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Joe J. Hudgens, Phyllis Hudgens v. Bell Helicopters/Textron, Dyncorp
328 F.3d 1329
11th Cir.
2003
Check Treatment
Docket

*1 Phyllis HUDGENS, Hudgens, J. Joe

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v. HELICOPTERS/TEXTRON,

BELL

Defendant,

DynCorp, Defendant-Appellee. Crawford, Becky

Francis Mark

Crawford, Plaintiffs-

Appellants,

v.

DynCorp, Defendant-Appellee, Helicopters/Textron, Defendant. 02-12357,

Nos. 02-13284. Appeals,

United States Court of

Eleventh Circuit.

April

Edmondson, Judge, specially Chief opinion.

concurred and filed

Cox, Judge, speciahy Circuit con- opinion.

curred and filed *2 EDMONDSON, Judge, Chief

Before COX, Judges. BARKETT and Circuit BARKETT, Judge: Circuit Hudgens and Phyllis Joe and Plaintiffs appeal Becky Crawford Francis in favor of summary judgment grants of diversity ac- these defendant helicopter crash arising out of a tions Shelby County, Alabama.

Francis Crawford and Joe Army heli- piloting a States were United 1,May mission on copter on a Medivac separat- fin helicopter’s tail 1999 when aircraft, in a crash in resulting ed from injured. severely both men were which respective pilots Each of the and their August separate filed suits on wives District of Alabama. the Northern accident, investigations con- After the aircraft’s and the ducted manufacturer, Helicopters/Textron (“Bell”), sep- that the tail fin’s determined rupture a aration resulted from (“fin fin helicopter’s vertical forward struc- spar” “spar”), component or assembly by helicopter’s tural pilot’s tail rotor is attached blade An skin covers the carriage.1 external frame of which the structural McKee, Hare, Wynn, Newell & Bruce J. investigating authorities con- part. The Newton, AL, Birmingham, for Plaintiffs- rupture caused cluded that the Appellants. originated at a rivet hole near spar. of the fin base Clark, Bradford, Jr., Paul A.

Robert W. Hill, Carter, Franco, Black, Hill, part & Cole The accident UH-1, AL, “Huey,” or heli- Defendant-Appellee. “Flat Iron” fleet Montgomery, summary judgment grant court’s and the Crawfords district 1. Both the Helicopters as a defendant named Bell to Bell. they appeal the complaints, their but do not copters Army’s maintained Fort repeated mination that engagement of the Rucker base Alabama. Under UH-1 and related in heavy lifting models , of a contract terms entered into operations could fatigue create fractures *3 Army DynCorp, DynCorp and was to that compromise the fin spar. In an Army maintain aircraft located at the base. failures, prevent effort to such the FAA agreement required DynCorp to “de- directive mandated that operators civilian termine the ... airworthiness condition of modify of these models spar the fin in a aircraft required by applicable regular as manner designed to inspection facilitate publicatiоns. tions and Such a.determina- for cracks. The directive required that inspection, tion shall on be mainte- based such modifications completed be within the checks, operational flying nance and test flight first eight subsequent hours to the required applicable Army publica- as Thereafter, directive’s issuance. operators publications tions and directives.” The inspect were to the modified fin spar for contemplated by the contract have been cracks at during least once each subse- in entered the record in the form of quent eight time, hours of flight using a spection providing checklists and manuals bright light and a 10X magnifying glass to instructions for the maintenance and re- visibility enhance the fractures. In R.l-36, H, pair of UH-1 aircraft. See Tab 1998, Helicopter/Textron circulated a exhibits 1-3.2 One checklist identifies a “Military Alert Bulletin” advising likewise inspections completed every series of to be that cracks had been found on some air- flown; day pre- a another spars crafts’ fin and recommending “tap proce- scribes a more intensive sеries of hammer” dye penetrant and fluorescent intervals; dures to carried out at longer inspections 25 flight within hours manual, spanning a third well over a receipt bulletin’s 180-day thereafter at pages, prescribes appropriate thousand intervals. means for repairing variety of defects. Army personnel stationed at Fort Rucker Army is not bound the FAA’s DynCorp’s performance monitored to en- airworthiness directives or Bell’s alert bul- compliance sure with these instructions for operation letins in Army-owned its air- the maintenance of the UH-1 fleet. See Nonetheless, Army craft. officers re- R.l-36, G, 2; R.l-44, S, Tab Tab sponsible development inspection for the procedures pertaining to the UH-1 re- accident,

