SAM JODKA v. CITY OF CLEVELAND, OHIO, ET AL.
No. 99951
Cоurt of Appeals of Ohio, EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT, COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
January 23, 2014
2014-Ohio-208
BEFORE: Rocco, J., S. Gallagher, P.J., and Kilbane, J.
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION; Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. CV-784372
Andrew R. Mayle
Ronald J. Mayle
Jeremiah S. Ray
Mayle, Ray & Mayle, L.L.C.
210 South Front Street
Fremont, Ohio 43420
John T. Murray
Murray & Murray Co., L.P.A.
111 East Shoreline Drive
Sandusky, Ohio 44870
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Barbara Langhenry
Director of Law
City of Cleveland
By: Gary S. Singletary
Assistant Director of Law
Cleveland City Hall, Room 106
601 Lakeside Avenue
Cleveland, Ohio 44114-1077
For Affiliated Computer Services, Inc., et al.
Chris Bator
Gregory V. Mersol
Baker & Hostetler
3200 PNC Center
1900 East Ninth Street
Cleveland, Ohio 44114-3485
OPINION
KENNETH A. ROCCO, J.:
{¶2} Herein, plaintiff-appellant Sam Jodka appeals from the trial court‘s order that granted the motions to dismiss and for summary judgment that defendants-appellees the city of Cleveland, Affiliated Computer Services, Inc., Boulder Acquisition Corp., and Xerox Corporation1 filed in response to Jodka‘s complaint. Jodka‘s complaint asserted that Cleveland Codified Ordinances (“CCO“) 413.031, which adopts an automated camera civil traffic enforcement system with a concomitant quasi-judicial process for that city, violates the
{¶3} Jodka presents three assignments of error. He аrgues in his first and second assignments of error that the trial court‘s decision to dismiss his complaint was improper because: (1) several sections of CCO 413.031 impair the jurisdiction of the Cleveland Municipal Court; and (2) he presented a cognizable common law claim for unjust enrichment. In his third assignment of error, he asserts that the trial court improperly granted ACS‘s motion for summary judgment.
{¶4} This court finds that sections CCO 413.031(k) and (l) violate
{¶5} However, because Jodka lacks standing to pursue a claim for unjust enrichment, his second assignment of error is overruled. This сourt declines to address Jodka‘s third assignment of error because he presents no authority for his argument as required by
{¶6} Jodka filed his complaint on June 6, 2012. Therein, he made the following pertinent allegations.
{¶7} Cleveland adopted a “civil enforcement system for red light and speeding offenders” pursuant to CCO 413.031. ACS provided the physical components for implementing the system. By means of this system, an electronic photographic, video or
{¶8} In the first count of his complaint, Jodka alleged that CCO 413.031 violated
{¶9} In the second count of his complaint, Jodka further alleged that, prior to its 2009 amendment, when he paid his fine, CCO 413.031 also violated the
{¶10} In the third count of his complaint, Jodka requested the trial court to certify a class pursuant to
{¶11} ACS filed a “motion to dismiss and/or for summary judgment” with respect to Jodka‘s complaint, attaching an affidavit to its motion.3 On August 20, 2012, Cleveland filed a
{¶12} Appellees maintained in their motions that the ordinance is constitutional. ACS also argued that Jodka could not support his unjust enrichment claim against it because, rather than “splitting” ticket monies with ACS, Cleveland simply paid for ACS‘s services pursuant to a contract.
{¶13} On September 11, 2012, the trial court issued a journal entry that stated as follows:
By agreement of the parties, Defendant ACS’ argument that Plaintiff‘s unjust enrichment claims against ACS fail as a matter of law (found at pp. 16-17 of ACS’ August 17, 2012 motion to dismiss and/or for summary judgment) is hereby severed from the motion, without prejudice. ACS will have the opportunity to reassert the argument, and the parties will
have the opportunity to engage in discovery, in the event Court denies ACS’ motion to dismiss. * * *
(Emphasis added.)
