to the dissent’s theoretically sparse. While it is speculate the facts is opinion about Sokolow. does existed, possible passageway noth- that such simply point nowhere in Sokolow We out that suggests Ac- opinion it did. in the whether did the Court state cordingly, makes no it is clear that Sokolow arrived. when the officers or closed entering an Likewise, holding respect to an officer opinion we note that the Sokolow passageway to knock on pas- open garage with a a visible that there was did not indicate Thus, the home. Soko- access door to home. The visible sageway access door of the to an control this case. one low cannot opinion only approximately Sokolow police go); Tay-

It is well-established that free to see also United States lor, (11th Cir.2006) proper officers can enter onto residential (“The Amendment, prohibits Fourth which portions that ty, including would consid by unreasonable searches and the seizures curtilage, carry the in to ered of order implicated by entry is government, Wayne legitimate police out business. private on a upon land to knock citizen’s LaFave, A R. Search and Seizure: Trea for legitimate police purposes door uncon- 2.3(f) § tise the Fourth Amendment premises.”); with a search of nected the 2004) (4th (“Thus, police ed. the when (“[OJfficers are allowed to knock on a id. private an property come on to to conduct approach residence’s door or otherwise investigation or for some other legitimate seeking speak residence to to the inhabit- purpose and restrict their movements to just private may.”) ants an citizen [sic] expected (e.g. places go visitors could be to (citation omitted) (mistake quotations and walkways, driveways, porches), observa Taylor). in vantage points tions made such are Amendment.”) by Fourth not covered We in need decide this case whether (and therein). the cases “This entering cited is an in order to utilize portion curtilage, being passageway gain because a to access to a visible to the is a anyone normal route of home violation of the access for visit hold, however, Fourth Amendment. We premises, only semi-private that, 2.3(f) totality under of circum- § (quotations area.” LaFave omit stances, ted). Deputies’ entry into the Cof- fins’ garage was a violation of the Fourth carrying duties, In out their The garage Amendment. here is attached police go are free public to where the itself, to the home it in putting closer expected go. would be to See LaFave proximity to the than home an unattached 2.3(c) (“Thus, § po courts have held that garage. In with carport, contrast legitimate may lice with business enter attached has walls on three sides of curtilage areas which are impliedly capability, and has if the outside door public.”) to (quotations use down, being rolled closed to maintain omitted); Florida v. Detlefson, 335 So.2d privacy. attempted Ms. Coffin also ex- to (Fla. 1976) (“It 1st DCA cannot ercise her Fourth In rights. said [that] defendant had reasonable Lutz, her first conversation with ex- she in expectation privacy porch the front of plained might that her husband need where, home presumably, delivery his men while before he would be able to come to to plants others were free observe the expressed the door. Lutz his willingness thereon.”); Tracht v. Comm’r Pub. wait, Coffin, by Safe to and Ms. closing ty, 865 (Minn.App.1999) N.W.2d locking the front indicated she that (“Police legitimate may business en maintaining was privacy her in the mean- ter the of curtilage impli areas which are encounter, Following time. this when Ms. edly open public.”); to use State walking Coffin noticed Lutz win- up her Duhart, (Fla. 810 So.2d 4th 973-74 bushes, through dow her she screamed 2002) (holding DCA that there no get him to out of her bushes and off her expectation reasonable privacy property police. and threatened to call the carport (initially referred to as a Finally, significantly, and most when Lutz garage) which is exposed to and Brandau remained on the property, public, comparing situation to attempted Ms. Coffin close Detlef porch delivery son’s front where men were door in privacy order maintain Katz, 194, 201, S.Ct. U.S. these circumstances Under area as well. (2001)). Court 150 L.Ed.2d 272 Our indications of Ms. Coffin’s light binding precedent hold looks privacy, we to maintain intended she —cases Court, from the United States as Ms. Coffin entering Circuit, highest and the court the Eleventh a violation of the it was to close attempted the claim arose— the state under which Amendment. Fourth question whether the determine Immunity Qualified IV. the time of the clearly established at Int’l, Bat Amnesty USA v. violation. See whether, next address We must (11th Cir.2009). 1170, tle, 1184 559 F.3d date, already clear it was pertinent the law that en by preexisting ly established argue Kyllo that v. United The Coffins in the face open garage tering the Coffins 2038, States, 27, 121 150 533 U.S. S.Ct. exercise her attempts to Ms. Coffins’ (2001), 94, equates garage a L.Ed.2d rights, includ privacy Fourth that clearly a home and establishes leave the Deputies request her protec- to Fourth Amendment are entitled ga attempt to close and her property garage. garage in their The word tion violate the Fourth would rage time, and, in one in the appears Kyllo that hold Amendment. We very appears, sentence in which Fourth clearly established did not violate expressly distinguished be- Supreme Court Amendment law. 30, and a home. See id. at garage tween (“The 2041 scan showed that S.Ct. at cases, immunity qualified In garage and a side wall of the roof over the whether the must “determine this Court relatively hot com- petitioner’s home were such that a clearly established right was home.”). Had the pared to the rest of understand that official would reasonable equate garage meant to Supreme Court right.” Ba doing he is violates what home, the would have said with a Court Ga., 1323, Cnty., 445 F.3d v. Rockdale shir It did garage.” “roof and sidewall of the Cir.2006) (citation (11th quota Rather, it said over say that. “roof omitted). identity with Exact factual tions and sidewall of the home.” required, case is not previously decided Additionally, significantly, Kyllo, of the conduct must the unlawfulness but thermal-imaging police conducted a law. Id. at pre-existing apparent Only Wilson, by scanning home. 1330-31; scan of the entire Vinyard v. 311 F.3d (11th Cir.2002). neigh- home and the homes of critical the entire “The to ascertain that police were the able provided the law bors inquiry [the is whether premises mainly portions certain warning’ [their] with ‘fair Deputies] — Kyllo’s garage and the Amendment.” the roof over violated the Fourth conduct hot com- wall of the home—were F.3d 1248 side Nugent, McClish Cir.2007) Pelzer, and the (11th parison to the rest of their home Hope v. (quoting 2516, 153 (noting 730, 741, 122 neighbors. their See id. homes of S.Ct. 536 U.S. (2002)). “relatively hot certain areas were It important L.Ed.2d “ home,” the rest of the thus compared be un inquiry that this ‘must emphasize home was making clear that entire specific context of light dertaken scan so thermal-imaging case, searched with general proposi a broad not as ” heat of the several areas that the relative Haugen, 543 U.S. tion.’ Brosseau police intrusion 596, 599, compared). could be 160 L.Ed.2d 583 125 S.Ct. itself, curiam) as well as the (2004) the home v. was into (per (quoting Saucier 1971) (“A house, garage. Because there was an intrusion is not a is it nor specially-protected space into the dwelling or a certainly pro- home.... home, there was no further need to consid- something tection afforded is less than fact, opinion garage. er And that afforded dwelling.”). [a] made no further mention of the garage. As explained the previous section dis- sum, In in Kyllo Court had cussing whether Fourth Amendment vio- to, not, no occasion and did address occurred, lation neither Sokolow nor Kauz extent to which an should Taylor clearly nor establish that protection share the Fourth Amendment was a Fourth Amendment of the home. violation. Sokolow cannot establish Although some have suggested courts the law for the instant case because it is protection that the Fourth Amendment at clear from the facts Sokolow wheth- equivalent tached to the is the er the open and whether there protection itself, provided the home passageway was a driveway from the see, Oaxaca, e.g., United States v. through garage to an access door of 1154, (9th Cir.2000), 1157 other courts and clearly home. Kauz cannot establish jurists suggested have otherwise. See the law for this case because it not clear is Oaxaca, 1154, (Graber, J., 233 F.3d 1159 from its facts that the officer could see an (“Oaxaca dissenting) willingly had left the interior door from garage to the home. garage open. door wide The garage is Thus, neither Sokolow nor Kauz made small, while its door huge; is and the holding respect with entering to an officer range, faces street at close so to knock on a ac- visible opening it exposed most of the interior to cess door Taylor home. cannot ready public view. facts These make this clearly establish the law this case be- Santana, closer case to United States v. cause the officers in forcibly that case 38, 2406, 427 U.S. S.Ct. 96 49 L.Ed.2d 300 entered a closed garage. neither Thus (1976)....”); Daughenbaugh City v. of Kyllo Taylor nor nor nor Kauz Sokolow (6th Cir.1998) Tiffin, 594, 150 F.3d 603 clearly establish that into this (“[T]he divergent conclusions reached garage was a Fourth Amendment viola- district court and court concerning this tion.15 Daughenbaugh’s the status of garage is