Prior to the several authorities warnings. viewed both the FAA and Bell familiar with Bell’s helicop- UH-1 line of R.l-36,. P, Reasoning Tab at 1-2. that its already ters had identified fin helicopters own UH-1 had not been en- problem that authorities later.identified gaged heavy-lifting operations and subject 1997, the cause of the accident. history using helicopters its UH-1 had Federal Aviatiоn Administration (“FAA”) accident, circulated an Di- been without decided “Airworthiness rective,” reported which the FAA’s deter- adopt inspection the recommended economy, 2. For the sake of all citations to the Dist. Ct. Case No. 99-S-2041-S. The Court will, indicated, record unless otherwise refer evidentiary has satisfied itself materi- appeal to the record on v. Bell als discussed in the text of this were Helicopters, Dist. Ct. Case No. CV 99-B- filed, form, in all instances identical in both 2042-S, any corresponding without reference cases. Helicopters, to the record in v. Bell Crawford Instead, discovery, Dyn- regi- necessary repairs.4 it adhered to a After protocols.3 Corp summary judgment during aids moved used men of its asserted basis entitlement flashlight were a inspections “government contractor defense” estab- mirror. U. inspection Boyle Technologies lished in v. United helicop- the accident the crash of After Corp., 487 U.S. S.Ct. however, ter, Army departed from its (1988). Boyle L.Ed.2d articulated procedures and instituted new apply three-pronged test for courts to of the concerns ex- reflective protocols protec- decide required when and Bell FAA advisories. pressed policymakers’ tion of discretion federal *4 provided Army for fre- Specifically, the im- preemption demands of state tort law inspections to be conducted with the quent posing design liability on contractors for glass, and for magnifying a 10X aid of gov- the products supplied defects to to periodic inspections made additional be ernment. examination, x-ray dye pen- fluorescent via identity impli- the facts Despite all etrant, Post-accident x- tap and hammer. summary by DynCorp’s cated motion for seven ray inspections of the other UH-1 judgment and Hudgens’ Craw- as within the Flat Iron led to helicopters fleet suits, separate fords’ the actions plaintiffs’ in the discovery of cracks vertical were dif- not consolidated and thus two aircraft. spars of four additional None judges ferent district court ruled on the eye to the naked these cracks were visible rejected plaintiffs’ Both ar- motions. X-ray. discovered they at the time were via gument government that contractor Although complaints originally their defects, applies only design defense additional causes of ac- stated numerous that the holding instead defense extends tion, Hudgens pri- and Crawfords now by kind contracts of the entered into DynCorp. negligent marily assert that DynCorp Army. Additionally, and the failing to properly evidentiary under Alabama law both that judges ruled parties, maintain the to make materials as submitted and/or Army appears prevented to have 3. The also based its have the failure of the tail section part although fact that decision in on the helicopter." para. of R.l-1 at 7. This designed modifications advisories described plaintiffs’ complaints follows assertion inspection, neither to facilitate bulletin rec- immediately precau- after a discussion of the problem a ommended solution to the created tions advised in the FAA and Bell bulletins. spar’s apparent susceptibility the fin interpret plaintiffs' We wanton- therefore P, fatigue fractures. at 1. An theory ness claim to rest on the that failure to Army spokesperson pointed also out in a let- precautions institute these rises to the level Shelby ter Richard that because to Senator under an intentional tort Alabama law. For being UH-1 reduced size in fleet was however, infra, the reasons discussed we do accident, preceding the the decade "assets DynCorp any responsibil- not believe that had major repair simply deemed in need of were ity precautions, the FAA institute and Bell retired from service.” Id. 2. accordingly summary judg- we sustain ment to the wantonness claim. plaintiffs Apart from claims which the con- summary ceded should dismissed before and Crawfords also asserted judgment, against there now remains claim negligent failure-to-warn in their com- claim "wantonness,” premised DynCorp for plaints, for the conceded but counsel allegation DynCorp "had full and com- argument. this claim at oral knowledge, dangers, plete but steps be taken which should in order to by slightly rulings ruling protects different that this defense DynCorp modified evidence, striking expert particular certain from the claims asserted genuine no issue of mаterial fact Hudgens showed and Crawfords. of the de- as to satisfaction begin with the district court’s deter- three elements.

fense’s government mination that contractor appeal, On and Crawfords applies defense to service contracts like Boyle’s government ‍​​‌‌‌​​​‌​‌​‌​‌​​​​​​‌​​​​‌​‌‌​​​​​‌​‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‍con- argue first the one between the DynCorp. apply tractor defense does not to service Alternatively, they argue that

contracts. Applicability I. Government Contrac- even if the contractor defense Army-DynCorp tor Defense district applies, court nonetheless Maintenance Contract striking expert opinion testimony erred in In Boyle, Supreme Court ad holding had demon- dressed the issue of “when a contractor any genuine strated the absence of issue of providing military equipment to Fed fact as to satisfaction of the material its *5 eral can Government be held hable under defense’s three elements. injury

state tort for law caused de a 502, sign Boyle, defect.” 487 U.S. at 108 DISCUSSION S.Ct. 2510. The Court approached this question as one of whether Constitu review the district court’s We tion or laws United States had “so novo, grant summary judgment ap de committed” a relevant matter “to federal plying legal the same standards as the control that law pre-empted state is Chapman Transport, trial court. v. AI replaced, necessary, by where federal (11th Cir.2000) (en law 1012, 229 F.3d 1023 (absent prescribed explicit of a content banc). the district court’s ex We review directive) statutory by the courts.” Id. at expert opinion clusion of evidence for 504, Preemption 108 S.Ct. 2510.5 of this abuse of discretion. General Electric Co. warranted, held, it Joiner, 136, 142, 512, only kind is when the v. 522 U.S. 118 S.Ct. imposition liability (1997); under state law L.Ed.2d 508 v. 139 Allison 1300, “significant would create a conflict” with Corp., McGhan Med. 184 F.3d (11th Cir.1999). policy “uniquely federal in an area of fed 507, eral Id. at 2510. interest.” 108 S.Ct.

