JOHN AMPLEMAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. DISH NETWORK SERVICE, LLC, and MILLENNIUM HOME SECURITY, INC., Defendants-Respondents.
This matter is before the Court on Defendants City of St. Louis, Jimmie Edwards, and Michael Edwards‘s Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 71). The motion is fully briefed and ready for disposition. For the reasons set forth below, the motion will be granted in part and denied in part.
I. Background
On August 20, 2020, Charles Bryant was being held as a pretrial detainee at the City of St. Louis Justice Center (“CJC“). At approximately 2:00 a.m., correctional officers observed Bryant behaving erratically in his cell. Bryant was eventually extracted from his cell and moved to a medical observation cell. During the extraction and subsequent move, various officers used physical force and pepper spray on Bryant. After being placed in the medical observation cell, Bryant became unresponsive. Medical staff and paramedics performed life-saving meаsures, but Bryant was pronounced dead later that morning.
Plaintiffs, the Estate of Charles A. Bryant and Bryant‘s surviving children, brought this action under
II. Legal Standard
The Court shall grant a motion for summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Once the moving party has met its burden, the nonmoving party may not rest on the allegations in its pleadings but must set forth specific facts and point to evidence in the rеcord showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248;
III. Discussion
A. Section 1983 Municipal Liability (Count VII)
Plaintiffs seek to hold the City of St. Louis liable for the alleged constitutional violations committed by the individual officers. Under Monell v. Dep‘t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), a municipality cannot be held liable under
To establish municipal liability, a plaintiff must identify (1) an official policy, (2) an unofficial custom, or (3) a deliberately indifferent failure to train or supervise. Mick v. Raines, 883 F.3d 1075, 1079 (8th Cir. 2018). Here, Plaintiffs argue the City is liable based on both an unofficial custom of exсessive force and a failure to train and supervise its correctional officers.
To demonstrate liability based on an unofficial custom, a plaintiff must show: (1) the existence of a continuing, widespread, persistent pattern of unconstitutional misconduct by the governmental entity‘s employees; (2) deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of such misconduct by the governmental entity‘s pоlicymaking officials after notice to the officials of that misconduct; and (3) that the plaintiff was injured by acts pursuant to the governmental entity‘s custom, i.e., that the custom was the moving force behind the constitutional violation. Corwin v. City of Independence, 829 F.3d 695, 700 (8th Cir. 2018).
Plaintiffs argue that the City had a custom of using excessive force against detainees at the CJC, particularly in the context of cell extractions. In support of this argument, Plaintiffs point to several prior incidents involving the use of chemical agents and physical force against detainees, as well as testimony from former detainees and staff regarding the culture at the jail. However, “a single incident, or a series of isolated incidents, is usually insufficient to establish a custom.” Jane Doe A v. Special Sch. Dist. of St. Louis Cnty., 901 F.2d 642, 646 (8th Cir. 1990).
The City Defendants argue that the incidents cited by Plaintiffs are insufficient to establish a widespread pattern of unconstitutional conduct. They contend that each incident was investigated and that, in many cases, the use of force was found to be justified under jail policy. The Court finds that while Plaintiffs have produced evidence of multiple use-of-force incidents at the CJC, they have failed to show that these incidents were so persistent and widespread as to constitute a “custom” of unconstitutional excessive force. Furthermore, Plaintiffs have not presented sufficient evidence that policymaking officials were deliberately indifferent to any such pattern of misconduct. Summary judgment will therefore be granted in favor of the City on Plaintiffs’ custom-based municipal liability claim.
2. Failure to Train and Supervise
A municipality may be liable for a failure to train or supervise its employees only where the failure “amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights оf persons with whom the [employees] come into contact.” City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989). To establish deliberate indifference in this context, a plaintiff must ordinarily show that the municipality had notice that its training or supervision was inadequate and likely to result in a constitutional violation. Brewington v. Keener, 902 F.3d 796, 803 (8th Cir. 2018). Notice can be shown by evidence of a pattern of similar constitutional violations or by showing that the need for more or different training is “so оbvious” that the municipality‘s failure to provide it can be characterized as deliberate indifference. City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 390.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the Court finds that genuine issues of material fact exist regarding the adequacy of the City‘s training and supervision. Plaintiffs have provided evidence suggesting that the City was aware of deficiencies in its training programs and that these deficiencies may have сontributed to the alleged constitutional violations in this case. Specifically, there is evidence that officers were not consistently trained on the medical risks associated with the use of pepper spray and physical restraints, and that supervisors were not always present to manage high-risk encounters like cell extractions. A reasonable jury could conclude that the City‘s failure tо address these issues amounted to deliberate indifference. Accordingly, summary judgment will be denied as to Plaintiffs’ failure-to-train and failure-to-supervise claims against the City.