further indication that reasonable minds Having concluded that no

can differ on whether it should be consid binding clearly case law established the part curtilage.”); ered United (5th case, rule of law v. for this we are with Knight, States 451 left F.2d 278 Cir.1972) question (“Nothing Deputies’ whether the en the officers’ conduct try of property when entered the the attached can be was a violation Wade, considered a search. with of the Fourth Officer Amendment as a matter drawn, gun out his clarity. walked to of obvious general the site constitution “[A] human activity, which al already ad rule identified the decisional joining residence.”); may United apply States law obvious clarity cf. (D.C.Cir. Wright, v. 449 F.2d 1362 specific in question, though conduct even However, place particular (1980). 15. The dissent seems to reli- L.Ed.2d despite 639 upon insistence, Payton language, ance repeated Payton its “the un- dissent's simply ambiguous physical Thus, of an Payton dimensions individ- did not involve at all. York, Payton ual's home.” v. New U.S. clearly 445 cannot establish whether an at- 573, 589, 1371, 1381-82, S.Ct. parcel 100 63 tached of the home. very question action previ- infringes right. Thus, has conduct [not] [i]f case law, terms, ously been held unlawful.” United States in factual has not staked out a Lanier, 259, 271, line, bright v. 520 U.S. qualified immunity S.Ct. almost al (1997) (inter- 1219, 1227, ways 137 L.Ed.2d 432 protects the defendant.” Smith v. omitted). Mattox, (11th quotations nal with “fun- Cases 127 F.3d Cir. 1997) (citation omitted) damentally “materially similar” or quotations similar” (per curiam). necessary finding facts are not for a ‘We have noted that would be established, clearly preex- the law was but inappropriate government to hold officials isting provide law must with to a higher officers level of knowledge and under fair notice that their conduct is standing legal unconstitu- landscape than [that] Pelzer, 730, 741, Hope displayed tional. by judges U.S. whose everyday busi 2508, 2516, 122 S.Ct. 153 L.Ed.2d 666 decipher ness it is to the meaning judi (2002). principle To find that a broad opinions.” cial Denno Sch. Bd. Volu Of sia, Fla., clearly (11th law establishes the Cnty., law as to a 218 F.3d facts, Cir.2000) specific set of “it (citing must do so ‘with Joyner, Barts v. 865 F.2d (11th Cir.1989)). clarity’ 1187, 1194 point every obvious objectively government reasonable official cases, clarity” “Obvious rare in facing the circumstances would know general, will be even more rare the official’sconduct did violate federal law Fourth expectation privacy when the official Vinyard acted.” v. Wil- context because it inherently fact-spe son, (11th Cir.2002). cific, lending thus not itself to es

Our case law has made clear tablished law. See United States v. clarity” Dunn, that 294, 301, “obvious cases will be rare. 1134, 480 U.S. 107 S.Ct. See, Ferraro, e.g., 1188, 1139-40, (1987) Lee v. 284 F.3d 94 L.Ed.2d 326 (setting (11th Cir.2002) 1199 (referring to obvious forth four factors analytical as “useful clarity exception”); cases as a “narrow tools” to determine “whether the area in Farrell, 1341, Rodriguez v. question 280 F.3d 1350 intimately is so tied to the home (11th Cir.2002) (“We very n. 18 occasional itself that it placed should be under the ly exceptional encounter the case which home’s ‘umbrella’ of Fourth Amendment a defendant egregious officer’s acts are so protection”); Ortega, O’Connor v. 480 that preexisting, fact-specific precedent 709, 715, 1492, 1496, U.S. 107 S.Ct. 94 necessary (1987) was not to give warning clear to L.Ed.2d 714 (explaining that be every ... reasonable officer that what the cause the court no talisman “ha[s] that defendant officer doing must be ‘un determines in all privacy cases those ex reasonable’ meaning within the of pectations society that prepared is to ac Amendment.”). Fourth This cept is because as reasonable” and “[b]ecause the “[p]ublic are obligated officials not to be expectation reasonableness of an priva of imaginative creative or in drawing cy, analo appropriate as well as the standard for gies previously search, from decided cases.” a is understood to differ according Cnty. Adams v. St. Lucie Dep’t, to gives weight context” the Court to vari Sheriff’s (11th 1563, Cir.1992) 1575 ous factors in determining appropriate (Edmondson, J., dissenting), approved en level protection); of Fourth Amendment banc, (11th Cir.1993) States, (per 170, 998 F.2d 923 177, Oliver v. United 466 U.S. curiam). “A 1735, 1741, reasonable official’s aware 104 S.Ct. 80 L.Ed.2d 214 (1984) (“No ness of the existence of an single abstract factor determines ... not equate knowledge does to that legitimately his whether an individual may

