Thе United States appeals from a final judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut (Peter C. Dorsey, Judge), granting John Cheung’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus and ordering his discharge from custody pursuant to a ruling by United States Magistrate Judge Joan G. Margolis granting the Government’s request for extradition. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the judgment of the district court and remand with instructions to vacate the writ of habeas corpus and to enter a certification of extraditability and order of commitment.
I. BACKGROUND
We decide on appeal whether the Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government *84 of Hong Kong For the Surrender of Fugitive Offenders (the “Hong Kong Extradition Agreement” or the “Agreement”), Deс. 20, 1996, U.S.-H.K, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-3 (1997), is a “treaty” between the United States and a “foreign government” such that the magistrate judge had jurisdiction to certify Cheung’s extraditability. See 18 U.S.C. § 3184. To provide a context for understanding the opinions below and our discussion, we recount briefly the evolution of the legal status of Hong Kong, 1 the development of the extradition relationship between the United States and Hong Kong, and the procedural background of this case.
A. Legal Relationship between Hong Kong and the People’s Republic of China
Prior to the Opium Wars of the mid-19th century between China and the United Kingdom (the “U.K.”), Hong Kong was an integral part of imperial China. British rule over Hong Kong was achieved in three stages. In 1842, China ceded rule over Hong Kong Island to the U.K. “in perpetuity” through the Treаty of Nanking, which settled the First Opium War. See Ming K. Chan, Hong Kong: Colonial Legacy, Transformation, and Challenge, 547 Annals Am. Aoau. Pol. & Soc. Sd. 11,12 (1996). Under the 1860 Convention of Peking, which ended the Second Opium War, China relinquished the Kowloon Peninsula permanently. See id.; Roger Buckley, Hong Kong: The Road to 1997 2-3 (1997). Finally, following China’s defeat in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95, the U.K. secured a lease of the New Territories for 99 years, until June 30, 1997. See Chan, supra, at 12; Buckley, supra, at 3.
As the lease period for the New Territories ran toward expiration, the U.K. and the People’s Republic of China (the “PRC”) initiated negotiations for the return of sovereignty over Hong Kong to the PRC. These talks culminated in the Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong (the “Joint Declaration”), which the U.K. and the PRC signed on December 19, 1984. See Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China (“Basic Law”), preamble, at ii. In 1990, China promulgated the Basic Law, a framework for the governance of Hong Kong upon reversion to Chinese rule. The Basic Law created the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (the “HKSAR”), governed by the principle of “one country, two systems.” Basic Law, preamble, at ii. Under this principle, Hong Kong is recognized as an “inalienable part” of the PRC, but its capitalist system is to be “unchanged for 50 years [from July 1, 1997].” Basic Law, arts. 1 & 5.
The Basic Law establishes an executive authority, see Basic Law, art. 59, and enumerates its powers and functions, among them, “to conduct relevant external affairs on its own” subject to the ultimate authority of the central government of the PRC, id., art. 13; see id., art. 62(3). It also creates a new legislature, see id., arts. 66-79 & annex II, and preserves the existing judicial system, except for the creation of a new high court, the Court of Final Appeal. See id., arts. 81 & 82. Moreover, the Basic Law authorizes the HKSAR government to “make appropriate arrangements with foreign states for reciprocal juridical assistance” subject to the approval of the central government of the PRC. Id., art. 96.
B. The Hong Kong Policy Act
In 1992, Congress enacted the United States-Hong Kong Policy Act (the “Hong Kong Policy Act” or the “Act”), 22 U.S.C. §§ 5701-5732. See Pub.L. No. 102-383, 106 Stat. 1448 (1992). Among other things, the Act expresses the support of the President and Congress for the 1984 Joint Declaration, see 22 U.S.C. § 5701, *85 and articulates a general bilateral framework for U.S. relations with the HKSAR after June 30,1997, see 22 U.S.C. §§ 5711-5715. The Act expresses the sense of Congress that the United States should seek to establish and expand direct bilateral agreements with the HKSAR in ten particularized areas as well as “other appropriate areas;” foreign relations is not specifically enumerated. 22 U.S.C. § 5711(2). The Act also calls for the United States to “continue to fulfill its obligations to Hong Kong under international agreements” on the basis of reciprocity, regardless of whether the PRC is a signatory to the particular international agreement, unless and until such obligations are legally modified or terminated. 22 U.S.C. § 5712(2).
C. United States-Hong Kong Extradition Relations
From 1977 to June 30, 1997, extradition relations between the United States and Hong Kong were governed by the Treaty on Extradition between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, June • 8, 1972, U.S.-U.K., 28 U.S.T. 227, made applicable to Hong Kong by an exchange of diplomatic notes on October 21, 1976,
see
28 U.S.T. at 238-41, and the Extradition Supplementary Treaty Concerning the Extradition Treaty Between the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, June 25, 1985, T.I.A.S. No. 12050 (the “Supplementary Treaty”), made applicable to Hong Kong by its terms.
See
Supplementary Treaty, art. 6(a) & annex;
see also In re Request for Extradition of McMullen,
Anticipating the expiration of the these treaties upon the restoration of Chinese rule over Hong Kong, the United States and Hong Kong in 1996 concluded the Hong Kong Extradition Agreement as a replacement. In March 1997,' the President transmitted the Agreement to the Senate for its advice and consent. With the transmittal letter, the President included a letter of submittal from the Secretary of State noting that the agreement was a “treaty” for purposes of United States law:
Although entitled an “Agreement” to reflect Hong Kong’s unique juridical status, for purposes of U.S. law, the instrument will be considered to be a treaty, and therefore I ;am submitting it to you for transmittal to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification.
Id. at v. The Agreement was favorably reported by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (the “Committee”) to the full Senate on August 19, 1997. See S. Exec. Rep. No. 105-2 at 8-10 (1997). On October 23, 1997, the Agreement was ratified by a two-thirds vote of the Senate. See 143 Cong. Rec. Sil,165-02 (daily ed. Oct. 23,1997).
The Agreement enumerates 36 categories of “offences” for which a fugitive shall be surrendered, including “[ojbtaining property or pecuniary advantage by deception; ... unlawful handling or receiving of property; ... or any other offence in respect of property involving fraud[.]” Hong Kong Extradition Agreement, art. 2(l)(x). Article 13 provides that the alleged offender shall be surrendered if the evidence against the fugitive satisfies the standards of the requested country for holding a defendant over for trial, or if the evidence is sufficient to find the fugitive guilty, to convict, or to sentence under the law of the requesting country. See id., art. 13. However, the Agreement prohibits extradition for alleged political offenses and creates a humanitarian exception to extradition. See id., arts. 6 and 7. Finally, the Agreement establishes procedures for requesting and surrendering a fugitive. See id., arts. 8-12, 14-19.
*86 D. This Case
1. Procedural Background
The essential facts of this case are undisputed. In June 1998, Cheung was arrested in Connecticut to answer a complaint for extradition pursuant to the Hong Kong Extradition Agreement. The complaint charged him with 33 counts of obtaining property by deception and one count of evasion of liability by deception under Hong Kоng law.
See In re Extradition of Cheung,
On December 24, 1998, Magistrate Judge Margolis held an extradition hearing pursuant to the federal extradition statute, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3181-3196. See United States v. Cheung, No. 3:98M51, slip op. at 13 (D.Conn. Feb. 5, 1999) (“Cheung II”). Section 3184 provides, in relevant part:
Whenever there is a treaty or convention for extradition between the United States and any foreign government [ ] any justice or judge of the United States, or any magistrate authorized by a court of the United States ... may, upon complaint made under oath, charging any person found within his jurisdiction, with having committed within the jurisdiction of any such foreign government any of the crimes provided for by such treaty or convention, or provided for under section 3181(b), issue his warrant for the apprehension of the person so charged....
18 U.S.C. § 3184 (emphasis added). Cheung challenged the court’s jurisdiction on the ground that the Hong Kong Extradition Agreement was not a treaty between the United States and a “foreign government” as that term is used in § 3184. See Cheung II, slip op. at 6-7. He argued that a “foreign government” refers to the government of a foreign sovereign. See id. Because the HKSAR government is a subsovereign of the PRC, he asserted that the HKSAR government is not a cognizable party under § 3184, and, therefore, no enforceable treaty exists which authorizes his extradition to the HKSAR. See id. In the absence of such a treaty, he contends that the magistrate judge lacked jurisdiction under § 3184 to certify his extraditability.
