Joel KRONFELD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC.; Transworld Corporation, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 32, Docket 86-7330
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit
Argued Sept. 17, 1986. Decided Nov. 2, 1987. As Amended on Denial of Rehearing Dec. 28, 1987.
833 F.2d 426
Ortiz argues against this result on the ground that it unfairly forces a defendant to testify in his own behalf:
[I]n the [sufficiency] context, a defendant has two opportunities to argue that the evidence is insufficient—once to the court and again in summation to the jury. If the defendant miscalculates and strengthens the prosecution‘s case, it is reasonable to require him to suffer the consequences. By contrast, the district court‘s erroneous admission of damaging evidence relating to the coconspirator was undoubtedly going to affect the jury adversely unless the defendant could rebut it. Admission of the evidence lets the jurors use it. The defendant cannot argue that the jury should not use it. (Appellant‘s brief at 15.)
This argument is meritless. The question of logical relevance, no less than the question of sufficiency, may be argued both to the court as a preliminary matter and to the jury as the ultimate decider. Plainly, the probative value of the challenged evidence would be an appropriate matter for argument to the jury. Indeed, it may be easier to persuade jurors that a given item of evidence has no logical connection to the defendant than to persuade them that evidence obviously having such a connection should not convince them of the defendant‘s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
In the present case, Ortiz testified that he had traveled to the site of the aborted narcotics transaction with Pineros in the vehicle in which the cocaine was found. Assuming that the government‘s own evidence failed to establish a connection between Pineros and Ortiz, Ortiz‘s testimony unquestionably established the missing connection. In light of the record as a whole, therefore, we conclude that the government‘s evidence regarding Pineros was properly submitted to the jury.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of conviction is affirmed.
Robert Sisk, New York City (Hughes Hubbard & Reed, New York City, of counsel, Norman C. Kleinberg, Rebecca Northey, Bradley J. Andreozzi, on the brief), for defendant-appellee Transworld Corp.
Dennis J. Block, New York City (Weil, Gotshal & Manges, New York City, of counsel, Dushica D. Babich, on the brief), for defendant-appellee TransWorld Airlines, Inc.
Before OAKES, MINER and MAHONEY, Circuit Judges.
MAHONEY, Circuit Judge:
This appeal brings up for review a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Ed-
I. BACKGROUND
TWA became a wholly-owned subsidiary of defendant Transworld Corporation (“TWC“) on January 1, 1979 pursuant to a plan of reorganization.4 By late 1982, TWC had five major subsidiaries: TWA, Canteen Corp., Century 21 Real Estate Corp., Hilton International Co. and Spartan Food Systems, Inc. At that time, TWA was a poor financial performer, having suffered large losses in previous years. Future losses were predicted.
In late 1982 and early 1983, Odyssey Partners (“Odyssey“), an investment partnership with substantial holdings in TWC, proposed to TWC‘s management a “disaggregation” of TWC‘s subsidiaries. Odyssey contended that the securities of the separated subsidiaries would trade at a premium over the then-trading value of the parent‘s securities, largely because, in Odyssey‘s opinion, the poor financial health of TWA was tarnishing the market performance of TWC securities.
Odyssey‘s discussions with TWC‘s management were not fruitful; Odyssey therefore took its case to TWC‘s stockholders by soliciting proxies in favor of a proposal requesting TWC‘s board of directors to develop and implement a program whereby TWC‘s primary subsidiaries would be spun off to form independently traded public corporations.5
TWC retained Goldman, Sachs & Co. (“Goldman Sachs“) to aid in meeting Odyssey‘s challenge. Goldman Sachs‘s ultimate criticism of Odyssey‘s financial projections was used by TWC in its opposition to Odyssey‘s proposal. At that time, TWC also asked Goldman Sachs to review the “structural and financial alternatives” available to TWC and to report its findings to the latter‘s board of directors “well ahead of the August 31 date specified in the Odyssey Proposal.” TWC Proxy Statement dated March 24, 1983, p. 19. The retention and assignment of Goldman Sachs were disclosed in a proxy statement issued to TWC shareholders on March 24, 1983, as well as in full-page advertisements in the Wall Street Journal (April 14, 1983) and New York Times (April 15, 1983), and articles in Newsweek (May 2, 1983) and Fortune (June 13, 1983) magazines.
