Patronis v. United Insurance Co. of AmericaPatronis v. United Insurance Co. of America
- Reporters:
- Before:
- Makar
June 3, 2020
MAKAR, J.
This case involves life insurance, unclaimed property, and the ominous sounding “Death Master File,” which is a federal electronic database administered by the Social Security Administration that includes the agency’s records of the names, social security numbers, dates of birth and, of course, dates of
In response to industry practices and their adverse effects on consumers, the Florida Department of Financial Services (Department) issued a declaratory statement October 2013 that concluded that under existing law a life insurance policy “becomes a claim upon the death of the insured” and that insurers have a duty to search accessible databases to determine whether policyholders had died. That determination was ultimately invalidated in substantial part in Thrivent Financial for Lutherans v. State, Department of Financial Services, 145 So. 3d 178, 182 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014), which held that the Department’s declaratory statement as to when proceeds are due and payable was erroneous. Under the then-existing version of
In response to Thrivent and the ongoing industry practices, the Florida Legislature in 2016 removed the language that allowed insurers to passively rely on their company records and, instead, imposed a statutory duty on insurers to use the DMF (or its equivalent) at least annually (or as often as they use the DMF to check on annuity contracts) to compare DMF death records against holders of their life insurance policies and annuities. Ch. 2016-219, § 1, Laws of Fla. (codified at
These three related amendments to the unclaimed property statute have been dubbed the “search amendment,” the “contact amendment,” and the “escheat amendment.” The Legislature directed that the “amendments made by this act are remedial in nature and apply retroactively” and that any applicable fines, penalties, or additional interest would not be imposed for failures to report or remit an “unclaimed life or an endowment insurance policy, a retained asset account, or an annuity contract with a death benefit” if such assets are “reported and remitted to the Department of Financial Services on or before May 1, 2021.”
In May 2016, four insurance companies challenged these amended portions of the 2016 act, seeking a declaration that retroactive application violates their state constitutional rights. No claim was made that the three amendments, applied prospectively, are invalid. The insurers’ initial complaint alleged two counts, one claiming a denial of due process under
The insurers moved for summary judgment on their facial due process claim. Based solely on the parties’ legal memoranda, the trial judge ruled in the insurers’ favor, concluding that the three challenged aspects of the act violated due process and could only be applied prospectively. It held that the DMF search amendment, beneficiary contact amendment, and escheat-five-years-from-time-of-death amendment are substantive (rather than procedural or remedial), and that retroactive application of them (a) adversely affected the insurers’ vested rights and (b) imposed new obligations and duties in connection with past transactions or considerations (it found it unnecessary to rule on whether they insurers were subject to new penalties). This appeal ensued.
I.
The theory of the insurers’ case is that the three challenged portions of the 2016 act are facially unconstitutional under the
With this backdrop of standards governing our appellate review in this facial constitutional challenge, we turn to the merits.
II.
At the core of this litigation is whether the challenged amendments are remedial/procedural and thereby operate
As to all three amendments, the trial court noted the difficulty of applying the general legal principle that “remedial” and “procedural” laws are constitutionally applied retroactively, State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Laforet, 658 So. 2d 55, 61 (Fla. 1995) (“a procedural or remedial statute is to operate retrospectively”), while “substantive” laws may not be applied retroactively if they abolish or curtail protected rights or impose unconstitutional obligations. See Maronda Homes, Inc. of Fla. v. Lakeview Reserve Homeowners Ass’n, Inc., 127 So. 3d 1258, 1272 (Fla. 2013) (“[A] substantive law prescribes legal duties and rights and, once those rights and duties are vested, due process prevents the Legislature from retroactively abolishing or curtailing them.”). The trial court said:
Like many definitions, this one is easier announced then applied. It is not difficult to imagine an interpretation that would render many statutes remedial, substantive and procedural at the same time. Indeed, the [three] amendments under review can be said to have remedial, procedural, and substantive aspects. The act operates to further a remedy and to confirm rights of life insurance beneficiaries, and directs how it is to be done. But it also proscribes new legal duties and imposes new obligations upon life insurance companies.
