Jit Kim Lim v. Central Dupage Hospital, a Corporation, George Holzhauer, Peter BruscaJit Kim Lim v. Central Dupage Hospital, a Corporation, George Holzhauer, Peter Brusca
- Reporters:
- Before:
- Coffey
For the third time, Dr. Jit Kim Lim is appealing from a denial of his claims for relief that arise from the same core of operative facts. In
Lim v. Central DuPage Hospital,
871 F.2d 644 (7th Cir.1989), we affirmed the district court’s ruling that Dr. Lim’s claim that the hospital unlawfully revoked his staff privileges on account of race failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, holding that Dr. Lim did not possess a property interest in retaining staff privileges. The plaintiff thereafter filed a
I. FACTS
Dr. Lim enjoyed staff privileges at Central DuPage Hospital in Winfield, Illinois as a neurosurgeon from 1976 until the suspension of his staff privileges on March 24, 1986. The plaintiff asserts that his suspension was the result of his association with Dr. Leonard J. Chinnici, a chiropractor, with whom he began to practice in December 1984. Dr. Lim and Dr. Chinnici agreed to refer patients to each other, to consult with each other when appropriate and to share office space at their respective offices for their practice in their joint venture, the Neuro-Spinal Center. The plaintiffs office was located in a condominium in Mona Kea Professional Park where a number of other medical doctors had their offices. The other condominium owners in the building objected to having a chiropractor practicing there and allegedly submitted the following letter to Dr. Lim on June 7, 1985:
“We wish to convey to you our extreme displeasure with the alliance between you and Dr. Chinnici and our hope that you will take the steps to terminate this arrangement as quickly as is feasible ... your partnership with Dr. Chinnici reflects poorly on Mona Kea Medical Park and the physicians who practice here. It is our intent to take whatever steps are necessary to discourage other chiropractors from practicing at Mona Kea.
“You should also know that the Central DuPage Hospital Medical Staff and the DuPage County Medical Society have been notified of your present association with doctors of chiropractic.”
The appellant maintains that during the summer of 1985 a number of the defendants warned him to terminate his association with Dr. Chinnici and that as a result of the defendants boycotting him, the number and quality of patient referrals to him decreased dramatically.
In November or December of 1985, the Medical Staff at Central DuPage Hospital informed Dr. Lim that it was going to conduct a peer review of his medical competence because of an alleged “concern[] with what appeared to be disproportionate post-operative complications among Lim’s patients_” Lim, 871 F.2d at 647. Upon completing the peer review process, Central DuPage Hospital suspended Dr. Lim’s staff privileges on March 24, 1986, and the hospital’s board of governors confirmed the suspension and made it permanent on August 25, 1986. Lim asserts that he satisfactorily addressed all of the investigators’ concerns, but in spite of this they suspended him as punishment for his association with a chiropractor 2 and to discourage future attempts of neurosurgeons to attempt to gain a competitive advantage through an association with a chiropractor.
On August 25, 1986, the plaintiff filed an antitrust claim in the district court alleging that the initiation of the peer review process was part of a conspiracy “to ostracize and destroy plaintiff’s medical practice.” Two days later in
Ezpeleta v. Sisters of Mercy Health Corp.,
800 F.2d 119, 122 (7th Cir.1986), we stated that “any future antitrust challenges to decisions regarding staff privileges under the Indiana medical peer review process may be deemed frivolous because of the clear bar of the state action doctrine.... ” When the defendants moved for dismissal of the complaint on the basis of
Ezpeleta
in February of 1987, Dr. Lim withdrew his antitrust claim and replaced it with a claim that the defendants suspended him as a result of his race, thereby violating his civil rights through illegally depriving him of a property interest in retaining his staff privileges at Central DuPage Hospital. Finding that hospital staff privileges were not “property” within the meaning of the civil rights statutes, the district court dismissed the complaint on January 15, 1988, and the
On September 15, 1988, four days prior to oral argument of his appeal, the plaintiff filed a motion in this court entitled “Motion for Leave to Cite Recent Authority and for Additional Procedural Relief.” In his motion the plaintiff asserted that he withdrew his antitrust claim as a result of this court’s Ezpeleta decision, and informed the court that Patrick effectively overruled Ezpeleta. The appellant requested “leave to reinstate the anti-trust counts of this litigation and for remand thereof to the district court.” In response, the defendants argued that it was too late for Dr. Lim to raise his antitrust claim on appeal because he had voluntarily abandoned it in the district court and allowed judgment to be entered against him without raising the claim there. At oral argument the appellant failed to reiterate his request for remand to reinstate his antitrust claim, and while we did not specifically address the issue in our opinion, we noted that “[abandonment of claims is a leitmotif of this appeal.” Lim, 871 F.2d at 646. The plaintiff again failed to allude to his request for remand to reinstate his antitrust claim in his petition for rehearing. We denied Lim’s request for rehearing on May 30, 1989.
The plaintiff filed a
“The Clerk has brought to the attention of this Court the fact that you have failed to file appellant’s brief within the required time. No motion for an extension of time within which to file appellant’s brief has been made pursuant to Circuit Rule 26. On consideration whereof,
“IT IS ORDERED that you, as counsel for appellant, respond within fourteen (14) days of the date of this order as to why this appeal should not be dismissed for lack of prosecution pursuant to Circuit Rule 31(c)(2).”