2. The Magistrate Judge’s Decision
The magistrate judge held that the Hong Kong Extradition Agreement is valid and enforceable. See id. at 7-8. She noted that, notwithstanding the PRC’s ultimate control of foreign affairs relating to the HKSAR, Article 151 of the Basic Law provides that the HKSAR government “may, on its own, using the name ‘Hong Kong, China,’ maintain and develop relations and conclude and implement agreements with foreign states and regions.” Id. at 4. The magistrate judge alsо observed that the Basic Law created execu *87 tive, judicial, and legislative bodies which govern Hong Kong, authorized an economic system independent of the PRC, and preserved civil and political rights. See id. at 4. Based largely on these factors, the magistrate judge concluded that:
[w]ith its own legislative body, its “high degree of autonomy on all matters other than defense and foreign affairs,” and its unique “one country, two systems” for economic and legal matters, under the Basic Law and the United States-Hong Kong Policy Act, HKSAR does constitute a “foreign government” for purposes of § 3184.
Id. at 7.
Having found at a prior proceeding probable cause to believe that Cheung is guilty of the charged offenses,
see Cheung I,
3. The District Court’s Decision
Cheung timely filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which the district court granted without a hearing. See In re Extradition of John Cheung, No. 3:99MC110, slip op. at 6-7 (D.Conn. Sept. 1, 1999) (“Cheung III”). The court noted that 18 U.S.C. § 3184 confers jurisdiction on federal courts to hold extradition proceedings only pursuant to treaties with a “foreign government.” See id. at 2. It then interpreted the term “foreign government” by reference to 18 U.S.C. § 3181, see id. at 3, which provides, in relevant part:
The provisions of this chapter relating to the surrender of persons who have committed crimes in foreign countries shall continue in force only during the existence of any treaty of extradition with such foreign government.
18 U.S.C. § 3181(a) (emphasis added). The court construed “such foreign government” to refer to the government of the “foreign country” where the charged crime was allegedly committed. See Cheung III, slip op. at 2-3. It held .that because the HKSAR is not a “foreign country,” thе Hong Kong Extradition Agreement did not satisfy the § 3184 condition precedent for federal jurisdiction over Cheung’s extradition. See id. at 6. In so holding, the district court implicitly equated a “foreign country” with a “foreign sovereign.” See id. at 2-3.
The court also reasoned that Congress was unlikely to have intended to extradite foreign nationals to subsovereigns. See id. at 4. In support of this conclusion, the court noted several cases which have referred to extradition as a process between sovereign nations. See id.
Moreover, the district court held that neither the Hong Kong Extradition Agreement nor-the Hong Kong Policy Act can be construed to have modified or repealed the federal extradition statute. See id. at 4-5. As to the Agreement, the district judge reasoned that this effort “by the Executive brаnch and the Senate do[es] not supplant the prior legislation of .the entire Congress.” Id. at 5. Where Congress has exercised its authority to limit the Executive’s latitude in conducting foreign relations by enacting the extradition statute, extradition contrary to the terms of the statute would “pose[ ] a substantial threat to the separation of powers.” Id. at 6. As to the Policy Act, the district court found no “repugnancy” between the Act and the statute since the Act merely affirmed Congress’s intent to fulfill existing treaty obligations, but did not itself authorize extradition. See id. at 5.
Accordingly, the district court held that Cheung may not be extradited to the HKSAR pursuant to § 3184 and ordered his release from custody. See id. at 6-7. This appeal by the Government followed.
II. DISCUSSION
In the United States, extradition is governed by the federal extradition statute.
See
18 U.S.C. §§ 3181-3196. Section 3184 of the statute mandates that extradition must be based on a treaty or conven
*88
tion, with some exceptions not at issue in this case.
See id.
§ 3184. In general, extradition treaties have served several functions, including: securing the obligation to surrender a fugitive; insuring reciprocity between the signatories; tailoring the list of extraditable offenses to specific political situations; and establishing the procedures each party must follow visa-vis the other. 1 John Bassett Moore,
Moore on Extradition
§ 72, at 82 (1890). Whereas the treaty promulgates the inter-party procedures, the federal extradition statute allocates responsibility for extradition within the U.S. Government to a judicial officer and the Secretary of State.
