Plаintiff, Jean Jew, an associate professor of anatomy at the University of Iowa, appeals from an adjudication that the district court had no original jurisdiction to consider her civil rights action. The action was brought pursuant to Iowa Code section 601 A.16(1) (1985) after a release authorizing suit had been issued by the Iowa Civil Rights Commission. The district court concluded that the offending conduct was “agency action” as defined in Iowa Code section 17A.2(9) (1985) and that the exclusive means for challenging such administrative action is a pеtition for judicial review under Iowa Code section 17A.19 (1985). We disagree with the conclusions reached by the district court and reverse the order sustaining defendants’ special appearance.
The petition filed in district court includes four counts. Counts Three and Four are defamation and invasion of privacy actions against an individual defendant who is not a party to this appeal. Counts One and Two are against the University of Iowa and the Iowa State Board of Regents (the defendants). Count Two alleges a breаch by defendants of plaintiff’s contract of employment. Count One' is an original civil rights action alleging that plaintiff filed a proper complaint against defendants with the Iowa Civil Rights Commission based on alleged sex discrimination by an employer and that following the stаtutory time periods that commission issued a release authorizing suit under section 601A.16(1).
*863 Defendants filed a special appearance with respect to each of these claims, asserting the district court lacked jurisdiction, in an original action, to hear and determine the claims. In support thereof, defendants assert that the allegedly offending conduct identified in the petition is “agency action” and, as a result, “Iowa Code chapter 17A ... is the exclusive means for obtaining ... review of [said] action, absent an express statutory provision that provides for another process.” Following a hearing, the district court sustained defendants’ special appearance with respect to both Count One and Count Two. Plaintiff has appealed this ruling with respect to Cоunt One only.
In determining that it lacked original jurisdiction, the district court found the offending conduct on both the civil rights count and the breach of contract count constituted “agency action” as defined in Iowa Code section 17A.2(9) and further explained in
Allegre v. Iowa State Board of Regents,
Plaintiff does not challenge the district court’s conclusions with regard to her breach of contract claims. She urges, however, that, evеn if the conduct of the defendants described in her civil rights action falls within the definition of “agency action” under section 17A.2(9), her original civil rights action is, nonetheless, authorized by reason of Iowa Code section 601A.16(1). To hold otherwise, she suggests, will render the Iowa Civil Rights Act оf 1965 a nullity with regard to claims by state employees against their agency employers even though Iowa Code section 601A.2(5) (1985) expressly provides that employers subject to its provisions include “the state of Iowa or any political subdivision, board, commission, department, institution, or school district thereof.”
Plaintiff argues that judicial review of the actions of the Board of Regents under section 17A.19 does not offer her an adequate alternative to proceeding under chapter 601A before the Iowa Civil Rights Commission оr by original action in the Iowa District Court following a release to sue. She suggests the Regents are not empowered to order the remedial action made available to civil rights claimants under Iowa Code section 601A.15(8)(a) (1985). In turn, the power of a court reviewing agency action under section 17A.19 is limited by the agency’s own statutory authority to grant relief. The conclusion to which this argument leads is that few, if any, of the provisions for “remedial action” contained in section
Plaintiff also points out that, in addition to creating tension concerning specific guarantees of the Iowa Civil Rights Act of 1965, the district court’s interpretation of chapter 17A creates tension regarding our decisions recognizing, in situations not involving acts by agency employees, that claimants are not required to pursue inadequate or ineffectual administrative remedies where a clear statutory procedure for relief is otherwise provided. This situation is illustrated in
Ruthven Consolidated School District v. Emmetsburg Community School District,
*863 exhaustion questions are resolved by a two-step аnalysis: Is an administrative remedy provided? Is it intended to be exclusive?
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[A] legislative intent is ... required, for the second step, that the administrative procedure be exclusive.
