In 1983 and 1984 Gary Van Waeyen-berghe and Carl Leibowitz promoted a tax shelter: each $10,000 invested would produce an immediate tax credit of $20,000, a deduction of $10,000, and the opportunity to reap profits from an ethanol manufacturing business. Like most opportunities too good to be true, this was too good to be true — although that did not stop more than 100 persons from taking the bait. The IRS
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disallowed the deductions and credits while tacking on interest and penalties. To make matters worse, Van Waeyenberghe and Leibowitz siphoned off the cash. Both pleaded guilty to tax and securities crimes; Leibowitz also was convicted of hiring a hit man to dispose of Van Waeyenberghe, after he concluded that Van Waeyenberghe might sing to the authorities.
United States v. Leibowitz,
It was a fiasco. The money is gone; Van Waeyenberghe and Leibowitz are in prison. The investors turned to the most convenient solvent party — Howard Schwartz, who wrote an opinion saying that taxpayers were entitled under the Internal Revenue Code to the credits and deductions Van Waeyenberghe and Leibowitz touted. (Schwartz’s law firm is the other defendant, and we suppose the firm’s insurer also takes keen interest; for simplicity we refer only to Schwartz.)
The offering circular promised that the investors’ money would be used to lease equipment to manufacture ethanol for use as fuel. Multi-Equipment Leasing Corp. (MEL) would receive money (designated as “rental”) and order equipment from Good-Wrench Industries, which was to subcontract the work to S & H Manufacturing Company. According to the offering documents, each $10,000 of prepaid rent would lead MEL to purchase equipment with a market value of $100,000; after using the cash for a down payment, MEL would issue its 14-year note for the balance. MEL would sublease the equipment on the investors’ behalf to Organized Producers Energy Corp. (OPEC), which would make ethanol. OPEC promised to pay as rental a portion of its profits, which MEL would pass on to the investors after deducting the balance of the purchase price owed to Good-Wrench. OPEC was to put the equipment in service by the end of 1983; the documents asserted that the investors would be entitled to the investment tax credit on the $100,000 purchase price and to amortize the rentals as ordinary and necessary business expenses. Were all this done at arms’ length and real prices, the tax angle would be implausible enough. But it was not done at arms’ length; Lei-bowitz and Van Waeyenberghe controlled all four firms directly or indirectly. It was not done at market prices; the stills, burners, and related equipment said to have a market value of $100,000 were worth some $5,000. In the end, it was not done at all; Leibowitz, Van Waeyenberghe, and a few confederates skedaddled with the money.
Schwartz gave the promoters an opinion letter reciting “facts” that made this venture look legitimate — that the four corporations were unaffiliated, that the equipment would be sold at market price, that all of the equipment would be placed in service by the end of 1983, and so on — and concluding that the IRS would be unable to deny investors the $20,000 credit and $10,000 deduction per $10,000 unit of investment. The “facts” so recited were fictions. Schwartz says that he told Robert Clem-ente, an associate at the law firm, to conduct the due diligence inquiry. Clemente recalls things differently, testifying at his deposition that Schwartz said he would check the facts personally. Whether the lack of inquiry was attributable to an Al-fonse-and-Gaston routine or to utter indifference to the truth, there was no verification. The letter says that the law firm examined documents “as we deem relevant” and relied on unnamed persons for unspecified facts. Although it added that “[w]e have not made an attempt to independently verify the various representations”, the letter also said that it was prepared “in a manner that ... complies with the requirements of both the proposed Treasury Regulations [Treas.Reg. 230] and [the ABA’s] Formal Opinion 346”. Both Regulation 230 and Opinion 346 require a lawyer to verify questionable assertions by the promoters. Assertions that every piece of equipment in an ethanol manufacturing business has a market value of precisely $100,000, that the transactions among four shell corporations were at arms’ length, and that equipment that could not be ordered until late 1983 (counsel’s letter is dated August 30, 1983, and the money-raising lay ahead) would be placed in service by the end of December 1983, carry *844 warning signals — especially considering that one of the promoters, Leibowitz, was a disbarred lawyer — so a reader of the letter might well infer that the law firm had inquired independently. † The letter explained that under Opinion 346 the author of a tax opinion must “make inquiry as to all relevant facts, be satisfied the material facts are accurately and completely described in the offering materials, and assure that any representations as to future activities are clearly identified, reasonable and complete”, so the reader would not have to be a connoisseur of the ABA’s ethics opinions to get the point.