See
18 U.S.C. § 3184. The judicial officer’s inquiry is confined to the following: whether a valid treaty exists; whether the crime charged is covered by the relevant treaty; and whether the evidence marshaled in support of the complaint for extradition is sufficient under the applicable standard of proof.
See Lo Duca v. United States,
If the judicial officer answers these questions in the affirmative, he or she “shall certify” the extraditability of the fugitive to the Secretary of State.
See
18 U.S.C. § 3184. An order certifying a request for extradition is not a final judgment that is appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
See Spatola v. United States,
If habeas relief is denied, the Secretary of State has sole discretion to weigh the political and other consequences of extradition and to determine finally whether to extradite the fugitive.
See
18 U.S.C. § 3186;
see also Murphy v. United States,
This case requires us to conduct the first prong of the habeas analysis: whether the magistrate judge had subject matter jurisdiction to certify Cheung’s extraditability. That depends, in turn, on whether the Hong Kong Extradition Agreement is a “treaty” between the United States and a “forеign government” within the meaning of the federal extradition statute. For the reasons explained below, we hold that the Agreement is, but for somewhat different reasons than the magistrate judge articulated.
A. The Political Question Doctrine
It has long been part of our settled law that the authority to recognize a foreign government is constitutionally committed to the Executive Branch.
See, e.g., Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co.,
B. Interpreting the Federal Extradition Statute
1. The Text
Cheung argues, and the district сourt held, that the extradition statute authorizes the United States to enter into extradition treaties with only foreign sovereigns. In construing the terms of a statute, we look first to its language to ascertain its plain meaning.
See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co.,
The extradition statute confers jurisdiction on federal judicial officers to conduct extradition proceedings based on “a treaty or convention for extradition between the United States and any foreign government.” 18 U.S.C. § 3184. Although the term “treaty” is commonly understood in modern usage as a “contract! ] between independent nations,”
Santovincenzo v. Egan,
Thus, it is clear that the term “treaty” had a meaning broader than an agreement between fully sovereign or independent entities. Indeed, at the time the extradition statute was enacted in 1848, “treaty” was also defined as “[t]he treating of matters with a view to settlement; discussion of terms, conference negotiations” and “[a] settlement or arrangement arrived at by treating or negotiation.” Oxford English Dictionary 465 (2d ed.1991) (providing annotations about the uses of words in different historical eras); see Prucha, supra, at 24. Nothing in these definitions suggest that only a sovereign nation can enter into treaties, as Cheung contends.
We consider next the § 3184 requirement that the treaty be between the United States and “any foreign government.” We believe the district court correctly construed “foreign government” by reference to § 3181, which clarifies that the relevant foreign government is the government of the foreign country where the alleged extraditable crime was committed.
3
This provision expressly applies to the entire chapter 209 of title 28. Moreover, the title of § 3184 — “Fugitives from foreign country to United States”— also indicates that the term “any foreign government” within the text means the government of any foreign country. “Although mindful of the limited role of statutory headings in textual interpretation,” this Court has recognized that statutory headings may be used to resolve ambiguities in the text.
United States v. Baldwin,
If § 3184 contains a sovereign nation requirement, that requirement would have to derive from the term “foreign country,” because it cannot be implied from the term “treaty.” The district court, without discussion, equated “foreign country” with a foreign sovereign or foreign central government. The Government contests this interpretation, arguing that if a “foreign country” means only a foreign sovereign government, then the word “any” in “аny foreign government” would be rendered meaningless. See 18 U.S.C. § 3184. It maintains that the HKSAR government is indisputably both “foreign” and a “government” and therefore falls within the meaning of “any foreign government.” It ar *91 gues further that if Congress had intended to restrict the authority of the Executive to enter into extradition treaties with foreign sovereigns only, it would have used the modifiers “national,” or “central,” or “fully autonomous” foreign government.
