Jiminez v. GrossJiminez v. Gross
In a proceeding, inter alia, tо compel the respondents to provide a special public assistance moving-expenses allowance to certain homeless families, and for a declaratory judgment, the petitioners appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Aronin, J.), dated April 11, 1985, which denied their
Judgment modified, on the law, by deleting therefrom the provision granting the petitioners’ leave to renew, and uрon searching the record, substituting therefor a provision dismissing the proceeding on the merits. As so modified, judgment affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
The three named petitioners are all recipients of public assistance, who, in 1984, were required to move from one emergency temporary housing faсility to another, incurring certain moving expenses as a result. They all sought reimbursement of these expenses from the respondent local commissioner but their applications were rejeсted. They then commenced the instant proceeding seeking, inter alia, to compel the local сommissioner to provide the moving expenses, a preliminary injunction, certification as a class and a declaratory judgment declaring the rights of the class with respect to expenses incurred when moving between emergency temporary housing facilities. However, at about the same time that the instant proceeding was commenced, the named petitioners separatеly requested, and received, administrative review and fair hearings on the propriety of the local commissioner’s denial of reimbursement for moving expenses in their individual cases.
Special Term denied the petitioners’ demands for a preliminary injunction, class certification and declaratory relief. With respect to so much of the proceeding as sought to compel the lоcal commissioner to reimburse the named petitioners, Special Term dismissed with leave to renew, on the ground that the petitioners, by commencing the proceeding before decisions had been rendered on their administrative hearings, had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. Soon after Special Term’s decision, the respondent Perales issued determinations in each оf the named petitioners’ administrative hearings, and denied their applications for reimbursement fоr their moving expenses.
The petitioners’ receipt of these adverse administrative hearing dеterminations, which are not presently before us for review, has effectively rendered moot their appeal from so much of the judgment as dismissed the proceeding for failure to exhaust their аdministrative remedies. Nevertheless, as this question is important and is likely to recur, we find that it is properly bеfore this court, and the appeal from that part of
We find that, under the circumstances of this case, these pеtitioners were not required to exhaust their administrative remedies through the respondents’ administrative hearing procedures. Much of the relief sought — a preliminary injunction, class certification and а declaratory judgment — would have been beyond the scope of the administrative hearing prоcedures (see, e.g, Matter of Mas v Lavine,
With respect to so much of the proceeding as sought to compel the local сommissioner to reimburse the named petitioners for their moving expenses, we find, contrary to the petitioners’ assertions, that neither statute, regulation nor decisional law mandates that the loсal commissioner must, in every case and under all circumstances, provide grants to reimburse a public assistance recipient for whatever moving expenses he or she may claim to have incurred, and consequently, resort to a fair hearing will be necessary in those cases where, as here, such an application is initially denied. The petitioners’ claim that they are entitled tо reimbursement without a hearing is incorrect, and the petition must, therefore, be dismissed on the merits. Bracken, J. P., Lawrence, Fiber and Kooper, JJ., concur.