2 Md. 274 | Md. | 1852
delivered the opinion of the court.
The proceedings in this case were instituted in Prince George’s county court, and removed from that county, upon suggestion and affidavit, to Anne Arundel county court, the -latter county being in a different judicial district from the former.
Upon motion, Anne Arundel county court refused to hear the case, and ordered it to be remanded to Prince George’s county. From this order the present appeal was taken.
The only questions arising out of this appeal are, first, the constitutionality of the act of 1849, chap. 518, under which this removal was made, and secondly, whether the present proceeding be such a “suit or action at law,” as was contemplated by that act.
It is alleged, that the act of 1849 is in contravention of that part of the old constitution embraced in the act of 1804, chap. 55, sec. 2, which requires removals to be made “within the district.” Independent of any legislative or judicial interpretation of this constitutional provision, we find no difficulty in pronouncing it to be in perfect harmony with the act of 1849. We will not pause to discuss the question whether the provision in the constitution, (if it stood alone, unqualified by the proviso,) directing how removals were to be made, is or is not a virtual denial of all power over the subject by the
We regard the second and third sections of the act of 1804, chap. 55, as a constitutional provision for the removal of civil and criminal cases, but which, by their provisos, confer upon the legislature the power further to regulate the subject. Until such power is exercised by the legislature, the provisions of the constitution referred to, are to be regarded as the law to govern and limit the courts in all such cases.
The case of the State vs. Dashiell, 6 Har. & John., 268, does not affect the present question. That was a decision denying the right of the legislature to curtail the powers of the court as conferred by the constitution, but is silent upon the subject of the right conferred upon the legislature, by the provisos, to enlarge those powers.
The remaining question is, does the act of 1849 embrace the present case? It is contended, that a petition for freedom is neither “a suit” nor “an action at law.”
All laws for the removal of causes from one vicinage to another, were passed for the purpose of promoting the ends of justice, by getting rid of the influence of some local prejudice which might be supposed to operate detrimentally to the interests and rights of one or the other of the parties to the suit. This is a common law right belonging to our courts, and as such can be exercised by them in all cases, when not modified or controlled by our constitutional or statutory enactments. Price vs. The State, 8 Gill, 310. The reason of
Judgment reversed and procedendo awarded.