51 Neb. 700 | Neb. | 1897
This was an action in the district court for Thurston county for the breach of a certain contract, which is thus described in the petition below: “That on or about the 3d day of August, 1893, plaintiff entered into a verbal
The ground upon which the recovery was permitted by the district court is not apparent from an inspection of the record. The jury were correctly advised that the measure of damage for the alleged breach of contract would be the difference, if any, in favor1 of the plaintiff, between the stipulated price and the cost of completing the work in question. The plaintiff was, according to the allegations of Ms petition, required to complete the plastering of the several buildings at the rate of eight cents per yard. Two witnesses were introduced by him, one of whom testified that the work described in the petition was worth ten cents, and the other that it was Avorth twelve and on'e-lialf cents per yard. The only other evidence touching the cost of the Avork was the testimony of the plaintiff himself, who figured a small probable profit on the venture upon the assumption that he Avould personally have done the Avork. To reach that result he
There is, in principle, as well as on authority, a wide distinction between contracts for personal service and for the doing of specific acts. In the former case, unless the plaintiff, who has been discharged without sufficient cause, is able to secure other employment, the contract price furnishes the exact measure of his damage. In the latter class of cases the measure of damage upon the violation of the agreement by the employer is that asserted by the district court, viz., the plaintiff’s probable profit, — in other words, the difference, if any, in his favor between the contract price and the sum it would have cost to complete the work. (Field, Damages, sec. 339; United States v. Speed, 8 Wall. [U. S.], 77; Watson v. Gray’s Harbor Bride Co., 28 Pac. Rep. [Wash.], 527; Nilson v. Morse, 52 Wis., 240; Nash v. Hoxie, 59 Wis., 384; Corbett v. Anderson, 54 N. W. Rep. [Wis.], 727; Glaspie v. Glassow, 28 Minn., 158; Atkinson v. Morse, 63 Mich., 276; Scheible v. Klein, 50 N. W. Rep. [Mich.], 857.) There is in this class of agreements no element of personal trust. The employe may, unless restricted by the terms of his contract, carry on the specified work in person or by his servants,
Reversed.