Joe A. Logan, Sr. v. United States

1990). Therefore, (BIA 166, 167 N. Dec. Sr., LOGAN, A. Petitioner- any finding of Joe must overturn

this Court supported by Appellant, substan- fraud not marriage evidence. probative tial and Chisley’s Pe-

iii. Denial of The INS’s America, UNITED STATES APA Violate the tition Did Not Respondent-Appellee. INA or the No. 04-5325. not the APA did violate INS for a Chisley’s petition when it denied Appeals, States Court of was not the denial spousal visa because Sixth Circuit. sup was capricious and and arbitrary The deni by substantial evidence. ported Oct. 2005. Submitted: arbitrary capricious and be al nоt Filed: Jan. Decided and Chisley with a supplied INS cause the As the INS ex explanation. reasoned indicated Mrs.

plained, the evidence Chisley was fraudu

Bangura’s marriage thus,

lent, required deny it to the INA Furthermore,

Chisley’s petition. sup finding factual fraud

INS’s probative evi

ported by substantial decree Bangura’s

dence. Mrs. divorce marriage appeared

from first her Next, Chisley and Mrs. Ban-

fraudulent. Additional living together.

gura were Bangura did own

ly, Chisley Mrs. Bangura may

joint Mrs. property. While for these explanation

offer a different

facts, explanation does not an alternative of the INS’s

negate the reasonableness Banguras Finally, the of fraud.

finding that the provision of the INA

point Chisley’s petition. in denying

INS violated

Therefore, Bangura does we find Mrs. APA claim prevail on the merits her court’s dismissal.

and affirm district

III.

CONCLUSION above, set we

For the reasons forth court’s dismissal of

AFFIRM district

all Plaintiffs’ claims. J.,

ROGERS, opinion delivered the court, SILER, J., joined. which CLAY, 510-13), (pp. delivered J. separate concurring opinion.

OPINION ROGERS, Judge. Circuit Petitioner, sentenced under higher a provision arson statute for maxi- results,” penalty argues mum “when death attack his upon this collateral sentence judge, jury, that the the district should fact that deaths re- determined the v. the fire that he set. sulted from States, (1999), L.Ed.2d 311 decided dur- ing ap- pendency petitioner’s direct under peal, held that the feder- higher al statute for provision death re- penalty maximum “when results” jury quired a determination ‍​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌​​​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​​​‌​‌​‌‌​‌‌​​​​​‌‌‌‌‌​‌​​​​‍that death carjacking. from the Because resulted distinguish- basis articulated for has been statutes, two the effect for the requires order impose a sentence under the federal arson higher for a maximum provision statute results,” the penalty “when death by a jury be determined bе- death must yond a reasonable doubt. We nonetheless affirm denial of relief under 28 U.S.C. petitioner never raised 2255 because review, issue, at trial direct either or on to do so despite apparent opportunity at both levels.

I. Terry Cushing, Monica ON BRIEF: M. employer and co-defendant Sur- Logan’s Wheatley, States Attor- Assistant United sought proceeds collect the esh Kumar Louisville, neys, Kentucky, Appellee. for policy failing an on his hotel insurance Sr., Greenville, Illinois, pro A. Logan, Joe end, Green, Kеntucky. To this Bowling se. maintenance Logan, Kumar asked his