1016 entering porch from a the Fourth Amendment claim under in- government free of place a knock on to a house” and that should a door warrant.”); authorized trusion not therefore officers did violate the “[t]he Smith, v. F.2d United States entering ga- (5th Cir.1992) of the (“Any determination door”); rage knocking on the service expecta- an individual’s of reasonableness Akins, C4-99-1066, v. State 2000 WL necessarily fact inten- is privacy tion of 271986, *1-4, MinmApp. LEXIS sive.”). reasons, are a number we For 2000) (holding *4-11 (MinmApp. Mar. that, as matter of conclude unable to expectation that Akins had no reasonable clarity, open an attached obvious privacy in his attached home, of the or entitled either “[p]eople’s expectations because for access the home. protection the same level of as premises commonly areas their differ that this is not One indication from their for more secluded expectations clarity are decisions matter of obvious areas,” public and “members would throughout country courts other reasonably they could assume that use [the no Fourth Amendment vio concluding that access], garage for when the overhead very lation simi occurred circumstances Duhart, open”); door was State cf. deputies in this facing lar to those (Fla. 2002) (hold- 4th DCA So.2d See, e.g., case.16 United States Cota- officer’s entrance into attached Lopez, F.Supp.2d 590-91 carport initially opinion referred to — (W.D.Tex.2002) (concluding that officers’ not a violation as —was open into an Fourth because “[although Amendment entirely knock the service door “was expectation has an is well settled one reasonable, and did not violate the Fourth its privacy curtilage, in his home or entering the “[i]n Amendment” because Fourth necessarily merely the officers took one protection in areas of this getting methods of two alternative case, exposed which public are (the inner Residence view,” citing authority prop- as for this door)”); front Tracht v. Pub. Comm’r of Detlefson, osition State v. 335 So.2d 371 863, Safety, (MinmApp. N.W.2d (Fla. 1976), 1st as holding DCA described 1999) (holding that where officers entered “no of expectation privacy reasonable on through garage open ga an attached the porch delivery front of home where men of rage purpose knocking door for the free to plants others were observe the service door no [was] interior “there thereon”). distinguishing applications basis the These cases are of officers’ official, Only Supreme cases from the Court of the able school it is instructive to take 16. States, Circuit, United the Eleventh or the perspective of of several note the reasonable clearly can Florida Court establish jurists attempted to who have articulate the Circuit, the but opinions law in our legal landscape”). [relevant] suggest ju- can that reasonable other courts rebuke, Contrary to the dissent’s our con- rists know that situ- would not certain factual non-binding cases sideration these does not of to the level of constitutional viola- ations rise require assume that officers will sift tions, and therefore reasonable officers would Rather, through every jurisdiction. the law of Volusia, Denno v. Sch. Bd. either. of Denno, development we noted in of 1267, Fla., (11th Cnty., 1272-76 merely jurisdictions law other reflects the Cir.2000) (considering a number of non-bind- jurists legal landscape, have how reasonable ing at- opinions "[i]n [the Court’s] because and, thus, interpreted precedent, tempt legal relevant identify landscape that might. apparent to how officers would have been such reason- reasonable law, gard. above: and foremost of mentioned First absence the well-established legiti- police have held that a any binding case law which these “Courts informs of the cur- may enter areas business violating mate officers that were to use impliedly open are tilage which Second, Fourth Amendment. indica- 2.3(c) (quotations § LaFave public.” jurists in non-binding tions from cases that omitted). an entrance into Amendment, might not the Fourth violate

Relatedly, when courts have extended particularly appears pas- where that the empha- to a often protection great sageway through the garage to the fact that to a door to given garage sis is See, Jenkins, e.g., 143 the falls within closed. State house the doctrine of areas (2007) (ex- 918, 155 P.3d public. Idaho left impliedly to use tending protection cases, significantly, And Florida which parcel because it garage “was may aware, Deputies well have been home, and constituting of the structure his recognize the doctrine that areas with a door at the time was secured closed curtilage deliverymen use others home”) (emphasis police arrived at might impliedly open public. to the See State, added); Bies v. 76 Wis.2d Duhart, State v. 810 So.2d 973. (1977) (“It disputed is not N.W.2d Third, with respect the law to expectation interior of defendant’s was of is a fact privacy sensitive inquiry protec- the Fourth Amendment’s within lending itself established law. within the tion. The was located Oliver, See 466 U.S. at 104 S.Ct. at dwelling, of his and it was not in curtilage Fourth, although had these officers semi-public The over- any sense area. been told once leave the property, facing public head on the required Florida statute thab they serve shut, reflecting a ex- alley was reasonable legal personally. process See discus- privacy as interior pectation to the II. Finally, sion in Part added). (emphasis garage.”) reasonably believed that Ms. Coffin door, which both diminishes resisting legal process, service a misde- expectation privacy reasonable Coffins’ law, meanor Florida Stat. under see Fla. a visible within the and creates 843.02, § which pres- Ann. occurred in the to an access passageway door of officers, arguably trigger- ence of the thus case in a it is puts this context where authorizing the Florida statute the offi- by a number of doc- competing affected cers to make immediate arrest. See Payton’s protection absolute trines: (1). § Fla. Ann. 901.15 Stat. & curtilage analysis, the Dunn factor impliedly use. public and areas Lutz and Brandau were very thus with a unusual faced scenario that, Although espe- we have concluded and a moment had to decide what to light cially in of Ms. Coffin’s instruction for qualified immunity do. “The standard to leave and her property the officers her ‘gives room ample judgments’ for mistaken door, attempt garage Dep- to close the ‘all protecting plainly incompe but the entry of garage uties’ did in fact violate knowingly tent or who those violate Amendment, cannot con- the Fourth we ” Bryant, law.’ Blunter U.S. clude that the law was established 534, 537, 229, 112 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d facing that reasonable these such officers curiam) (1991) (quoting Malley v. (per their con- circumstances would know that 335, 343, 341, U.S. S.Ct. Briggs, 475 duct would violate federal law. Several (1986)). 1092, 1097, inform our in this re- 89 L.Ed.2d 271 reasons conclusion BARKETT, concurring in Judge, error Circuit accommodation for reasonable “This not err al- dissenting part (joined by because ‘officials should in part exists and they ways MARTIN, on the side of caution’ DUBINA, because Judge, Chief being (quoting sued.” Davis fear Id. Judge):1 Circuit Scherer, 183, 196, 104 S.Ct. U.S. noth- majority’s opinion today does (1984)). Standing 82 L.Ed.2d 139 than eviscerate inviolate ing less the once driveway, fully that the Coffins aware historically home protections accorded the they process were waiting knew to deliver by the Fourth Amendment of United being process and that service of ob- accomplish States Constitution. To this structed, began the automatic basic, task, majority ignores the most This while Brandau to close. occurred seeking bright-line principle as to supervisor advice from a to do Deputies, what next. The this jurisprudence: Court’s Fourth Amendment time, recognized likely prob- that had oc- that warrantless searches and seizures to arrest for resist- able cause Ms. Coffin curring unambiguous physical within process, and that Florida law service of the home are presumptively dimensions immediately gave right them the arrest. majority circum- unconstitutional. point, with a At that Brandau was faced occupying vents fundamental precept this split-second decision as to whether to en- very core the Fourth Amendment ter the order to reach the interi- by concluding, any without explanation, or with all of the discussed in issues that an at- physically enclosed opinion running through this her mind but sharing tached to a home—and the home’s analyze the benefit of without time roof walls—does not exist within them, and of binding without the benefit physical unambiguous dimensions case law. we on-point Although conclude faulty home. This conclusion rests on the that the officers did fact violate the premise ordinary people that expect Amendment Fourth under the facts and attached, deliverymen will come into their case, circumstances of this cannot con- we deliverymen garages enclosed and that clude, light of all foregoing consider- so, recognize have a to do and fails to ations, that the officers have violated clear- attached, that an is no enclosed ly-established Fourth law.17 house, different than other room the reasons, the foregoing judgment For and is thus entitled to the same blanket district court protections living aas den, room,

AFFIRMED. or a bedroom. strong language suggests part parcel 17. The in the dissent the kitchen is home. firmly qualified immunity held latter, belief that respect disagree; simply With to the we apply should in this The dissent case. deliverymen infrequently we believe 1) apparently Payton, believes either: passageway through use a Sokolow, Kyllo, actually holds that an Kauz a visible kitchen access door in circumstances parcel the do similar to situation here. We not home; 2) or a that it is obvious as matter of room, living just believe this like a open common sense that an attached den, a or a bedroom. room, den, just living like “a or bed- former, respect With we be- room.” to the My majority 1. with limited concurrence the very we have lieve demonstrated at the least deputies to its conclusion that the violated the Payton Kyllo that neither Sokolow nor nor nor rights. clearly open Coffins’constitutional establishes that Kauz passageway with a door to to a visible