{¶14} On September 21, 2012, Jodka filed a single brief in opposition to appellees’ motions. He attached to his brief copies of: (1) the 1985 Cleveland Municipal Court order that permitted the city to establish a “Parking Violations Bureau” with the authority “to handle all parking infractions occurring within the territory of the municipal corporation,” and (2) CCO Chapter 459, the enabling legislation for that bureau. As set forth in CCO 459.01(a), violation of CCO 413.031 was not listed within the definition of a “parking infraction.”
{¶15} On May 3, 2013, the trial court issued an opinion and journal entry that granted appellees’ motions and dismissed Jodka‘s complaint. The trial court stated in pertinent part as follows:
Under CCO 413.031(k), violations are handled along the same lines as parking violations. As such, when an alleged violator disputes the claim, there is an appeal process where appeals are heard by the Parking Violations Bureau through an administrative process established by the Clerk of the Cleveland Municipal Court.
* * * [T]he Complaint indicates that in 2007, Plaintiff Sam Jodka (hereafter “Plaintiff“) was issued a ticket for violation of CCO 413.031. Plaintiff paid the monetary penalty and did not аppeal the violation. However, five years after the ticket was issued, Plaintiff brought suit based upon the receipt of his ticket on the theory that CCO 413.031 violates Article IV, Section 1 of the Ohio Constitution, and that the version of CCO 413.031 in effect in 2007 violated the Equal Protection Clause of Article I, Section 2 of the Ohio Constitution.
Plaintiff now seeks monetary relief against ACS and the City of Cleveland * * * . Defendants * * * have moved to dismiss and/or for
summary judgment * * * . * * *
The General Assembly exercised its exclusive power to establish courts and determine their jurisdiction under
Ohio Const. Art. IV, Sec. 1 by enactingR.C. 1901.20(A)(1) , under which municipal courts were granted jurisdiction over the “violation of any ordinance * * * unless the violation is required to be hаndled by a parking violations bureau pursuant to Chapter 4521 of the Revised Code.”* * *
* * * [T]he precise issue of a constitutional violation has already been considered and rejected by Ohio Courts. * * *
Based on the applicable standards, and a review of case law, this Court finds CCO [413.031] does not violate Article IV, Section 1 of the Ohio Constitution, and finds the logic of both [State ex rel. Scott v. Cleveland, 112 Ohio St.3d 324, 2006-Ohio-6573, 859 N.E.2d 923], and Mendenhall v. Akron, 117 Ohio St.3d 33, 2008-Ohio-270, 881 N.E.2d 255] persuasive. Accordingly, this Court gran[t]s Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss/Motions [sic] for Summary Judgment.
[As to] Plaintiff‘s claim that the earlier version of CCO 413.031 in effect prior to March 11, 2009 violated the Equal Protection Clause of Article I, Section 2 of the Ohio Constitution by treating vehicle owners and lessees differently[,]
[a]s a preliminary matter, this Court notes that “legislative enactments are presumed to be constitutional.” See McCrone v. Bank One Corp., 107 Ohio St.3d 272, 2005-Ohio-6505, 839 N.E.2d 1, P. 20. * * *
* * * [T]his Court finds that there is no private cause of action for alleged violations of the Equal Protection Clause of the Ohio Constitution.
Accordingly, Plaintiff‘s claim for an alleged violation must fail as a matter of law.
* * *
For the reasons as outlined, the Court hereby grants Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss and/or for Summary Judgment in their totality. Final.
{¶16} Jodka appeals from the trial court‘s decision with the following
I. The trial court erred in holding that a municipality has power to enact an ordinance that restricts and impairs a court‘s jurisdiction provided by the General Assembly.
II. The trial court erred in holding that a common law unjust-enrichment claim is not valid unless it is first enabled by statute.
III. The trial court erred in granting the non-Cleveland defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
{¶17} In his first assignment of error, Jodka argues that the first count of his complaint was improperly dismissed because several sections of CCO 413.031 violate
{¶18} Appellate review of an order dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim for relief is de novo. Perrysburg Twp. v. Rossford, 103 Ohio St.3d 79, 2004-Ohio-4362, 814 N.E.2d 44. This court accepts the material allegations of the complaint as true and makes all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Johnson v. Microsoft Corp., 106 Ohio St.3d 278, 280, 2005-Ohio-4985, 834 N.E.2d 791. In order for a defendant to prevail on a
{¶19} Municipal ordinances, like other legislative enactments, are entitled to the presumption of constitutionality. Hudson v. Albrecht, 9 Ohio St.3d 69, 71, 458 N.E.2d 852 (1984). The burden is on the party challenging the ordinance to prove it is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Lowe, 112 Ohio St.3d 507, 2007-Ohio-606, 861 N.E.2d 512, ¶ 17, citing Klein v. Leis, 99 Ohio St.3d 537, 795 N.E.2d 633, ¶ 4. Jodka maintains that CCO 413.031 unconstitutionally usurps the authority of thе Cleveland Municipal Court to adjudicate certain traffic infractions. He does not assert that the ordinance is unconstitutional on another ground, as was the situation the Ohio Supreme Court faced in Mendenhall, 117 Ohio St.3d 33, 2008-Ohio-270, 881 N.E.2d 255.
{¶20} With respect to a different constitutional challenge to an automated camera civil traffic enforcement system, the Mendenhall court made the following pertinent observations at ¶ 16-41:
Section 3, Article XVIII of the Ohio Constitution provides that municipalities are authorized “to exercise all powers of local self-government and to adopt and enforce within their limits such local police, sanitary and other similar regulations, as are not in conflict with general laws.”We use a three-part test to evaluate claims that a municipality has exceeded its powers under the Home Rule Amendment. * * * [The test is] whether (1) the ordinance is an exercise of the police power, rather than of local self-government, (2) the statute is a general law, and (3) the ordinance is in conflict with the statute.
The first part of the test relates to the ordinance. As we have held, “If an allegedly conflicting city ordinance relates solely to self-government, the analysis stops, because the Constitution authorizes a municipality to exercise all powers of local self-government
within its jurisdiction.” Am. Fin. Servs. Assn. v. Cleveland, 112 Ohio St.3d 170, 2006-Ohio-6043, 858 N.E.2d 776, ¶ 23. If, on the other hand, the ordinance pertains to ”local police, sanitary and other similar regulations,” Section 3, Article XVIII, Ohio Constitution , the municipality has exceeded its home rule authority only if the ordinance is in conflict with a general state law. * * *A. The ordinance
It is well established that regulation of traffic is an exercise of police power that relates to public health and safety, as well as to the general welfare of the public. See Linndale v. State (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 52, 54, 706 N.E.2d 1227, citing Geauga Cty. Bd. of Commrs. v. Munn Rd. Sand & Gravel (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 579, 583, 621 N.E.2d 696. Here, there is no dispute that the Akron ordinance is an exercise of concurrent police power rather than self-government. Thus, the question remains whether the state statute involved is a general law and, if so, whether the Akron ordinance impermissibly conflicts with the general law.
B. The statute as a general law
* * * When interpreted as part of a whole,
R.C. 4511.21 applies to all citizens gеnerally as part of a statewide regulation of traffic laws and motor vehicle operation.C. Conflict Analysis
Because the statute regarding speed limits is a general law, we must finally determine whether, when cities pass ordinances creating automated systems of speed-limit enforcement, the municipal ordinances are in conflict with the state statute.
* * *
R.C. 4511.07 does not expressly signal that the state has exclusivity in the area of speed enforcement. Furthermore, because there is no indication that the state has intended to reserve to itself the ability to enforce statewide traffic laws through a civil process, we decline to recognize a conflict by impliсation.* * *
* * * The ordinance does not change the speed limits established by state law or change the ability of police officers to cite offenders for traffic violations. After the enactment of the Akron ordinance, a person who speeds and is observed by a police officer remains subject to the usual traffic laws. Only when no police officer is present
and the automated camera captures the speed infraction does the Akron ordinance apply, not to invoke the criminal traffic law, but to impose an administrative penalty on the vehicle‘s owner. The city ordinance and state law may target identical conduct — speeding — but the city ordinance does not replace traffic law. It merely supplements it. * * * The Akron ordinance complements rather than conflicts with state law. IV. Other theories
* * * Although there are due process questions regarding the operation of the Akron Ordinance and those similar to it, those questions are not appropriately before us at this time and will not be discussed here.
