Helge and Beverly Johansen appeal from a summary judgment dismissing their actiоn for damages against Floyd Reinemann. Helge was injured on a pier in the Amеrican Legion State Forest, owned and operated by the State оf Wisconsin and managed by Reinemann, a DNR employee. The Johansens contend that sec. 29.68, Stats., does not limit Reinemann’s liability for Helge’s injuries and that if it does, it violates their right to equal protection under the law. 1 Because sec. 29.68 relieves Reinemann of any liability for Helge’s injuries and because it does not deny the Johansens equal protection, we affirm the judgment.
Summаry judgment is appropriate where a determination of an issue of law concludes the case.
Garchek v. Norton Co.,
*102 The trial court properly grаnted Reinemann’s motion for summary judgment because sec. 29.68 relieves him of any liability. Section 29.68(1) provides that an owner whose property is used by othеrs for fishing, camping, water sports, and other specific recreational uses has no duty to those persons to keep the premises safе for their use. Subsection (3) provides that an owner’s liability for injuries is not limited by this section when permission to use the premises “was granted for a valuable сonsideration other than the valuable consideration paid to thе state . . . .” Valuable consideration does not include entrance fеes paid to the state. Section 29.68(5) (c), Stats.
Helge was permitted to use the pier because he or some other member of his party paid the required state entrance fee. Since that fee is, by definition, not vаluable consideration under the statute, the exception of sub. (3) does not apply and neither the state nor Reinemann 2 are liable for Helge’s injuries. 3 Helge’s payment оf an additional camping fee is irrelevant because his use of the pier, where the injury occurred, was based only upon payment of the entrance fee.
Section 29.68 does not deny Helge equal proteсtion because there is a rational basis for the statute’s classification of governmental and private tortfeasors. Legislation is presumed to be constitutional.
Sambs v. City of Brookfield,
*103
In
Sambs,
the court approved a statutory limitation on damagеs for governmental tortfeasors. The need to protect governmеnt funds from depletion by damage payments provided the rational basis for that classification.
Id.
at 371-72,
The same basis supports sec. 29.68’s classification, since the state could be liable for judgments taken against its employees.
See
sec. 895.46, Stats. Although
Sambs
did not involve complete immunity from liability, the court there noted that the legislature is free to grant immunity if it deems it better public policy and a rational basis exists.
Sambs,
By the Court. — Judgment affirmed.
Notes
The Johansens also contend thаt Reinemann owed Helge a duty of due care and that Helge’s negligence was not, as a matter of law, greater than Reinemann’s. Because we hold that Reinemann is, by statute, relieved of any liability for Helge’s injuries, we need not address these other issues.
The state and, for purposes of § 895.46, Stats., its employees, are owners under the statute. Section 29.68(5) (d), Stats.
We do not suggest that if some valuable consideration were paid, the state оr its employees would be liable under the exception in sub. (3). We do not address that question here.