1019 house, squared with other room the but rather Nor can this conclusion Supreme applying, support both the without and in binding precedent from conflict clearly establishing precedent, Court newly and this Court Court “totality entitled to such constitu- minted of the garages are circumstances” test gave deputies the looks to whether its protection, open tional which which door is person closed and whether a warning repeated- fair that their conduct violated has ly told to rights. majority constitutional While officers leave it. The Coffins’ majority opinion upends only a Fourth Amendment viola- the law of search finds case, so, by recog- qualified and seizure but the law of immu- tion this does nity an- nizing garage’s obvious status as as well.2 merely Although I believe that this case should be she exercised her Fourth

2. State, 833, ground rights. Rodriguez that the Coffins relied resolved on v. 964 So.2d Cf. deputies’ upon warrantless (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2007) (holding 837 that indi- —that into the Coffins’ home violated Coffins’ by telling vidual did not commit obstruction rights, constitutional re- established get deputy property to off his and retreat- gardless deputies probable of whether the had ing "deputy to his house when the had cause to arrest Mrs. Coffin—I also believe attempted engage to him in a consensual citi- majority's exposition of Florida law encounter”); State, zen H.H. v. 775 So.2d probable just wrong. on the cause issue is 397, (not (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2000) 398-99 ob- Despite the fact that this issue was not to flee struction when the officers had no Court, squarely major- before this en banc individual); State, authority to detain R.S. v. way ity goes far out of its to decide that 1026, So.2d (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 531 1026-27 probable cause for the arrest existed. Noth- 1988) (not obstruction to refuse to answer supporting law to in Florida comes close questions authority when officers had no to proposition. this answer). majority’s response demand an to this basic tenet of law constitutional is that majority reaches untenable conclu home; "the did here not enter the reasonably appeared sion that Mrs. Coffin to they rather entered an to access justice merely by failing open obstruct to and knock on the visible door to the kitchen.” Maj. Op. door of her front house. 1008- Maj. Op. response at 1009 n.12. But this establishing But threshold for "[t]he point. deputies confuses the Whether the vio- 843.02, commission of under [obstruction] [§ by entering lated the Fourth Amendment Fla. that the officer be in the ‘lawful Stat.] is case, garage, while central to the rest of this ‘legal duty.’ execution’ of a To meet this separate question they is a from whether had threshold, the conduct the officer must be probable cause to arrest Mrs. Coffin for ob- consistent with the Fourth Amendment....” structing justice. they authority As lacked the State, (Fla.Dist. C.E.L. v. 995 So.2d compel open any to Mrs. to Coffin door of her (Fla.2009). Ct.App.2008), aff'd, 24 So.3d 1181 open her failure to the front door and Amendment, deputies Under the Fourth attempt regardless to close the lawfully required could not have Mrs. Coffin constitutionality deputies subse- open front her door because did not quent entry into the could not have possess Kentucky a warrant of sort. See justice constituted obstruction of -, because she King, U.S. S.Ct. had a Fourth Amendment what (2011) ("When do L.Ed.2d 865 law enforcement she did. officers who are not armed with warrant Moreover, that, Florida law makes clear occupant knock on a door.... has no despite physically Mrs. Coffin’sfailure to take obligation speak.”); or to Tobin, restraining deputies' order from the United States v. hands, 1991) (en banc) deputies (11th could have nonetheless (recognizing Cir. effectively process by leaving served the re- occupants deny of a house are [an "free straining request alternatively order in the mailbox or on the front officer’s] [to enter] doorstep. through See Liberman v. Commercial Nat’l talk to the a closed door” [officers] warrant). Thus, Cnty., Bank when the officers lack a Mrs. Broward 256 So.2d (mail box); (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1971) Haney Coffin's her door did not ob- failure (Fla.Dist. legal duty; Corp., struct the execution of Olin 245 So.2d 672-74 lawful Background kitchen, I. lowed Brandau into the urged her to Taser Mr. Coffin. Worried that a facts, many majority The omits viewed husband, kill Taser could her since he had Coffins, light in the favorable to the most undergone five-way bypass surgery, Mrs. precisely why illustrate the Fourth Coffin rushed inside and held onto her bright-line prohibiting Amendment’s rule husband, pleading deputies with the not to entry into a home so warrantless essen- Taser him. Ignoring plea, Brandau tial. Brandau in- Deputy stepped When shot Mr. Coffin with the Taser. Lutz then garage, triggering side the Coffins’ grabbed Mrs. Coffin and threw her into stop closing, Dep- sensor to the door room, adjacent laundry causing her to uty Lutz into followed her fall on her hip. got Mrs. Coffin up to going Mrs. Coffin was told she was to be reenter the kitchen as Mr. Coffin was re- justice. arrested for obstruction Mrs. treating laundry towards the room refusing Coffin’s “offense” consisted of because Brandau, having already entry officers’ into her shot him with her warrantless Taser, right guaranteed hitting her him in Fourth the stomach with back, Amendment.3 her baton. Stumbling She told officers she Mr. Coffin fell Lutz, was “baffled” as her already husband had who in turn fell back into Mrs. served, Coffin, been and attempted causing to enter her all pile three to fall in a on hallway get papers to show to the top of one another in laundry room. deputies. Unbelievably, at point, minutes, For the next several Brandau grabbed Brandau her left arm and Lutz stood over Mr. Coffin and continued to grabbed arm, right her standing on her him, swing her inadvertently baton fracturing bare foot and pain, her toe. In striking Coffin, Lutz in the head. Mr. who Mrs. Coffin screamed and fell to the floor. had up trying protect himself, his hands Lutz then twisted Mrs. Coffin’s arm eventually managed separate Brandau behind her attempted back and to handcuff baton, from her point at which Brandau her, tearing her Hearing rotator cuff. his left and went into garage. Mr. Coffin scream, wife Mr. Coffin entered ga- kitchen, walked into the the baton placed rage, to pain, find his wife in with Lutz’s counter, on the and sat down on the floor. foot on her chest and her arm twisted Lutz got then to his feet and stood over behind her back. and, Mrs. laundry Coffin room “fire in eyes,” put gun

As Mr. Coffin his reached for his wife’s his to her head hand, Brandau Hearing shoved him back into cocked it. the door kitchen and again, threatened to shoot him with a yelled, Mrs. Coffin got gun! “he’s Coffin, Taser. Lutz released Mrs. fol- got gun!” He’s Another officer entered (front Ct.App.1971) doorstep). Recognizing process served” process when server left door); point, majority this defendant's asserts that a restrain- see also Fla. R. Civ. P. (governing "personal 1.070 service” of initial legal order is somehow a distinct form of orders). Thus, pleadings and court Mrs. Cof- process physically placed that must be in the fin’s failure to her front door could not assertion, recipient's intended That hands. have justice. constituted obstruction of however, support finds no in Florida law. majority's deputies conclusion that the had See, Too, e.g., Top King, Dollar Pawn Inc. v. probable contrary cause to arrest her runs 861 So.2d (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1265-66 both sanctity Florida law and the of the home. 2003) (applying general service-of-process law temporary restraining to service of a or- permits No statute or case law uninvited der); Yachts, Inc., Palamara v. World Class injunction. into a home to serve a civil 824 So.2d (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2002) majority cites none and I have found (holding that "personally defendant had been none.

