*1 Lubbock, Simek, petition- Patrick C. for ers. JILANI, Wagas Ammad Jilani Saher

Jilani, By Through Minors Their Lubbock, Purdom, respon- J. for Thomas Friend, JILANI, Next Khawar Petition- dent. ers, SPEARS, Justice. suit filed personal injury This was JILANI, Respondent.

Ahmad F. as friend of minor Jilani next her Khawar children, Jilani, Wagas Ammad Jilani No. C-7481. father, Jilani, against Saher the children’s Supreme Court Texas. Jilani, damages arising out of Ahmad present- The issue automobile collision. Dec. 1988. unemancipated ed is minor chil- whether Rehearing Denied May damages against dren recover negligence caused of that operating a motor vehicle. Ahmad driv- June of Jilani was ing his three children to visit wife friends Arkansas when highway off the and collided with swerved pole. and her three utility Mrs. Jilani brought injured. Mrs. Jilani children were present three action on behalf of her unemancipated personal minor children for injuries by the children. Mrs. sustained alleged injuries Jilani that the children’s negligence proximately were caused failing proper keep of their father driving at an rate lookout and excessive speed. judg- granted summary court The trial defendant, father of the three ment for the on the based appeals affirmed doctrine. court of re- judgment. 747 S.W.2d 504. We appeals verse the and remand the cause to trial court on the merits. trial in its primitive most form acts as basic attempt recover children who barrier to injuries a result damages for sustained as The doc parent’s tortious actions. in 1891 Hew judicially trine created 9 So. George, 68 Miss. lett v. (1891). Hewlett, Supreme Court minor could Mississippi held that a child against his not maintain an action Without citation imprisonment. for false reasoned that sound authority, the court designed promote public policy family unit forbids peace within the *2 minor asserting per child from a claim for under which the same duties were injuries against sonal parent. That court plaintiff to any owed as to employee. other long reasoned “so as the is under The court held that negligent because the obligation for, control, guide, to care alleged acts were to have been committed reciprocal and the child is obligation under partnership the course of business rath- to aid and obey, comfort and no such action er discharge parental than author- Miss, as this can be maintained.” 68 at duties, ity plaintiff should not be 711, 9 So. at 887. prevented pursuing from his action farming partnership. Id. at 932-33. Although of American adopted doctrine, courts the Hewlett nu Although this de- Felderhoff merous exceptions and limitations have clined to parental abolish the doctrine of inception. been created since A its number immunity entirely, adopt it did a test which parental of courts held that the immu parent-child set the litiga- boundaries nity prevent does not an action tion. The court retained rule representative a child of a de respect “alleged ordinary acts of parent. See, e.g., ceased Brennecke v. Kil negligence which involve a reasonable exer- patrick, (Mo.1960); 336 S.W.2d 68 Palcsey authority cise or the exercise of Tepper, N.J.Super. 176 A.2d 818 ordinary parental respect discretion with Smith, F.Supp. Davis 497 provisions for the care and necessities of (E.D.Pa.1954). In Davis the court rea the child.” 473 S.W.2d at 933. The court disturbing par soned that the risk of reasoned that these duties which extinguished ent-child upon home, provision food, include the of a parent’s F.Supp. death. 126 An at 507. chores, schooling, family medical care and exception recognized to the doctrine recreation, “seriously impaired” could be if parent’s some courts arises when the parents could be held liable for their ordi- actions constitute an intentional tort. Em nary negligence occurring while dis- ery Emery, 45 Cal.2d 289 P.2d 218 charge duties. Matsoukas, Nudd v. 7 Ill.2d stated, This court further Moore, 131 N.E.2d 525 Mahnke v. 197 Md. 77 A.2d 923 Cowgill v. prevent most we can do is to [T]he Boock, (1950). 189 Or. 218 P.2d 445 judicial system used to dis- Moreover, we are unable find where rupt sphere wide reasonable dis- applied court has ever pa the doctrine of necessary cretion which is order for rental to suits between a child properly respon- exercise their parent concerning property and con nurture, care, sibility provide dis- rights. tractual cipline (emphasis for their add- ed). (Tex.1971), this court carved out its at 933. Id. exception own to the doctrine and set the principles We continue to adhere to determining parameters overall in Texas expounded in Felderhoff. when a would remain immune from question we now decide is whether alleged liability to his child for acts of scope facts of this case fall within the ordinary negligence. 