OPINION
This mаtter is before the Court on the defendants’ motions to dismiss. 1 For the reasons discussed in this Opinion, the motions will be granted, and this action will be dismissed with prejudice.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs Anthony and Darryl Jerdine bring this action against the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) in its capacity as the receiver for Washington Mutual Bank (‘WaMu”), Select Portfolio Servicing Inc. (“SPS”), and DLJ Mortgage Capital Inc. (“DLJ”) on claims arising “in Cuyahoga County, Ohio by virtue of a mortgage loan and related inter-temporal transactions associated therewith which concern the [plaintiffs’ primary residential real estate which is located in Pepper Pike, Ohio 44124[.]” Compl. ¶ 9.
Plaintiffs secured mortgage financing from WaMu. Compl. ¶ 21. At the closing in February 2005, they “executed Promissory Notes and Security Agreements in favor of ... WaMu,” id., which “retained a security in [the] Pepper Pike, Ohio [property].” Id. ¶ 22. For the first two years, the interest rate was fixed; thereafter the rate adjusted at six-month intervals. Id. ¶ 12. WaMu allegedly entered into this transaction knowing that plaintiffs could not repay the loan and that “[plaintiffs likely would be placed in a position of default, foreclosure, and deficiency judgment upon not being able to meet their increased loan obligations once the fixed rate interest period expired and the adjustable rate applied[.]” Id. ¶ 11(e). WaMu “assigned the Note and mortgage to ... SPS,” id. ