delivered the opinion of the court:
Plаintiff, Michael Haubrich, appeals from the order of the circuit court affirming the order of the Industrial Commission (Commission). We reverse.
Claimant, Russell D. May, filed two applications for adjustment of claim following an incident in which he was electrocuted while at work. On August 27, 1991, May filed a claim against JMH Properties, Inc., d/b/a Quincy Building Materials (JMH), and on Septembеr 23, 1991, he filed a claim against Haubrich, the principal stockholder of JMH. Following a hearing, an arbitrator denied thе claim against Haubrich and found JMH solely liable for claimant’s injury. On December 4, 1991, claimant was awarded 18 weeks of temporary total disability totaling $4,320 and medical expenses of $102,700.86.
On June 8, 1992, May filed a two-count complaint in the circuit court. Count I alleged that JMH had failed to pay according to the arbitrator’s decision and sought a judgment agаinst JMH for $102,700.86 plus additional medical bills. Count II was brought against Haubrich and his wife, Collette, and sought to pierce the corporate veil of JMH and enter judgment against the Haubrichs, individually, for the $102,700.86. The Haubrichs moved for dismissal of count II, arguing that clаimant was attempting to circumvent the exclusive remedy provided by the Workers’ Compensation Act (820 ILCS 305/1 et seq. (West 2000)) (Act) and that the arbitrator’s decision was res judicata as to the issue of personal liability. On January 4, 1993, the trial court entered judgment against JMH on count I but granted the Haubrichs’ motion to dismiss count II with prejudice. May appealed the dismissal of count II, but the appellate court, on May’s motion, dismissed the appeal on April 15, 1993.
May returned to the Cоmmission and filed a new complaint under the case number in which he had received his award, asking the Commission to pierce JMH’s corporate veil and enter judgment against the Haubrichs. An arbitrator granted JMH’s motion to dismiss, but, on review, the Cоmmission vacated the decision and remanded the cause for further hearing. A different arbitrator conducted a hearing and found the Haubrichs personally liable for the judgment against JMH. The Commission affirmed and adopted the arbitrator’s decision, and the trial court affirmed the Commission’s order. This appeal followed.
JMH contends that the arbitrаtor lacked jurisdiction to consider the issue of piercing the corporate veil. We agree.
The Industrial Commission, as an administrative, agency, has no general or common law powers. Daniels v. Industrial Comm’n,
We conclude that the Commission acted outside its statutory authority when it pierced JMH’s corporate veil and imposed liability on the Haubrichs. Thе Act specifically provides for the award of additional compensation and attorney fees when аn employer delays or fails to make payments pursuant to an award. See 820 ILCS 305/16, 19(k), 19(1) (West 2000). However, the Act does nоt grant the Commission the power to grant equitable relief, such as the piercing of the corporate veil whеn an employer does not pay an award, nor does the Act provide for individual liability against a corporation’s officers and directors (see Webb v. Webb,
Claimant brought two claims before the Commission and received from an arbitrator an award against JMH, not against the Haubrichs. Claimant did not appeal this decision. Claimant sought, and received, a judgment against JMH for the award in the trial court. Hе dropped his appeal of the trial court’s dismissal of his attempt to obtain a judgment against the Haubrichs. When claimant sought to pierce the corporate veil to enforce that judgment, his action was an attempt to enforce the judgment of the trial court, not the award of the Commission. The proper forum for such a case was the trial court, not the Commission. While our research disclosed no case in which the Commission piercеd the corporate veil, we found numerous cases in which attempts to pierce the corporatе veil were brought in the circuit court even though they sought enforcement of workers’ compensation awards. Sеe, e.g., Jacobson,
We note that the result we reach in this case is harsh, especially in light of the humane and rеmedial purposes of the Act; claimant is essentially denied the ability to recover his award. The harshness of thе result, however, is due solely to the conduct of claimant through his attorney. Had claimant maintained his appеal before this court, or had claimant appealed the Commission’s initial award, then the result reached here may not have come to pass. Claimant, however, inexplicably abandoned those options. We sаy inexplicably because claimant’s counsel was unable, at oral argument or in his brief, to justify this conduct.
In summary, claimant neglected to pursue the specific remedies the Act provides for nonpayment or tardy paymеnt of awards. It does not give the Commission the authority to enforce a circuit court’s judgment by piercing the corрorate veil. Therefore, the Commission lacked jurisdiction to grant that remedy, and we must reverse the order of the Commission.
Reversed.