man, fire to the hotel consider- to set ROGERS, place and to live for SILER, CLAY, ation for a free $3500 Before: year. set fire to one Judges. Circuit destroyed building, fire Re- challenged Presentencing hotel. The individuals, port grounds. in- on ten seriously Logan argues killed four purposes motion that three of jured others. Kumar filed an in- fifteen objections his ten demonstrate that for more than million in surance claim $4.5 raised issue whether the or the Logan, losses. See United States Nоs. authority judge had the to decide whether 97-5912, 97-5914, 1999 WL at *1 First, Logan argued the deaths occurred. (6th 19,1999). July Cir. depar- that he was to a entitled downward proceedings During pretrial for Kumar ture because he lacked the cul- necessary trial, Kumar Logan’s joint argued pable mental to kill state when he set the fire the deaths in hotel were irrelevant Second, argued hotel on fire. that the by to the offense be arson to considered court failed give to sufficient consideration jury thus that of the evidence the to by thе evaluations submitted defense deaths was barred Federal Rules of experts that Logan mentally indicated Evidence 401 and 402. The district court Third, impaired. argued Logan that the authority split noted the as to whether government’s evidence, summary the an the issue of death was element the court, upon by relied the trial “not did aggravated or arson offense a mere sen- accurately reflect the cul- defense level of tencing enhancement. The court deter- pability sentencing for purposеs.” mined that not an death was element and 844(i), § to Pursuant 18 U.S.C. dis- the argues noted because “the defendant 7, 1997, trict on July court Lo- sentenced relevant, that the death certificates are not gan to life imprisonment for the arson agrees govern- defendant Kumar with the charges because the the arson caused position ment’s death was not an [that 1999, death of four people. On March element of the The court offense].” there- Court decided Jones v. Unit- the granted motion keep fore Kumar’s to еvi- States, ed 526 U.S. 119 S.Ct. jury. Logan dence the deaths from the (1999), L.Ed.2d which held brought a motion to a 911 exclude tele- required federal carjacking statute phone transcript he argued because decide, jury an element the statu- testimony regarding the victims did not offense, tory whether death occurred as a it any probable make more or less that he result of the relevant criminal conduct. set the granting fire. the same order court, Logan appealed sentence this motion, granted Kumar’s district arguments which heard oral on June Logan’s grounds motion on 1999. This court affirmed his probative. 911 evidence was not July Logan subsequently peti- tioned the Court a writ of joint After a trial with co-defendant Ku- certiorari, but peti- denied his mar, 28, 1997, jury February found tion. (1) guilty of Logan conspiracy to commit mail fraud and arson violation of 18 Logan filed a motion for collateral relief (2) 844(i), §§ 1341; U.S.C. pursuant on January 28 U.S.C. arson of real used in property affecting magistrate 2001. The recommended interstate commerce violation of 18 applied to-Logan’s case because 844(i). jury did not decide Logan’s was decided before case any bodily whether injury death or serious magistrate became final. The also held resulted from the that Jones announced a acquit- arson. The rule of new