сlaims are also untimely under the post- conviction statute. Because the district court did not err when it concluded that Evans‘s claims were untimely, we affirm. Affirmed.
230
Jerome Deon NUNN, petitioner, Appellant, v. STATE of Minnesota, Respondent.
No. A14-1767.
Supreme Court of Minnesota.
Aug. 5, 2015.
230
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Saint Paul, MN; and
Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Jeаn Burdorf, Assistant County Attorney, Minneapolis, MN, for respondent.
OPINION
WRIGHT, Justice.
In December 1995, a jury found petitioner Jerome Deon Nunn guilty of first-degree premeditated murder,
In 2014, Nunn moved to correct his sentence under
The postconviction court denied Nunn‘s motion, concluding that Nunn received a lawful sentence under Minn. Sent. Guidelines II.F. The postconviction court also determined that, because Nunn failed to produce any evidencе of purposeful discrimination in support of his equal protection claim, he was not entitled to relief on
I.
We review a postconviction court‘s decision to deny a motion to correct a sentence under
A.
Nunn contends that the consecutive sеntence imposed by the district court for his attempted first-degree premeditated murder conviction is not authorized by Minn. Sent. Guidelines II.F (1995). Section II.F.2 of the 1995 Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines permits а district court to impose a consecutive sentence “[w]hen the offender is convicted of multiple current felony convictions for crimes against different persons, and when the sentence for the most severe current conviction is executed according to the guidelines.” The most severe current conviction in Nunn‘s case was first-degree premeditated murder, which is “excluded from the guidelines by law” and has “a mandatory life sentence.” Minn. Sent. Guidelines IV (1994). Nunn argues that his most severe conviction could not be “executed according to the guidelines” bеcause the offense of first-degree premeditated murder is expressly excluded from the sentencing guidelines. Therefore, he argues, section II.F does not authorize the imposition of a consecutive sentence in his case.
Nunn‘s argument fails for two reasons. First, in Townsend, we conclusively answered the question of whether the imposition of a life sentence for a first-degree murder conviction satisfies the requirement in section II.F.2 that the most severe current conviction be executed according to the guidelines. 834 N.W.2d at 739-40. In Townsend, the defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment with the possibility of relеase for a first-degree murder conviction and to an additional consecutive sen
Like Townsend, Nunn was sentenced to life imprisonment with the possibility of release. Also like Townsend, Nunn received a consecutive sentence for the attempted murder of a second victim. The language of the sentencing guidеlines that authorizes consecutive sentences when a defendant commits felony offenses against multiple victims is the same in the 1992 sentencing guidelines (which applied to Townsend) and the 1995 sentencing guidelines (which apply to Nunn). Therefore, as in Townsend, the consecutive sentence at issue here is authorized by Minn. Sent. Guidelines II.F.2.
Second, we have interpreted the phrase “executed according to the guidelines” in section II.F.2 simply to require that the sentence for the most severe current conviction “be executed and not stayed.” State v. Lindsey, 314 N.W.2d 823, 825 (Minn.1982). Moreover, when used in this cоntext, “according to” means “[i]n keeping with.” The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 11 (5th ed.2011); see also Webster‘s Third New International Dictionary 12 (1976) (including “consistently with” among definitions of “according to“). Because the sentence Nunn received for his first-degree premeditated murder conviction was executed and imposed in keeping with the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines, the district court was permitted to impose a consecutive sentence for Nunn‘s attempted first-degree premeditated murder conviction. Therefore, Nunn‘s argument that his consecutive sentence is an unauthorized sentence fails. The postconviction court did not abuse its discretiоn by denying Nunn‘s motion to correct his sentence.
B.
Nunn next argues that the postconviction court erred by rejecting the argument that his sentence violates his right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Nunn claims that he was sentenced more harshly than other similarly situated persons convicted of the same or similar offenses who were not African American.
Proof of discriminatory purpose is required when a defendant challenges a sentence under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292, 107 S.Ct. 1756, 95 L.Ed.2d 262 (1987). In McCleskey, the United States Supreme Court concluded that a statistical study showing racial disparity among defendants in Georgia who were sentenced to death was not sufficient to еstablish a violation of the petitioner‘s right to equal protection. Id. at 293-97, 107 S.Ct. 1756. Rather, using case-specific evidence, a petitioner must prove that the decision-maker acted with а discriminatory purpose when imposing the death penalty. Id. The only evidence that Nunn has provided in support of his equal protection claim is general statistical data showing racial disparities in sentencing both nationally and in Minnesota. As in McCleskey, this type of evidence is insufficient to support Nunn‘s equal protection claim under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See id. Because Nunn has failed to provide any evidence that the sentencing
II.
To summarize, the postconviction court‘s denial of Nunn‘s motion to correct his sentence was not based on an erroneous application of the law, nor was it against logic or the facts in the record. The postconviction court‘s ruling is consistent with our decision in Townsend, 834 N.W.2d at 739-40, and the United States Supreme Court‘s decision in McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 293-97, 107 S.Ct. 1756. Because the postconviction court did not abuse its discretion by denying Nunn‘s motion to correct his sentence, we affirm.
Affirmed.
CONNEXUS ENERGY et al., Relators, v. COMMISSIONER OF REVENUE, Respondent.
No. A14-1996.
Supreme Court of Minnesota.
Aug. 5, 2015.