The trial court, though recognizing the “act operates to further a remedy and to confirm rights of life insurance beneficiaries[,]” nonetheless concluded that the three amendments were substantive and could be applied only prospectively. Although the question is a debatable one, we conclude that the three amendments to the unclaimed property act are remedial and facially valid.
In this same regard, the long-standing legislative purpose underlying
This chapter shall be applied and construed as to effectuate its general purpose of protecting the interest of missing owners of property, while providing that the benefit of all unclaimed and abandoned property shall go to all the people of the state, and to make uniform the law with respect to the subject of this chapter among states enacting it.
The Legislature made clear that it deems the challenged 2016 amendments to
Finally, the requirement that the five-year escheat period begin at the insured’s death presents a slightly more nuanced legal question as to remediation. Although the dormancy period of five years has not changed, the overall period during which insurers hold funds and earn interest will likely decline. And the new and typically shorter effective holding period might pose difficulties in situations where it is determined that a policy holder died a decade earlier and the five-year dormancy period has elapsed; in those situations, the insurer holds funds that presumptively should have already escheated to the State. As to these situations however, the 2016 act created a safe harbor provision, stating that no fines, penalties, or additional interest would be imposed if insurers had previously failed to report or remit unclaimed insurance proceeds but reported and remitted them to the Department by May 1, 2021. Ch. 2016-219, § 2, Laws of Fla. In other words, so long as insurers do the one-time check of the DMF as to pre-existing policies and document their due diligence in attempting to contact beneficiaries, they will not be subject to fines, penalties, or additional interest if done by the designated statutory date. On balance, the escheat amendment tips heavily towards the remedial purpose of
III.
Despite their remedial nature, the trial court concluded that the three amendments violated due process because they are substantive and “proscribe[d] new legal duties and impose[d] new obligations upon life insurance companies.” A “substantive” label, however, does not necessarily preclude retroactive application. If statutory amendments are deemed substantive, two factors come into play in deciding whether they apply retroactively: “(1) whether the statute itself expresses an intent that it apply retroactively; and, if so, (2) whether retroactive application is constitutional.” Old Port Cove Holdings, Inc. v. Old Port Cove Condo. Ass’n One, Inc., 986 So. 2d 1279, 1284 (Fla. 2008). The intent of the Legislature is that the three amendments apply retroactively; but if doing so violates the constitution, the inquiry is at an end and the amendments are properly enjoined as to such applications. Thus, “[e]ven when the Legislature does expressly state that a statute is to have retroactive application, this Court has refused to apply a statute retroactively if the statute impairs vested rights, creates new obligations, or imposes new penalties.” Laforet, 658 So. 2d at 61. The parties agree that insurers have no vested rights in unclaimed property, so the question before the trial court—after its determination of the substantive nature of the amendments—was whether the amendments facially and unconstitutionally impose new obligations or new penalties.
As to new obligations, the three amendments generally are consistent with the pre-existing duties of insurers under
reasonable and prudent methods under particular circumstances to locate apparent owners of inactive accounts using the taxpayer identification number or social security number, if known, which may include, but are not limited to, using a nationwide database, cross indexing with other records of the holder, mailing to the last known address unless the last known address is known to be inaccurate, or engaging a licensed agency or company capable of conducting such search and providing updated addresses.
Given the broad existing statutory duties of insurers, it cannot be concluded that the three amendments are a facially unconstitutional imposition of new obligations as to all insurers in all situations. It is likely that most insurers were already using the DMF or some other search tools in ascertaining whether annuity holders had died. The same is true as to their efforts to contact potential beneficiaries, which were already required by statute. Neither the search nor contact amendments can be said to be facially unconstitutional as “new obligations” in every instance. Perhaps an insurer can show that the search and contact amendments, as applied to its pre-existing insurance policies, pose an unconstitutional hardship, but no individual “as applied” challenge is made here. We see no general impediment or burden on all insurers as to justify facially invalidating these provisions in toto.