We agree with the Government that a “foreign country” does not refer solely to a foreign sovereign or independent nation. Both now and in the mid-1800’s, the word “country” had a variety of meanings, including, among others: “a tract or expanse of land of undefined extent,” Oxford English Dictionary, supra, at 1041; “a tract or district having more or less definite limits in relation to human occupation,” id.; and the territory or land of a nation; usually an independent state, or a region once independent and still distinct in race, language, institutions, or historical memories, id. at 1042 (emphasis added). Under the first two definitions, “country” denotes a geographic, not political, concept. To the extent that the term “foreign country” as used in the extradition statute describes where the alleged offense occurred, see 18 U.S.G. §§ 3181 & 3190, it could certainly be referring to the physical land or a place abroad. Under this conception, Hong Kong could be a “foreign country,” in which case the HKSAR government could be the government of a “foreign country” under § 3181 and a “foreign government” under § 3184. If “country” is understood as a political entity, as under the third definition, it is “usually” an independent state, and thus need not always be so. The Suрreme Court has long recognized the ambiguity of the term “foreign country” as reflected in these various meanings:
It may be taken to mean foreign territory or a foreign government. In the sense of territory, it may embrace all of the territory subject to a foreign sovereign power. When referring more particularly to a foreign government, it may describe a foreign state in the international sense ...; or it may mean a foreign government which has authority over a particular area or subject-matter, although ... only a component part, or a political subdivision, of the larger international unit.
Burnet v. Chicago Portrait Co.,
2. Ambiguity and Statutory Purpose
Wherе a statute is textually ambiguous, its terms must be determined by reference to the purpose of the particular statute. In
Burnet,
the Supreme Court held that the State of New South Wales was a “foreign country” within the meaning of § 238(a) of the 1921 Revenue Act, which granted a credit for taxes paid by a domestic corporation to “any foreign country.”
Id.
at'4 n. 1, 21,
In interpreting “country” in the specific context of the federal extradition law, our task is “to consider the object of the [statute] and to construe [its terms] so as to achieve, not defeat, its aim.”
Burnet,
3. Legislative History of the Federal Extradition Statute
To ascertain the meaning of a textually ambiguous statute, we may con-suit its legislative history.
See, e.g., Oklahoma v. New Mexico,
[B]y treaty stipulations made with more than one Government of Europe, we were bound to deliver up fugitives who have fled from justice on the commission of crime. Cases ... shoioed that it was necessary to enlarge the facilities to comply with our obligations. It often happened that an individual came to this country where the crime was obvious, and the application for the fugitive regular; but there were no such officers in the part of the country where the fugitive was found as were authorized or were willing to take on themselves the burden and weighty responsibility of issuing a warrant to arrest and to take the preliminary proceedings toward handing over the individual to the properly authorized officer. The object of this bill was to appoint officers and to authorize others to carry out the provisions of the treaties with France and England, at all times, without delay and the danger of a denial of justice. It provided for the appointment of commissioners, or authorized the courts of the United States to aрpoint commissioners to take the preliminary steps, and to procure the authority of the Secretary of State, to whom the treaties give the authority to deliver up fugitives to foreign countries, for the accomplishment of the desired object.
*93
Cong. Globe,
30th Cong., 1st Sess. 868 (June 23, 1848) (statement of Rep. J.R. Ingersoll) (emphasis added). As this statement explains, the object of the statute was to enable the United States to meet its obligations under extradition treaties
5
by creating a system for regularizing the review of extradition requests.
See Factor v. Laubenheimer,
C. Legislative History of the Hong Kong. Extradition Agreement
Our conclusion is bolstered by the extensive legislative history of the Agreement, which leaves no doubt that in enacting the Agreement, both the Executive Branch and the Senate intended to conclude a treaty with the government of HKSAR, rather than with its sovereign, the PRC. In its report, the Senate Committee expressly declared that the HKSAR government’s status as a subsovereign did not undermine the validity of the Agreement:
The treaty raised- several key questions for the Committee and the Senate to consider, not least of which is the unique nature of the treaty itself. The agreement is with a sub-sovereign entity, not a sovereign state. Such an arrangement is not the norm. It raises, in particular, a fundamental question about whether the treaty partner has the power to enter such an agreement. It is clear that Hong Kong does; the Agreement has been authorized by both the previous sovereign (the United Kingdom) and the current sovereign (the People’s Republic of China).
S. Exec. Rep. No. 105-2, at' 8 (emphasis added). Further, notwithstanding the official title of the document, the Committee confirmed the status of the Agreement as a “treaty” within the meaning of the extrаdition statute:
[Tjhis agreement is ... intended to be a “treaty or convention for extradition between the United States and a foreign government” for purposes of Title 18, United States Code, Section 3184.