The complaint initiating this lawsuit on behalf of 106 bilked investors is considerably longer than Schwartz's opinion letter but no better thought out. Despite amendments it is packed with implausible assertions and references to inapplicable statutes. The district court sliced off claims based on Indiana’s securities law, and state and federal versions of RICO, in a thoughtful opinion.
I
Section 12 creates a remedy against any person (1) who “offers or sells a security in violation of section 5” (that is, sells a security that should have been registered but was not) or (2) who “offers or sells a security ... by means of a prospectus or oral communication, which includes an untrue statement of a material fact”. A person who violates either § 12(1) or § 12(2) “shall be liable to the person purchasing such security from him” under a rescissionary standard.
Pinter v. Dahl,
Although the investors maintain that Schwartz is amenable to liability under § 12(2) even if not under § 12(1), the statute does not permit such differentiation. Both § 12(1) and § 12(2) identify the person who “offers or sells a security” as the one potentially liable. “Offer” and “sell” are defined terms in the ’33 Act (see § 2(3)) and cannot mean one thing in § 12(1) and something else in § 12(2). “Clearly the word [sell] has the same meaning in subdivision (2) as in subdivision (1) of section 12.”
Schillner v. H. Vaughan Clarke & Co.,
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If the language of § 12 left any doubt, the structure of the ’33 Act would resolve it. Section 12 must be understood as a partner to § 11.
Pinter,
Our investors try to escape this conclusion by contending that Schwartz, if not liable as a principal, is at least answerable as an aider and abettor. Yet this approach, no less than an expansive reading of § 12 itself, would destroy the limitations built into the ’33 Act. “[NJotions of aiding and abetting liability would be inconsistent with the intent and language of the statutory provision which expressly limits to offerors and sellers the categories of persons who may be sued.”
Schlifke v. Seafirst Corp.,
Plaintiffs take comfort in the concluding sentence of this section of
Schlifke:
“[W]e see no reason
at this time
to imply a right of action for aiding and abetting under section 12(2).”
II
The district court characterized the investors’ claim under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 as another species of vicarious liability. Several of our opinions say that to be liable as an aider or abettor under the ’34 Act, the defendant must act with the mental state required for primary liability, must violate
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a duty to investors established by state law, and also must perform acts that promote the underlying scheme. E.g.,
Barker v. Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt,
In focusing on the distribution of the letter, the district court hinted at a more fundamental question: whether Schwartz had a duty to the investors. Federal law requires persons to tell the truth about material facts once they commence speaking, but with rare exceptions does not oblige them to start speaking. The duty to speak comes from a fiduciary relation established by state law.
Dirks v. SEC,
Indiana follows
Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, Niven & Co.,
Ultramares reflects a judgment that providers of information need protection from the sort of liability that routinely falls on manufacturers of defective products. This may be in part because providers of information have a harder time capturing the benefits of their skills than do sellers of products, see Greycas, Inc. v. Proud, 826 F.2d 1560, 1564 (7th Cir.1987), although the issuer of securities can cope with part of this problem by promising to indemnify its professional assistants. A privity rule also likely reflects recognition that damages in securities cases often bear tangential relation to social loss. Pecuniary losses in *847 securities markets greatly exceed social losses. An error in stating accounts receivable may cause the price of stock to fluctuate; if the price rises unduly, sellers gain at the expense of buyers; when the truth comes out and the prices adjust again the flow is reversed. The fluctuation causes a transfer among investors, rather than a transfer from investors to promoters or their advisers. Litigation seeking to collect the entire price movement from the accountant — while leaving other investors with the gains in their pockets — produces a damages award unrelated to the real loss created by the error (an increase in volatility of stock prices and a slight reduction in the propensity to invest, to the detriment of society at large).
Although considerations of this kind support the
Ultramares
rule when the accountant or lawyer is negligent, they do not support immunity from damages for fraud. The optimal amount of fraud is zero; judges worry less about overdeter-rence of socially productive activities (although error in separating fraud from negligence leaves a residuum of concern).
Ul-tramares
itself was a negligence case, and Judge Cardozo carefully observed that his opinion was not designed to “emancipate accountants from the consequences of fraud.”