consti- ted of mail-fraud. magistrate tutional law. The nevertheless Jones announced a new rule of that, plain- applicable under determined law, not a rule of review, new constitu Logan was not entitled error petitioner tional law. Jones suc “death he had not raised the because relief cessfully jury had Moreover, argued that the to de mag- any manner. issue” offense, cide, as an element of the whether “there was serious noted that istrate anyone carjack with his died connection deaths result- case that the dispute that, ing. The Court held because allow of which Mr. from the arson ed judge to determine the fact of convicted.” sentencing fac anyone whether died as adopt court did not The district tor would “raise serious constitutional in full because the magistrate’s report in questions,” Congress presumptively announce a that Jones did not court held death to an element tended the Instead, law. new rule constitutional Jones, offense. merely court held quell 1215. To the dis statutory interpretation limited provided senters’ fears that the Court’s decision and did the federal statute state-sentencing practices, would unsettle rule of criminal provide a constitutional stated, today majority decision “[0]ur rely on Jones Logan could not procеdure, any principle does not announce new district court § in his 2255 motion. The law, merely interprets a but constitutional Logan’s motion. dismissed accordingly particular in of a set federal statute 24, court, 2004, On November of constitutional concerns the district struing Logan’s appeal of through of our emerged a series decisions for a certif- ruling application as an court’s century.” Id. 252 quarter at past over him appealability, permitted icate of 1215; n. 119 S.Ct. see also United to his applied Jones case appeal whether Lucas, (6th 414, 420 States v. 282 F.3d and, so, proeedurally if default- whether Cir.2002) (stating Court conclude, his claim. We first ed Jones in the case on Jones resolved district court’s determina- contrary to the discussion was grounds, its constitutional tion, rely can on Jones because dicta), on merely partially overruled other regarding elements of holding Jones’ Leachman, v. grounds by United States pertinent carjacking statute the federal (6th Cir.2002). Indeed, the 309 F.3d 377 interpretation of the federal to the corrеct Jersey, U.S. Apprendi in v. New 530 Court However, we affirm the arson statute. 147 L.Ed.2d 435 dismiss judgment the district (2000), of constitutional announced rule because, to ar- by failing Logan’s motion in suggested criminal Jones: procedure (at appeal) trial and on direct gue both any fact that increas must decide nonconstitutional, nonjurisdictional issue beyond a penalty a crime statu es the resolved, Logan proeedurally that Jones 530 U.S. tory Apprendi, maximum. See claim. defaulted (stating that 120 2348 S.Ct. holding Ap- in merely foreshadowed II. therefоre, ). court, The prendi district of the Su- The nonconstitutional nature provided that Jones correctly determined in v. United holding preme Court’s statutory interpretation, not rule only rely- preclude Logan from States does not procedure. criminal constitutional § 2255 motion. on that case in his statutory nature of Jones’ 2255 extends relief based Section mean that holding does not itself “laws of the United States.” 508 upon rely Jones on collateral Jones because the district court’s error did