The Odyssey proposal was rejected by TWC‘s shareholders at their annual meeting on April 27, 1983 following a bitter, well publicized proxy fight, although 23% of the vote favored the proposal, and substantial institutional holders of TWC‘s common stock, while supporting management, were sympathetic to or perceived merit in the Odyssey proposal. Goldman Sachs continued its review of TWC‘s structural and financial options. At the May 25, 1983 meeting of TWC‘s board of directors, Frank L. Salizonni, senior vice president for finance and administration of TWC,
As these events unfolded, TWA‘s financial losses continued. By May or early June, 1983, TWA considered the possibility of a public offering, having been advised that market conditions were favorable for an issuance of stock.7 On July 7, 1983, the TWA board of directors authorized the stock offering which is the subject of this litigation. On July 29, 1983, TWA filed a registration statement with the Securities and Exchange Commission and issued a prospectus for the offering of four million shares of cumulative convertible preferred stock at an initial price of $25 per share.
The prospectus included a section set off by the heading “RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TWA AND [TWC],” which contained the following statement:
There may in the future be other arrangements between TWA and [TWC] (or other of its subsidiaries). It is intended that the terms of these arrangements will be determined on an arms-length basis. There can be no assurance, however, that these terms will be favorable to TWA or that [TWC] will continue to provide TWA with the same level of support for TWA‘s financing and other needs as it has in the past.
631 F.Supp. at 1261. This section of the prospectus went on to detail various relationships between TWA and TWC under the headings Financial Relationships, Guarantees, Benefit Plans, Corporate Expenses and Federal Taxes.
The immediately preceding section of the prospectus, headed “CONTROL BY [TWC],” included the following statement:
As TWA must obtain the consent of its lenders to set aside Common Stock into which the Convertible Preferred Stock can be converted, consents have been obtained to allow the creation of up to a 40% public holding in Common Stock. TWA and [TWC] may from time to time issue or sell or otherwise dispose of shares of Common Stock as a result of which the outside ownership of Common Stock could be increased to an amount in excess of 40%, assuming any required consent of lenders and stockholders of the two companies is obtained.
The prospectus made no mention of the ongoing Goldman Sachs study.
At a meeting on July 7, 1987 between representatives of TWC and Goldman Sachs respecting the Goldman Sachs study, Mary Ann Casati, a Goldman Sachs associate, took notes which included, under a heading “2 AIRLINE SALE/SPINOFF,” the statement ”primary-goal-build liquidity in airline & cut cord w/TWC so they can walk away” (emphasis in original); and in the margin on the same page, “TILL DEATH DO US PART.”
As planned, Goldman Sachs presented the results of its study to TWC‘s Board of Directors on September 6, 1983. Seven alternatives were submitted to the Board for its consideration: (1) liquidation of TWC through a sale of each of its subsidiaries to the highest bidder with a spinoff to shareholders of subsidiaries that could not be sold for a premium over public market values; (2) sale of TWC; (3) partial liquidation, through sale of TWA or other subsidiaries; (4) additional public sales of TWA shares; (5) public sale of 20% of a “hospitality company” composed of non-airline subsidiaries; (6) separation of TWC and TWA by a spinoff of the airline or a rights offering to TWA shareholders; and (7)
Following the September 6, 1983 presentation, TWC‘s board of directors referred the matter to its finance committee. The Committee met twice, with other board members attending; on September 27, 1983, it unanimously recommended that the board of directors authorize development of a “detailed program for a possible separation of TWA from TWC.” TWC‘s Board adopted the proposal on September 28, 1983. At the same time, public announcement was made that TWC was “considering the possible separation of TWA,” and had “instructed management to develop a detailed program under which [TWC‘s] 81 percent common stock holdings in [TWA] would be distributed to [TWC‘s] common stock holders, establishing TWA as a separate, publicly owned company.” The announcement added that TWC‘s board of directors was giving this proposal “its most careful consideration,” and would seek stockholder approval “if it votes to proceed with a separation plan . . .” TWC‘s Board formally adopted a plan of separation on October 26, 1983. The plan received shareholder approval on December 28, 1983 and was effectuated on February 1, 1984.
Following TWC‘s September 28, 1983 announcement that it was “considering” the separation of TWA, the market price of the stock purchased by plaintiff dropped markedly. The Joint Appendix submitted by the parties shows a 23.8% decline between September 20, 1983 and October 3, 1983.
In his complaint dated November 29, 1983, Kronfeld alleged that the registration statement and prospectus issued in connection with the July 29, 1983 offering were misleading in that they allegedly failed to disclose material “information regarding [TWC‘s] consideration of a plan to completely spinoff its TWA subsidiary.” Plaintiff further alleged that the offering documents failed to mention the impending Goldman Sachs report, even though “at the time of the July 29, 1983 offering, Goldman Sachs was preparing to recommend to [TWC] the spinoff of TWA.”