As to new penalties, the trial court—having ruled in the insurers’ favor on other grounds—chose not to adjudicate the issue. The insurers ask that we affirm the trial court’s ruling on this undecided ground under the Tipsy Coachman doctrine, i.e., that affirmance is warranted on alternative grounds if the record establishes a basis for doing so. See Dade Cty. Sch. Bd. v. Radio Station WQBA, 731 So. 2d 638, 644 (Fla. 1999) (“Stated another way, if a trial court reaches the right result, but for the wrong reasons, it will be upheld if there is any basis which would support the judgment in the record.”). We hesitate to do so primarily because the insurers’ facial challenge would require us to conclude that no possible application of the penalty provisions is constitutional, an undertaking fraught with difficulty on an undeveloped record. Though it is conceivable that some insurers may have valid claims, it is not clear that all would, making this issue one more amenable to as-applied challenges.2
REVERSED.
M.K. THOMAS, J., concurs; WINOKUR, J., dissents with opinion.
APPENDIX
(8)(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, an insurer shall compare the records of its insureds’ life or endowment insurance policies, annuity contracts that provide a death benefit, and retained asset accounts that were in force at any time on or after January 1, 1992, against the United States Social Security Administration Death Master File once to determine whether the death of an insured, an annuitant, or a retained asset account holder is indicated and shall thereafter use the Death Master File update files for future comparisons. The comparisons must use the name and social security number or date of birth of the insured, the annuitant, or the retained asset account holder. The comparisons must be made on at least an annual basis before August 31 of each year. If an insurer performs such comparisons regarding its annuities or other books of business more frequently than once a year, the insurer must also make comparisons regarding its life insurance policies, annuity contracts that
provide a death benefit, and retained asset accounts at the same frequency as is made regarding its annuities or other books or lines of business. An insurer may perform the comparisons required by this paragraph using any database or service that the department determines is at least as comprehensive as the United States Social Security Administration Death Master File for the purpose of indicating that a person has died.
Ch. 2016-219, § 1, Laws of Fla.
Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under
WINOKUR, J., dissenting.
Undeniably, a sound argument can be made that the disputed statutory requirements can be constitutionally applied to insurance policies that were executed prior to the effective date of chapter 2016-219, Laws of Florida (the Act). Nor is it deniable that the aims of the new law are salutary, as set out admirably in the majority opinion. But our supreme court has already decided clearly when new statutory requirements related to insurance policies can be imposed. Under this binding case law, we have no option but to conclude, as the trial judge did, that application of the new requirements to existing policies violates the constitutional rights of appellees. For this reason, I believe we must affirm the trial judge’s order.
1. Facial vs. as-applied challenge
The majority claims that the insurers cannot make a case that the disputed law is facially unconstitutional, which requires them to prove that the challenged law has “no possible lawful applications.” Maj. op. at 4-5. Instead, the majority suggests that the specificity of many of the insurer’s claims show that they are best suited to as-applied challenges, which can be made when
As the United States Supreme Court has explained, “the distinction between facial and as-applied challenges is not so well defined that it has some automatic effect or that it must always control the pleadings and disposition in every case involving a constitutional challenge. The distinction . . . goes to the breadth of the remedy employed by the Court, not what must be pleaded in a complaint.” Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 331 (2010). In other words, it is the remedy sought that determines whether a challenge is facial or as-applied.
The insurers’ complaint made clear what portion of the Act it alleged was unconstitutional. Section 2 of Chapter 2016-219, Laws of Florida, reads in part, “[t]he amendments made by this act are remedial in nature and apply retroactively.” The remedy the insurers sought was what one seeks in a facial challenge. They did not seek to enjoin the Department from taking certain action against it on the ground the action is unconstitutional. Instead, they asked the court to “[declare] invalid the retroactive provision of the Act on the grounds that it violates [their] right to due process of law as guaranteed by the Florida Constitution . . .” and “enjoining retroactive enforcement of the Act.” The retroactivity provision is plainly the enactment that the insurers challenged. I submit that this claim is a valid facial challenge.