could not un- not causе a bringing attack. Petitioners motions “fundamental defect” or a rely justice.” “miscarriage § can on the Court’s deci- ‍​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌​​​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​​​‌​‌​‌‌​‌‌​​​​​‌‌‌‌‌​‌​​​​‍der 2255 Indeed, law. grounded sions Statutory brought claims under States, v. 417 Davis U.S. § proper 2255 are when the issues (1974), 94 41 L.Ed.2d 109 S.Ct. presented in the motion were raised Court held “the or, if appeal direct the issue could not grounded a contention is the Consti- raised, a miscarriage justice when tution, the ‘laws the United arises. held Sunal preclude its assertion in States’ would Large petitioner that a could raise § procеeding.” a 2255 statutory claim for the first time on collat Moreover, applies a con eral attack where the resolution of the viction under the federal arson statute “at legal relevant the time of the though under even decided crystallized.” ... conviction[ ] had not statutes, statute. Both 174, 181, S.Ct. 91 L.Ed. phrasing language, similar with de (1947). States, Later Davis v. United crime pro scribe the substantive and then inqui that “the appropriate Court held penalties bodily injury vide if different ry was whether the claimed law error of during death oсcurs the commission the was ‘a fundamental defect which inherent 844(i), Compare crime. U.S.C. with ly in a complete miscarriage results Indeed, government justice,’ presents] ‘[i]t whether ... analysis concedes “a Jones of 18 exceptional circumstances where the need 844(i) certainly would almost remedy for the the afforded writ of have in a resulted conclusion that the ‘if ” corpus apparent.’ habeas at finding death results’ an to was element be (citations omitted). In 94 S.Ct. 2298 proved jury.” to the of the simi Powell, v. Stone the Court stated that larity between the language statutes’ and together Sunal and Davis stand for the concession, government’s the Logan can (1) following may rule: petitioners rely properly on in his 2255 mo statutory raise collateral attacks issues tion. appeal, that could have been raised on (2) any statutory claims that could not III. permissible have been raised on appeal are Although precluded rely from they satisfy if the “fundamental de ing upon Jones because fect” test. 428 U.S. 478 n. holding, proce basis for the Jones Logan (1976). 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 The Stone durally by failing defaulted his claim to Court also scope noted while the raise the at or appeal. Jones issue trial on corpus the writ of habeas has been ex Logan never despite raised panded to include various constitutional recognition district court’s that the issue claims, expansion there has been was of Logan’s unsettled at the time trial nonconstitutional claims. See id. despite Supreme the fact assertions, Logan’s Contrary Court decided Jones before oral to Logan’s Lo argument objections to court appeal. gan’s this on direct to Re Presentencing Moreover, even if this court to port were hold failed to raise the issue whether Logan did opportunity not have the to the deaths were elements issue, Logan rely objection raise the still cannot on first offense. His concerned was not to decide whether the mental state requisite he had whether silent in Logan at offense level deaths occurred. remаined base to sentenced kill; no intent to challenge. had the face Kumar’s successful argued He negli- criminally instead, he was at most Logan also failed to raise the Jones objection His second or reckless. gent appeal issue on direct once Jones was de- ex- improperly court that the district was decid- cided. Because Logan’s mental testimony expert cluded Logan’s argument ed oral on Jones before objection His third impairment. (and appeal direct thus before rely on the court should the district final), Logan case became certain- Logan’s summary of the evidence States’ United ly upon in his could relied his true level of it failed reflect appeal this court and certiorari objections neither chal- These culpability. v. Ken- Court. See Griffith nor that deaths occurred lenged the fact tucky, 479 U.S. S.Ct. jury or whether the the issue of addressed (1987). Although Jones was L.Ed.2d 649 result- whether deaths judge should decide 24, 1999, March over two decided on Therefore, Logan the hotel fire. from ed аrgu- months this court oral before heard the issue decided failed at trial raise ments, not file a to cite Logan did motion Jones. R.App. authorities under Fed. additional issue at Logan failed raise 28(j) P. issue in his oral or address the knowledge that the issue despite his trial to raise argument. Because failed death The issue whether was unsettled. trial appeal, issue at or direct of the offense a mere an element Logan procedurally defaulted unsettled the time sentencing factor was claim. Compare his 1996-97 trial. United (5th Triplett, 922 F.2d v. States IV. Cir.1991) jury must (holding that the de- the offense whether cide an element of Even if this court determined occurred), with States deaths reasonably con not have could (8th Cir.1993), Ryan, 9 F.3d 669 appeal, on he the issue at trial or tested Oliver, F.3d 552 States v. 60 rely because the dis still cannot on Jones (9th Cir.1995) (holding that whether interpretation incorrect trict court’s merely sentencing a deaths occurred was not in a “funda statute at trial did result factor). fact, pre- In the United States inherently in a which results defect mеntal unset- thorough a discussion sented Davis, justice.” miscarriage of complete in mo- response its to Kumar’s tled issue proper The at S.Ct. 2298. 417 U.S. 94 that two circuits suppress, tion to noted asks whether inquiry “fundamental defect” disagreed, correctly informed the dis- act convicted ‘an the “defendant stands that the Circuit had never trict court Sixth criminal.’” the law does not make that therefore, issue, The the issue. decided States, Bousley 523 U.S. v. United at the settled nor overlooked was neither (1998) 1604, 140 118 L.Ed.2d 828 S.Ct. problematic trial. Even more fоr time of Davis, 417 (quoting fact his co-defendant Logan is the that 2298). satisfy “funda Logan cannot of the argued Kumar to exclude evidence inquiry. mental defect” grounds on of irrelevance. deaths a “funda- present not Logan’s claim does for Kumar district court concluded he is not convicted defect” because on relevance mental challenge evidence not make that the law does of an act necessarily Kumar conceded grounds, 510 Logan guilty argued judge’s

