Case Information
*1 Before REAVLEY, JONES, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: [*]
Jesus Roberto Corral-Trevizo (Corral), a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of a decision of Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissing his appeal of a decision by an immigration judge (IJ) ordering him removed under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) for having been convicted of an aggravated felony. The BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision only to the extent that it found that Corral’s prior offense under 26 U.S.C. § 7202 categorically met the definition of an aggravated felony under Clause (i) of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M). It did not address the IJ’s determination that the offense met the definition under Clause (ii).
The parties concur, and a plain reading of the statute reveals, that there
is at least one way to commit a § 7202 offense that does not involve fraud or
deceit. Thus, Corral’s conviction is not categorically an aggravated felony.
See Larin-Ulloa v. Gonzales
, 462 F.3d 456, 464-67 (5th Cir. 2006). The
Government urges that under the modified categorical approach, however, it
is clear that Corral pleaded guilty to an offense necessarily involving fraud or
deceit because the information charged Corral with “willfully fail[ing] to
truthfully account for and pay” the taxes that were due. Corral’s plea
agreement included a factual basis, however, indicating that Corral agreed
only that he failed to pay the taxes, a failure which did not necessarily require
fraud or deceit. Corral’s admission to failing to pay the tax was sufficient for
a conviction under § 7202.
See United States v. Gilbert
,
Corral’s § 7202 offense was not categorically an aggravated felony under Clause (i) of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M). We do not reach the question whether the offense meets the definition of an aggravated felony under Clause (ii) because the BIA did not address it.
We GRANT Corral’s petition for review, VACATE the BIA’s decision, and REMAND the case for further proceedings.
Notes
[*] Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4.