B. Section 1983 Supervisor Liability (Counts IX and XI)
Plaintiffs assert claims for supervisor liability against Jimmie Edwards and Michael Edwards. A supervisor may be held liable under
The City Defendants argue that neither Jimmie Edwards nor Michael Edwards had notice of a pattern of unconstitutional conduct and that they took appropriate steps to supervise jail operations. Plaintiffs contend that both defendants were aware of ongoing issues with the use of force at the CJC and failed to take corrective action. For the same reasons discussed with respect to municipal liability, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have not established a widespread custom or pattern of misconduct thаt would have put these supervisors on notice of unconstitutional acts by their subordinates. Moreover, there is no evidence that Jimmie Edwards or Michael Edwards were personally involved in the incident involving Bryant. Consequently, the Court will grant summary judgment in favor of Jimmie Edwards and Michael Edwards on Counts IX and XI.
Finally, the City Defendants move for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ state law wrongful death claim. They argue the City is entitled to sovereign immunity and that Jimmiе and Michael Edwards are entitled to official immunity.
1. Sovereign Immunity
Under Missouri law, public entities are generally immune from tort liability.
Plaintiffs argue that the City hаs waived its immunity through the “Public Facilities Protection Corporation” (PFPC), a non-profit corporation used by the City to pay for certain claims and settlements. The Missouri Supreme Court has held that similar self-insurance arrangements do not constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity unless they are part of a formal insurance policy. State ex rel. City of St. Louis v. Ryan, 776 S.W.2d 13 (Mo. banc 1989). Here, Plaintiffs have not shown that the City purchased a liability insurance policy that covers the wrongful death claim at issue. Therefore, the City is entitled to sovereign immunity on Count XIV.
2. Official Immunity
Official immunity protects public officials from liability for their “discretionary acts” performed in the course of their official duties. Southers v. City of Farmington, 263 S.W.3d 603, 610 (Mo. banc 2008). It does not, however, protect officials who act with malice or in bad faith. State ex rel. Twiehaus v. Adolf, 706 S.W.2d 443, 446 (Mo. banc 1986). Discretionary acts involve the exercise of reason and judgment, whereas ministerial acts are those that an official is required to perform in a prescribed manner without regard to his own judgment. Southers, 263 S.W.3d at 610.
The acts alleged against Jimmie Edwards and Michael Edwards—supervising the jail and establishing policies—are clearly discretionary in nature. Plaintiffs have not produced evidence that these defendants acted with malice or bad faith in their supervision of the CJC. Accordingly, Jimmie Edwards and Michael Edwards are entitled tо official immunity on the state law wrongful death claim.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, the City Defendants’ motion for summary judgment will be granted as to Plaintiffs’ municipal liability claim based on custom (Count VII, in part), Plaintiffs’ supervisor liability claims (Counts IX and XI), and Plaintiffs’ state law wrongful death claim (Count XIV). The motion will be denied as to Plaintiffs’ municipal liability claim based on a failure to train and supervise (Count VII, in part).
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants City of St. Louis, Jimmie Edwаrds, and Michael Edwards‘s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 71) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that judgment is entered in favor of Defendants Jimmie Edwards and Michael Edwards on all counts.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that judgment is entered in favor of Defendant City of St. Louis on Count XIV.
JOHN A. ROSS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
This matter is before the Court on Defendants Corizon, LLC, Paul Chon, M.D., and Jennifer Lewis, L.P.N.‘s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 34). Plaintiff has filed a response in opposition (ECF No. 42) and Defendants have filed a reply (ECF No. 44). The motion is, therefore, fully briefed and ready for disposition.
I. Background
Plaintiff Brian T. Hardeman, an inmate at the Missouri Eastern Correctional Center (MECC), filed this action under
II. Legal Standard
The Court shall grant summary judgment if the movаnt shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
On a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and give that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from those facts. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). “A court‘s function is not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter, but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587.
The following facts are undisputed for purposes of summary judgment. On April 23, 2013, Plaintiff was transferred to MECC. (Defs.’ Statement of Uncontroverted Material Facts (“SUMF“), ECF No. 36, at ¶ 1). Upon his arrival, Plaintiff underwent an intake screening where he reported a history of chronic back pain. (SUMF at ¶ 2). Plaintiff had previously been diagnosed with degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine. (Pl.‘s Statement of Additional Material Facts (“SAMF“), ECF No. 43, at ¶ 1). At the time of his transfer, Plaintiff had an active prescription for Naproxen (an anti-inflammatory pain medication) and a “lower bunk/lower tier” medical restriction. (SUMF at ¶¶ 5-6).