Summary judgment appropriate when uniquely The held that Court one area of genuine “there is no mate- issue as procurement federal interest is the moving party rial fact and ... is enti- equipment by the United States. Id. judgment.as tled to a a matter of law.” 56(c). defining “significant what counts as a con- Fed.R.Civ.P. motion for flict,” necessary found it to iden- Court summаry judgment exclusively rested tify “limiting principle” pre- a that would protection its asserted entitlement government vent contractor defense government contractor defense. interfering unduly operation Accordingly, See R.l-49. we need with 509,108 resolve It whether the district court erred of state law. Id. at S.Ct. 2510. 504, five-justice majority, Boyle, 5. In his for common law.” 487 U.S. at a enterprise Justice Scalia remarked that this 2510. S.Ct. has been characterized as one of "federal designed promote all-or- quires is not in the notion of a principle a found such different classes nothing as that term rules “discretionary function” Rather, Act.6 Id. question Tort Claims is whether Federal contract. used The “selection of liability under subjecting 108 S.Ct. a contractor military equip- design for appropriate significant a law create state tort would discretionary function is a ment” interest. unique a federal conflict with merely involves not Co., it “often sense because 966 F.2d Equipment Miller Glassco v. analysis judgment as but engineering Cir.1992). (11th would be technical, military, balancing many hard-pressed to conclude exceedingly considerations, including even social recognized interest unique federal greater the trade-off between specifically signifi- potential Boyle, as well as effectiveness.” safety greater combat law, not like- state are cant conflict with held that Accordingly, Court Id. present case. wise manifest mili- against tort law of state enforcement design specifications and formulation of preempted must be inas- tary contractors protocols articulation of maintenance interfere with operation much as its would very same dis- the exercise of the involve by government of discretion the exercise military fleet of to decide how a cretion making these sensi- charged with officials Holding readied. airworthy craft will be judgments. policy tive con- under state law for contractor liable maintaining military aircraft scientiously and Crawfords assert according specified procedures contractor Boyle recognized government officials’ discretion threaten *6 pro- only parties in the casе of defense holding con- manner as precisely the same that since They urge curement contracts. design departing for tractors liable liability private “[i]mmunity from tort specifications. rule,” general party exception con- it extended to service ought not be government con- thus hold that the We DynCorp tracts such as the one between Boyle ap- recognized tractor defense Congress or “until and the United States (cid:127) the service contract between plicable to on the Supreme explicitly act Court DynCorp. Initial Brief at precise Hudgens’ issue.” 24; Initial Brief Crawfords’ II. the Elements Applying lawmaking power the common agree that Contractor Government government contractor de- on which the hastily Defense must not be predicated fense is tort liability to limit under state invoked DynCorp In order for to have Nonetheless, govern- we think the law. defense, it must establish benefit of this Boyle set forth ment contractor defense applicability general the defense’s case. clearly applies present its Army, but also to its contract with three elements set forth satisfaction of Boyle specifically referred Although contracts, Supreme to ensure analysis it re- Court procurement duty discretionary or “discretionary perform a function 6. The FTCA uses the term agency employee withholding part or an the United States's of a federal function” in Government, dis- consent to suit for: whether or not the of the cretion involved be abused. [a]ny upon ... the exercise or claim based 2680(a). § 28 U.S.C. performance to exercise or or the failure conflict” fed- of an air requisite “significant conditioning-unit, between specifying policy and state law exists under the the cooling capacity precise eral but not the construction, this case. particular circumstances manner of a state law im- 2510; Boyle, posing upon at U.S. S.Ct. the manufacturer of such Glassco, (stating F.2d at 642 duty units a of care to include a certain “three-part inquiry ‘signifi- safety elaborates the duty feature would not abe iden- test”). prong anything promised cant conflict’ As the tical to the Govern- ment, Supremе Court articulated these three contrary. but neither it be conditions, liability may imposed for no be The contractor comply could with both “(1) design military equipment defects in if its obligations contractual and the state- approved reasonably prescribed duty the United States sug- care. No one (2) precise specifications; equipment gests generally that state law would (3) specifications; conformed to those pre-empted in this context. supplier warned the United States Boyle, 487 U.S. at 108 S.Ct. 2510. dangers equip- the use of the about precision requirement reasonable en- supplier ment that were known to the but sures that the contractor de- not to the States.” Id. United fense is limited proper scope by to its requiring Supreme design “that the feature in ques- Court’s references

“specifications” tion was considered reflects the nature of the Government offi- cer, Boyle, merely it in and not ‍​​‌‌‌​​​‌​‌​‌​‌​​​​​​‌​​​​‌​‌‌​​​​​‌​‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‍case before involved the contractor itself.” 512,108 alleged design military defect in the of a Id. S.Ct. 2510.

helicopter’s escape hatch. In the context case, In this application of the defense’s case, present we rearticulate the prong design specifi- first directs us not to defense’s three elements to foreclose liabil- cations procedures. but to maintenance (1) if ity under state tort law the United judges Army’s Both district found the approved reasonably precise States main- guidelines maintenance to constitute a (2) procedures; DynCorp’s perfor- tenance comprehensive regime *7 mance of maintenance conformed to those expected supplement through any not to (3) procedures; DynCorp and warned the procedures specifically other than those dangers United States about the in reli- They set forth. pre- also found that the procedures ance on the that were known cautions advised the FAA and Bell had DynCorp but not to the United States. affirmatively deliberately been and omitted prescribed proce- from the maintenance Reasonably

A. Precise Maintenance agree. dures. We Procedures appeal, On concede that requirement prescribed that main- Army’s procedures maintenance were procedures reasonably precise tenance reasonably precise meaning within the necessary to ensure that a close relation- government contractor defense and ship duty exists between the contract im- DynCorp required that not to institute posed by government the federal and the any procedures prescribed expressly not duty application gov- state law that Army. Hudgens, the district ernment contractor preempt: defense will succinctly high degree court described If, example, precision Army publica- for the United con- of reflected in the States purchase setting inspection procedures tracts and installation tions forth 1336 repairs perform inspections or not The court summarized aircraft.