14- Felderhoff, a parental authority “reasonable exercise of unemancipated year-old injured minor was ordinary parental or the exercise of discre- working farming partnership while for a provisions for the care tion with partner. injury which his father was a and necessities of the child.” alleged was to have been caused Although this court has never had the negligent acts of his father the course interpret scope of the opportunity to partnership and furtherance of the busi- exceptions, other courts have opinion, ness. In a well-reasoned this court Felderhoff way helpful. An defined them in a that is legal relationship observed was employer employee involves created between supervising plaintiff disciplining and partnership and the acts such as the defendant automobile, (citations Mich.App. driving an child. while Wright Wright, omitted). 351 N.W.2d exercise in providing for the care and discretion 405 A.2d at 684. child, hand, the other necessities on here We aware that the accident obligated limited to that on occurred while the Jilani Horn, 630 Horn S.W.2d furnish. See language that the in Felder- vacation and *3 (Ky.1982). 70 suggests that recreation was one of hoff the parental duties which should several definitions, do hes Under these we beyond judicial sphere. ordinarily be holding itate that the facts here do not change does not factor sphere fall within the of “reasonable exer Regardless result. parental authority cise of or the exercise of excursion, this case does not ordinary parental discretion” described paren- exercise involve the “reasonable obligations The familial Felderhoff. authority or of parental tal the exercise quite law imposed duties and nature are as envisioned discretion” Felderhoff. general obligation from the different holding today Our is limited to the facts imposes upon every law driver of an auto before us: an automobile tort action mobile. It is the “reasonable discretion” brought by unemancipated an minor child parental obligations that parent.1 We believe that allow- trying protect this court was Felder ing “paren- such an action will not threaten limited to transac hoff nor risk discipline” tal will it essentially parental. tions that are In the substituting judicial parental for discretion action, present alleged essence rearing minor discretion in the care and negligence operation the improper of a judg- children. We therefore reverse activity motor not essentially vehicle—an upholding the appeals ment of the court of Coe, parental. In Schneider v. 405 A.2d summary judgment re- trial court’s (Del.1979), 682 the Supreme Court of Dela trial court trial. mand this cause ware reasoned: automobile, driving an supervi- Unlike MAUZY, J., concurring files a sion one’s children involves issues ROBERTSON, J., opinion in which control, authority, and discre- joins. uniquely very tion matters of COOK, JJ., file GONZALEZ personal type judgment. The freedom dissenting opinions. judgment to exercise such has constitu- Justice, MAUZY, concurring. underpinning sharp- tional and contrasts regu- supervision with the state’s decision to allow concur court’s unemancipated pursue minor child to lation of the one must exercise an 432, Briere, thirty 224 A.2d 588 1. We at least other states would Briere v. 107 N.H. note that 533, (1966); Jeffries, unemancipated v. N.J. 461 A.2d allow child Foldi 93 a suit Co., 27, (1983); parent negligence. Ins. N.M. Hebel Guess v. 96 for automobile See 1145 Gulf (1981); Hebel, (Alaska 1967); Spencer, v. 36 v. 627 P.2d 869 Holodook v. 435 P.2d 8 Sandoval 338, 35, Sandoval, 11, (1981); 859 324 N.E.2d 364 N.Y.S.2d 128 Ariz. P.2d 800 N.Y.2d 623 648, Wells, (N.D. Gibson, 914, (1974); v. 154 N.W.2d 364 3 479 P.2d 92 Huelle Gibson v. Cal.3d 326, Coe, 1967); (1971); Crystal, Ohio Cal.Rptr. v. 15 St.3d v. A.2d Kirchner 288 Schneider 405 (Fla. (1984); Through (Del.1979); Ard, By 275 Unah v. So.2d 474 N.E.2d 682 Ard 414 1066 (Okla.1984); Martin, Reed, P.2d 1366 Group Idaho Uriah v. 676 Ins. v. 109 Farmers 718, (1984); Turner, (1985); Gilroy, 296 681 P.2d 776 Winn v. Or. 550 Turner v. 304 712 P.2d Pados, (1971); (Iowa 1981); 444 282 A.2d Falco Pa. 351 Nocktonick v. Nock v. N.W.2d 786 Silva, (R.I.1982); (1980); v. tonick, Rig Elam 446 A.2d 1013 135 Silva v. 227 Kan. 611 P.2d (1980); Elam, S.E.2d (Ky.1971); S.C. 109 Rigdon, Black don v. 465 S.W.2d 921 Solmitz, (Me.1979); Wright, Wright Va. S.E.2d v. v. 409 A.2d 634 Stamboulis Sutterlin, (1972); Stamboulis, 93 Wash.2d Merrick 519 N.E.2d 1299 Mass. Comer, (1980); W.Va. 610 P.2d 891 Lee Sweeney Sweeney, 402 Mich. Stream, S.E.2d Conn.Gen.Stat. Anderson N.W.2d 1-539.21 (Minn.1980); § N.C.Gen.Stat. § Co. 52-572C Transamerica Ins. N.W.2d 595 (1983 Cum.Supp.). Repl.Vol., 1985 Royle, P.2d 820 202 Mont. cause of action Furthermore, his or her if a pur- defendant has negligence operating chased liability insurance and a child sues insurance, motor vehicle. The doctrine of to collect such there is little possibility only disruption of family be retained with re- har- if spect mony the child is recovery. to acts which allowed This involve a reasonable is especially true when the suit arises parental authority out or the exer- cases, an automobile accident. such cise of providing discretion in parent usually nominal defendant the care and necessities of a child. In all suffer no loss coverage because insurance judicially cases this created doctrine by statutory mandated law Texas. As should be abandoned. Supreme Judicial Court of Massachu- reviewing upholding various decisions setts noted: immunity, I find involved, When insurance is the action premises four upon basic which the doc- between and child is not truly First, trine is based: allegedly adversary; parties both recovery seek *4 preserves peace, the harmony domestic from the insurance carrier to create a unit; tranquility family second, of the the fund for the child’s medical care and allegedly prevents possibility the support depleting family’s without the collusion; third, of fraud and the doctrine other assets. Far potential a allegedly prevents potential depletion the disharmony, source of the action is more funds; fourth, family of the the doc- likely preserve family pur- the unit in allegedly trine inhibits interference with goal suit of a easing common of —the parental discipline and control. family stemming financial difficulties rationale, regard In to the first it is hard injuries. from the child’s perceive suits in tort how based Sorensen, 350, 362, v. Sorensen 369 Mass. destroy harmony tranquility of the (1975). Although 339 N.E.2d I property unit while and contract ac- principle adhere to the that the mere exist- disruption tions A do not. to the ence of insurance should not create a cause peace likely is far more to occur as a result exists,1 of action where none otherwise it is itself, of the tortious conduct rather than appropriate and relevant to consider liabili- allowing as a result redress of the ty as one insurance factor because of its wrongful injury. action which led to the prevalent nature. fpr justification prohibiting The second abrogated When this court the doctrine suits, parent-child possibility of collu interspousal Price, Price v. lawsuits, rejected by sive this court (Tex.1987), noted, “it S.W.2d 316 we is interspousal immunity when it abolished denying difficult to fathom how a forum Price, (Tex.1987). Price v. 732 S.W.2d 316 any wrong for the redress of could be said Price, system In we noted that our encourage tranquility.” domestic at Id. justice capable ascertaining the exist analyzed 318. Other courts have the fami ence of fraud collusion and therefore rationale, similarly rejected possibility the mere concluded e.g., it as unmeritorious. See Briere v. fraudulent claim should not be the basis Briere, 107 N.H. 224 A.2d 588 denying recovery. Similarly, Kir Gelbman, v. 23 N.Y.2d Gelbman Crystal, chner 15 Ohio St.3d v. 245 N.E.2d 192 N.Y.S.2d Falco (1984), N.E.2d 275 the court held: Pados, 444 Pa. 282 A.2d 351 v. Klein, 1, 199 perjury charge, Plumley v. 388 Mich. N.W.2d The deterrent effect of a Stienne, discovery Rupert pretrial 90 Nev. extensive and detailed Elam, procedures, opportunity for cross-ex- P.2d Elam (1980). also, avoidability of summa- S.C. 268 S.E.2d 109 See amination and Co., ry judgment a few exam- Dorsey v. Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. motions are but State 27, 30, (1984). judicial ples of the tools available to our 9 Ohio St.3d 457 N.E.2d 1169 See, White, e.g., Goiter 20 Wis.2d N.W.2d system exposing provision care and necessities fraudulent claims negligence type of lawsuit. child. An case does paren not involve reasonable justifiable why There no reason we tal or the exercise princi- continue to adhere should not Rigdon Rigdon, discretion. See legal ple system equipped to that our Coe, (Ky.1971); S.W.2d Schneider possibility of fraud. reduce the (Dela.1979); A.2d 682 Turner v. Turn analyzing applicability “de (Iowa 1981). er, 304 N.W.2d 786 pletion argument, funds” it is interesting to note that this rationale reviewing sup- After reasons never applied protecting porting parental immunity, the doctrine of wrongdoer’s children claims justify do not am convinced that strangers injured by parents’ negligent denying plaintiff right pursue Sneed, conduct. Sneed 705 S.W.2d cause of in this case. Had there action 392 (Tex.App. Antonio writ —San passengers in than been the car other chil- n.r.e.), ref’d court allowed a suit on driver, passengers dren of the those par his behalf of a child deceased bring per- could the driver for suit held, estate, ents’ “it is under hard to injuries. recovery sonal To allow here to stand why compensated a child not be relatives, acquaintances, all friends or but injury by stranger for an while a not to the would be a driver’s own deplete ‘family will be allowed to fund’ right denial children’s re- the detriment tortfeasor’s chil dress. dren.” at 397. Id. Although immu- law, parent Texas Under current whose nity designed protect *5 originally par- was to negligent operation of an automobile ents, cases, in the of these vast personal injury causes can be his sued only party from the doctrine to benefit nieces, spouse, nephews and aunts and un- parents’ liability is the insurance carrier. relatives, cles and all but not his children. choice, given If what If our legislative judicial branches person to in the every elect insure world personal injury determined that actions against negligence except his own chil- place impermissi- will not an relatives dren? in be Parents this state would out- fund, ble strain on the suit an doctrine, raged they if knew that the when unemancipated child will likewise not over- applied, used to bar their children’s now burden the financial resources. parents’ liability claims insur- law, Under Texas drivers of owners ance carrier. required purchase are to automobiles liabil- parental immunity The doctrine of should ity Assuming insurance.2 of a owner respect retained to acts which in- be with mandate, complies car this with au- volve reasonable depletion be little no or of or exhaustion thority or the exercise of discre- coverage funds if the insurance providing in care and necessi- tion adequate. ties of a child. reviewing pa the fourth rationale used, intended should to be never immunity, rental that it inhibits interfer used, liability insurance be to shield a carri- control, discipline ence with minor just er from the claims of a child. in developed v. Felder rule present question to the best solution (Tex.1971) hoff, gives ade ed in this and similar cases is the enact quate protection such interfer statute. See Conti ment direct action ence. retained Huizar, 740 S.W.2d nental Gas Co. v. respect immunity rule with to acts J., (Tex.1987) (Kilgarlin, concurring). ordinary negligence which involve reason injured persons allow Such statute would able exercise of or ordi against a pursue a action tort- nary with to cause of parental discretion 6701h, (Ver- Supp.1988). art. non Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. 1A§ might operate destroy If liability company. insured which feasor’s insurance plaintiff’s claim. statute, the Texas had a direct action Jilani suing be their father’s liabil children would of the insurer would avoid the Joinder company, not their father. ity insurance dangers in de- potential inherent the above joinder scribed situation. Rules required by insurance is a statute When adopted avoiding multi- with ordinance, protection of the insured suits, plicity why and there is no reason objective of insur primary is not the companies exempt insurance be specific in lan ance. Even the absence respect. joinder If from the law this securing injured persons direct guage initially, all inter-related were allowed rights policy, there is inherent in under the could heard and claims and defenses be compulsory policy an inference of a such a reciprocally among parties, all adjudicated undertaking part on the of the insurer to table, on the and the all the cards would be person. damages injured answer rights the same initial plaintiff would have requirement compulsory insurance “[T]he against insurer as insurer now has Safety im the Texas Motor Vehicle law manner, all plaintiff. In this the interest of resulting plies potential claimants that all parties expeditiously litigating the claim intended as from automobile accidents are would be furthered. required statutorily beneficiaries argument jury apt that a is more coverage.” liability Dairyland injured party, return a verdict for the County Mutual Ins. Co. Texas v. Chil amount, larger if the loss for a know (Tex.1983). dress, 650 S.W.2d ultimately compa- fall on an insurance In- legislature has bestowed on the all motor ny is untenable. Jurors know approval power surance Commission required in this state are vehicle owners insur- of “No Action” clauses standard carry liability insurance. Those who drive contractually policies. Those clauses ance are reminded of this fact each a vehicle prohibit companies from insurance premiums. they pay their insurance time their in- parties named as suits avoiding Considering public sureds. eliminating multiplicity and of of suits policy to public It inconsistent impediments adjudica- unreasonable situation which the ultimate sanction a justifiable no reason process, tive can find deprived beneficiary policy proceeds is *6 al- insured and insurer should be why an policy open, of an provision clause to employ a “no action” lowed pursue speedy opportunity postpone realistic reme- away añd contract party, impose or to unusual right adequate remedy dy at law of a third to an party’s right to sue limitations on a third the insurer. jointly against the insured and parties jointly. Shingleton adverse See such restric- The result obtained (Fla.1969). Bussey, 223 So.2d 713 incongruous especially when tions is controversy, not participates in the insurer ROBERTSON, J., joins in this proceeding joint defendant as a concurring opinion. against injured plaintiff brought by the COOK, Justice, dissenting. insured, but, rather, as the “undisclosed rights of the guardian” of the interest and unemancipated minor holding that By present system, the insured. Under the pursue a cause of action children having precluded from injured plaintiff is negligent opera- against parents their in one ac- directly trial court consider vehicles, has re- the court tion of motor joint of the defendant’s already tion all facets from our one more thread moved plain- only to the liability, not as Reverence degenerating several social weave. insured, ten- of the most basic parents but also as is one claim one’s tiff’s today Yet the court society.1 ets of has defenses the insurer thee"). giveth thy (“Honour Lord God thy land which the E.g., 20:12 father Exodus thy days may long upon thy mother: that be