Moreover, the Florida Supreme Court has allowed facial challenges specifically to the retroactive application of new statutory provisions. For instance, in Maronda Homes, Inc. of Florida v. Lakeview Reserve Homeowners Ass’n, Inc., 127 So. 3d 1258, 1272 (Fla. 2013), the plaintiffs challenged the retroactive application of a newly-enacted statute that would preclude relief if applied to their case. The court did not consider whether the plaintiffs brought a facial or as-applied challenge to the retroactivity of a statute, but only whether retroactivity would violate due process. Id. at 1275–76 (holding that “section 553.835 does not apply to any causes of action that accrued before the
2. Retroactive application — in general
The Florida Supreme Court has generally discussed the due process implications of statutes intended to apply retroactively as follows:
Article I, section 2, of the Florida Constitution guarantees to all persons the right to acquire, possess, and protect property.Section 9 of article I provides that “[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.” These constitutional due process rights protect individuals from the retroactive application of a substantive law that adversely affects or destroys a vested right; imposes or creates a new obligation or duty in connection with a previous transaction or consideration; or imposes new penalties. For the retroactive application of a law to be constitutionally permissible, the Legislature must express a clear intent that the law apply retroactively, and the law must be procedural or remedial in nature.Remedial statutes operate to further a remedy or confirm rights that already exist, and a procedural law provides the means and methods for the application and enforcement of existing duties and rights. In contrast, a substantive law prescribes legal duties and rights and,
once those rights and duties are vested, due process prevents the Legislature from retroactively abolishing or curtailing them.
Maronda Homes, 127 So. 3d at 1272 (citations omitted).
The Legislature plainly intended for the Law to apply retroactively. However, even with such expressed intent, we still have an obligation to “determine whether retroactive application would violate any constitutional principles.” Menendez, 35 So. 3d at 877.
3. Substantive vs. remedial legislation
I agree with the majority that the distinction between substantive and remedial legislation, which courts have drawn to determine whether the legislation can be applied retroactively, is not a simple one to apply. The majority concludes that the Act is remedial——and therefore may be applied retroactively—because it was enacted to “formally rectify industry practices harmful to consumers.” Maj. op. at 9. I respectfully disagree that this fact makes the statute “remedial” for the purpose of retroactive application. Presumably, all new laws are “remedial” in the sense that they intend to rectify a perceived problem. I do not believe that this broad definition is appropriate for determining whether a law can be applied retroactively. For this purpose, remedial statutes “operate to further a remedy or confirm rights that already exist[.]” Maronda, 127 So. 3d at 1272. Put another way, “[r]emedial statutes or statutes relating to remedies or modes of procedure, which do not create new or take away vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of rights already existing,” may be applied retroactively. E. Airlines v. Planet-Reliance Ins. Co., 695 So. 2d 732, 734 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (quoting City of Lakeland v. Catinella, 129 So. 2d 133, 136 (Fla. 1961)). The Act simply imposes new requirements on insurers and alters when insurance proceeds escheat to the State. It has nothing to do with remedies or modes of procedure.2 The fact that the Act
A law is not remedial and will not be given retroactive effect, even if expressly labeled as retroactive, if it impairs vested rights, creates new obligations, or imposes new penalties.4 See Menendez, 35 So. 3d at 878–80 (holding that an amendment to a PIP statute was substantive and could not apply retroactively (although the legislature intended it to be) because it attached new legal consequences to pre-existing policies, specifically by imposing a penalty, implicating attorney’s fees, granting additional time for payment, and delaying an insured’s right to bring suit); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Laforet, 658 So. 2d 55, 61 (Fla. 1995) (holding that an amendment altering bad-faith damages could not be applied retroactively even though argued to be “simply a remedial
At the least, the Act creates a new legal consequence upon existing policies, by a new and accelerated escheat obligation (five years after death), which applies even where insurers were unaware of insureds’ deaths, effectively eliminating the dormancy period in these cases. The other requirements of the Act, specifically 1) a DMF search of all policies in effect at any time since 1992—including accounting for variations in search data, see
4. Impairment of vested rights and attachment of new obligations
I also disagree that retroactive application of the Act does not violate due process because it neither impairs vested rights nor attaches new obligations or penalties to events completed before its enactment.