1021 room, Lutz, home, “hey, hey, hey,” ‘by said ture of the even a fraction of an gun inch,’ much,” from Lutz’s hands. Oth and took the too Kyllo [is] v. United the States, 27, 37, er officers arrived on scene and 2038, 121 533 U.S. S.Ct. 150 4 (2001) both arrested. Silverman, Coffins were 94 (quoting L.Ed.2d 365 679) 512, (emphasis U.S. at 81 S.Ct. add- Deputies’ Entry II. The Warrantless ed). Garage Into The Violated Coffins’ Here, undisputed facts demonstrate Clearly Their Established Constitu- part Coffins’ attached Rights tional unambiguous physical of “the dimensions very At “the core” of the Fourth home,” Payton, 589, at [their] U.S. Amendment is “the of a man to 1371.5 S.Ct. was not a his home and retreat own there be separate building; porch it was not a with government free from unreasonable intru carport, sides or a likewise open on States, sion.” Silverman v. United all part sides. Rather it was of the foot- 505, 511, 679, 81 S.Ct. 5 L.Ed.2d 734 U.S. house, print of completely by enclosed (1961); see States v. U.S. Dist. United contiguous, exterior walls of the house Court, 313, 2125, 407 U.S. S.Ct. and covered the same roof. Appen- See (1972)(explaining L.Ed.2d 752 that “physi home). dix (picture of the Coffins’ Like cal of the home is the chief evil the front the automatic garage door against wording which the of the Fourth could be closed and locked to prevent en- directed”). Amendment While try by trespassers. And because it con- protects an individu a doorway leading tained to the other expectation al’s of privacy reasonable rooms, unnecessary to exit government variety intrusion in a of set go house order to from the tings, privacy none is the zone of “[i]n any other room or vice versa. According- more defined than when bounded ly, there is “no distinguish reason to unambiguous [the physical dimensions of Coffins’ [they] attached] where Payton individual’s home.” v. New York, time, work, 573, 589, spend posses- and store their 445 U.S. 100 S.Ct. (1980). Thus, sions, from kitchen, L.Ed.2d 639 “the Fourth den or [their] [their] [they] time, work, a firm spend has drawn line at the where and store house,” entrance to the possessions. id. at 100 their Simply put, person’s “any S.Ct. invasion of the struc- is as much a of his castle as investigation, 4. After an internal affairs language Payton. sions of the home” deputies were found to have expressly police violated Sar- Court held that the not, warrant, Department’s general may asota Sheriff's order without a cross the thresh- law, requiring conformity any to the and were old room that falls within the "unam- suspended pay home,” without for 160 hours and or- biguous physical dimensions of the complete training relating dered to remedial period. 445 U.S. at 100 S.Ct. 1371. But to search and seizure law. On administrative majority's reasoning, police under the appeal, allegations against deputies may cross the threshold of room within sustained, penalty were but their was re- unambiguous physical dimensions of the suspension pay duced to 40 hours without long type so as that of room was not training! and no remedial Thus, expressly Payton. discussed in accord- enter, majority, police may to the instance, den, kitchen, basement, majority’s disregarding despite 5. The rationale for Payton unambiguous the fact is that it "did not involve a that it falls within the Maj. Op. reasoning all.” at 1010. But this dimensions home. This conclusion ignores “unambiguous physical simply squared Payton. dimen- cannot be 1022 robbery,

the rest of his home.” United States v. armed the Court reversed the (9th Oaxaca, 1154, Cir. conviction because the officers had crossed 2000).6 the threshold of his home without a war 576, 603, rant. Id. at S.Ct. Indeed, by failing recognize that an Thus, Payton unambiguously held that the garage simply attached is another room in prohibits law enforce house, majority ignores the reali- entering ment officials from unambigu day society. ties modern American Ga- ous physical dimensions of the home with commonly rages put are now to a wide warrant, out a whether open its door is or uses; instance, variety of intimate for 589-90, 100 shut. Id. at S.Ct. 1371. country using Americans across the are garages parking attached spaces, gyms, as Because the Coffins’ attached laundromats, spaces, recording work stu- Payton bedroom, like the defendant’s ex- dios, facilities, storage game and rooms. isted within unambiguous physical di- attached, In respect, this an ga- enclosed home, mensions of the the Fourth Amend- rage building’s footprint within the is no it, law, protected ment as a matter of even than, say, different a bedroom used though deputies could see inside. The storage. for Because these areas exist therefore, deputies, violated the Fourth unambiguous within the physical dimen- by crossing Amendment its threshold and home, sions of the the use to which arresting Mrs. Coffin inside. (or put put) constitutionally are is ir- relevant: the Fourth recog- Amendment Validating point, this several Supreme that, qualification nizes without within Court and Eleventh Circuit cases have rec- dimensions, physical those “all details are ognized that the Fourth pro- Amendment Kyllo, intimate details.” at U.S. tects an garage just attached as it does 121 S.Ct. 2038. any other room in Kyllo, the house. In Supreme Court held a thermal-