677 Further, litigation pits court does not discuss the approves of children parents. allowing litigation disrupt fact that this tranquillity The court has read v. Felder Felderhoff relationship between a unit. (Tex.1971), hoff, 473 S.W.2d 928 too broad unique. and child is It involves elements of majority ly. The construes that case confidence, love, trust, independence abrogate parental immunity the doctrine of continuously by par- that must be exercised except parental authority areas demanding and carrying ents in out their discretion. The issue Felder pri- duties. Parents are the burdensome was “whether hoff mary role models for children. Children arising extended to outside be acts do; parents learn from see their what family relationship of the normal holding only encourage such as this can occurring parent’s and child and litigious society. and breed a more activity in the child en business gaged employee.” as an 473 S.W.2d at 930 preserve relationship The need to this added). (emphasis majority’s reading stronger today’s remains even troubled would make the entire sec Felderhoff society. At a time when the deterioration phrase superfluous. ond unit is a matter of concern construing courts have likewise Felderhoff alarm, preserve the court should —and holding concluded that not this destroy not further is left of this —what broad.2 strength.3 A basic unit of our nation’s fact, interpretation this broad of Fel number of other states still bar a cause of previous interpre conflicts with a derhoff such the one in this case. action as Ward Votteler, tation this court. In Sax v. Rhodes, Beck, Inc., 511 Hammonds & court, (Tex.1983), rely S.W.2d 661 159, (Ala.1987); Carpenter So.2d ing on Felderhoff, reasoned that the doc 424, 426, 299, Bishop, 290 Ark. 720 S.W.2d parent-child immunity pre trine of Reaves, Horton v. 186 Colo. suing clude children from 149, 156, P.2d Brown parents negligently when the fail assert 316, 316-17, Ga.App. Phillips, a cause of action on behalf of the children. S.E.2d 787-88 Buffalo Buf Id. at 667. (Ind.Ct.App. falo, 441 N.E.2d 712-14