[E]ven where the Legislature has expressly stated that a statute will have retroactive application, this Court will reject such an application if the statute impairs a vested right, creates a new obligation, or imposes a new penalty. Therefore, the central focus of this Court’s inquiry is whether retroactive application of the statute “attaches new legal consequences to events completed before its enactment.” In order to answer this question, we compare [the statute] as it existed at the time the insureds’ insurance policy was issued with the [] amendment.
Menendez, 35 So. 3d at 877–78 (citations and footnote omitted); see also Coventry First, LLC v. State, Office of Ins. Regulation, 30 So. 3d 552, 558 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (finding that the legislature intended the statute to have retroactive effect, but holding it could not be so applied because it impaired vested rights). Substantive amendments “may have retroactive effect if constitutionally permissible.” Lakeland Reg’l Med. Ctr., Inc. v. State, Agency for Healthcare Admin., 917 So. 2d 1024, 1031 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (permitting retroactive application because the right impaired by the legislation—destroying hospital’s pending administrative challenge to another hospital’s license issuance—was not a vested right, thus due process was not violated); see also Metro. Dade Cty., 737 So. 2d at 499 (“[T]he court must ask whether the new provision attaches new legal consequences to events completed before its enactment.”) (quoting Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 269–70 (1994)).
There is little precedent on when an insurance contract becomes a “previous transaction or consideration” or “an event completed.” The Department argues that because these are life insurance policies, they cannot be completed until the insured dies and the insurance proceeds are paid out or remitted, but cites no precedent for this point. The insurers point to Menendez, which determined that the new amendment’s retroactivity analysis was to be compared to the automobile “insurance policy issued prior to the enactment of the statute,” continuing as follows:
In our analysis, we look at the date the insurance policy was issued and not the date that the suit was filed or the accident occurred, because “the statute in effect at the time an insurance contract is executed governs substantive issues arising in connection with that contract.” Hassen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 674 So. 2d 106, 108 (Fla. 1996); see also Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Ceballos, 440 So. 2d 612, 613 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983) (holding that a liability policy is governed by the law in effect at the time the policy is issued, not the law in effect at the time a claim arises); Hausler v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 374 So. 2d 1037, 1038 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979) (holding that the date of the accident does not determine the law that is applicable to a dispute).
In Florida Ins. Guar. Ass’n, Inc. v. Devon Neighborhood Ass’n, Inc., the supreme court also found that the time the policy issued was the relevant time for retroactive application in the context of
Although life insurance policies are different from automobile and residential insurance policies, the rationale in Menendez and Devon Neighborhood—that an insurance policy is completed when it is executed in reliance on current laws—is equally applicable. Thus, the transaction is completed at execution in compliance with current laws and any subsequent incidents are governed by the policy, absent a valid retroactive statutory amendment. There is logic to the contention that a life insurance policy could not be completed until the insured dies and the insurer pays proceeds, as the Department argues. But that logic would also indicate that an auto insurance policy is not completed until the term expires (or, an accident results in a claim and settlement). Menendez, in contrast, explicitly looked at the date of execution.
5. Specific statutory requirements
a. Search and Contact Obligations
The majority claims the Act’s search and contact requirements are not dissimilar to those of FDUPA prior to the Act. However, the only “due diligence requirements” prior to the Act concerned property presumed unclaimed (i.e., after the dormancy period expired) and years after the insurer became aware of the death or the insured reached the limiting age. The Act imposes search requirements on all policies where the dormancy period has not been triggered. The Act requires insurers to search the DMF for all policies in effect at any time after 1992, which the insurers contend is a prohibitive period of time, to identify the small percentage where they did not receive knowledge or proof of death.
Additionally, retroactive effect is barred if the law “imposes or creates a new obligation or duty in connection with a previous transaction or consideration[.]” Maronda, 127 So. 3d at 1272 (emphasis added). All premiums are set when the policy is issued and cannot be increased afterwards. Additionally, the Act specifically prohibited insurers from charging insureds (or beneficiaries, etc.) “any fees or costs associated with any search,
b. Escheat Obligations
Prior to the Act, FDUPA stated that funds become due and payable (i.e., the dormancy trigger) “as established from the records of the insurance company holding or owing the funds,” unless one of the exceptions (e.g., if the “company knows that the insured or annuitant has died”) applies.
