261 F. 986 | 2d Cir. | 1919
The plaintiff, an able seaman on the schooner Florence Thurlow, at Ponce, Porto Rico, while taking out the cargo fall from the snatch block, got his hand caught between the fall and the pulley, and permanently injured. The vessel was discharging heavy sawed logs 30 to 40 feet long from the lower hold to the ’tween-decks and through a square port in the bow to a lighter.
The plaintiff’s story is that the discharging had been going on for some days in the usual and safe method, which need not be particularly described, when the master for the sake of speed adopted a new and dangerous one. He directed the men in the hold to put a stick under the after end of the logs, to hold them up while the fall was being disen
The court required the plaintiff to elect at the trial whether he would stand upon his right to wages and expenses of maintenance and cure to the end of the voyage, or to stand upon his right to indemnity. He elected the latter, on the ground that the master, as vice principal of the owners, ordered the dangerous method of discharging the logs, and that the vessel was unseaworthy because of the defective and unsafe stick selected by him.
The court, over the defendant’s exception, denied its motion for the direction of a verdict in its favor, and left to the jury the question whether the master adopted an improper method of discharging the cargo, and whether the stick used was defective, instructing them that, if they so found, the owners were liable, and that, while the plaintiff’s contributory negligence, if any, would not prevent him from recovering they should consider such negligence as one of the elements in fixing the amount of his indemnity.
*988 “Section 20 of the Seaman’s Act [Comp. St. § 8337a] declares 'seamen having command shall not be held to be fellow servants with those under their authority,’ and full effect must be given this whenever the relationship between such parties becomes important. But the maritime law imposes upon a ship owner liability to a member of the crew injured at sea by reason of another member’s negligence without regard to their relationship; it was of no consequence therefore to petitioner whether or not the alleged negligent order came from a fellow servant; the statute is irrelevant. The language of the section discloses no intention to impose upon shipowners the same measure of liability for injuries suffered by the crew while at sea as the common law prescribes for employers in respect of their employés on shore.” •
There would, however, be little security for careful owners if, after furnishing a seaworthy ship and proper appliances, they were still liable ¡for the act of the master in not using the proper appliances furnished, or in using them for purposes for which they were not furnished.
The judgment is reversed, and a new trial ordered.