criminal. found of ar- finding prejudiced judge found Logan’s son. The also any way. Instead, him in in his death arson resulted of others. to suppress, Logan apparently motion be- concerning holding, who must find a Jones’ judge, lieved that it favored him for the (not found), fact must be what no jury, rather than the to decide whether the legal. way Logan’s renders conduct therefore, Logan, deaths occurred.1 can- change; only not substance of law did rely not no miscarriage Jones because procedure changed. See Schriro v. justice extraordinary оr other factor Summerlin, 348, 354, 124 542 U.S. S.Ct. exists in this case. (2004) 442 (holding 159 L.Ed.2d ruling requiring jury, a constitutional y. judge, aggravating instead of the to decide a death-penalty proce- reasons, factors cases was foregoing For the we AFFIRM dural, opposed substantive, to a Logan’s district court’s denial of change). Because Jones does render motion.

Logan’s legal, Logan conduct does not stand convicted of a act noncriminal CLAY, Judge, concurring. Circuit satisfy cannot the “fundamental defect” I concur decision affirm the tеst. district court’s denial of habeas relief assuming Even there awas “funda Petitioner, separately but I write defect,” justice miscarriage mental no or my rationale differs from that of ma- extraordinary other factor in this case al view, jority. my Petitioner may rely lows in his motion rely on support petition Jones to change interpretation. In Lo habeas relief. The decision Jones did case, gan’s party questioned, according not announce a new rule of criminal proce- magistrate, to ‍​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌​​​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​​​‌​‌​‌‌​‌‌​​​​​‌‌‌‌‌​‌​​​​‍the that deaths resulted general rather, application; dure with from the fire. See Derman v. United the decision was one States, (1st Cir.2002) (de F.3d struction the federal carjacking statute. nying petitioner’s § 2255 motion based on prisoner When federal makes a constitutional claim determining after claim, alleges habeas that his sentence juror that no reasonable could have found illegal, in that it violated the United in petitioner’s favor an regarding States Constitution federal law. See decided). judge that the should question § 2255. The is then what Moreover, remained silent af exactly illegal. Jones made The answer to ter the court addressed the exact issue this question straightforward; is Jones decided Jones against finding counsels illegal made it a for convict and any miscarriage Indeed, justice. carjack- sentence an individual for federal successful motion to 911 exclude the tele resulted, phone transcript bodily injury when serious or implicitly premised resulted, the jury carjacking fact that for federal the had no need when death consider if regarding inju- evidence the of whether bodily the victims’ issue serious injury resulted, serious ry resulted, death. has not or whether death 668, 690-91, appeal's 1. also unable to a state suc- 466 U.S. 80 (1984), cessful claim for ineffective strategic assistance of L.Ed.2d 674 held that deci- pursued "virtually unchallengeable.” counsel. Counsel a trial tactic of sions are Coun- keeping considering all evidence of the appears deaths from the sel’s decision reasonable jury. Washington, The Court in Strickland v. that the of the deaths was uncontested.

511 251-52, Id. at 119 and for its verdict.” S.Ct. in the indictment charged was not supplied). proved (emphasis 1215 have been by jury found v. Jones beyond a doubt. See reasonable fact, Supreme explicitly In Court 251-52, 119 States, 526 U.S. United only of the holding stated that the one (1999). L.Ed.2d 311 143 S.Ct. dis- statutory construction of 2119. The a illegal for court to not make it did majority’s underly- that sent reasoned an individual for federal sentence vict and ing principle doubt sen- “east[ ] would when the arson when death resulted and tencing practices assumptions followed resulted was determined whether death system federal but also preponderance a by judge by Jones, many 119 526 U.S. at States.” evidence; only Apprendi Jersey, v. New J., (Kennedy, dissenting). Be- 1215 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 530 U.S. S.Ct. many criminal stat- cause federal and state (2000), later Supreme would the Court sentencing utes elements and used both by announc- illegal a make such considerations, that the dissent’s view was “[ojther rule that ing the constitutional constitutionality of statutes these conviction, any fact prior than the fact of a into question would bе called the Jones penalty a crime be- that increases the for decision, as and state courts would federal statutory maximum prescribed yond daunting of separat- be left with the task proved jury, submitted to a must be truly of a crime ing what was an element Id. a doubt.” beyond reasonable sentencing for each from mere factors by finding majority, The S.Ct. these statutes. ille- Petitioner’s sentence that Jones made responded Court importance gal, bestows a constitutional today by stating “our concern dеcision Supreme Court reserved any principle new does not announce Apprendi. law, a merely interprets constitutional a set particular federal statute majority recognizes, As the of constitutional concerns only to referred holding Court’s of our decisions emerged through series statute. The issue carjacking the federal Id. at 252 past quarter century.” over the by the in Jones was addressed Court (emphasis supplied). n. S.Ct. statute, 18 carjacking “whether federal dissent’s fear response In to thе 2119, ... defined three distinct federal would extend to other single or a crime with choice offenses statutes, unequiv- the Court state criminal of them de- penalties, three maximum two analysis to ocally its constitutional cabined exempt sentencing factors pendent on carjacking statute. requirements charge from the held specifically has This Court States, 526 U.S. verdict.” Jones v. United to cases involve inapplicable is 227, 229, 119 143 L.Ed.2d 311 S.Ct. the federal statutes other than (1999). “[a]ny held that doubt Court Lucas, this States statute. issue of cоnstruction on the recognized that: avoiding in favor of hence to be resolved holding on by was based explicit is Jones’s questions. This done [constitutional] [Su- establishing statutory §2119 construction.... three construing as that “under statement preme] of Court’s separate by specification the offenses Fifth of the elements, the Due Process Clause each of which must distinct tri- jury and indictment, and the notice Amendment charged by proven beyond Amendment, al of the Sixth doubt, jury guarantees to a and submitted reasonably 512 conviction) (оther prior fact than tence on fed-