A. Treatment for Back Pain
On May 14, 2013, Plaintiff saw Dr. Chon for a chronic care clinic visit. (SUMF at ¶ 8). Dr. Chon noted Plaintiff‘s history of back pain and continued his prescription for Naproxen. (SUMF at ¶ 9). Plaintiff requested a referral to an outside specialist or an MRI, but Dr. Chon determined that these were not medically necessary at that time based on his physical examination, which showed Plaintiff had a normal gait and no neurological deficits. (SUMF at ¶¶ 10-11). Over the next year, Plaintiff saw medical staff on numerous occasions for back pain. (SUMF at ¶ 12). He was prescribed various medications, including Naproxen, Ibuprofen, and Baclofen (a muscle relaxant). (SUMF at ¶ 13). Medical records indicate that Plaintiff‘s pain was managed with these medications, although Plaintiff disputes their effectiveness. (SUMF at ¶ 14; SAMF at ¶ 15).
In July 2014, Plaintiff‘s prescription for Naproxen was discontinued because he failed to show up for several scheduled medication pick-ups. (SUMF at ¶ 18). Plaintiff alleges he missed these аppointments because he was unable to walk to the medical unit due to severe pain. (SAMF at ¶ 19). Dr. Chon saw Plaintiff again on August 5, 2014, and restarted the Naproxen after Plaintiff explained his difficulty walking. (SUMF at ¶ 20). At that time, Dr. Chon also ordered a set of X-rays of Plaintiff‘s lumbar spine, which showed mild degenerative changes but no acute fracture or dislocation. (SUMF at ¶ 22).
B. Treatment for Foot Condition
Plaintiff also sought treatment for a skin condition on his right foot, which hе described as an “itchy rash” or “athlete‘s foot.” (SUMF at ¶ 25). He was seen by nurse Jennifer Lewis on several occasions between May and October 2013. (SUMF at ¶ 26). Lewis observed redness and peeling skin and treated Plaintiff with anti-fungal creams (Clotrimazole and Miconazole) and hydrocortisone. (SUMF at ¶ 27). Plaintiff testified that these treatments would provide temporary relief but the condition would always return. (SAMF at ¶ 28).
IV. Discussion
Plaintiff‘s claims are brought under
A. Dr. Paul Chon
Plaintiff argues that Dr. Chon was deliberately indifferent because he failed to order an MRI or refer him to a specialist for his back pain, and failed to provide effective long-term trеatment for his foot condition. However, a prisoner‘s disagreement with a course of medical treatment is insufficient to state an Eighth Amendment claim. Meuir v. Greene Cnty. Jail Emps., 487 F.3d 1115, 1118-19 (8th Cir. 2007). “Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976).
The record shows that Dr. Chon saw Plaintiff regularly, conducted physical examinations, monitored his conditions, and adjusted medications based on Plaintiff‘s reports and the clinical findings. Regarding the back pain, Dr. Chon exercised his professional judgment in determining that conservative management with medication and X-rays was appropriate before pursuing more invasive diagnostic tools like an MRI. (SUMF at ¶ 11). This is a classic example of a matter of medical judgment. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 107 (noting that the decision of whether an X-ray or additional diagnostic teсhniques is needed is a matter for medical judgment).
Similarly, with respect to the foot condition, Dr. Chon and nurse Lewis provided multiple courses of treatment, including various creams and eventually oral medications and antibiotics. While the treatment may not have been immediately successful or to Plaintiff‘s liking, the record reflects an ongoing effort to address the issue. Plaintiff has produced no evidence that Dr. Chоn‘s actions were so “grossly incompetent” as to amount to a constitutional violation.
B. Nurse Jennifer Lewis
Plaintiff‘s claim against nurse Lewis appears to be limited to her treatment of his foot condition. The record reflects that Lewis saw Plaintiff on several occasions, documented her observations of his rash, and administered treatments as ordered by physicians or in accordance with nursing protocols. (SUMF at ¶¶ 26-27). There is no evidence that Lewis refused to see Plaintiff or disregarded his comрlaints. At most, Plaintiff‘s allegations against Lewis sound in negligence, which is not actionable under
C. Corizon, LLC
Plaintiff also sues Corizon, the private entity contracted to provide medical services at MECC. To hold a corporate entity like Corizon liable under
Plaintiff asserts that Corizon has a policy or custom of denying expensive treatments, such as MRIs and specialist referrals, to save costs. However, Plaintiff has failed to produce any evidence of such a policy. He relies solely on his own speculation and the fact that his own requests for an MRI were denied. This is insufficient to establish a custom or policy under Monell. See Mettler v. Whitledge, 165 F.3d 1197, 1204 (8th Cir. 1999) (stating that a single incident, or series of incidents specific to the plaintiff, is generally insufficient to prove a custom). Because Plaintiff has not shown that his treatment (or lack thereof) resulted from a Corizon policy or custom, Corizon is entitled to summary judgment.
The Court finds that there are no genuine disputes of material fact as to whether Defendants were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff‘s medical needs. The record demonstrates that Plaintiff received continuous medical care for his back and foot conditions, and his dissatisfaction with the effectiveness or diagnostic course of that care does not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 34) is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff‘s Motion for an Update (ECF No. 46) is DENIED as moot.
An appropriate Judgment will accompany this Memorandum and Order.
JOHN A. ROSS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated this 13th day of April, 2015.