for UH-1 Army’s tech- specifically prescribed by the “Daily Inspection Checklist” Army’s Accordingly, nical we conclude manuals. inspections, “over 130 individual requiring publica- Army’s comprehensive helicop- eight general areas of covering precise inspec- reasonably tions dictated (internal citation at 6 See R.l-47 ter.” incorporate procedures that did not tion omitted). specifically Mechanics were precautions enumerated the FAA spar fin inspect the “vertical structed advisories. and Bell cover attachment driveshaft and vertical directly cracks in the area channel for degree gearbox attachment the 90

below Dangers B. Contractor Known to the (citation omitted). The at 7 fitting.” Id. But Not the States United Checklist,” Army’s “Phased Maintenance (rather turn next to the third than inspections complet- to be prescribing second) government element of intervals, required examina- at certain ed simply defense because it is contractor so along rib ... rivet “[v]ertical.fin tion of the in this notice easily met case. This ele- (access cracks fin 10.08 for row at station requires ment contractors to inform the holes).” Id. at topmost lighting thru dangers sup- “known omitted). (citation Army’s Finally, Boyle, not to the plier but United States.” Instructions, exceed Maintenance 512,108 plain- 2510. The 487 U.S. S.Ct. length, for a com- pages provided Dyn- argument tiffs conceded at oral assembly “tailboom” plete inspection Corp has satisfied this condition. Their gave and part, of which the record, by the concession is borne out repairing a vari- “specific instructions for Army which demonstrates that assembly, ety of defects the tailboom danger aware of the which the FAA well including cracks the forward Bell had a failure and associated with omitted). (citation Id. at fin.” vertical incorporated adopt precautions certain testimony procedures. its own In addition produced deposition within DynCorp deposition testimony, Vemmer, Vemmer’s Ralph an aeronautical C. Army has submitted letters written employed by the division engineer spokesperson shortly after the accident ac- manu- develops these instructions knowledging awareness of the advisories an- Tab F. Vemmer als. See explaining imple- not to decision in the affirmative when asked swered precautions. ment recommended See FAA Bell advisories were whether the *8 O, thus hold Tab P. We the inspection from the “suggested deviations government third condition the contrac- previously had and maintenance which respect to be tor defense satisfied with to by at 217. approved Army.” the Id. been dangers engendered by non-implemen- the agreed precautions that the also Vemmer by procedures tation of the advised the implemented on not have been “should FAA and Bell. Army until the authorized Army aircraft Id. procedures.” such Inspection C. With Conformance no Hudgens present and The Crawfords Procedures contesting assertions

evidence Vemmer’s and; above, at they as mentioned conceded Our discussion thus far establishes that duty DynCorp failing that had no cannot be held hable argument DynCorp oral procedures Army procedures to the recommended conformance with institute has to question been reduced the of whether Army and the FAA. instructions the fin spar crack in the the visible to reasonably precise in omission their were naked eye any at time of inspection measures, precautionary and the of these required Accordingly, before the crash.8 aware of thus cre- Army danger in deciding DynCorp satisfy whether can Crawfords, The and how- ated. government per- contractor defense’s ever, DynCorp’s to primarily seek defeat formance we prong, only need determine assertion contractor genuine is a there issue of fact as by showing DynCorp that has not defense visibility eye. to the crack’s to the naked might “per- what satisfied termed question The of a visibility crack’s prong,” DynCorp requires formance compo- best understood to consist of two it carried in con- inspections to out show First, nent parts. was the crack within Army with procedures. formance The capacity the ocular to eye human argue that Army’s is, detect —that was the crack of such despite procedures, incorporating size and that nature it could be seen? the FAA precautions recommended Second, present crack was the at a location Bell, required still to find DynCorp in the helicopter’s internal that structure sрar prior crack Since the crash.7 range was within the of visual access so, DynCorp they mechanics ar- never did achieved mechanics carrying out gue DynCorp did not with conform is, Army’s procedures would me- —that Army’s procedures. chanics have at looked the crack in the properly course of inspections? conducted litigation progressively As has narrowed case, the issues involved the contro- plaintiffs point they to materials versy parties as to three between submitted from witnesses to support briefs, they argue DynCorp "inspec- 7. DynCorp their that “if clear directive that conduct performed nonnegli- tion, its checks, had service contract operational maintenance gently, DynCorp [the would have discovered required flying by applicable Armypub- test as spar] ordinary crack in the course of ordi- lications and directives.” Our discussion nary inspections (completely divorced question the text addresses of whether any Directives] Airworthiness or [FAA [Bell DynCorp's failure to discover the crack Bulletins]).” Military Hudgens' Alert Initial genuine to create a fact issue of sufficient 30; Brief Crawfords’ Initial Brief publi- conformance those with plaintiffs’ We construe inartful reference cations directives. "nonnegligent” performance contract adequate performance. mean contract Hence Although DynCorp's evidentiary submis- interpret quoted excerpt we from the conclusively sions fail to demonstrate plaintiffs' equivalent briefs as assertion on unenhanced relied visual DynCotp cannot show conformance spections, any are unable we to locate indica- Army procedures procedures because those Army procedures tion in record that required mechanics to discover ' type called for other examination prior to the crash. inspections required course of the before quote and Crawfords also Moreover, plaintiffs at crash. counsel for the range say Dyn- provisions they of contract *9 argument "genuine is- oral characterized the Corp agree violated. We with the district consisting sue of fact” in this case as material evidentiary the before court that materials us spar that in the assertion the crack in the fin genuine do show fact issue of as to long prior for a the "had been visible time” to DynCotp’s compliance any the con- with of crash. provisions by plaintiffs. tract cited the key our contract's to determination is the in of an affidavit we find to have been portion the crack visible that the contention wrongfully excluded. Each stat- witness both of these senses.9 by the could be seen that the crack ed Expert Testimony Per- 1. Exclusion of of them prior to the crash. One eye naked taining DynCorp’s to Conformance particular described a specifically also Inspection with Procedures should during which mechanics spection exclu- we review a district court’s Since spar fin portion the looked at the of have expert opinion of for abuse sion evidence was located.10 where the crack discretion, only if its we will reverse of “manifestly erroneous.” decision was DynCorp, a motion response to Joiner, 142, 512. at 118 S.Ct. U.S. materials court treated these the district evidence, see Fed. expert opinion as A controls the three-pronged test 702, portions struck R.Evid. and of expert determination whether prop un- is it deemed inadmissible evidence is admissible. Admission materials which “(1) qualified testify is to expert er if the in the test forth Daubert v. Merrell der set in the matters he competently regarding Pharmaceuticals, 579, 113 Dow 509 U.S. (2) address; methodology by the tends (1993), and 125 L.Ed.2d 469 its S.Ct. is expert which the reaches his conclusions striking in After the materials progeny. sufficiently as the reliable determined court that part, the district found Daubert; inquiry of mandated in sort that showing had made no (3) fact, testimony assists the trier of eye to the naked crack was ever visible scientific, through the of tech application accordingly ‍​​‌‌‌​​​‌​‌​‌​‌​​​​​​‌​​​​‌​‌‌​​​​​‌​‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‍It deter- prior the crash. nical, specialized expertise, or to under genuine issue mined there existed no or to a fact stand evidence determine to. entitle- of material fact as City v. Harcros issue.” Tuscaloosa of of protection ment Chem., Inc., (11th Cir. 158 F.3d contractor defense. We review the district 1998) (footnote omitted). portions decision to strike certain

