Jeremy FONTANEZ, Appellant v. Commonwealth of PENNSYLVANIA.
No. 13-4620.
United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.
Opinion Filed: June 20, 2014.
115
Before: SMITH, HARDIMAN and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges.
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 June 12, 2014.
OPINION
PER CURIAM.
Pro se litigant Jeremy Fontanez appeals the District Court‘s order dismissing his complaint against the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. For the reasons set forth below, we will summarily affirm.
Fontanez filed this action in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania on October 25, 2013. He is incarcerated at the United States Penitentiary in Hazelton, Pennsylvania, and is currently pursuing an appeal for post-conviction relief in the Pennsylvania state courts. Although he was appointed counsel, Fontanez attempted to file several documents with the Superior Court of Pennsylvania pro se in the course of his PCRA appeal. These documents were forwarded to his appointed counsel, unfiled, pursuant to the Pennsylvania courts’ rule against hybrid representation.
In the complaint at bar, Fontanez argued that this rule, detailed in Commonwealth v. Jette, 611 Pa. 166, 23 A.3d 1032 (2011), violated the federal constitution. In particular, he argued that the rule violated the First Amendment right of access to the courts, the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel, the Fifth Amendment right to due process of law, the Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection under the law, and the separation-of-powers doctrine. He sought an injunction that would force the Pennsylvania Superior Court to accept and file his pro se documents despite his represented status. Fontanez purported to bring these claims under
The District Court dismissed the complaint with prejudice under
The District Court construed the complaint as asserting a claim under
Even were this not the case, Fontanez‘s claims fail substantively. The thrust of his complaint concerns a Pennsylvania litigant‘s right to represent himself on appeal. But there is no such right under the federal constitution. Although such a right does exist at the trial level, the United States Supreme Court has made clear that this right does not extend to appeals. See Martinez v. Court of Appeal of Cal., Fourth Appellate Dist., 528 U.S. 152, 154, 163-64, 120 S.Ct. 684, 145 L.Ed.2d 597 (2000). And rules limiting hybrid representation (in which a litigant proceeds simultaneously by counsel and pro se) are constitutionally acceptable in both the appellate and trial contexts. See United States v. Turner, 677 F.3d 570, 578-79 (3d Cir. 2012); see also McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 183, 104 S.Ct. 944, 79 L.Ed.2d 122 (1984).
Lastly, Fontanez‘s complaint falls short of the basic pleading standard for asserting his claims. He fails to allege an actual injury in the context of his First Amendment access-to-courts claim, which is a fatal flaw. See Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 205-06 (3d Cir. 2008). He then purports to state an equal protection claim, but fails to allege its fundamental elements: that he is a member of a suspect class being treated differently than others who are similarly situated. See City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439-42, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985). And his Sixth Amendment, Due Process, and separation-of-powers claims consist of conclusory, one-sentence assertions, which are insufficient under
We are satisfied that amendment to Fontanez‘s complaint would be futile, and thus conclude that the District Court properly dismissed the complaint with prejudice. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002). Accordingly, we will summarily affirm the District Court‘s order. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.