*94 Id. at 11. 6 Thus, the Committee confirmed the capacity of the HKSAR government as a subsovereign to enter into the treaty, as required by the extradition statute, and the validity of the Agreement as a treaty under § 3184. 7
Notably, the Committee did not question the authority of the Executive to enter into an extradition treaty with a subsovereign. On the contrary, the Committee recommended the Agreement to the full Senate for ratification because it would serve dual American policy interests.
See United States v. Pink,
D. The Status of Treaties
Cheung argues, and the district court agreed, that enforcement of the Agreement would threaten our system of separation of powers. According to Cheung, an act passed by both houses of Congress and signed by the President cannot be implicitly amended or repealed by a later treaty executed by the President and ratified by the Senate without the participation of the House of Representatives. He contends that a contrary holding would amount to usurpation of Congress’s constitutionally vested legislative authority. This argument is premised on a statutory interpretation that brings the 1848 act intо conflict with the Agreement, a construction which we have rejected for the reasons explained above.
Of equal significance, this contention fundamentally miscomprehends the status of treaties in our constitutional scheme. The Supremacy Clause declares the Constitution, federal law, and treaties to be “the supreme Law of the Land.” U.S. Const, art. VI, cl. 2. It is well-established that under the Supremacy Clause a self-executing treaty — one that operates of itself without the aid of legislation — is to be regarded in the courts as equivalent to an act of the legislature.
See Whitney v. Robertson,
The Agreement is self-executing.
See
Letter of Transmittal, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-3, at III (“As a treaty, this Agreement will not require implementing legislation.”); S. Exec. Rep. No. 105-2, at 2 (“Unlike in the United States, Hong Kong requires additional implementing legislation[.]”);
see also Terlinden v. Ames,
We have considered all of the appellee’s other arguments and find them to be without mеrit. Therefore, the judgment of the district court is reversed. We remand this case to the district court to vacate the writ of habeas corpus and to enter a certification of extraditability and an order of commitment.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained above, we reverse the judgment of the district court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Notes
. As used in this opinion, "Hong Kong” refers to the physical territory comprising three areas: Hong Kong Island, the Kowloon Peninsula, and the New Territories (an area comprising 92 percent of the total terrain of the three areas).
. In
Cheung I,
decided before Hong Kong’s return to Chinese rule, the magistrate judge granted a prior request for Cheung’s extradition.
Id.,
. In 1948, as part of an overall recodification of title 18 of the United States Code, § 3181 was amended. Prior to the 1948 amendments, this section read:
The provisions of this Title relating to the surrender of persons who have committed crimes in foreign countries shall continue in force during the existence of any treaty of extradition with any foreign government, and no longer. R.S. § 5275, reprinted in H.R.Rep. No. 80-304, at 242 (1948) (emphasis added). The recodification changed "Title” to "chapter” and "any foreign government, and no longer” to "such foreign government.” 18 U.S.C. § 3181. The legislative history of the amendment makes clear that it resulted in only "[m]inor changes ... in phraseology.” H.R.Rep. No. 80-304, at 158 (1948).
. The courts in Rossi, McCulloch, and Blanco sought to reconcile a later statute with a preexisting treaty, whereas in the present case, we seek to reconcile an earlier statute as it applies to a subsequent treaty.
. Although the statement referred to the treaties with France and England, the object of the extradition law could not have been limited to then-existing treaties because the United States had, by 1848, begun negotiations with, among others, Mexico, Prussia, Belgium, and Austria. See Moore, supra, § 74, at 84.
. The Committee Report explained that the document was termed an "agreement” rather than a "treaty” and used the word "surrender” rather than "extradite” at the request of the PRC, but referred to these as "semantic preferences” only. S. Exec. Rep. No. 105-2, at 11.
. In recommending the Agreement to the full Senate, the Committee explained that the Agreement had been authorized by the PRC. See S. Exec. Rep. No. 105-2, at 8. This fact was also noted by the President in his Letter of Submittal, see S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-3, at v, and is incorporated into the preamble to the Agreement. The PRC's approval of the Agreement is, however, of no moment to our interpretation of the extradition statute. Whatever significance the political branches of our Government may have attached to the PRC’s endorsement, that is a political issue that is constitutionally committed to them.
.
Valentine v. United States ex rel. Neidecker,