Nor it constitutionally relevant wheth- imaging scan detecting “that the roof over er a room within happens these dimensions garage and a petition- side wall of [the] be visible to outsiders. Under relatively er’s home were precedent, compared Court hot majority ig- which the nores, the rest of the home substantially the fact that the Coffins’ garage door was warmer than legally neighboring In homes” consti- irrelevant. Payton, police tuted a officers saw one of the de- warrantless search of the home fendants sitting through bed violation of the Fourth his Amendment. 533 door, apartment entered without a war- U.S. at (emphasis S.Ct. 2038 add- ed). rant, shows, arrested him. 445 at Payton U.S. As its reliance on id. Although S.Ct. 1371. the officers had at 121 S.Ct. the Court treated probable cause to arrest the defendant Kyllo’s for garage attached as a of his garage may 6. None of the larger features of opening than a front door and identifies, 1012-13, majority Maj. Op. pro- may reveal more aof home's contents can- any justification distinguishing vides decisive, not be because that would mean that attached, garage enclosed from the rest of a door, having large sliding glass front door, window, Opening any home. or even a large open passes or even window that view, exposes public the interior of a home to arbitrary some undefined and size threshold does; just opening door and re- strip would the entire house of Fourth size, it, gardless door's relative protection. Surely, authority Amendment no house, any like other door to a can be closed supports necessary implica- this and absurd privacy prevent to maintain others from majority’s position. tion of the Indeed, entering. the fact that a and thus established that the applying Payton, analyzed the search of Fourth applies to an differently no than the search way in the same it applies house, the rest of the ultimately other room the home. ruled that the evidence from the garage obtained, was unlawfully demonstrates majority disregards Kyllo because that it considered the part of the petitioner’s reads the “sidewall of home” home. language meaning as the unreason- able search was conducted in part Moreover, the fact that the “ga- word home un-associated with the garage, and rage” appears only Kyllo once in actually because “garage” appears the word only supports proposition the that a garage opinion. once the attempts These at must be part considered a of the home for distinguishing Kyllo do not withstand care- Fourth Amendment purposes. It shows ful scrutiny. that there was no need for some elaborate analysis equating a garage with a home. First, the majority is incorrect in read- Thus, majority has no valid basis for Court’s reference to a disregarding Kyllo, and for concluding “side wall” to mean that spot the hot re- Payton's, bright-line rule prohibiting vealed the thermal imaging scan was warrantless into the home does not part Kyllo’s some home other than his apply here. garage. The scan Kyllo indicated that “had been using lights halide to grow case, mar- Another squarely on-point, is the ijuana house,” 30, in his 533 U.S. at 121 former Fifth Circuit’s decision in Kauz v. 2038; S.Ct. and since States, (5th room men- Cir.1938).7 United 95 F.2d 473 being tioned as relatively case, hot was the ga- In that the defendant moved sup- rage, and a growing operation with lamps press testimony from officers who entered plants obviously cannot be located and searched the defendant’s with- wall, only logical within way to read out warrant. Id. at 473-74. Like the opinion is that the scan revealed that garage, Coffins’ Kauz was Kyllo growing marijuana had been his building same that housed the such, garage. As regardless of whether living defendant’s quarters, had the scan also obtained evidence other leading to the living quarters, and had a parts Kyllo’s the Court had sliding opened door that onto the street. consider the lawfulness of the scan of the at Id. 473. When the officers arrived at garage, because that is where the evidence building, garage’s sliding door obtained, at issue was and the Court’s “was about three feet.” Id. at 474. holding the thermal imaging scan deputies here, As the did one of the offi- —that was an unconstitutional search because it cers entered and arrested obtained evidence regarding the interior of a co-defendant. Id. Someone then closed home—was necessarily sliding just as Mrs. Coffin did. premised legal on the Nonetheless, conclusion that the Id. a second officer forced garage was entitled to protections ac- way his into through the de- corded the home the Fourth Amend- living quarters, fendant’s inside, and once 40, ment. See id. at 121 S.Ct. In- 2038. “detected the smell of whisky, moonshine deed, the fact Court, the Supreme which thought [the officer] came from re- Prichard, 7. City In Bonner v. 661 F.2d dent all Fifth Circuit decisions handed down (11th Cir.1981) (en banc), prior to the close of September business on adopted Eleventh Circuit binding prece- as “on building” “a metal that was Holding that the was small Id. cently jugs.” broken city adjacent lot to the the corner of a premises the defendant’s search of officers’ petitioner Taylor in which resid- rights, dwelling the for- her constitutional violated ed.” at 52 S.Ct. 466. The Court that “the testi- Id. Fifth Circuit concluded mer by the garage was protected in held that the as to what saw mony of officers “part[ the same of] ... inadmissible.” Id. garage was added). premises Id. Significantly, [as residence].” the Court (emphasis added).9 testimony (emphasis S.Ct. ruling to the not restrict its did way his the officer who forced Sokolow, Likewise, in United States living the defendant’s garage through (5th Cir.1971), the 325-26 the held that officer who quarters, but also held, specifically with- former Fifth Circuit when door garage the attached the entered qualification, that an officer’s warrant- out the defendant’s constitu- was violated garage the less entrance into defendant’s deputies the rights. Because did tional In that violated the Fourth Amendment. here, this same Kauz controls thing the case, air condi- police a officer observed case.8 tioning ga- units inside of the defendant’s at Indeed, rage suspected stolen. Id. even it is unclear whether that he were when not, garage, contents of like garage is or the case law is 325. The the a those visible unambiguous entry garage, a warrantless into of the Coffins’ were that constitutionally prohibited. deputies from the outside. Id. Like the garage a case, First, did the officer entered the there is the Court’s deci- this States, This Taylor garage 286 U.S. without warrant. Id. sion v. United (1932). enter L.Ed. 951 In that Court held that the officer could not 52 S.Ct. case, garage the a warrant the Court held that Prohibition defendant’s without the agents suppressed violated the Fourth Amendment and evidence obtained at entry. from a from unconstitutional Id. liquor “garage when seized the Thus, propo- adjacent to residence” without a war- 326. the case stands for the [a] prohib- garage rant. Id. 52 S.Ct. 466. The sition that the Fourth Amendment inside, garage majority speculates that see the critical 8. The the interior and which is garage according majority. fact the connecting door residence to to the Finally, fact that focused might from the Court not have been visible the street. more who defen- illogical strip garage on the officer entered the But it would be living quarters change the fact dant’s does not protection when officers holding that officer the Court’s was that the can see such a because existence of garage directly through who entered the only supports the door the conclusion that attached, Amend- door also violated the Fourth indistinguishable enclosed holding, Court’s the structure ment. The home other room in the also con- opinion, its is all matters. taining majority's such Under the a door. reasoning, if officers can see door connect- majority attempts distinguish Taylor 9. The den, bedroom, ing a or kitchen to the rest of ground on the in that case home, they may enter the to access room distinction, however, was is ir- closed. That parts Nothing logic other the home. or above, Payton, relevant under discussed as authority supports this conclusion. ignores undisputed that Mrs. also fact Likewise, contrary attempted majority’s had to close her asser- Coffin tion, distinguished Taylor door. as the forced cannot be on the Just officers in Kauz lock, breaking ground way their case was into “only” open Maj. Op. deputies way feet. at 1011. here forced their three indisputably large garage by triggering opening The Coffins’ an electronic three-foot enough closing. for the officers in enter the sensor when Kauz surrounding regard- immediately residential the area a dwell- its into a the same ing protection house under the inside officers could see less of whether burglary law of was afforded house it.10 Dunn, itself.” 480 U.S. at 107 S.Ct. authority majority asserts that the added). (emphasis As further ex- case does not control this discussed above Dunn: plained in doc- competing a “number of because defining In the terms “mansion or dwell- considered, lists also be trines” must house,” Blackstone wrote that “no (1) “the Dunn analysis,” curtilage factor barn, warehouse, distant or like are (2) impliedly open public “areas privileges, under the same nor looked ” Maj. at 1017. Like Op. use.” Cinderella’s upon as man’s castle of defence.... majority to shoe- step-sisters, attempts Blackstone, 4 W. Commentaries 225. observed, however, force- inapplicable horn these “doctrines” Blackstone that “if barn, stable, warehouse, case, parcel misfit. fully despite into this the clear mansion-house, within majority men- first doctrine fence, though not under same common wholly be- curtilage—is inapplicable tions— or contiguous, burglary the same a roof very cause inherent the definition may therein; committed for capi- to applies only it land curtilage is that protects tal house and all privileges its outside, from, existing apart or structures appurtenances, branches and if within of curti- dwelling. purpose the actual or homestall.” Ibid. curtilage to determine lage analysis is whether 3,n. Id. at 300 (emphasis 107 S.Ct. 1134 area or structures outside the residence added). Thus, a dwelling was defined at Amend- given should be same Fourth law as the common home and all areas residence, ment accorded the protection contiguous,” “under the same roof or like not whether certain rooms within the four garage, curtilage the Coffins’ while was enjoy the walls of the residential structure defined as the structures “within same protection as same Fourth single common fence.”11 There not a is other rooms within that structure. See Court, Circuit, Supreme or Eleventh Flori- Dunn, 294, 300- United States v. 480 U.S. Supreme applying da Court case the curti- (1987) 03, 1134, 107 S.Ct. 94 L.Ed.2d 326 to a lage doctrine room under the same surrounding a (analyzing whether areas roof within the contiguous and walls curtilage). curtilage Indeed, con- barn were “The doing house. so be incon- would Payton’s at to extend cept originated common law to sistent un- bright-line Kauz, curtilage it 10. As with is irrelevant whether the doctrine here. But this reason- garage might have lacked visible Sokolow garage open is circular. That the was passageway another home. to door of the been a would have relevant consideration Payton Nor it under whether the relevant curtilage applied, doctrine see if open or While the closed. Dunn, at 480 U.S. 107 S.Ct. but it majority speculates about these facts in an question begs that fact to also use as Sokolow, distinguish holding attempt to curtilage decide reason to that the doctrine is entering clear the case remains that resi- with; words, applicable begin to in other dential without warrant is constitu- people pass- fact an area is to observable tionally impermissible. ing by one of the four factors identified in is distinguishing open Dunn for between an Ignoring this well-established understand- curtilage, doctrine, field and so it is circular to simulta- curtilage majority ing of the rely applying neously justify on that fact to fact that the asserts that the Coffins’ provides apply place. test in open a reason four-factor the first view, exposed public expressly distin- ambiguous rule that “threshold [of reasonably guished may not be crossed likened to a home] porch)).12 without a warrant.” 445 U.S. 100 front None these treatises or Dunn, attached, cases S.Ct. 1371. Even address enclosed building’s the actual footprint, Court assumed that “barn en- is within the joyed protection and under the same roof as the house. Such a nothing walkway, could not be entered and its contents like a drive- way, porch, carport, without a 480 U.S. at front all seized warrant.” of which holding In are outside the and lack walls. S.Ct. 1134. house officers did not violate the Fourth Amend- majority Perhaps the focuses on this so- ment into the barn from an peering impliedly called doctrine of “areas field, it that “the emphasized officers public use” because believes that barn, nor did they never entered the enter supports “doctrine” its somehow central respondent’s prem- other structure premise reasonably people expect de- Thus, ises.” Id. at 107 S.Ct. 1134. attached, liverymen to enter their enclosed support Dunn provides proposi- no deliverymen garages and that have a enter, police opposed tion that may however, to do so. un- premise, This inside, peer a residential structure when I realistic and unwarranted. believe that open. its door is expect, most Americans do and would “competing As to the doctrine” of “areas permit, including strangers, delivery- use,” impliedly open public majority men, to enter roam through their at- upon general relies statements from a tached, garages. majority enclosed treatise cases from and several intermedi authority cites no for its assertion that appellate involving ate facts far courts so deliverymen to have the enter an of this they removed from those case that attached, enclosed without consent. They have no here. relevance address Indeed, it is in unlawful Florida to enter a home, areas the four walls of a outside per- residential without the owner’s open walkways such as and driveways State, 123, mission. 557 G.D. v. So.2d home, leading up porches to the with no (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1990) (holding that there house, enclosed walls outside and car support “was sufficient evidence to the ad- ports at Maj. Op. with no all. at walls judication to trespass unoccupied for Wayne LaFave, 1010-11 R. (citing dwelling garage” in the when defendant A Search and Seizure: Treatise on the a entered the of vacant house with- 2.3(f) (4th ed.2004) § out the permission). owner’s (walkways, driveways, porches), State v. (Fla.Dist.Ct. 371, Detlefson, holding In “competing So.2d that these doc- (front App.1976) that porch apply, majority ignores and trines” Pay- street), visible to people bright-line prohibiting and State ton’s rule warrant- (Fla.Dist. Duhart, 810 So.2d 973-74 less home and effectively Ct.App.2002) that (carport and removes the Court’s Supreme presumption majority exception cites this and talk' to the also Court’s deci- Fourth Amend- Taylor, warrant,” sion United 458 F.3d States requirement ment’s 458 F.3d (11th Cir.2006), Maj. Op. at which only apply Deputy at would Lutz’s permissibility approaching addressed door, approach initial to the Coffins’front knocking residence on the front deputies' subsequent entry into the crossing per- the threshold of structure and and seizure of Mrs. Coffin. " forming a seizure. search or This ‘knock expecta- certain factual situations rise to the protected have level that individuals violations, homes. privacy their Under of constitutional and therefore tion of presump- either.”); instead of the id. majority’s opinion, reasonable officers would not will in the individuals privacy (relying ju- tion of at 1016 on “indications from showing have bear the burden of non-binding rists in cases” and intermedi- in each expectation privacy reasonable appellate ate state court decisions “of home, requiring in their separate room deputies may which the well have been every every keep them to door shut rights aware” to conclude that the Coffins’ pro- in order to secure the established). curtain drawn clearly were not This double Fourth Amendment within tections of the no standard makes sense. The basis for ruling homes. This strikes at “the them restricting binding our focus to case law is very core” of the Fourth Amendment. expect do not public “[w]e officials to Silverman, 365 U.S. at 81 S.Ct. 679. jurisdiction every sort out the law Marsh, country.” at 1032 n. 10. Qualified Immunity