court’s Sammons expert opinions and then consider Affidavit

of ofB.J. summary judgment its of is grant piece expert opinion of first at affidavit of appears the one evidence issue light due to be reversed of in the assertion that the relevant fin 9. In addition to the materials discussed text, challenge Army and Crawfords spar could in the be seen course drawing district court’s exclusion of inspections. The affidavits of Steve Powell appear which certain handwritten notations McSwain, however, provide no and Richard they supportive as characterize their inferring any their basis for awareness on abuse of case. find no discretion part the protocols followed mechanics evi- district decision to exclude this court's particular inspections. Since in the course of dence, for ever which no foundation was laid. normally fin from view obscured argue Although Hudgens and Crawfords skin, by the tail must fin's external mechanics drawing Steve discussed in a Powell gаin open plates, panels, visu- doors and/or deposition, they refer provide the citations part al access to this aircraft. testimony he portions of Powell's 7, at failure of Powell and 1. The both clearly discussing entirely docu- different address how access would be McSwain to pointed by the dis- ment. This was first out gained by following proce- mechanics Hudgens. court trict See Memorandum testimony read dures leads us to their Opinion respect por- affidavit as with to what silent been viewed tions of have 10. The characterize Crawfords given inspection. making in the course of all three witnesses' affidavits *10 Sammons, ply B.J. an aircraft mechanic em- apply what the district court ack- ployed roughly forty at Fort Rucker for nowleged “expertise” was his n years retiring day before on the before the “maintenance inspection of UH-1H subject accident. At the time of his helicopters.” retire- Memorandum Crawford ment, Sammons was the lead Opinion mechanic on In crediting Sammons’s helicopters the fleet of expertise, which the acci- the district court necessarily de- belonged. dent craft The fault termined that the first and prongs second court striking range the district of of the test for opinion scientific evidence— statements Sammons’s affidavit. We qualification witness’s expert as an find except no abuse of discretion reliability inas- and the of his or her methodolo- much as the court gy struck Sammons’s state- respect satisfied with to Sam- —were October, ment pertaining to an opinion mons’s October, spection that he describes in inspection. some detail.11 1998 Specifically, Sammons states that properly In light of aspect this of the district DynCorp personnel instructed would have ruling, court’s we believe its exclusion of discovered on cracks this occasion Sammons’ statement was likely most Army procedures because required “a de- oversight caused poor affidavit’s inspection tailed of all of components draftsmanship.12 To the extent that boom assembly, including tail statement’s exclusion was not an oversight, R.l-38, fin spar.” vertical Tab at 1-3. the court’s determination that Sammons distriсt court’s memorandum had qualification satisfied the and reliabili- stated no basis for excluding Crawford ty prongs left exclusion to rest on a deter- portion this of Sammons’s affidavit. mination that prong the relevance was not

We understand Sammons’s use of the Any satisfied. such determination would word “cracks” to refer generically to be an abuse of discretion. As this case has cracks of a size and nature that developed, visibility permit them to by inspectors be detected October, at the time of the 1998 inspection eyesight adequate. Thus, whose we only disputed question perti- of fact read his assertion to concern nent to satisfaction of the ele- range of visual access by inspec- achieved ments of the contractor de- adhering Army’s tors procedures— fense. The and Crawfords have is, inspectors would have failed any to submit other potentially com- portion looked at the fin spar petent on showing evidence that Army inspec- which the crack was located. On this procedures tion would have led to the reading, oрinion appears Sammons’s discovery sím- crack’s other occasion. themselves, part court did not strike this at 2. The Crawfords how- of Sammons’ affidavit. Our ever, discussion of the prior summary judgment conceded pertains only district court’s error therefore qualified that Sammons was not to state an Crawford. opinion regarding whether cracks existed at any particular point considering in time. 12. The of Sammons’s affidavit dis- admissibility just quoted, of the sentence part cussed in the text of a sentence that may understandably the district court have read in full: "The cracks existed in the verti- improper reacted to Sammons's assertion re- cal fin on this date and these cracks would garding paus- existence cracks without during have been discovered if ing recognize the distinct assertion Sam- the line proper guid- mechanics had received following mons makes the words "and these.” DynCorp management.” ance from