Additional factual matters are stated hereinafter where pertinent to our ensuing consideration of the legal issues presented.
Defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court found, based on the undisputed facts and the inferences plaintiff could draw therefrom, that as of the date the offering materials were issued, there had been no “final corporate determination[ ]” to separate TWA from its parent. 631 F.Supp. at 1264. Whatever may have been the views of TWC‘s individual directors respecting separation as an alternative, the district court held that such views need not be disclosed “prior to definitive action by the Board.” Id. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment was accordingly granted.
Plaintiff‘s primary contention on appeal is that the district court failed to follow the law of this circuit respecting the materiality of prospective events, but instead relied on inapplicable precedents.8
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
Here, because we are persuaded that the wrong legal standard was applied on defendants’ motion for summary judgment, and in view of the strong showing which generally must be made to justify resolving the question of materiality under the securities laws by way of Rule 56,9 as the district court acknowledged, 631 F.Supp. at 1263, we reverse.
B. Materiality Under Section 11
1) The Standard of Materiality.
In TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 96 S.Ct. 2126, 48 L.Ed.2d 757 (1976), the Supreme Court defined an omitted “material” fact in the proxy context10 as one posing “a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to vote.” Id. at 449, 96 S.Ct. at 2132.11
The materiality standard of Northway has been applied in this circuit under Section 11 of the 1933 Act. See, e.g., Akerman v. Oryx Communications, Inc., 609 F.Supp. 363, 367 (S.D.N.Y.1984), aff‘d, 810 F.2d 336 (2d Cir.1987); Elfenbein v. American Fin. Corp., 487 F.Supp. 619, 626-27 (S.D.N.Y.1980), aff‘d mem., 652 F.2d 53 (2d Cir.1981); Greenapple v. Detroit Edison Co., 468 F.Supp. 702, 708 (S.D.N.Y.1979), aff‘d, 618 F.2d 198 (2d Cir.1980); Straus v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 460 F.Supp. 729, 736 (S.D.N.Y.1978).
The leading case in this circuit concerning the applicability of the materiality standard to prospective or contingent events is SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir.1968) (in banc), cert. denied sub nom. Kline v. SEC, 394 U.S. 976, 89 S.Ct. 1454, 22 L.Ed.2d 756 (1969). That case involved both the corporation‘s liability under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 with respect to a press release which it issued concerning a finding of mineral ores
[M]aterial facts include not only information disclosing the earnings and distributions of a company but also those facts which affect the probable future of the company and those which may affect the desire of investors to buy, sell, or hold the company‘s securities. In each case, then, whether facts are material within Rule 10b-5 when the facts relate to a particular event and are undisclosed by those persons who are knowledgeable thereof will depend at any given time upon a balancing of both the indicated probability that the event will occur and the anticipated magnitude of the event in light of the totality of the company activity.
Because this standard was articulated in the insider trading context, a qualification must be expressed at the outset concerning its application here. An insider may be liable for trading on the basis of, or “tipping” third parties concerning, information at a time when the corporation to which the information pertains is not yet under any duty to disclose it. See, e.g., SEC v. Geon Indus., Inc., 531 F.2d 39, 48 (2d Cir.1976).
On the other hand, we do not address here a pure question of a duty to disclose. The Prospectus issued by TWA indisputably addressed itself to the ongoing relationship between TWA and TWC, and was obviously required to address that relationship. Accordingly, the issue we must consider is whether there were material omissions in that presentation. The general standard articulated in Texas Gulf Sulphur and quoted above, which has been cited and applied by this court12 and other courts in varied contexts pertaining to disclosure requirements under the federal securities laws, is of clear importance to that evaluation.13
2. The Decision Below.
The district court‘s ruling was based upon the fact that at the time TWA‘s prospectus was issued, a proposal to change the relationship between TWC and TWA had not yet been presented to TWC‘s board of directors, and TWC was not obligated “to disclose mere contingencies long in advance of the consideration of the question by those responsible for decision.” 631 F.Supp. at 1265. The district court cited Reiss v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 711 F.2d 11, 14 (2d Cir.1983); Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937, 951 (2d Cir.1969); and Flum Partners v. Child World Inc., 557 F.Supp. 492, 499 (S.D.N.Y.1983), for the propositions that the “content of contingent speculations” and “the views held by individual directors”14 need not be disclosed. 631 F.Supp. at 1264 and n. 17.
