255 Pa. 353 | Pa. | 1917
Opinion by
We think that the learned court was right in holding
The undisputed facts show, as stated substantially by the learned court below, that the defendant’s automobile was kept at the garage of the Anderson Automobile Company under a contract between the defendant, Frick, and the company for storage at nine dollars per month, cleaning and oiling to be done and gasoline, etc., supplied when required. Frick did not have a chauffeur and did not drive the car himself, and when he wished to use it the company agreed to furnish a driver at seventy-five cents an hour, selecting any one of its employees. Payments were made for all charges on monthly statements. The drivers were paid by the company which selected the driver on each occasion when Frick required one to operate his machine. He testified that he had no authority over the drivers assigned to him except to direct them where he wished to go and when he was in the car to check them if they drove at a too high rate of speed. The accident resulting in the plaintiff’s injuries happened on August 8,1912. On that morning the company, at Frick’s request, sent his. car to his residence by Gannon as the chauffeur. He drove Frick and a friend; by Frick’s direction, to Ambridge, then to the railroad station at Sewickley, where they alighted. Frick sent Gannon to his (Frick’s) house with some robes which he left there, and after leaving the house and when Gannon was on his way to the garage the accident occurred.
The facts appeared from Frick’s testimony, except what'occurred after Gannon left the railroad station, and the court instructed the jury that if the plaintiff was injured through Gannon’s negligence, Frick was liable.
We think the learned court reached the correct conclusion. The defendant was the owner of the car. The relation of bailor and bailee existed between him and the automobile company for the purpose of storage of the
It is .clear, we think, that, while Gannon Avas in the general employment of the automobile company, he was the servant of defendant as long as he had charge of and was operating' the latter’s car on the morning of the accident.- A person may be in the employment and pay of another person and yet not necessarily make the latter the master and responsible for his acts. The master is the person in whose business he is engaged at the time,
The case is distinguished in .its facts from Luckett v. Beighard, 248 Pa. 24. In that case the defendant agreed, for a stipulated sum, not only to store the owner’s machine, hut also to deliver it at the owner’s house and take it from the house to the garage. When, therefore, the machine was being taken to the owner’s house or returned from the house to the garage by the defendant’s .driver, his agent, the machine was under the sole control of the defendant in the discharge of his contractual obligation. In that case,' it was as much the defendant’s duty to deliver the automobile at the house and return it to the garage as it was his duty to keep it on stórage in the garage, and while the driver of- the owner of the garage was taking it to or bringing it from the house, it was on the business and under the control of the garage keeper. In that case the accident occurred when the driver was bringing the machine from the house to the garage, and it was held that the owner of the garage was liable for the injury resulting from his chauffeur’s negligence.
The judgment is affirmed.