No response was forthcoming, and on August 31, 1990, we issued a second order:
“Appellant failed to respond to the court’s Rule to Show Cause issued on June 1, 1990. In that Rule to Show Cause, appellant was advised that his failure to respond to the court’s order would result in the dismissal of his appeal. Accordingly,
“IT IS NOW ORDERED that this appeal is DISMISSED for WANT OF PROSECUTION. See Circuit Rule 31(c)(2).”
While the plaintiff was defaulting on his appeal of the denial of his
II. ISSUES
The only issue we consider on this appeal is whether res judicata bars the plaintiff from asserting his antitrust claim. The appellant agrees that res judicata bars him from pursuing a RICO claim against the Central DuPage defendants, and since he has failed to argue that the district court erred in holding that the Mona Kea defendants were in privity with the Central Du-Page defendants, we need not address the RICO arguments.
III. RES JUDICATA
The appellant argues that our
Ezpeleta
decision forced him to withdraw his preferred antitrust theory, and therefore, he was denied a full and fair opportunity to litigate that issue in his first action. “For res judicata to apply, three requirements must be met: (1) an identity of the
“the scope of [the] ‘cause of action,’ this circuit has utilized the ‘same transaction’ test. Under this test, a ‘cause of action’ consists of ‘a single core of operative facts which give rise to a remedy.’ This ‘same transaction’ test is decidedly fact-oriented. Once a transaction has caused injury, all claims arising from that transaction must be brought in one suit or be lost. Thus, ‘a mere change in the legal theory does not create a new cause of action.’ Therefore, prior litigation acts as a bar not only to those issues which were raised and decided in the earlier litigation but also to those issues which could■ have been raised in that litigation.”
Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 789 F.2d 589, 593 (7th Cir.1986) (emphasis original) (citations omitted). Since both of Dr. Lim’s actions are based on the identical core of operative facts and the same injury, there is an identity of the causes of action. In regard to the third requirement for applying res judicata, the appellant has’ never disputed the fact that there was a final judgment on the initial lawsuit.
The plaintiff does not take issue with the foregoing description of res judicata, but contends that the policy reasons behind res judicata do not justify applying it in this case where he was allegedly prevented from bringing his preferred cause of action in the former suit. He quotes Jones v. City of Alton, 757 F.2d 878, 885 (7th Cir.1985), for the proposition that res judicata “does not bar litigation of issues which could not have been litigated” in the prior action. Dr. Lim’s reliance upon Jones is misplaced. Initially, we note that Jones was decided under the res judicata principles of Illinois law. “Because the prior litigation was brought in federal court, the federal rule of res judicata determines whether the [former] suit bars [Lim] from maintaining this action.” In re Energy Cooperative, 814 F.2d at 1230. As we recognized in In re Energy Cooperative, “the federal rule seems less demanding than that applied by the Illinois cases....” Id. “Once a transaction has caused injury, all claims arising from that transaction must be brought in one suit or lost.” Id. (quoting Car Carriers, 789 F.2d at 593). Dr. Lim has failed to demonstrate that a change in law after the entry of judgment creates an exception to the application of federal res judicata law.
The second reason that Dr. Lim’s reliance upon
Jones
to exclude the application of
res judicata
is in vain is that he was not prevented from litigating the antitrust claim in the former suit. In view of our warning about Rule 11 sanctions in
Ezpeleta,
it is not surprising that the plaintiff chose to withdraw his antitrust claim (but he could have argued that the Illinois peer review system was sufficiently different from Indiana’s that
Ezpeleta
was inapplicable to his case). Nonetheless, the plaintiff failed to take advantage of his full and fair opportunity to litigate the antitrust claims after the Supreme Court released its opinion in
Patrick v. Burget.
The requirement that a party have a full and fair opportunity to litigate an issue before
res judicata
may apply relates to the procedural opportunity rather than to a judicial determination of the merits of the issue.
See Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp.,
456 U.S. 461, 481, 102 S.Ct. 1883, 1897, 72 L.Ed.2d 262 (1982). Dr. Lim filed a request for remand four days before oral argument on his appeal, but he failed to respond to the defendants’ arguments against remand, he failed to raise the issue during oral argument, and he failed to object to our
sub silentio
rejection of his request for remand in our opinion when he requested rehearing of his appeal. After failing to zealously pursue the procedures available to him in the appellate court, the plaintiff possessed still one more opportunity to attempt to reinstate his antitrust
IV. CONCLUSION
At some point, there must be an end to litigation, and barring the appellant’s second suit on the ground of res judicata is an equitable method of upholding that policy. As the district court noted, “[t]he plaintiff has filed two cases, five separate complaints, two appeals [now three], and numerous motions to reconsider and/or vacate. At some point it is unfair to require the defendants to repeatedly renew their defense in a case which they reasonably believed to be closed against them.” Dr. Lim’s inability to litigate his antitrust claim is the result not of a deprivation of available process, but of his counsel’s failure to follow through with the full and fair opportunity that was available to him. The judgment of the district court is
Affirmed.
Notes
. As we explain below, Dr. Lim’s initial complaint alleged an antitrust violation, but he voluntarily dismissed it to avoid Rule 11 sanctions.
. The plaintiff claims that he terminated his association with Dr. Chinnici on January 10, 1986, as a result of the pressures the defendants focused on him.
. On April 25, 1988, this court issued an order to the plaintiff to show cause why his appeal should not be dismissed for failure to file a brief. The appellant filed his brief on May 3, 1988, and responded to a show cause order on May 6, 1988. We note that the plaintiff likewise required an extension of time to file his reply brief. While the plaintiff is unwilling to accept •the district court’s judgment that his case is closed, we note that he was far from diligent in prosecuting it.
. The complaint also included pendant state law claims, which are not before us on this appeal.