We do not regard these decisions as controlling here. Reiss is representative of a current trend in the courts to hold preliminary merger negotiations immaterial as a matter of law for purposes of Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 liability. These cases, and our view of their inapplicability to the facts of this case, are discussed hereinafter. The citation of Electronic Specialty refers to an alleged statement by a corporation‘s president, in response to a financial reporter‘s question, that the corporation‘s “preference” was to sell its holdings in a potential target at a time when he had personally decided that it would be advisable to reactivate a tender offer for the target, but had not yet presented that conclusion to his board of directors, for whose authority (in Judge Friendly‘s words) he “manifested punctilious regard.” 409 F.2d at 951. Electronic Specialty would be persuasive authority were plaintiff‘s case here based solely upon Mr. Salizzoni‘s view of the TWA-TWC relationship as of June, 1983, but that is clearly not the case. Flum Partners states that “the failure to disclose future business plans is also not actionable.” 557 F.Supp. at 499. To the extent that this statement is invoked as a general rule of law, rather than a disposition of the particular issues presented in that case, we deem it overbroad in view of Texas Gulf Sulphur and the cognate decisions cited hereinabove.
3. The Preliminary Merger Discussion Cases.
We turn next to Reiss and related cases that deal with the question of Section 10(b) Rule 10b-5 liability with respect to preliminary merger discussions. The district court considered this a “related context,” and deemed Reiss highly persuasive, if not controlling, here. 631 F.Supp. at 1264-65.
A recent line of cases has rejected arguments that preliminary merger negotiations should be disclosed to the investing public. For example, in Staffin v. Greenberg, 672 F.2d 1196 (3d Cir.1982), the Third Circuit rejected claims that preliminary merger negotiations should have been disclosed to tender offerees and members of a broader class of open market sellers. It found preliminary merger discussions immaterial as a matter of law, finding merit in the opinions of other courts and commentators in the related area of takeover bids that disclosure of such discussions may do more harm than secrecy. Id. at 1206.15 It held that a disclosure obligation arises once an agreement in principle is reached. Id. at 1207.
Recently, in Flamm v. Eberstadt, 814 F.2d 1169 (7th Cir.1987), the Seventh Circuit followed Staffin and Reiss and held that a target company‘s search for a white knight was immaterial as a matter of law prior to agreement on the deal‘s price and structure.16
We do not question the wisdom of the rule of “constructive immateriality,” as one commentator terms it, as it has been applied in the preliminary merger context. See generally Note, Rule 10b-5 and the Duty to Disclose Merger Negotiations in Corporate Statements, 96 Yale L.J. 547 (1987) [hereinafter “Note, Duty to Disclose“]. Indeed, the application of a different rule there could scuttle corporate deals, costing shareholders desirable merger premiums, either because acquiring corporations generally insist on negotiating mergers in confidence and may terminate a deal that is disclosed prematurely, or because early disclosure may drive the target corporation‘s stock price so high as to make merger consummation economically unfeasible. See Note, Duty to Disclose at 554-55; see also Flamm, 814 F.2d at 1176-78.
4. The Instant Case
Similar concerns are not implicated here.
Texas Gulf Sulphur recognizes that contingencies inextricably bound up with a company‘s fortunes need not be certainties to qualify as material. Were defendants’ arguments to carry the day, corporate actors would be granted the power to render facts—objectively material facts under the standard of Northway—immaterial as a matter of law by steering them clear of the board room. The Third Circuit seems to have recognized as much, even in the merger context, noting in Staffin that circumstances may arise where failure to disclose merger negotiations short of agreement in principle may nonetheless be actionable where the “functional equivalent” of agreement obtains. Staffin, 672 F.2d at 1207. As an example, the Staffin Court cited Thomas v. Duralite Co., 524 F.2d 577 (3d Cir.1975), a Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 case in which an insider was found liable on a record indicating that he deliberately postponed merger negotiations which had already yielded the “likelihood of acquisition” in order to purchase a large shareholder‘s stock at a favorable price. Id. at 585.
We conclude that the governing rule here is provided by Northway and Texas Gulf Sulphur, rather than the Staffin/Reiss/Flamm line of authority. We further conclude that, judged by the strict standard applicable to the granting of motions for summary judgment, especially concerning questions of materiality, defendants’ motion should not have been granted in this case.