III. The Law of Now, apparently, public we assume that majority Not does the erode the will through officials search the law of Amendment, but, of the Fourth protections every jurisdiction, only pay attention holding Coffins’ constitutional that support position those cases established, were not rights also they want if take —even it’s from a qualified immunity distorts law dissent!13 First, in ways. relying upon several dis majority also qualified distorts im- sents, circuits, even from other as well as munity by declaring law it will be appellate opinions from intermediate state exceedingly general “rare” for a constitu- courts, 1012-13, 1015, Maj. the ma Op. apply clarity tional rule to with obvious jority appears abrogate, in a one-sided § a defendant’s conduct in 1983 cases al- rule that way, our well-established limits leging a Fourth Amendment violation. qualified the relevant universe of cases for Maj. Op. at 1014-15. The decisions the to those of immunity purposes the United majority simply say cites do not that. In- Court, Circuit, Eleventh States stead, the decisions stand for the unre- highest pertinent of the and court state. proposition question markable that the of 1014, 1032 Cnty., Marsh v. Butler 268 F.3d particular expectation privacy whether a of (11th Cir.2001) (en banc). n. 10 While the is reasonable often is fact intensive. But § majority appears require to still 1983 here, require the Coffins’ claims do not a plaintiffs prior prove to follow our rule to analysis. Payton’s bright- fact-intensive established, rights clearly that their were prohibiting entry line rule warrantless permits rely defendants to on the now applies clarity the home obvious any jurist any jurisdiction opinions of in deputies’ the warrantless into the prove clearly that the law was estab Coffins’home. See Maj. Op. (“[Ojpin lished. at 1009 n.12 Finally, can that suggest majority’s hyper-technical ions from other courts the Kauz, reading Kyllo, jurists not know that counterfactual of reasonable would and assertion, Contrary majority’s to the Denno restricted our focus to "decisions of the U.S. 13. Volusia, Fla., Court, Cnty., Supreme the v. Sch. Bd. United States Court of (11th Cir.2000), Circuit, support Appeals cannot reli- for the Eleventh and the 1267 its non-binding precedents, highest pertinent ance on dissents and court of the state” when pre-dates determining right clearly a because Denno our en banc decision whether was es- Marsh, 1032 in 268 F.3d at n. which tablished. (as holding) specific opposed to its the stan- Sokolow, Taylor contravenes and that, abusing pris general, in Pelzer, physically U.S. Hope forth dard set past for would violate the oner misconduct 153 L.Ed.2d 730, 122 S.Ct. 742-44, at Eighth Amendment. Id. binding determining whether (2002), for contrary conclu S.Ct. This Court’s a constitu- clearly established precedents danger rigid, of a ov “expose[d] sion Hope, Supreme In Court right. tional similarity.” Id. at erreliance factual unduly imposing for an this court chastised 742, 122 S.Ct. 2508. clearly prong rigid established gloss on immunity Hol- qualified standard. binding prec- case, applicable In this Harland, rel. Holloman loman ex factually similar to edents are more even (“This (11th Cir.2004) cir- 1252, 1277 F.3d deputies’ precedents than conduct recently chastised Su- cuit was prison officials’ con- Hope were to the taking unwarrantedly an preme for Court duct, deputies and fair warn- gave thus of the circumstances which narrow view that violated Coffins’ their conduct responsible held public can be officials like ev- rights. constitutional violations.”). their constitutional Overrul- other in the ery room Coffins’ standard, which had re- ing this Court’s home, and Pay- within confines quired previous that the facts cases put one says ton that officers cannot foot facts case to the materially similar a home without a into the confines of Court, Supreme Court held before the warrant; that a warrantless Kyllo held when, established that the Fourth search violates factual distinctions be- “despite notable Kauz, Sokolow, Amendment; and relied on and the precedents tween the entering garage held without Taylor that prior the Court ... cases then before a warrant the Fourth Amendment. violates warning reasonable gave decisions nothing confusing There is unclear violated conduct then issue constitution- holdings the straightforward about al 536 U.S. at rights.” Hope, majority ignores cases. lan- these (internal quotation marks omit- S.Ct. 2508 cases, guage holdings of these ted). standard, proper Applying irrelevant, upon hypothetical seizes facts our concluded that two of Court legal that were neither theories men- prior gave the defen- precedents Hope nor of these tioned considered cases warning handcuffing prison- fair say dants fair provide did notice attached, for seven hitching post ers to a hours was enclosed entering constitutionally impermissible, despite the Fourth without warrant violates addressed several forms Simply put, majority fact that one case Amendment.14 including in- handcuffing Court punishment, exactly does what (as doing for in opposed Hope. cells or fences chastised this Court mates to own, Reading ordinary on their hitching posts) prolonged periods for these cases officers, time, people, especially case’s reasonable premise and the other broad noted, Kyllo "garage” only majority mentioning the word on the ex- As focuses garage open, in was incorrectly tent to which assumes that the once rele- Kauz garage speculates might that the have part in a vant search was conducted passageway to lacked a visible home, the rest separate garage; and it house disre- so; though says the decision never even gards Taylor garage in that because the case speculates that the likewise Soko- closed, though decision was even does not might closed and low have been also lacked expressly rely fact that the door was on the house, though, passageway even visible closed. so; says again, never it faults the decision attached, would understand that an protected by