1340 action, is products liability specifically identified causation affidavit Sammons’s ”). puzzle’ ‘piece “more than a of the Since October, inspection as an occasion the 1998 district exclusion of Sammons’s Army procedures the court’s on which conformance erroneous, manifestly the get testimony mechanics to was allowed would have striking this portion spar.13 court abused its discretion of view of the relevant of Sammons’s affidavit. portion that he took account specificity His shows spar cannot of the fact that wrongfully evidence When excluded various visually opening without examined affidavit, re-integrated into Sammons’ R.l- panels, or doors. inspection plates, read as fol- passage the relevant should affidavit, 7, Sammons’ Tab at 1. Hence lows: inspec- that evincing knowledge his while maintenance, this type repair and With necessarily examine tors would in- there should have been a detailed portion spar of the fin relevant of the function, spection components of all of the every of maintenance course assembly, including tail boom the verti- the “detailed made clear that nonetheless spar. cal fin would have been Cracks inspection” for October 1998 was called if during inspection this discovered they do so. one occasion on which would proper had line mechanics received simply this The relevance of assertion Tuscaloosa, guidance DynCorp management. City See not contestable. of (in satisfy order rele- 158 F.3d Deposition Testimony Powell Steve of expert opinion of test for evi- prong vance dence, and Crawfords also circumstantial evidence “must piece puzzle challenge striking district of merely one court’s constitute Powell, testimony deposition endeavor assemble Steve Allison, Helicopters op who jury”); investigator 184 F.3d at Bell field before microscope through an (remarking expert’s opinion, erated electron plaintiffs only photographs he took of fractured when offered as evidence which suggests portions inspections, On one or of these 13. Sammons two other more may there his affidavit that have existed other cracks of vertical fin should have conforming occasions on which mechanics by DynCorp.” at 2-3. Al- been detected Id. procedures with would have might though amena- passage have been spar. examined the relevant First,-Sammons of the fin redaction, appropriate for the ble to counsel visi- stated were "cracks agreed, prior to the and Crawfords day they ble and were before detectable ruling summary judgment, on district court's during inspec- the crash the corrosion control striking reference to Sammons's passage tion.” This PMD’s, “daily inspections phase such as court, properly struck district spections, as 50-hour as well 25-hour and unqualified opin- found Sammons to offer Hence, inspections.” subsequent his refer- ion about whether cracks existed and were inspections” ence to more of "one or these detectable before crash. believe antecedent, and we referred no identifiable passage district exclusion of the court's entire find court abused do not the district to have proper asser- because Sammons’s tacit striking it. its discretion in For these rea- procedures tion in cor- followed sons, only portion of Sammons’s affidavit inspections sev- rosion could not be control conform- that describes an occasion which accompanying ered from his assertion that Army procedures with have en- ance cracks were visible and detectable at the time the fin de- tailed examination of is his Second, inspection. such Sammons October, scription inspection. "DynCorp daily inspec- ... stated that did PMD's, phase inspections, tions such as inspections.... well as 25-hour and 50-hour *12 parts helicopter after the crash. assess such matters as when' a crack first in The district court both cases struck appeared and whether it prior was visible Powell’s assertion that the fin crack a crash. And while it is conceivable spar would have been visible to the naked that a application skilled of striation count- rationale, eye prior to the crash. As a ing could constitute a reliable means of entirely court relied on Powell’s admission formulating opinion, an such Powell stated that he had no knowledge of performed that he no counting striation procedures. Hudgens maintenance Mem- involved this case. R.l- 21; orandum Opinion at Memo- 38, 2, Tab at 35. Hudgens Crawford and Craw- Opinion randum at 15. This error in fords have therefore identity failed to even that it confounded what we have identified arguably reliable methodology underly- component parts as the two of the question ing Powell’s determination that the crack visibility. of The courts should have con- prior was visible to the According- crash. testimony simply sidered Powell’s itas ly, although the district court stated an range related to the of visual access insufficient excluding rationale for Powell’s by DynCorp inspectors, achieved also but testimony, we hold that such exclusion was as to eye’s capacity the naked to detect not an abuse of discretion. cracks of a type certain size a certain McSwain, Richard H. PhD Affidavit of metal. Richard McSwain an engineer error, Despite this we do not believe the qualification whose engineer as a materials district court abused its discretion in ex- was not contested befоre the district court. cluding testimony. Powell’s The district court struck and Crawfords have not shown that Pow- McSwain’s affidavit in opined which he experience ell’s provided a reliable basis that “the cracks were visible to the naked for his ap- the crack’s eye and also would have been detectable pearance prior crash. by the use of testing” non-destructive at specialized The two forms of expertise inspection the time of an performed 112 by using claimed Powell involved an elec- prior hours to the accident. McSwain cit tron microscope applying the tech- ed several documents as his basis for nique of striation counting, which the dis- reaching this conclusion. He relied on an trict court described as “a method used to “Aircraft 150 Hour Inspection Phase Rec determine growth the rate of of a crack.” premise ord” for the 15; inspection that an Opinion Memorandum see Crawford also was conducted 112 Opinion prior Memorandum hours to the accid We are unable to ent.14 For experi- conceive how the conclusion that the crack ence the use of an microscope, electron would have been visible and detectable at itself, time, and of could qualify a witness McSwain relied on the results of 1997, 1997, It is clear that McSwain here refers to the occurred in June October Febru- inspection same R.l-38, that Sammons characterized ary and November 1998. See taking place in October of 1998. The doc- Tab at exhibits A-D. Given the substan- text, summarizing ument identified in the periods separating tial of time these occa- “phase inspection,” 150-hour includes nota- sions, it is clear that the described spanning tions of dates October and Novem- Sammons, McSwain, variously and other R.l-38, ber of 1998. See Tab 13. Other occurring sources as in October or November materials submitted show and the same. one phase inspections preceding the crash emphasis Court has repeated Supreme study conducted titled