V. Conclusion
* * * We hold merely that an Ohio municipality does not exceed its home rule authority when it creates an automated system for enforcement of traffic laws that imposes civil liability upon violators, provided that the municipality does not alter statеwide traffic regulations.
(Emphasis added.)
{¶21} Thus, the Mendenhall court determined that a city‘s automated camera civil traffic enforcement system is constitutional pursuant only to
(h) Notices of Liability. Any ticket for an automated red light or
speeding system violation under this section shall: (1) Be reviewed by a Cleveland police officer;
(2) Be forwarded by first-class mail or personal service to the vehiclе‘s registered owner‘s address as given on the state‘s motor vehicle registration, and
(3) Clearly state the manner in which the violation may be appealed.
(i) Penalties. Any violation of division (b) or division (c) of this section shall be deemed a noncriminal violation for which a civil penalty shall be assessed and for which no points authorized by
R.C. 4507.021 (“Point system for license suspension“) shall be assigned to the owner or driver of the vehicle.(j) Ticket Evaluation, Public Service, and Appeals. The program shall include a fair and sound ticket-evaluation process that includes review by the vendor and a police officer, a strong customer-service commitment, and an appeals process that accords due process to the ticket rеspondent and that conforms to the requirements of the Ohio Revised Code.
(k) Appeals. A notice of appeal shall be filed with the Hearing Officer within twenty-one (21) days from the date listed on the ticket. The failure to give notice of appeal or pay the civil penalty within this time period shall constitute a waiver of the right to contest the ticket and shall be considered an admission.
Appeals shall be heard by the Parking Violations Bureau through an administrative process established by the Clerk of the Cleveland Municipal Court. At hearings, the strict rules of evidence applicable to courts of law shall not apply. The contents of the ticket shall constitute a prima facie evidence of the facts it contains. Liability may be found by the hearing examiner based upon a preponderance of the evidence. If a finding of liability is appealed, the record of the case shall include the order of the Parking Violations Bureau, the ticket, other evidence submitted by the respondent or the City of Cleveland, and a transcript or record of the hearing, in a written or electronic form acceptable to the court to which the case is appealed.
A decision in favor of the City of Cleveland may be enforced by means of a civil action or any other means provided by the Ohio Revised Code.
(l) Evidence of Operation. It is prima facie evidence that the person registered as the
owner of the vehicle with the Ohio Bureau of Motor Vehicles, or with any other state vehicle registration office, or in the case of a leased or rented vehicle, the “lessee” as defined in division (p), was operating the vehicle at the time of the offenses * * * .
(Emphasis added.)
{¶22} The adjudicatory hearing procedure established by CCO 413.031(j) through (l), therefore, consists of the following: (1) a representative of the camera vendor and a police officer jointly determine if the photo shows a violation; (2) notice of this determination is sent to the vehicle owner or lessee; (3) if the vehicle owner wants to dispute the determination, he or she files an appeal; (4) at the hearing on the appeal, a person appointed by the city presides; (5) this city-appointed person displays the camera vendor‘s photo to the vehicle owner or lessee; (6) the city-appointed person determines the sufficiency of the photo as evidence of liability; and then, (7) the decision about liability proceeds to the municipal court as an administrative decision. In this process, the same non-judicial hearing officer is both the prosecutor and the judge, and the person who contests liability laсks any meaningful ability to present a defense.