Further, Bondurant, assuming arguendo that Bondurant v. 386 So. correctly interpreted scope (La.Ct.App.1980); Frye Frye, court has of 2d 542, 567, abrogation immunity, 305 Md. 505 A.2d Felderhoffs misapplied the court has the test estab- McNeal v. Administrator Estate McNeal, (Miss.1971); specifically lished. 523-24 enumerated So.2d home, food, Novak, provision schooling, “the Pullen v. Neb. chores, care, medical and recrea- N.W.2d Barranco v. Jack (Tenn.1985). son, scope tion” as within the discre- See Ill.App.3d *7 Hogan Hogan, on a 106 tion. Id. at 933. Jilanis were also v. 770, 929, 931, 107, 435 N.E.2d trip when the accident oc- 61 Ill.Dec. recreational (1982) (operation in of motor vehicle to curred. The decision this case overrules 772 accomplish family the in covered test established Felderhoff. 386, Jackson, Attwood, 2. See v. Estate 276 Ark. P.2d n. 2 Barranco v. Attwood 390 230, 235, 366, 221, (Tenn.1985); Langley S.W.2d 633 369 v. Dzenutis 690 S.W.2d 227 130, Dzenutis, 290, 297, 343, (Tex. v. 200 Conn. A.2d Co., 512 National Lead 666 S.W.2d 345 Ard, 1066, 134 Ard v. 414 1067 & So.2d 1984, writ); Grey App. v. Paso no Chase - El (Fla.1982); Nocktonick, n. 3 Nocktonick v. 227 Inc., 444, 453, Lines, 195 S.E. hound 156 W.Va. 758, 771-72, 135, Kan. 611 P.2d 143-44 810, (1973). 2d 815 765, Stamboulis, 762, v. Stamboulis 401 Mass. 1299, 519 N.E.2d Sorensen, 1301 n. 6 Sorensen 786, Turner, 789-90 3. See Turner v. 304 N.W.2d 350, 8, 369 Mass. 357 n. 339 N.E.2d J., (Iowa 1981) (LeGrand, dissenting). Accord 907, (1975); Hooper n. Food 911 8 v. Clements 416, (D.C. Rousey, Rousey 421-24 528 A.2d Co., 943, 944-45, (Okla.1985); 694 P.2d 945 n. 2 J., 1987) (Nebeker, dissenting). Gilroy, Or.App. 656 Winn v. 250 n. doctrine); cher- the court has weakened a parental Kendall sion further 176, 178 Co., society. Sears, ished cornerstone of our Roebuck & 634 S.W.2d (Mo.1982) re (parental immunity doctrine basis). on a applied case-by-case

