66 F. 1013 | E.D.S.C. | 1895
The schooner Carolina, a vessel of the United States, whereof Joseph E. V. Jervey, Sr., is owner, and which is duly enrolled and licensed for the coasting trade under the laws of the United States, sailed from the port of Savannah, in the state of Georgia, on the 18 th day of February, 1895, and, crossing the bar of Charleston about 9 o’clock on the night of the 25th Febrn-
“Sec. 38. Any wagon, cart, boat'or other conveyance transporting liquors at night, other than regular passenger or freight steamers and railway cars, shall be liable to seizure and confiscation, and to that end the officer shall cause the same to be duly advertised and sold, and the proceeds sent to the state commissioner.”
A libel in rem in a cause of possession was filed by Jervey, as owner, on the 27th of February. The answer of the defendant Holley, by the attorney general of South Carolina, filed March 5, 1895, avers that the seizure was lawful, and denies the jurisdiction of this court. Theodore G. Barker, intervening for his interest, claims that he advanced to Jervey the purchase money of said schooner, taking a mortgage thereon, which has been duly enrolled; that a balance of $560, with interest thereon from March 31, 1891, remains unpaid; and that by the stipulations of said mortgage the title to said schooner has vested in him.
The first question to be considered is that of jurisdiction. The .constitution of the United States provides (article 3, § 2): “The judicial powers shall extend to all cases of admiralty and maritime •jurisdiction.” This clause, imputed to Charles Pinckney, was accepted by the framers of the constitution without debate and without dissent. The most vigilant defenders of the rights of the states, and the most jealous upholders of the rights of the people, intent upon preserving to them the right of trial by jury, and protection to person and property, and providing for its administration according to the course of the common law in all the material subjects of litigation,' conceded to the courts of the United States jurisdiction in all admiralty and maritime cases, without exception as to subject or place. The intent of the framers of the constitution manifestly was to secure perfect equality in the rights and privileges of the citizens of the different states, not only in the laws of the general government, but in the mode of administering them. The sea belongs to no state. It is the joint property of the nations. And as the tranquillity, reputation, and intercourse between citizens of different states and foreign nations would be affected by admiralty decisions, it is essential that they should be uniform, and no uniformity could be expected if there were as many independent jurisdictions as there are distinct states. By the judiciary act of 1789 (Rev. St. § 563) congress vested this entire grant of judicial power in the district court: “The district court shall have jurisdiction •of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, saving the suitors in all cases the right of common law remedy ,when the common law is competent to give it, and such jurisdiction should ■be exclusive.”
It being the manifest intention of the framers of the constitution to create a tribunal in the interest of commerce, and for its safety and convenience for the speedy decision of controversies where delay would be ruinous, and this court having been created with a jurisdiction, orí 'nal, instant, plenary, and exclusive, it remains to consider whether this cause falls within its cognizance. Here is a schooner, duly enrolled as a United States vessel, sailing from the port of a, neighboring state, over the high seas, laden with an undischarged cargo, her transit completed, but, until discharged, still occupied in the business of navigation, seized without a warrant or other process of law. In determining the jurisdiction of a court in admiralty, locality is the primary question, and the ship or vessel, in its uses, forms the central point, for the great interests of commerce are affected by such instruments, and these interests become subject to the regulations of maritime law, called maritime because the sea is the place of its operation. Says Justice Story in De Lovio v. Boit, 2 Gall. 398, Fed. Cas. No. 3,776: “These words include jurisdiction of all things done upon or relating to the sea, or, in other words, all transactions and proceedings relating to commerce and navigation and to damages and to injuries upon the sea.” And Justice Clifford in Ex parte Easton, 95 U. S. 68: “It may now be said without fear of contradiction that it extends * * * to civil marine torts and injuries, * * * illegal dispossession or withholding of possession from the owners of ships, * * * municipal seizures of ships,” etc. “Petitory as well as possessory suits are cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. They may be brought in all cases to reinstate the owners of ships who have been wrongfully deprived of their property.” Ben. Adm. pp. 176, 177, § 311; Hen.
It being clear that the conduct complained of is, if illegal, a marine tort, committed upon a vessel of the United States, and lying in the waters of the United States, this court cannot, consistently with its duty, refuse the jurisdiction with which it is clothed by the constitution and laws, where its aid is invoked by a party entitled to demand it. Its powers are limited to the inquiry and decision of the single question whether the seizure of the vessel under the circumstances was legal or illegal. It cannot pass upon the validity or invalidity of those police regulations whereby the state may undertake the control of the liquor traflic upon its soil. Between the citizens, claiming the right to sell liquor as “an inalienable right,” and the state, asserting by strenuous legislation , its right to a monopoly of that traffic, this court cannot interfere; nor, in the exercise of its function as a court of
The decisions of the supreme court on this subject have been so recently set forth in the able opinion of the circuit judge within this jurisdiction, in the habeas corpus Case of Jervey, 66 Fed. 957, that it would be a work of supererogation to make further comment thereon. Inasmuch, however, as the learned assistant to the attorney general has pressed upon the court the view that the Wilson act (August, 1890) has made a radical change in the law respecting interstate commerce, it may be well to consider the .effect of that legislation. This act did no more, and purported to do no more, than to declare that imported packages of intoxicating liquor should, upon their arrival in the state, become subject to the police power equally with liquors produced therein. The supreme court had decided in Leisy v. Hardin, 10 Sup. Ct. 681, that
In this case there was no process in the state court, no warrant. The constable seized with a strong hand, dispossessed the owner, and was proceeding summarily to confiscate. There is, therefore, no conflict of jurisdiction between the judicial tribunals of the state and of the United States. It is not a question of comity, but of duty. This court assumes that the courts of the state would not refuse relief to any citizen entitled to their protection, but the delays unavoidably incident to courts of common law in their rules and mode of proceeding are ofttimes equivalent to a denial of justice, and for this reason, in the great majority of cases, seafaring men seek their remedies in the courts of admiralty. Having a choice of jurisdiction, the libelant has sought his remedy in this court. The court has no option to grant or withhold relief in a case clearly within its jurisdiction. It is adjudged that so much of the act of January, 1895, under which this vessel was seized, is null and void as an interference with interstate commerce, and that the libelant is entitled to a decree for possession and for his costs.