{¶23}
{¶24}
(A) (1) The municipal court has jurisdiction of the violation of any ordinance of any municipal corporation within its territory, unless the violation is required to be handled by a parking violations bureau or joint parking violations bureau pursuant to Chapter 4521. of the Rеvised Code, and of the violation of any misdemeanor committed within the limits of its territory. The municipal court has jurisdiction of the violation of a vehicle parking or standing resolution or regulation if a local authority, as defined in division (D) of section 4521.01 of the Revised Code, has specified that it is not to be considered a criminal offense, if the violation is committed within the limits of the court‘s territory, and if the violation is not required to be handled by a parking violations bureau or joint parking violations bureau pursuant to Chapter 4521. of the Revised Code. * * *
(Emphasis added.)
{¶25} The statute thus provides that a municipal court‘s jurisdiction extends to violations of “any” ordinance. The statute‘s sole exception grants a municipality‘s “parking violations bureau” jurisdiction “pursuant to Chapter 4521” over vehicle
{¶26}
{¶27} It is a general rule of statutory construction that words and phrases that neither have been legislatively defined or nor acquired a technical meaning “shall be read in context and construed according to the rules of grammar and common usage.”
{¶28} In Columbus v. Webster, 170 Ohio St. 327, 164 N.E.2d 734 (1960), the Ohio Supreme Court intimated, too, that the word “parking” implies a lack of action, rather than movement. Quoting People v. Hildebrandt, 308 N. Y. 397, 126 N.E.2d 377 (1955),
{¶29} CCO 413.031, however, makes it a violation of the municipal code for a vehicle operator to fail to stop for a red light and to travel in excess of the posted speed limit. Perhaps logically, therefore, “violation of CCO 413.031” is not included in CCO 459.01(a)‘s definition of what offenses constitute “parking violations.” The automated camera system captures this fleeting moment in time. Because the vehicle operator is unaware of the camera‘s action, he or she cannot adequately mount a challenge to the accuracy of the device.5
{¶30} The exhaustive, well-reasoned opinion in Mendenhall v. Akron, 117 Ohio St.3d 33, 2008-Ohio-270, 881 N.E.2d 255, justified a city‘s authority as a concurrent police power to impose civil violations for traffic offenses only under “home rule.” The court did not thereby give its imprimatur to the quasi-judiсial procedure that CCO 413.031(k) and (l) establishes for those persons charged with civil violations who wish to contest their liability. Although the evidence in the record demonstrates the Cleveland Municipal Court expressly relinquished jurisdiction over “parking infractions” in favor of the city in 1985 pursuant to
{¶31} The General Assembly has permitted municipalities to establish by ordinance administrative tribunals that preside over contests of purely internal matters of local self-government. For example,
{¶32} The creation of such a tribunal, an issue not addressed in Mendenhall, 117 Ohio St.3d 33, 2008-Ohio-270, 881 N.E.2d 255, does not constitute a proper exercise of “concurrent police power” pursuant to
{¶33} Based upon the plain meaning of the words used in
{¶34} Jodka‘s complaint also presented a claim of unjust enrichment. In his second assignment of error, he argues that the trial court improperly dismissed this claim.
{¶35} As this court noted in Tate v. Garfield Hts., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99099, 2013-Ohio-2204, ¶11-12:
Standing is a jurisdictional prerequisite that must be resolved before reaching the merits of a suit. Fed. Home Loan Mtge. Corp. v. Schwartzwald, 134 Ohio St.3d 13, 2012-Ohio-5017, 979 N.E.2d 1214, ¶ 23. To establish standing, the party invoking the court‘s jurisdiction must establish that he suffered (1) an injury that is (2) fairly traceable to the defendant‘s allegedly unlawful conduct, and (3) is likely to be redressed by the requested relief. Moore v. Middletown, 133 Ohio St.3d 55, 2012-Ohio-3897, 975 N.E.2d 977, ¶ 22, citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-561, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992).