tained GONZALEZ, Justice, dissenting. pres states have relied on the Several presented any not been with We have abrogating the liability change insurance in ence of compelling public policy reasons to respect to doctrine with There- immunity. E.g., fore, exception motor vehicle accidents. Williams I not the carve out (Del.1976); Williams, 369 A.2d has in case. Fur- that the court made this Ard, (Fla. thermore, poten- the opinion So.2d 1067-68 the court’s has Ard v. disharmony Sorensen, sowing Mass. tial of seeds of Sorensen (1975). disrupt 350, 362-63, conflict home and will N.E.2d has en- misplaced. reasoning stability that this area of the law is This reliance past years. It is for these joyed not for “nominal that a defendant” I affirm that dissent. would liability in reasons usually loss suffer because appeals. judgment court First, minimum cov is flawed. surance $20,000 only in for erage required Texas is filed on behalf of This is a suit a wife personal person to a in an accident. injury children, ages 15, against her 14 and her 6701h, art. TEX.REV.CIV.STAT.ANN. husband, father, as a result the children’s (Vernon 1(10) Supp.1988). The “nominal § in an auto- injuries the children received personal parent would then be defendant” accident occurred while the mobile which recovery. As a liable for excess taking on a vacation.1 father was them result, very remains a real chance injury operative fact not that the family funds. depletion exhaustion of automobile, occurred but post to thus conduct Are children family on vacation. discovery on their and thereafter State, this the common law of Under department levy on the the sheriff's negli liability immune parents are family? assets of per are gent injury to child while Second, has the State Board of Insurance forming parental duties. Aboussie v. (Tex.Civ. for Auto- Aboussie, amended the Standard Provisions 270 S.W.2d ref’d), Policies and added an endorsement mobile Felder App. Worth writ - Fort elimi- Texas Automobile Manual that Felderhoff, hoff spouse Co., coverage if the is the nates claimant (Tex.1971),Farley v. M M Cattle insured. (Tex.1975).2 or other member One S.W.2d Insurance, Tex.Reg. 1126 Bd. of recognized State duties personal policies Texas for recreation. providing 1,May provide after 1987 do vaca taking written at 933. Since S.W.2d coverage nature, such as the liability situations this cause is recreational tion presented purview the instant case. one comes within immunity doctrine. society many where commitments In our impor- recognized meaning, family longer taken are no dangers of is the and the eroding. of this tance Evidence values among negligent acts by children country, in our suits rate divorce Aboussie, opinion in an parents. deci- highest the world. With jurisdic split adopted 2. There Board of Insurance has The State tions, *8 policy appears which automobile endorsement the standard but it that liability coverage exempt claimant is if the support parent eliminates is the a view that states family of the in- spouse or other member the injuries liability negligent to a child. fromed Ins., Tex.Reg. 1126 State Bd. sured. Annotation, Injury Un- Liability to Parent for However, Manual). (1987) (Texas Automobile Negligence by emancipated Parent’s Child Caused contain such an in this case did not the Cases, 6 A.L.R. 4th 1066 —Modern exclusion. 12.04(7) (Ver- child, Ann. appeals Tex.Fam.Code adopted, the court of § we which discharge any 1986) and to hold or non stated: child. Tex. funds for the benefit love, God-given loyalty There are ties 1986). (Vernon 12.04(8) Ann. Fam.Code chil- § and parents devotion between and chil- not the that do exist between dren there some instances Inevitably, will be people. not think other We do dren and parent alleged negligence of the the where en- be asunder or ties should cut these operation of an out of the not arise will uneman- dangered by permitting a minor may have no parent and/or the parent to sue for dam- cipated child its inadequate insurance. liability insurance ages ordinary, on unintentional based cases, there exist an inherent will such negligence. hand, one the of interest. On the conflict Aboussie, explains This 270 S.W.2d at 640. duty supporting the the parent will have sue to why a child not be allowed hand, child, sued on the other when while persons in parents, while other his or her minor, placed an the the is file a permitted are to the same vehicle position in to the child. relation adversarial against the driver. lawsuit judgment If the minor recovers a we stated: charged be parent, the the would it is trust that not out of date We disbursing a sum responsibility the with courts with and its to be concerned state duty the money to the child. the most family as the welfare manage will effect to the child’s estate recognize society. in our unit We vital money to to the hands cause the return peace, discipline tranquility and appoint to parent. If the chooses the court inspired the home are and endowed funds award- guardian to administer the a statutory enact- higher than minor, will create a ed to the this also Harmonious ments and decisions. parent, the potential conflict between relationships filial and depend on expendi- minor, guardian, as to the nei- can parental love money funds. ture of those Whether by legisla- nor preserved ther be created or an insur- paid is can do is tures or courts. The most we apt company, may children be more to ance judicial prevent system to parents, “it’s argue my their such as with disrupt rea- sphere to used wide motorcycle or buy I can money and necessary in sonable discretion which if I to. If money with the want sports car parents properly exercise order for me, going my to talk you don’t let am nurture, responsibility provide attorney lawyer.” There even be care, discipline children. for their initiate lawsuit another who 473 S.W.2d at 933. for their to accede to parents refusal of the minor. I therefore the wishes (1) duty support their have a to: Parents judicial opinion join an that allows (Ver- Ann. 4.02 Tex.Fam.Code § specta- used forum for system to be as a care, (2) provide Supp.1988); medical non pitted members cle where (Vernon 12.04(3) Ann. Tex.Fam.Code § gladiators” “paid each other child, manage the estate of end. fighting to win the bitter guardian appointed. except where 12.04(4) (Vernon Ann. Tex.Fam.Code § though opinion limit- court’s Even 1986). application, I am concerned scope ed consequences carving out an Furthermore, right about taught History has exception in this case. earnings of the Tex.Fam.Code child. making exceptions to 12.04(5) (Vernon 1986). we start Parents us that once Ann. § doctrine, likely to exceptions are power represent the child a have the also on the assault happens, follow. When legal other decisions actions make common law concerning will continue.3 nature a substantial child, likely will de- injuries that a “runner" causing it severe If is an accident *9 is not It capacity inflexible. has

growth adaptation. we have presented any compelling been exception

reasons to make the

court has made. reasons,

For these I dissent.. HOLLOWAY, Relator,

Pat S.

The FIFTH COURT OF

APPEALS, Respondent.

No. C-7865.

Supreme Court of Texas.

March 1989.

Rehearing April Denied O’Quinn, parent. hospital vulture See State Bar Texas v. scend on the child in like a 397, (Gonzalez, concurring). J, trying to hustle child for a lawsuit