Opinion by
The testator died in 1876, owning certain real estate in the city of Philadelphia which he devised to a daughter for life with remainder over; the life-tenant died in 1910. The questiоns are, (1) Must the remainder-men pay collateral inheritance taxes on the value of their estates in this property as of 1876 plus interest at six per cеnt., or on its value at the time they entered into possession in 1910? (2) Is the Act of May 6,1887, P. L. 79, unconstitutional because of defect in title?
The third section of the statute in question reads as follows: “In all cases where there has been or shall be a devise, descent or bequest to collateral relatives or
The Act was before this Court in Coxe’s Estate,
After considering all the prior legislation and the numerous cases called to our attention in the most excellent paper-book of counsel for the appellant, we are not convinced of any error in the construction placed upon the Act of 1887 in the case just referred to. It is true that in Coxe’s Estate, the decedent died after the Act of 1887, but the statute by its express terms applies not only to future devises, but also to those already made, “in all cases where there has been a.....devise” are the words used. The question of the tax or the amount to be retained by the Commonwealth upon the transmission of decedents’ estates is peculiarly for the law making power of the State; no authority has been cited to us, and we know of no rule or principle which forbids the Legislaturе to make changes in the statutory law affecting the time or manner of assessing an inherited estate, and incidentally to affect the sum of the tax to be paid, at any time before the estate comes into the actual possession of the person liable for the tax prior to an actual payment thеreof. Cooper’s Estate,
The third section of the Act of 1887, taken as a whole, clearly shows that the legislature intended to make a change in the lаw as to the time for fixing the value of estates in remainder, and that the purpose was to affect all such estates then subject or to become subject to the payment of collateral inheritance taxes. Under the Act, the death of the testator, as theretofore, establishes the right to the tax, but it doеs not become due and collectible until the remainderman enters into “actual possession.....by the termination of the estates for life or years;” and when he so enters he must pay the tax upon the value at that time. On the whole no hardship is worked by this provision, for, as suggested in Coxe’s Estate, supra at page 110, in mаny instances the value of the real estate may greatly depreciate after the death of the proprietor and thus affect the value of thе estate of the remainderman when it comes into his actual possession. The Act tends toward equality and uniformity in that it makes each person pay the tаx upon the value of the estate which he actually takes into his possession; that this was the intention of the Legislature and that it had the right so to enact, we entertain no doubt.
But the appellant contends that, “The Act of 1887, as to its third section, if it does attempt to alter the law as it existed prior to its passage, as to estates in which collateral inheritance taxes are already accrued and could be paid, is unconstitutional in that the title does not give аny notice of any such intention, nor is it broad enough to cover any such action of the Legislature.” The statute is entitled, “An Act to provide for
The assignments of error are overruled and the judgment of the Court below is affirmed.