Life insurance funds become “due and payable” under subsection 717.107(1) at the time the insurer receives proof of death and surrender of the policy as contemplated by section 627.461; or, funds become “due and payable” under subsection 717.107(3) when the insurer knows that the insured has died, or when the insured attained or would have attained the limiting age.
The Act changed this dormancy trigger from knowledge or proof of death to “the date of death of the insured,” thus property would automatically be presumed unclaimed five years after an insured’s death.
c. Penalties
This Court may also affirm on the additional ground that the Act unlawfully imposes new penalties retroactively, an issue the trial court felt was unnecessary to address.6 The parties do not appear to dispute that the Act imposes new penalties by penalizing previously lawful conduct (inaction). The Department argues the new penalties are lawful retroactively because they provide a five year grace period for compliance and a good-faith exception (e.g., an insurer lawfully disposed of records). See City of Miami v. St. Joe Paper Co., 364 So. 2d 439, 444 (Fla. 1978) (“[R]etroactive statutes have been almost universally declared constitutional when a reasonable time was given to protect property interests by complying with the new requirements. Thus, the constitutional objection that retroactive application of a statute results in a deprivation of due process is obviated where the statute gives owners of old claims still enforceable at the time of the statutory enactment a reasonable time to take certain steps to preserve their interests.”).
“[C]onstitutional due process rights protect individuals from the retroactive application of a substantive law that . . . imposes new penalties.” Maronda, 127 So. 3d at 1272. The Act’s grace period precludes penalties, fines, or additional interest “due to the failure to report and remit” unclaimed property to the state so long as reporting and remittance is done within five years. Ch. 2016-219, § 2, Laws of Fla.;
Second, the insurers argue that these new penalties are especially problematic considering that FDUPA only requires insurers to retain records for five years after property becomes reportable, and therefore they were under no duty to retain the records they are now required to search.
Third, the insurers argue that the presence of a grace period is insufficient. The Department relies on St. Joe Paper Co., but the supreme court in that case allowed a statute of limitations (to claim title to property) to apply retroactively because the claim owners still had an opportunity to preserve their rights after the act’s enactment. 364 So. 2d at 442–44. Here, the grace period is not to allow the preservation of rights, but to get into compliance before facing new penalties for previously lawful conduct. Unlike in St. Joe Paper Co., after the grace period, new penalties would be imposed for pre-amendment transactions. See Childers v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 696 So. 2d 962, 964 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997) (“Statutes stating new grounds for administrative fines . . . or for license revocation or suspension should not be given retroactive effect.”).
These reasons are sufficient to conclude that the Act imposes new obligations on previous transactions and imposes new penalties, and thus may not be applied retroactively.
For the foregoing reasons, I would hold that chapter 2016-219, Laws of Florida, cannot apply retroactively to policies executed prior to the Act, and would affirm the trial court’s order reaching that conclusion.
M. Drew Parker of Radey Law Firm, Tallahassee, and Lynden Lyman, pro hac vice, Unclaimed Property Advisor, Concord, MA, in support of Appellants by Amici Curiae the National Association of Unclaimed Property Administrators.
M. Hope Keating of Greenberg Traurig, P.A., Tallahassee; Nicole M. Ryan, pro hac vice and Carol Lynn Thompson, pro hac vice of Sidley Austin, LLP, San Francisco, CA, for Appellees.
Katherine E. Giddings and Diane G. DeWolf of Akerman, LLC, Tallahassee, in support of Appellees by Amici Curiae American Council of Life Insurers; Christine Davis Graves of Carlton Fields, Tallahassee, in support of Appellees by Amici Curiae The National Alliance of Life Companies; Thomas P. Crapps, Timothy J. Meenan, and Kirsten Matthis of Meenan, P.A., Tallahassee, in support of Appellees by Amici Curiae Florida Insurance Council; Timothy G. Schoenwalder of Meenan, P.A., Tallahassee, and Andrew B. Kay, pro hac vice and P. Randolph Seybold, pro hac vice of Venable, LLP, Washington, DC, in support of Appellees by Amici Curiae Thrivent Financial for Lutherans.