Bruce W. and Jeannette L. Jackson appeal from a summary foreclosure judgment entered in the Superior Court (Penobscot County, Kravchuk, J.) in favor of Jim Mitchеll and Jed Davis, P.A. (the attorneys) and from a summary judgment (Pierson, J.) entered in favor of the attorneys on the Jacksons’ counterclaim. We affirm the judgments.
In late 1987, the Jacksons met with the attorneys to discuss their contention that several Maine banks were conspiring to cut off their credit. In December 1987, the parties entered into a written contract pursuant to which the attorneys agreed to provide legal services in the “investigation of and lawsuit against banks fоr conspiracy to cut off clients' credit.’’ The Jacksons’ payment of legal fees under the contract was secured by a mortgage on a lаrge tract of undeveloped land owned by the Jacksons in Edinburg. The attorneys informed the Jacksons of the need to secure a banking expert in order to pursue the matter. Jed Davis subsequently sought the assistance of Gary Knight, former State Director of the Independent Bankers Association of America; but after twice reviewing the substance of the Jacksons’ banking claim, Knight refused to testify as an expert on their behalf.
In November 1988, Davis informed the Jacksons that he had been unable to find a banker willing to testify in their case and that, without a credible expert, they would almost certainly lose. He suggested that if thе Jacksons wished to pursue the matter further, they should look for a banking expert themselves and that the statute of limitations on their claim would expire on March 1, 1989. In January 1989, Bruce Jackson informed the attorneys that he had two potential witnesses but he “would not reveal their identities at that time.” In February, Davis informed the Jacksons that he “would be unwilling to sign the complaint in the absence of [a banking] expert and in the face of Mr. Knight’s *1016 unfavorable opinion” and thаt to do so “would have involved a violation of Rule 11.” He informed them at that time that if they wished to pursue the matter, they would have to proceed pro se. Davis prepared a complaint for the Jacksons to file pro se as well as a new contract under which the attorneys would provide “[a]d-vice regarding and assistance with the clients’ pro se lawsuit against [banks].” The Jaсksons refused to sign the pro se complaint or the new contract. The statute of limitations subsequently expired on the Jacksons’ bank claim.
The attorneys filed а complaint for foreclosure of the mortgage on the Jacksons’ Edinburg property alleging that the Jack-sons failed to pay attorney fees owing under the December 1987 contract. The Jack-sons answered and filed several counterclaims all of which essentially alleged legal malрractice. The Superior Court (Pierson, J.) entered a summary judgment in favor of the attorneys on the Jacksons’ counterclaims because the Jacksons failed to produce “necessary expert testimony to support their allegations against [the attorneys].” Later, the Superior Court {Krav-chuk, J.) also entеred a summary foreclosure judgment in favor of the attorneys. In response, the Jacksons appealed.
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Foreclosure Action
“In reviewing an entry of a summary judgment, we exаmine the evidence before the court in the light most favorable to the party against whom the judgment has been granted to determine if the trial court сommitted an error of law.”
Robinson v. Maine Central R.R.,
This contention is meritless. We have stated that “[a]n agreement to rescind a contract is itself a contract аnd must be evaluated by principles of contract law.”
Drinkwater v. Patten Realty Corp.,
II.
Malpractice Counterclaim
In their legal malpractice counterclaim, the Jacksons challenged the attorneys’ judgment regarding the viability of their claim against several Maine banks for conspiring to deny them credit; the attorneys’ diligence in procuring a banking expert to support their position; and the attorneys’ refusal to proceed on their claim without a banking expert. The Jacksons included only the affidavit of Bruсe Jackson in support of their counterclaim for legal malpractice. The trial court {Pierson, J.) granted the attorneys’ motion for a summary judgment on the Jacksons’ counterclaims holding that “[a]bsent expert testimony supporting [the Jacksons] assertions, [they] raise no genuine issue of material fact аnd their counterclaim fails as a matter of law.” The Jacksons challenge this conclusion.
Although we have not addressed the necessity of expert testimony to establish an attorney’s standard of care and breach thereof in a legal malpractice case, we have decided, in сlaims for medical malpractice, that “[i]t is incumbent upon the plaintiff to show
by expert testimony
that
*1017
the treatment pursued by the defendant was something other than that which the average and reasonably skillful physician would have employed.”
Downer v. Veilleux,
The majority of courts around the country have adopted the same general rule and exception for lеgal malpractice cases: expert evidence is required in a legal malpractice case to establish the attorney’s breach of duty “except in cases where the breach or lack thereof is so obvious that it may be determined by the Court as a matter of law, or is within the ordinary knowledge and experience of laymen.” Michael A. DiSabatino,
Annotation: Admissibility and Necessity of Expert Evidence as to Standards of Practicе and Negligence in Malpractice Action Against Attorney,
The question remaining in this case then is whether the case at bar is one “where the breach or lack thereof is so obvious that it may be determined by the Court as a matter of law, or is within the ordinary knowledge and experience of lаymen.” Since the Jacksons are challenging the attorneys’ judgment and diligence, the trial court did not commit reversible error by requiring expert testimony to suрport their claim of negligence. With no expert testimony to establish the attorneys’ standard of care and a breach thereof, the Jacksons failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact and summary judgment was properly granted.
The entry is:
Judgments affirmed.
All concurring.