a 1999 upon “gatekeep- the district court’s placed Spar Propagation Crack Test Fin “UH-1 ing” role determination test sub- 129. This Results.” evidence shоuld admitted. See expert flight to simulated jected another *13 Carmichael, 526 Kumho Tire Co. v. U.S. study growth of a to the in order stress 137, 152, 143 L.Ed.2d 238 S.Ct. virtually location as the the same crack at (1999) (concluding judge trial “that the of the accident caused the crash one which leeway deciding have must considerable helicopter. particular go case to about deter- a how compara- that the Finding test particular expert whether testimo- mining respects to the one in all relevant ble reliable”); Joiner, at 522 U.S. ny is helicopter, the on accident installed (recognizing district court’s S.Ct. report held on court that “Bell’s district authority “opinion to exclude evidence that may ... be used to propagation crack only by existing connected to data crack regarding data” that extrapolate expert,” it conclude ipse dixit should under- agree caused the crash parties both an simply great analyt- that “there is too Hudgens suit. Memorandum lying this opinion gap between data and ical 17; Opinion at Memorandum Crawford a decision Even when to proffered”). Accordingly, at 14.15 the district Opinion expert determi- strike evidence is outcome opinion to declined strike McSwain’s court native, grant supports as when it a of detectability to crack’s as it related judgment, court’s summary the district de- (such x- testing through non-destructive subject deferential cision remains to re- did, however, portion rays). It strike 142-43,118 Id. at 512. view. S.Ct. crack opining affidavit that the of his begin by observing that the district Hudgens, naked In eye. to the visible Hudgens failed to articulate a court following court stated rationale district rationale for its exclusion of sufficient this its decision: “Because for opinion visibility regarding the McSwain’s is no evidence that McSwain has there spar. crack in the accident before, are a UH-1 aircraft there no seen excluding the court’s stated reason for tes- may infer by facts court timony appears confused the ‍​​‌‌‌​​​‌​‌​‌​‌​​​​​​‌​​​​‌​‌‌​​​​​‌​‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‍to have two competent testify to about McSwain in our components we identified dis- have cracks de- have been question visibility. cussion of the a before crash visual tectable may fact that McSwain never have seen a Opin- spection.” Memorandum potential does not from his UH-1 detract Crawford, In the district court ion to capacity, engineer, as a ren- materials simply that no “factual stated it found a crack of opinion about whether der regarding for conclusion basis” McSwain’s kind of particular particular size mate- eye. visibility cracks’ to the naked eye. could be the naked rial seen 14. Opinion Memorandum Crawford opinion read need not be McSwain’s range access reviewing for concern the of visual achieved these determinations discretion, inspecting mechanics the course abuse of we are mindful argued component tested identical to the court was not in the district helicopter. DynCorp the size of the crack in inferences on the accident model based the accident could not be appeal. argument on has not renewed this propagation Bell’s test because attorneys UH-l aircraft. While all layers.” five Id. These cracks were present should havе had Crawfords even before the commencement of visibility McSwain’s affidavit refer to the the controlled experiment, which utilized a inspection” the crack “at the time of the spar that was received from the prior .crash, conducted 112 hours 10,214 had recorded flight prior hours simply than inspection,” rather “at the the test. Id. Only after roughly 215 context of his affidavit as a whole makes hours of additional flight simulated had the clear that it is the former he grown cracks a point that caused the fin means to In failing appreciate assert. rupture. Finally, Id. study distinction, the district court erred. suggests, albeit with some ambiguity, that at least one crack was visible to the naked *14 opinion referred, The court’s Crawford eye throughout experi- course of the n withoutfurther elaboration, to the absence ment. See (reporting id. “[e]ddy cur- of a “factual basis” for McSwain’s conclu- rent was conjunction also used in with visibility sions the crack’s visual means measure crack lengths on eye. naked Hence does not Crawford layers”). the outer Hudgens, manifest the error we discern in nor it explain precisely why sum, but does it In report provided a basis opinion found McSwain’s to lack a factual opinion that visible cracks could exist cases, however, basis. both the deci- on a fin spar without developing into a opinion sion to strike McSwain’s complete will not rupture for almost twice long as if require reversal we determine that ex- as 112 hours for which McSwain required by proper clusion was applica- opined cracks were visible on the accident tion opinion of the test for scientific helicopter’s evi- spar. study not, The does however, dence. discuss frequency with which begin cracks layer on a surface turn, purpose We thus for the of deter- multi-layer material of which the relevant mining opinion argu- McSwain’s portion of fin spar is fabricated. ably rested on a methodology, reliable propagation the Bell crack study DynCorp he cited has submitted materials tend- as its sole basis. The study reported ing spar to show that cracks often do not experiment a controlled designed repro- begin оn spar’s layer, surface and that precisely duce spar same failure that the crack on the likely accident craft most parties all agree caused the document, accident un- did not. One which derlying R.l-38, this suit. See Tab describes as a 1997 internal Bell document fig. 6 (showing spar of fin location where and which the have not chal- propagated over course of ex- lenged authenticity grounds, on states that periment). engineers The who conducted spar “very difficult” applied the test a stress load that simulat- because “visual inspection cannot find ed the conditions under spar R.l-36, which the cracks ...” sub-laminates Tab operates flight. J, Id. at 2. report at BE018871. The document also notes described cracks on the test as fol- that the FAA previously had informed Bell lows: “The fin flange is fabricated “that the design permit laminated did not using layers five metal bonded together. adequate inspection inadequate and was an fatigue cracks at hole design.” number stared Id. at BE018873. It then recom- layer the outer progressed and through mends creating single piеce “a [left-hand] uninformed) existing possibly conclusion laminated