*864
Defendants’ response to plaintiffs arguments is a nearly exclusive reliance on the “speсific reference” provisions of Iowa Code sections 17A. 1(2) and 17A.23 (1985). They contend that, in claims based on action by state agencies, these provisions create a conclusive presumption of the exclusivity of the chapter 17A judicial review prоcedure over all other statutory remedies, unless the competing legislation has negated application of the IAPA by specific reference somewhere in its provisions. The defendants suggest that our recognition and application of the specific reference requirements in
Polk County v. Iowa State Appeal Board,
In seeking to solve the central issue presented by this case, we conclude the exclusivity of the judicial review procedures of section 17A.19, as a means of assailing acts or omissions of administrative agencies, must necessarily vary, based on the context of the transaction. Ostensibly, section 17A.19 applies to judicial review of at leаst three distinct types of agency action: (1) contested case hearings, (2) rule-making, and (3) so-called “other agency action.”
Allegre v. Iowa State Board of Regents,
Where a contested case procedure envisioned by section 17A.12 has been undertaken and has run its course to conclusion, it is almost axiomatic that any further challenge to the action taken or confirmed by the final agency decision may only be asserted by proper petition for judicial review under section 17A. 19.
Walker v. Iowa Department of Job Service,
With respect to judicial review of so-called “other agency action,” we detect that the lines of exclusivity are not as rigidly drawn as defendants’ argument suggests or as the district court found. We agree with plaintiff’s assertion that where, as in the present case, the action challenged bears scant relation to the agency’s statutory mandate or supposed area of expertise, agency employees should enjoy the samе right to pursue matured statutory causes of action as other employees. This is particularly true where public employees are expressly included as beneficiaries of the enabling statute in its definitional provisions.
We do not find that permitting an indepеndent action to proceed in the present case is contrary to our holdings in
Kerr v. Iowa Public Service Co.,
*865 In both Kerr and Dougherty, the action challenged was the very decision which the agency’s mandate directed it to make. In the present case, thе action challenged (sexual harassment) has little connection with the mandate of the University or the Regents. We find no attempt in the present case to avoid a statutorily prescribed mandate for resolution of the type of controversy presented. Indeed, to the extent that a statutorily prescribed mandate may be detected in the legislation here considered, it is that civil rights claims are to be pursued in the manner undertaken by plaintiff. 1
Nor do we believe that permitting an independent action to рroceed in the present case runs counter to the “specific reference” mandates of section 17A.1(2) or section 17A.23. The former section forms the preamble to the entire chapter constituting the Iowa Administrative Procedure Act. It contains a statement of goals and purposes and further provides:
This chapter is meant to apply to all rule-making and contested case proceedings and all suits for the judicial review of agency action that are not specifically excluded from this chapter or some portion thereof by its express terms or by the express terms of another chapter.
Iowa Code section 17A.23 provides, in part:
Except as expressly provided otherwise by this chapter or by another statute referring to this chapter by name, the rights created and thе requirements imposed by this chapter shall be in addition to those created or imposed by every other statute now in existence or hereafter enacted. If any other statute now in existence or hereafter enacted diminishes any right conferred uрon a person by this chapter or diminishes any requirement imposed upon an agency by this chapter, this chapter shall take precedence unless the other statute expressly provides that it shall take precedence over all or somе specified portion of this named chapter.
Section 17A.1(2) is susceptible of an interpretation that, where actions for judicial review of agency action are in fact brought, they shall be maintained in accordance with the provisions of section 17A.19. It does not speak to the issue of exclusivity. Section 17A.23 also talks around the subject of exclusivity, except with regard to statutes diminishing rights conferred upon a person by chapter 17A. No suggestion has been made in the present case that section 601A.16(1) or any other provision of chapter 601A serves to “diminish” plaintiffs rights under chapter 17A.
We hold the defendants have failed to establish that the district court was without original jurisdiction of plaintiffs civil rights action on the grounds asserted, and the district court therefore erred in sustaining their sрecial appearance to Count One of the petition on such grounds. That order is reversed, and the case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Notes
. In addition to the arguments we have set forth, plaintiff also sеeks reversal of the district court's order based on an amendment to § 601A.16(1) enacted after this appeal was taken. In 1986 Iowa Acts ch. 1245, § 263, the legislature added the following language to that section:
This provision also applies to persons claiming to bе aggrieved by an unfair or discriminatory practice committed by the state or an agency or political subdivision of the state, notwithstanding the terms of the Iowa administrative procedure Act.
Because we conclude that this amendment only clarifies the intent of the statute prior to its enactment, we need not consider plaintiff’s contention that it should be given retroactive application.