To have standing [to pursue a claim], a plaintiff must have a personal stake
in the outcome of the controversy and have suffered some concrete injury that is capable of resolution by the court. Middletown v. Ferguson, 25 Ohio St.3d 71, 75, 25 Ohio B. 125, 495 N.E.2d 380 (1986). It is not sufficient for the individual to have a general interest in the subject matter of the action. The plaintiff must be the party who will be directly benefitted or injured by the outcome of the action. Shealy v. Campbell, 20 Ohio St.3d 23, 24, 20 Ohio B. 210, 485 N.E.2d 701 (1985). The purpose behind this “real party in interest rule” is “‘* * * to enable the dеfendant to avail himself of evidence and defenses that the defendant has against the real party in interest, and to assure him finality of the judgment, and that he will be protected against another suit brought by the real party at interest on the same matter.‘” Id., quoting In re Highland Holiday Subdivision, 27 Ohio App.2d 237, 240, 273 N.E.2d 903 (4th Dist.1971).
(Emphasis added.)
{¶36} In Carroll v. Cleveland, 522 Fed.Appx. 299, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 7178 (6th Cir.2013), the court made the following pertinent observation:
* * * The citations that Appellants received clearly indicated that paying the fine, rather than contesting the citation, was an admission of liability. Thus, by paying, each Appellant admitted that he or she committed the alleged traffic violation, without asserting any defenses. * * *
{¶37} Jodka admitted in his complaint that he simply paid the citation the city issued to him. Thus, Jodka neither placed himself under the рurported authority of the
{¶38} Jodka‘s second assignment of error is overruled.
{¶39} Jodka argues in his third assignment of error that the trial court should not have granted ACS‘s motion for summary judgment after the court had “severed” that motion from appellees’ motions to dismiss his complaint. This court declines to address this assignment of error for two reasons.
{¶40} First, Jodka supplies no authority to support his argument as required by
{¶41} The trial court‘s judgment is affirmed in part and reversed in part. The provisions in CCO 413.031 that purport to create a quasi-judicial tribunal to handle contested automated camera traffic citations violate
It is ordered that appellant and appellees share the costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to cаrry this judgment into
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
KENNETH A. ROCCO, JUDGE
MARY EILEEN KILBANE, J., CONCURS;
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, P.J., CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN PART (SEE ATTACHED OPINION)
SAM JODKA v. CITY OF CLEVELAND, OHIO, ET AL.
No. 99951
{¶42} This case presents issues that I believe defy resolution at the intermediate appellate level. This is yet another case that reflects a need for legislative policy-making and oversight over modern technological advancements implemented by municipalities in law enforcement. As we are seeing with automated traffic camera ordinances, such measures often result in protracted litigation within the legal system. It is not the function of the courts to engage in policy matters, yet the issues that are appearing involve matters that should have been reviewed by the legislature before implementation.
{¶43} This case is among the increasing number of lawsuits challenging municipal ordinances that authorize the use of automated traffic cameras to impose civil penalties for red light and speeding violations. In the case of the Cleveland ordinance, the city, without any legislative oversight, decided to implement an automated traffic
{¶44} While the General Assembly has provided jurisdiction to municipal courts over criminal traffic-code violations,
{¶45} The Ohio Supreme Court recently granted discretionary review in Walker v. Toledo, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-12-1056, 2013-Ohio-2809, 994 N.E.2d 467, discretionary appeal allowed, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2013-Ohio-5285, wherein the Sixth District determined that a Toledo municipal ordinance was unconstitutional under the
{¶46} However, unlike Walker, the lead opinion finds the plaintiff lacked standing to present his claim of unjust enrichment because he did not avail himself of the unconstitutional quasi-judicial process created by the ordinance. In Walker, the court determined that an unjust enrichment claim could be pursued by a defendant who had paid the penalty for a red-light camera violation. I agree with Walker in that regard.
{¶47} There are no provisions providing for a reduction to judgment when a citation is paid, or when a citation is unchallenged but remains unpaid. Additionally, with minimal fines involved, there is little incentive for a person to challenge the citation, let alone to engage in protracted litigation. More significantly, even accepting that the parking violations bureau has quasi-judicial authority to review whether a violation occurred, there is no authority for the parking violations bureau to hear unjust enrichment claims or constitutional challenges against the ordinances. Therefore, it is my view that the unjust enrichment claim cannot be barred for lack of standing or by res judicata.