Dr. James HOOD and Metro Atlanta Taskforce for the Homeless, Plaintiffs-Appellants v. City of ATLANTA, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
No. 08-12087
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.
Nov. 18, 2008.
301 Fed. Appx. 700
Michelle J. Hirsch, State of Georgia, Department of Law, Atlanta, GA, for Defendants-Appellees.
Before BLACK, PRYOR, and HILL, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Dr. James Hood and Metro Atlanta Taskforce for the Homeless appeal the denial of their post-judgment motion to amend their complaint, filed pursuant to Rule 59. The district court denied the motion, holding that plaintiffs had not presented any newly discovered evidence, nor established any intervening development or change in the controlling law, or need to correct a clear error or manifest injustice, as required by Preserve Endangered Areas of Cobb‘s History, Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Eng‘rs, 916 F.Supp. 1557, 1560 (N.D.Ga.1995).1 The district court noted that in the absence of a showing of any of the above, a motion for reconsideration “is not an opportunity for the moving party ... to instruct the court on how the court ‘could have done it better’ the first time.” Id. Because we find no abuse of discretion in the district court‘s conclusion, we
AFFIRM.
Jimmie BOWERS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NORFOLK SOUTHERN CORPORATION, Norfolk Southern Railway Company, Central of Georgia Railroad Company, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 08-12087
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.
Nov. 18, 2008.
301 Fed. Appx. 701
Mark E. Toth, Amanda M. Morris, Jay C. Traynham, Hall, Bloch, Garland & Meyer, LLP, Macon, GA, for Defendants-Appellees.
Before TJOFLAT, DUBINA and COX, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Jimmie Bowers sued Norfolk Southern Corporation, Norkfolk Southern Railway Company, and Central of Georgia Railroad Company under the Federal Employers Liability Act. In his suit, Bowers alleged he was injured after riding on a defective locomotive seat. Bowers sought to introduce expert testimony regarding the cause of his injuries, but the district court granted the Defendants’ motion to exclude Bowers‘s expert testimony on causation. The district court then granted the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the ground that Bowers failed to show causation. Bowers appeals the grant of summary judgment.
On appeal, Bowers challenges the district court‘s exclusion of the causation testimony of Dr. David A. Miller, Dr. Arthur Wardell, Dr. Roy Baker, and Michael O‘Brien. Specifically, Bowers contends the district court abused its discretion in its analysis of whether the expert testimony should be admitted under
Bowers first argues that the district court did not apply the appropriate test in analyzing the admissibility of the expert testimony at issue in this appeal. Bowers contends that McCorvey v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 298 F.3d 1253 (11th Cir. 2002), requires a district court to use only the three-part test set forth in
In deciding whether these requirements of Rule 702 are met, Daubert instructs courts to consider the following factors: (1) whether the expert‘s theory can be and has been tested; (2) whether the theory has been subjected to peer review and publication; (3) the known or potential rate of error of the particular scientific technique; and (4) whether the technique is generally accepted in the scientific community.
McCorvey, 298 F.3d at 1256 (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469). It is obviously not an abuse of discretion, therefore, to apply the Daubert factors in analyzing the admissibility of expert evidence. Additionally, in Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999), the Supreme Court stated that a trial judge has “broad latitude to determine” what factors are most appropriate to apply in a given case. Id. at 152-53, 119 S.Ct. at 1176. Therefore, we conclude it is not an abuse of discretion for a district court to consider factors enumerated in the advisory committee notes to
Bowers next argues that the district court abused its discretion in excluding Dr. Miller‘s expert testimony on causation. Bowers argues that the district court made factual errors in its analysis. While most of Bowers‘s arguments attempt to reargue the facts presented to the district court, one argument merits discussion. Bowers correctly contends that the district court made use of an unauthenticated document in its analysis of the admissibility of Dr. Miller‘s evidence on causation.1 But, the district court only used the unauthenticated document in its analysis of one factor enumerated in the advisory notes to
Bowers next argues that the district court abused its discretion in excluding the expert evidence offered by Dr. Wardell and Dr. Baker. The crux of Bowers‘s argument is that the district court applied the wrong test to determine admissibility of expert evidence. As discussed above, however, the district court has wide latitude to determine the appropriate factors to use in its analysis. Here, the district court‘s application of the Daubert and advisory committee factors was both thorough and careful. We conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the expert evidence offered by Dr. Wardell and Dr. Baker.
Bowers next argues that the district court abused its discretion in excluding the expert testimony of Michael O‘Brien. Specifically, Bowers contends that the district court improperly credited the testimony of the Defendants’ fact witness over the expert testimony of O‘Brien. This is incorrect. The district court excluded O‘Brien‘s testimony because he admitted he was not qualified to determine the cause of Bowers‘s back injuries. (R.4-85 at 47-48). The district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the expert testimony of O‘Brien.
Finally, Bowers argues the district court erred in granting summary judgment. We disagree. Because Bowers cannot show causation, summary judgment for the Defendants was appropriate. Accordingly, we affirm the district court‘s grant of summary judgment for the Defendants.
AFFIRMED.