Does the Employers ’ Liability Act apply to this case? This is the first question to be determined. So far as material here, the act provides :
“And generally, all owners, contractors or subcontractors, and other persons having charge of, or responsible for, any work involving a risk or danger to the employees or the public, shall use every device, care and precaution which it is practicable to use *639 for the protection and safety of life and limb, limited only by the necessity for preserving the efficiency of the structure, machine or other apparatus or device, and without regard to the additional cost of suitable material or safety appliance and devices.” Laws 1911, Chap. 3, § 1, codified as Or. L., § 6785.
As an important factor influencing the decision as to whether the work in a given case does in truth involve a risk or danger, proper consideration must be given to the place in which the work is done:
Vanderflute
v. P.
R. L. &
P.
Co.,
The plaintiff testified that, at the time he sustained the injury, he was thirty-eight years old; that he had been employed in longshoring for the company for about a year and eleven months, and had earned on the average about $150 a month; that the place herein referred to as a dock was an inclosed building about 400 by 800 feet, with a roof over it. He thus described the trucks used by the company, one of which he, with his partner, was pulling across the dock when he was injured:
“Well, they are a truck about half a foot high when one of these boards is laid on top of it to put the cargo on. It is lined with steel or iron. It has four heavy pieces of iron on each corner so men can lift them up, handles, and also to hook on with. The trucks have four iron wheels and they weigh about 400 pounds with a slingboard on it.”
He testified that the trucks were about three feet by six feet in size, and the record shows that they were not equipped with brakes. As to the conduct of the work he testified:
“Q. Will you give the jury an idea of how busily those jitneys and trucks were moving on that dock the day you were hurt * * ? A. WeÜ> the way that *640 was, they started to load the ship, and they were unloading it at the same time, and they were in a hurry. That is why they done that, and there was so many men around there; there was about 75 or 80 men on that dock working at one time. They were just going from one end to the other as fast as they could.
“Q. How fast were you hauling the empty trucks by hand? Give the jury an idea of the rapidity with which it was proceeding. A. Well, I was walking faster than I really should. I was told to hurry up.
“Q. Who told you to hurry up? A. The straw boss.
“Q. What did he say with respect to that? A. He •told me to ‘step on it,’ they had ‘to get this ship loaded. ’
“Q. How fast were the jitneys usually operated? A. Well, from 12 to 16 or 18 miles an hour. # *
“Q. What were you doing right at the time you were hurt? * # A. I was hauling canned goods from about the center of the dock down to the other end. * *
“Q. During the time you were working on the dock, had there ever been any rule or regulation promulgated or enforced or communicated to you in regard to how the traffic on the dock was handled between these various trucks and jitneys? A. No, sir.
“Q. Was there any statement or rule prevalent among the men as to who had the right of way? A. I never heard of it, sir.
“Q. Or any rule as to how traffic should move? A. No, sir.
“Q. Was there anything of the kind posted up, any rule posted up? A. No sir, none at all.”
Plaintiff testified that at the time of his injury he saw a jitney approaching the passage toward which he was headed, but that he had seen jitneys come through there before, and that they had always cleared the passage before they stopped.
*641
Under the facts brought out by the foregoing testimony, the question as to whether the plaintiff’s work involved a risk or danger so as to bring him within the Employers’ Liability Act was for the jury: See
Mackay
v.
Commission of Port of Toledo,
It has been held by this court in a number of instances that the language herein quoted from the act enlarges the meaning of the particular words used in the first part of that section. See
Poullos
v.
Grove, supra,
where Mr. Justice Burnett collected the following cases in support of the reach of the protection of the Employers’ Liability Act:
Dorn
v.
Clark-Woodward Drug Co.,
The trial court did not err in submitting to the jury the question of the defendant’s liability under the provisions of the Employers ’ Liability Act.
Second. If the Employers’ Liability Act applies, was there a violation? In response to competent evidence, the jury answered this question in the affirmative.
Third. If the Employers’ Liability Act applies, was the defense of negligence of a fellow-servant available to defendant? Under the provisions of
*642
Section 6620, Or. L., we fail to see how the negligence of a fellow-servant can be invoked as a defense in this case. Furthermore, the motor-car that was being operated by plaintiff’s fellow-servant was machinery under the control of that fellow-servant. See Or. L., § 6789. That a motor-car is a machine will not be disputed. And it has been held that an automobile may be a dangerous or deadly weapon:
People
v.
Anderson,
We next reach the question as to whether the common observance of a rule or custom by workmen in their work relieves the employer of the duty of promulgating or printing or posting such rule. The following authorities support the proposition that it is unnecessary to post, promulgate or otherwise announce a rule or regulation to be effective, if it is understood and observed by the persons to whom it applies so as to have become a custom:
Luebke
v.
Chicago, M. & St. Paul Ry. Co.,
Did the trial court err in giving certain instructions and in refusing to give other requested instructions? It seems to the writer that the court by its instructions covered the case in its entirety, and that counsel’s requested instructions but repeated some of the instructions given. To illustrate: When the court had fully instructed the jury, counsel for defendant said:
“I have these suggestions to your Honor you may adopt; I am not now excepting to the instructions. Yet I want to make these additional suggestions to *643 your Honor. You may adopt them or not. I think the jury should he told, in view of the allegation in the complaint, if no system of communication or signals was adopted that even the Employers’ Liability Act only requires them where necessary for safety.
“The Court: I thought I made that entirely clear to the jury. I see them nod in the affirmative. Was that entirely clear to you, that rules do not have to be announced, prepared and announced, unless they are necessary for the safe conduct of the business without destroying its efficiency?”
At counsel’s request, the court then repeated, in language following, its instructions relating to the negligence charged in the complaint.
“Do the jury understand that? It must, of course, be the negligence charged in the complaint. I thought I made that clear in the statement of the burden of proof. That is the law. It is not some other negligence that is not charged in the complaint.”
The final suggestion of counsel to the court related to the alleged negligence of defendant in failing to provide rules and regulations for the conduct of the work; and the court told the jury that such failure would not be a ground for finding against the defendant unless the absence of rules caused or contributed to the injury. The only rule posted in the dock was “Safety First.” Another rule perhaps established by custom was to the effect that motor vehicles had the right of way over the hand-drawn trucks. There seems to have been no rule requiring the drivers of the motor vehicles to look out for and observe and warn those who were operating the hand trucks; and we are of opinion that, in view of the danger incident to the conduct of the work in question as disclosed by the record, the jury could have found that some such rule should have been promulgated for the protection of the workmen
*644 Did the trial court err in refusing to interfere with the argument of counsel for plaintiff? In presenting this case to the jury, counsel for plaintiff went to the verge of permissible argument; but we cannot say, as a matter of law, that this cause should be reversed by reason thereof. There is some testimony of record relating to the speed of the motor vehicle with which plaintiff collided and the movement of the hand truck which plaintiff was operating, upon which counsel based his argument.
Upon the whole, this cause appears to have been fairly tried, and there is no substantial ground for sending it back for retrial. Hence we direct its affirmance. Affirmed. Rehearing Denied.