Both the fraud and the direct dissemination qualifications of Ultramares come into play. Let us start with the latter. Schwartz expressly consented to the distribution of his letter to accountants, attorneys, and tax advisers — that is, to the professional assistants of investors. Schwartz treats these persons as if they were distinct from investors, but they are not. They are agents of investors. To give information to an agent is to give it to the principal. The SEC treats a sophisticated adviser (that is, a “purchaser representative” under Rule 501(h)) as a proxy for a sophisticated investor when deciding the allowable scope of an unregistered § 4(2) or Regulation D offering. See Rule 506(b)(2)(ii). Information sent to such “purchaser representatives” is designed to affect investment decisions. That the effect is indirect is no more a defense to liability than it would be to observe that the erroneous description of a drug’s effects appeared in the literature distributed to physicians but was not stuffed in the box when the patient picked up a prescription. Information is given to physicians precisely so that it will affect the choice of drugs; information is given to accountants and tax advisers so that it will affect the choice of investment — sometimes via an investment the agent makes for the client’s account, sometimes via the advice the agent gives to the client, and sometimes the agent passes along the information verbatim. Nothing in the rationale of Ultra-mares implies a line between a tax adviser and a taxpayer. Perhaps some of the 101 appellants (who bought one or more units in the 1983 program) did not have attorneys, accountants, or tax counsellors (or had agents who did not get the letter); but those who did receive this information with Schwartz’s consent through their agents (or whose agents acted on the basis of the information) are entitled to proceed against its author.
Then there is the matter of fraud. Plaintiffs would like to be able to recover from Schwartz for negligence, but § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 do not allow this, and we agree with the district judge that neither does Indiana law except to the extent Schwartz authorized the distribution of the letter to the investors’ advisers. But if Schwartz acted recklessly, he had the mental state that identifies fraud under both state and federal law. Indiana law allows an action for fraud even when
Ultramares
blocks recovery for negligence. See
Ash-land Oil.
The district court’s only reason why the record, viewed in the light most favorable to the investors, would not allow an inference of recklessness is that the promoters were the only audience to which
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Schwartz owed a duty. That conclusion cannot stand, for it assumes that
Ultra-mares
interdicts even fraud actions. Under Rule 10b-5, moreover, the lack of an independent duty does not excuse a material lie. A subject of a tender offer or merger bid has no duty to issue a press release, but if it chooses to speak it must tell the truth about material issues.
Basic Inc. v. Levinson,
Although this is a closer question— and will turn out to be irrelevant if all of the plaintiffs had advisers who received the letter with Schwartz’s consent — we also conclude that the district court should not have found that Schwartz withheld authorization for the use of his letter in the offering materials. Schwartz testified by deposition that he told Van Waeyenberghe and Leibowitz not to include the letter in the offering materials.
III
Schwartz offers in support of his judgment a ground on which he lost in the district court: that his errors did not cause the investors’ loss. Causation is an essential element of liability.
LHLC Corp.,
Schwartz insists that the district judge should have segregated the loss attributable to the IRS’s denial of credits and deductions from the loss attributable to the principals’ defalcations. Although such a line may be appropriate, it cannot support the judgment. Unless Schwartz knocks out the possibility of any damages the case must continue, with apportionment in the hands of the triers of fact. On remand the district court should consider this question along with the many other issues that remain for decisions.
The judgment is affirmed to the extent it grants judgment for the defendants on state and federal versions of RICO, state securities law, and § 12 of the ’33 Act (plus theories of aiding and abetting a violation of § 12) and determines that Indiana law governs state-law claims. The judgment is otherwise reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Notes
ABA Formal Opinion 346 provides in part: "[WJhere essential underlying information, such as an appraisal or financial projection, makes little common sense, or where the reputation or expertise of the person who has prepared the appraisal or projection is dubious, further inquiry clearly is required. Indeed, failure to make further inquiry may result in a false opinion [which violates the disciplinary standards].” Summing up, Formal Opinion 346 states that a lawyer must "[m]ake inquiry as to the relevant facts and, consistent with the standards developed in ABA Formal Opinion 335, be satisfied that the material facts are accurately and completely stated in the offering materials, and that the representations as to intended future activities are clearly identified, reasonable and complete.”