spar cap replace respect in this accident differed Id. at BE018876. spar.” over very aircraft its use found telling it cracks also find We closely time the other most resembled: four other craft with- the accident on after Fort Rucker helicopters within same fleet were each in the Fort Rucker Evaluating fleet. of these soundness lay- the surface concealed beneath instance clearly aspects opinion re- of McSwain’s compromised spars thus discov- er of probabilities. Yet quires weighing X-rays. only via the use ered the likeli- explained McSwain has neither (affidavit DynCorp employee X who assigns hood to each of the unknowns he inspections all x-ray “supervised spoken “precision nor with the sort of Rucker”). Ft. None aircraft at UH-1 logic” assess the that would allow us to eye. This naked Id. were visible to the relationship experience between his with known pattern, conjunction in this engineer materials his in the Bell memoran- problem discussed Frazier, cаse. v. 322 F.3d United States dum, a strong us to raise infer- seems to (11th Cir.2003). therefore heli- that the crack on accident ence visibili- opinion regarding hold that his *15 prior not visible to the copter was likewise ty of crack at the an time of crash. 112 hours conducted before the accident properly was excluded the district materials, of these face court. explanation no McSwain’s affidavit offers opinion he formed the of how Thus, to review it remains for us crack on accident differed correct in whether the district court was subsequently those discovered the rest evidentiary parties’ determining Fort fleet. not Rucker McSwain genuine any submissions did reveal identify specific upon to only fails facts analysis issue fact. of of material Our this based, opinion his but also man- into of portion matter will take account the pattern ifests no awareness of found wrongfully affidavit struck in Sammons’s thus other feel com- helicopters. We Crawford. to liken case to those in which pelled this expert’s explain to for an failure the basis 2. Absence Genuine Issue Matеrial of of important inference mandates exclusion DynCorp’s Fact as Conformance Rider opinion. of his or her See v. Sandoz Inspection With Procedures (11th 1194, Corp.,

Pharm. 295 F.3d Cir.2002) expert opinion fall (holding In determining issue of fact whether an requires” of short what “Daubert when “genuine” the purpose defeating for require finding reliability “several summary judgment, we ask whether the ”). scientifically ‘leaps unsupported of faith’ jury is “such that a evidence reasonable reliable, To find McSwain’s a dis- nonmoving could return a verdict for the he trict court would have to determine that party.” Liberty Lobby, v. Anderson believing 2505, had some unstated basis U.S. 106 S.Ct. 91 L.Ed.2d helicopter (1986); on the to have Chapman, accident 229 F.3d determination, on In pattern making exhibited same observed we view the time, light At the the one tested Bell. same evidence most favorable (and nonmovant, infer- drawing all reasonable it would have credit his unstated party’s Augusta in that favor. Iron evidence to DynCorp enees demonstrate that has “performance” satisfied this Employers prong v. Ins. and Steel Works government (11th Cir.1988). cоntractor defense. Wausau, 855, 856 835 F.2d Here, applied these standards must be In fight of our earlier discussion of the DynCorp’s evaluate contention that no other government two elements of the con- maintaining visible to mechanics defense, tractor DynCorp we hold that has accident conformance demonstrated the absence of genuine Army’s inspection procedures. with the issue of material fact its entitle- DynCorp believe has carried this bur- ment to the protection defense’s in this den. case.

Although wrongfully por- stricken tion of Sammons’s affidavit does tend to CONCLUSION Dyn- show at least one occasion on which held, first, Having that the Corp visually mechanics should have ex- applies contractor Army- defense amined the relevant of the accident and, maintenance contract sec- helicopter’s spar, DynCorp has submit- ond, that DynCorp has demonstrated the range suggesting ted a of materials any genuine absence of issue material crack at this location was never visible fact as to its satisfaction of the defense’s еye. to the naked In addition to the the elements, three summary we AFFIRM the description memorandum and the judgment entered on behalf post-accident x-rays conducted on the the district court. fleet, remaining Fort it Rucker has sub- *16 AFFIRMED. mitted an affidavit from the mechanic who very inspection conducted the discussed affidavit,

Sammons’s states that no EDMONDSON, Judge, specially Chief fin spar cracks were visible at that concurring: U,

time. at 1. The Hudgens I I judgment, join concur Crawfords, contrast, pre- have not Judge opinion except Barkett’s for Part any support sented admissible materials to IIC. their contention that the crack on the acci- any point dent was visible at COX, Judge, specially Circuit prior to the crash. concurring: sum, all evidentiary materials de- I judgment, join concur and I serving suggest of consideration that no Judge opinion except Barkett’s for Part crack could eye be seen the naked as of IIC. October occasion as to which there is indication that mechanics fol-

lowing procedures should have

looked at the relevant

spar. visibility Since the crack’s remains only disputed ‍​​‌‌‌​​​‌​‌​‌​‌​​​​​​‌​​​​‌​‌‌​​​​​‌​‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‍pertinent issue of fact Army proce- conformance with

dures, jury we conclude that a reasonable

would have to find a preponderance of the

Case Details

Case Name: Joe J. Hudgens, Phyllis Hudgens v. Bell Helicopters/Textron, Dyncorp
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Date Published: Apr 25, 2003
Citation: 328 F.3d 1329
Docket Number: 02-12357, 02-13284
Court Abbreviation: 11th Cir.
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