29 N.J. Eq. 199 | New York Court of Chancery | 1878
This action was brought to obtain redress for certain frauds alleged to have been committed by the defendant against the complainant. The bill charged that the defendant had, under the pretext of purchases, fraudulently obtained a large amount of property belonging to the complainant, as the receiver of the Erie Railway Company. The object of the suit was to invalidate the defendant’s title and secure the restoration of the property, or compensation for it. The proofs produced on the hearing failed, in my opinion, to establish any of the frauds alleged, and a dismissal of the bill was decreed. On filing the bill an injunction was granted forbidding the sale of any of the property in controversy, and, on a subsequent allegation that the injunction had been violated, a receiver was appointed to
The power of the court to make the order applied for seems to be so well established as to be no longer a proper subject of debate in this court. Chegary v. Scofield, 1 Hal. Ch. 529; Eyerson v. Boorman, 3 Hal. Ch. 640; Schenck v. Conover, 2 Beas. 32. While, in the case first cited, it is admitted there is a plain distinction between a decree which grants affirmative relief, or which creates or gives a right to do, or to enjoy, or to have something which, without the decree, could not be done, or had, or enjoyed, and a . decree which merely leaves the parties in the condition in which it found them when its aid was first invoked, or which simply relieves a party from a restraint put upon him by the court for the protection of his adversary, still the ' power of the court to act in either case is clearly asserted. The power of the court to grant a stay in this case, provided proper reasons for its exercise have been shown, I think, cannot be doubted.
Such applications are always addressed to the sound discretion of the court. And while it is quite manifest this power is indispensable to an efficacious administration of justice, yet it is also quite obvious, unless it is exercised with the utmost caution and discrimination, it may be made the instrument of wrong and ruin. Its exercise must generally be attended with great perplexity. This case presents a striking example of the difficulties besetting its exercise.
.The complainant, on the hearing, failed, in the opinion of the court, to prove fraud; the claim he set up to the property in controversy has been rejected, and the defendant’s light to it has been sustained. His title has been vindicated by the judgment of this court. It is the constitutional right of every citizen of this state to have the possession and enjoyment of his property. The courts cannot abridge or annul this right. On the complainant’s sworn allegation that the
The eminent jurist who decided Schenck v. Conover, ubi sup., held, that there was strong reason for staying the arm of the law whenever it appeared it would be impossible to set the appellant right again if he was successful in his appeal, but when it appeared a stay was not necessai’y to his protection, and would prejudice his adversary, then the enforcement of the decree ought not to be arrested. Judgments for a sum in the aggregate exceeding $27,000, it was admitted on the argument, have recently been recovered against the. defendant ; the property, on being restored to him, will at once be liable to seizure and sale under these judgments. They may, and most probably will, absorb the whole of it. If the property is placed beyond the complainant’s reach, success in his appeal would be an empty victory. To vindicate his title after the property had been appropriated, under legal forms, to the. payment of another man’s debt, would seem more like a mockery of justice than administering it. While suing for justice, he would be stripped of his property, because the court refused him the protection it had the power to give. Against a result so disastrous and reproachful to the administration of justice, even though it may seem very remote, the complainant is entitled to protection. The injunction will be continued for the present, but the defendant shall be at liberty, at any time during the pendency of the appeal, to have it dissolved and the property restored to him, on giving a bond to the complainant in the sum of $20,000, with sufficient surety, conditioned that if complainant is successful on the appeal he will pay him any sum he may recover under or equal to the sum named in the bond.