enclosed the Fourth

Amendment. Home15 unnecessary was to exit the house in Coffins’ go

order to from garage other HULL, room or vice versa. Judge, Circuit concurring part dissenting (joined in part by Barkett, J., concurring part and dissent- MARTIN, Judge):1 Circuit (second part, at 44 alteration in original). my In view this is an open-and-shut Second, I recognize that the majority case, “open not an garage” case. focuses on a open-door difficult question. First, agree I Judge with Barkett’s de- However, we need not open- resolve the scription key, of these undisputed facts: because, door issue Ias understand the facts, undisputed Plaintiff Mrs. Coffin had [T]he Coffins’ attached garage already refused the Defendants unambiguous of “the physical dimen- door, her front pushed had the automatic home,”.... sions [their] button garage door, to close her and her separate building; was not a it was not a garage door closing Defendant before porch carport, sides or a like- Deputy entry. Brandau’s wise on all sides. Rather it was part of footprint house, com- Mrs. Coffin had completed what she pletely contiguous, enclosed exte- needed to do to Indeed, close her door. rior walls of the house and covered the deputies standing were about five feet the same roof. Appendix (picture See from the when pushed Mrs. Coffin home). Coffins’ Like the front the automatic button to shut her garage the automatic garage door could Seeing be door. door was prevent closed and locked to entry by closing, Defendant Brandau stepped into trespassers. And because it contained a the garage, breaking electronic-eye the doorway rooms, leading to the other safety it beam for the door causing and (Ex. Entry 15. Dist. My Ct. Docket 44-5 D-Photo- 1. majority concurrence is limited Home). to graph deputies its conclusion that the of Coffins' violated the rights. Coffins' constitutional actively protests where the homeowner open position. to to its door retreat entry. ga- effectively closed her Coffin had Mrs. Deputy Brandau and

rage door Defendant The “firm Amend line” Fourth by breaking the elec- up it back opened house ment at the entrance of the draws De- closing. its stopping tronic beam only bright.” firm “must be not but also act. Lutz witnessed this Deputy fendant States, 40, 121 Kyllo U.S. United garage; Lutz fol- entered Brandau (2001). 2038, 2046, 150 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 94 lowed. binding precedent, which today, Before our short, deputies violated Mrs. Cof- In that an established attached rights Amendment when fin’s Fourth part treated of the under the “house” her and the Amendment, entered closed drew firm and Fourth clearly Amendment law estab- Kyllo’s Fourth bright apply But rather than line. could not enter deputies rule, lished sets bright majority line now after she closed the Coffin’s home Mrs. on a of con standard that relies number Wilson, Vinyard door. See text-specific circumstance-dependent (11th Cir.2002) (considering the so, has doing factors. In this court con- of the events and plaintiffs version stripped very rights the Coffins standard, al- cluding clarity” the “obvious Amendment intended to the Fourth meet, in was satisfied though difficult to protect. clearly established law is-

relation “any today, physical Until invasion sue). home, ‘by the structure of the even inch,’ Kyllo, too fraction of an was much.” MARTIN, Judge, concurring in Circuit U.S. 121 S.Ct. at 2045. But now (joined part by in dissenting Circuit, police citizens in this neither nor DUBINA, Judge):1 Chief have notice of the advance bounds in happen fully Judge dis- Fourth Amendment. What will I concur Barkett’s example, person the next case? For if a senting opinion because Fourth at- normally keeps the of her rights Amendment violated who I tached closed is slow to close clearly sep- here were established. write just work arately only upon p.m., as Mr. her return from at 6:30 emphasize free into the denied law enforcement now to dart and Mrs. Coffin have been relief home, momentarily door? law enforce- “totality this intrusion their Is into go ga- through test in ment to then of the circumstances” established allowed shifting stan- majority nothing pro- rage does into the house? opinion here not muddles people tect in their homes from dard established similar but Specifically, jurisprudence, intrusions the future. our Fourth sanctity. home strip of its indefinite standard established threatens Indeed, may present that this today to one the I fear case court reduces many unconstitutional entries under which a first of established circumstances prohibited are no prevent longer can law homes that person enforcement law. this rea- by clearly established For entering her her warrant, son, Judge no to those set out even where the officer has addition majority’s were holding I that Mr. violated. concur rights and Mrs. Coffin’s dissent, I respectfully Barkett her dis- opinion. majority

sent from the

BILLUPS-ROTHENBERG, INC.,

Plaintiff-Appellant, AND

ASSOCIATED UNI REGIONAL PATHOLOGISTS,

VERSITY INC.

(doing business ARUP Laborato

ries) Laboratories, Inc., and Bio-Rad

Defendants-Appellees, 2-20,

Does Defendants.

No. 2010-1401. Appeals,

United States Court

Federal Circuit.

April

Case Details

Case Name: John Coffin v. Stacy Brandau

Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Date Published: Jun 3, 2011

Citation: 642 F.3d 999

Docket Number: 08-14538

Court Abbreviation: 11th Cir.