As we have stated earlier, the TWA prospectus discussed in some detail the relationship between TWA and TWC, so the question presented is whether that discussion omitted to state material facts necessary to make the statements therein not misleading; not whether, considered in the abstract, there was an obligation to disclose those facts at that time.17 Plaintiff contends, in essence, that there should have been some reference to the ongoing Goldman Sachs study of TWC‘s structure and finances, and to the possibility of a termination of TWA‘s status as a TWC subsidiary.
It is not our role at this juncture, of course, to decide whether plaintiff is correct. Rather, we are to determine whether plaintiff raised a genuine issue of material fact concerning the matter.
As to the magnitude of the event, we agree with the district court that:
It is not disputed that the nature of the relationship between TWC and TWA, in which TWC guaranteed much of the
credit upon which TWA did business and financed its substantial requirements for operating capital, was critical to the decisions faced by knowledgeable investors in evaluating TWA‘s value as an investment, particularly in view of the fact that TWA had suffered substantial losses in the period before July 29, 1983.
631 F.Supp. at 1263. Furthermore, when TWC announced on September 28, 1983 that it was “considering the possible separation of TWA,” the price of TWA‘s common stock went into an immediate and sharp decline.
The likelihood of the event‘s occurrence cuts much less sharply in favor of plaintiff, but there was certainly, at a minimum, a substantial possibility of its occurrence. Especially given the fact that the TWC-TWA relationship was given considerable attention in the TWA prospectus, we cannot say, in ruling on a motion for summary judgment, that the evidence is “so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law” and does not “present[ ] a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2512, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).
For example, the discussion in the TWA prospectus of various arrangements and relationships between TWA and TWC stated that there might in the future be “other arrangements . . . [to] be determined on an arms-length basis,” adding that “[t]here can be no assurance, however, that these terms will be favorable to TWA or that [TWC] will continue to provide TWA with the same level of support for TWA‘s financing and other needs as it has in the past.” A jury might conclude that this language, while anticipating revisions of the multitude of relationships existing between TWA and TWC, did not give any fair indication of the equally substantial possibility that TWA‘s status as a TWC subsidiary might be terminated. Indeed, the suggestions of diminished future support of TWA by TWC, and of possible future sales of some TWA stock, could both be read to imply that some continuing relationship between TWC and TWA, although one less favorable to the latter, was contemplated.
There was no mention in the TWA prospectus of the ongoing Goldman Sachs study. The district court noted that Goldman Sachs’ activities in investigating alternative structures for TWC “had been extensively publicized by TWC in connection with the proxy solicitation by Odyssey Partners.” 631 F.Supp. at 1265. All of TWC‘s activity in that regard pre-dated the annual meeting of TWC which occurred on April 27, 1983, however, and on June 23, 1983, TWC issued a press release in which its chairman stated that “[TWC] now has set targets that by 1987 its presently unprofitable airline subsidiary, TWA, should become a source of $100 million in pre-tax profits . . .” There are serious limitations on a corporation‘s ability to charge its stockholders with knowledge of information omitted from a document such as a proxy statement or prospectus on the basis that the information is public knowledge and otherwise available to them. See Spielman v. General Host Corp., 538 F.2d 39, 40-41 (2d Cir.1976) (per curiam); Fisher v. Plessey Co. Ltd., 559 F.Supp. 442, 445-48 (S.D.N.Y.1983). At a minimum, in any event, an issue is presented whether purchasers of TWA‘s cumulative convertible preferred stock could properly be charged with knowledge on July 29, 1983 and thereafter that Goldman Sachs was then engaged in a study on behalf of TWC one of the live options of which was a termination of TWA‘s status as a TWC subsidiary. That it was then live is evidenced by Ms. Casati‘s notes taken at the July 7 meeting of Goldman Sachs representatives with TWC officials, despite her inability upon deposition to recollect what was said or meant.
Plaintiff also points out that, although defendants contend that it would have been inappropriate to discuss in the July pro-
There is other evidence of record that bears upon the ultimate issue of a material omission. For example, although the Odyssey proposal called for a “disaggregation” of TWC‘s five subsidiaries, there is evidence indicating that Odyssey privately informed Mr. Salizzoni that it would be satisfied if only TWA were separated from the holding company. The record also indicates that some significant shareholders supported the Odyssey proposal, but felt it best to let management work things out without the pressure of a shareholder resolution. Alliance Capital Management Corporation, for example voted over 750,000 shares owned by its pension and endowment fund clients against the Odyssey proposal, but contemporaneously indicated in a letter dated April 27, 1983 to L. Edwin Smart, TWC‘s chairman, that it saw “much merit to the Odyssey plan.”19 Nor would a jury be required to accept at face value the testimony of defendants’ witnesses that the Goldman Sachs study was not presented to TWC‘s board of directors in July, 1983, as originally planned and prior to the TWA public offering, solely because the study was not then ready to be presented. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157-58, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1608-09, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970).