any based either constitutional or statutory eral grounds. Section penalty that increases the maximum states, Title 28 the United States Code charged in a crime must be an indict- prisoner custody “A in under sentence of a ment, jury, proven submitted to a and by Congress Act of established doubt,” ... beyond a reasonable the to claiming right upon be released the dictum in its resolution the ground that in imposed the sentence was on statutory case the basis of construc- violation the of the Constitution laws tion. may ... United States move the court (6th Cir.2002), 282 F.3d overruled imposed vacate, which the set sentence grounds by on other United States v. ques- aside or correct the sentence.” The (6th Leachman, Cir.2002) 309 F.3d 377 tion points is then what statute Petitioner (internal omitted) (emphasis sup- citations to that would warrant habeas relief. Cer- case, plied). that this Court refused to tainly majority the not that suggest does holding extend the to 21 Jones rely may carjack- Petitioner on federal the § a federal narcotiсs statute. Id. This ing statute itself for proposition the found that Court the defendant could not whether death results under the federal rely legality on Jones attack the of his Nothing arson statute is a in issue. sentence, federal narcotics as dealt the text of the would such support statute only with carjacking the federal statute. § an argument. See U.S.C. 2119. short, Id. In the Lucas decision is clear Perhaps majority’s argument is example where this Court has refused to rely Petitioner can on statutory extend Jones to other statutes. federal carjacking struction statute Despite the unambiguous language of in an argument why Jones make as to Court, both the and this arson statute federal should have been majority endeavors to contort the hold- case; in construed the same manner in his apply of Jones to federal arson however, if the point, this is is Petitioner statute, may rely so that Petitioner on not on relying statutory at all. law in petition. his habeas seem- While relying He the Supreme is Court’s in- ingly accepting limiting in language terpretation of the federal stat- interpretation this Court’s of ute grounds based constitutional Lucas, language majority in finds show that the federal arson statute should be construed based on those same consti- holding [t]he nature Jones’ grounds. tutional challenges Petitioner by does not itself mean that could unconstitutional, sentence not in vio- rely upon Jones on collateral attack. law, lation of federal statutory Petitioners bringing motions under “when occurs” fact death was a found § rely 2255 can on the Court’s decisions judge jury. Indeed, grounded in law. question then becomes whether States, . . . Davis United in fact converted Petitioner’s federal Court held that “the that a conten arson from constitutional to un- grounded Constitution, tion is language constitutional in nature. The the ‘laws of the United States’ previously 'cited demonstrates be- preclude

would not its assertion a yond argument that the answer no. I § proceeding.” agree majority with the that the relevant 844(i) certainly ‍​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌​​​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​​​‌​‌​‌‌​‌‌​​​​​‌‌‌‌‌​‌​​​​‍§ It is true in a similar; language habeas 2119 is petition, however, a petitioner can attack his sen- not require Jones did courts that filing dates decisions between made to the Jones apply Apprendi espe- similar to

analysis to statutes Supreme Court went

cially since analysis explain that lengths to

great 2119. If the §to applied

in Jones analy- the Jones intended

Supreme Court it similar to apply

sis statutes much. have said as

would say that courts after Jones is not to

This used could not have Apprendi

but before engag- authority when persuasive construction statutes

ing in their own carjacking statute.

similar to however, is that Jones was point, instances; con- in those

controlling involved the fed- only in cases

trolled A court’s decision

eral statute. ignore another unconstitutional, been not have

text would law, or otherwise of federal violation decision exem-

illegal; this Lucas Court’s put, point. Simply pre-Ap-

plifies this to use may have been able

prendi court statute, it construing another result, As to do so. required

was not show how fails to

Petitioner not entitled illegal, and he ‍​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌​​​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​​​‌​‌​‌‌​‌‌​​​​​‌‌‌‌‌​‌​​​​‍therefore § 2255 habeas relief. America,

UNITED STATES

Plaintiff-Appellee, ISAIAH, Defendant- B.

Sharmila

Appellant.

No. 04-4343. Appeals, Court of States Circuit.

Sixth

Argued: Dec. 20, 2006. and Filed: Jan.

Decided

Case Details

Case Name: Joe A. Logan, Sr. v. United States

Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Date Published: Jan 19, 2006

Citation: 434 F.3d 503

Docket Number: 04-5325

Court Abbreviation: 6th Cir.