151 Minn. 421 | Minn. | 1922
Defendant is an interstate carrier. It transports the government mails over1 its lines olfi railway. On April 1, 1919, and for about 7 months prior thereto, plaintiff was employed as its transfer mail clerk at Fargo, North Dakota. It was his duty to receive mail put off and load mail taken on its trains there. His method of doing his work was to draw a truck to the door of the mail car, load it with mail bags, and repeat the process until all the mail was put off the train. Trucks loaded with the out-going mail were then pulled up and the mail placed aboard the train. Early in the morning of April 1 he received a quantity of mail from defendant’s train No. 9, loading it on trucks in the customary manner. He testified in substance as follows: One of the bags was unusually heavy, weighing 160 or 170 pounds. He placed this bag at one end of the truck. Defend
Plaintiff was a man 40 years of age, a farmer until about a year before he was injured, and had several months’ experience in handling mail bags. He did all the transfer work at Fargo alone except at the Christmas season, when he had a helper. A rule of the postal authorities, prohibiting the placing of more than 125 pounds of mail in a bag, was put in evidence.
This action was brought to recover damages for the injury plaintiff sustained. The complaint alleged negligence in several particulars, but only two were submitted to the jury, who were charged as follows:
“The jdaintiff claims that the defendant was * * * negligent in * * directing the plaintiff to hurry up with his work so as not to delay the train * * * and the rapidity with which he was ordered to handle the mail bags, and particularly the heavy mail bag in question, is claimed by the plaintiff, together with the alleged fact that he did not have sufficient help, was the direct and proximate cause of his injury. If you find that the defendant was negligent in these particulars, then your verdict should be for the plaintiff, unless you further find that plaintiff assumed the risk incident to'the work in the particular manner and under the circumstances under which such work was performed.”
Plaintiff recovered a verdict for $2,550. Defendant made a motion in the alternative for judgment or a new trial and has appealed from an order denying its motion.
No case has been called to our attention in which it has been held that it is the master’s duty to make a preliminary test of the weight of an object to ascertain whether a servant who is required to handle it hurriedly has the physical strength to do so without assistance. We therefore conclude that the.“rule of haste” does not take such a case as this out of the field covered by the rule relating, to injury from overexertion. The following cases, though not directly in point, shed some light on the subject: Rosin v. Danaher Lbr. Co. 63 Wash. 430, 115 Pac. 833, 40 L. R. A. (N. S.) 913; Kosinski v. Hines, 113 Wash. 132, 193 Pac. 209; Roberts v. Indianapolis St. Ry. Co. 158 Ind. 634, 64 N. E. 217; International & G. N. Ry. Co. v. Figures, 40 Tex. Civ. App. 255, 89 S. W. 780; Haviland v. K. C. P. &. G. Ry. Co. 172 Mo. 106, 72 S. W. 515; Mayott v. Norcross Bros. 24 R. I. 187, 52 Atl. 894.
We have concluded that the defendant is not entitled to judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The evidence on another trial may clear up doubts as to the circumstances under which the mail bag was actually handled by the plaintiff. The evidence on this trial will not support a verdict for the plaintiff.
Order reversed and a new trial granted.