The foregoing does not constitute an exhaustive recital of the evidentiary points plaintiff might make at trial, and of course, given the issue presented to us, does not touch upon the ripostes available to defendants. Enough has been said, however, to make it clear that, under the standards provided by Northway and Texas Gulf Sulphur, plaintiff tendered genuine issues of material fact as to whether there were material omissions in TWA‘s July 29, 1983 prospectus. Accordingly, summary judgment should not have been rendered in favor of defendants.
CONCLUSION
In the interests of caution, we wish to stress that our discussion of certain factual issues and evidence herein, for the limited purpose of demonstrating the existence of genuine issues of material fact precluding summary judgment, intimates no view whatever concerning the merits and ultimate outcome of this litigation. The judgment of the district court is reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
MINER, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
Since I cannot agree that there is any triable issue of fact as to whether TWA‘s July 29, 1983 prospectus contained any untrue material fact or omitted to state any material fact, I respectfully dissent.
The prospectus gave specific notice to prospective shareholders of TWA that TWC might not provide the same financial support to TWA as it had provided in the past. The shaky financial condition of TWA was apparent from the financial information furnished to those interested in purchasing shares at the public offering, and the prospectus gave further notice that TWC might “sell or otherwise dispose of” its shares of TWA. The information provided was full and complete, potential investors were cautioned adequately as to the problems facing the company, and there was no false representation of any kind. A jury should not be afforded the opportunity to speculate otherwise.
I cannot agree that the statement in the prospectus giving notice of the possibility of withdrawal of financial support by TWC “did not give any fair indication that TWA‘s status as a TWC subsidiary might be terminated.” The withdrawal of financial support could be seen to lead to a total collapse of TWA, let alone termination of its status as a subsidiary. Moreover, another provision in the prospectus warning that TWC might sell its shares clearly indicated the possibility of spin-off. The risky nature of an investment in TWA should have been apparent to all those who took the time to examine the prospectus. Nor do I agree that there is an issue whether stock purchasers can be charged with knowledge that Goldman Sachs was undertaking a study involving the “live” option of separation. It seems to me that there was no need to notify prospective purchasers of the study at all, because the study was in progress and had produced no options, “live” or otherwise, at the time of the public offering.
The mere fact that the Odyssey proxy battle centered on a proposal for “disaggregation” of TWC‘s subsidiaries does not create a triable issue as to whether divestiture of TWA should have been included in the prospectus. The Odyssey proposal was defeated, partially on the strength of the pending Goldman Sachs review of all available “structural and financial” alternatives. Although Mr. Salizzoni, a senior vice-president and director of TWC, had concluded in June 1983 that separation was desirable, there is no indication that his opinion was imparted to any other board member or that any other board member held the same view. In point of fact, Odyssey‘s defeat in the proxy contest represented a corporate rejection of the separation proposal. With regard to the Casati notes, I fail to see how the idle scribblings of a minor functionary of Goldman Sachs during a meeting with TWC representatives could possibly be indicative of material facts required to be revealed in a prospectus.
Resolution of the question of materiality requires an assessment of the “probability that the event will occur.” SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir.1968) (in banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976, 89 S.Ct. 1454, 22 L.Ed.2d 756 (1969). There simply is no way in which the evi-
Notes
Those persons who would buy stock on the basis of the occurrence of preliminary merger discussions preceding a merger which never occurs, are left “holding the bag” on a stock whose value was inflated purely by an inchoate hope. If the announcement is withheld until an agreement in principle on a merger is reached, the greatest good for the greatest number results. If the merger occurs, all of the company‘s shareholders usually benefit; if no merger agreement is reached, the stock performs as it would have in any event. Staffin, 672 F.2d at 1207 (footnote omitted).
Further, we thought the Odyssey proposal put management under too much pressure for fast action on divesting or selling assets. Finally, we saw no virtue at all to the Corporation selling assets; we would only favor partial or total spinoff of subsidiaries to stockholders. * * * * * * The minority divestiture of Trans World Airlines, Inc. is a step in the right direction, and we are shareholders. We hope this is a first move towards spinning off to shareholders more of TWA and other subsidiaries which have “stand alone” capability.
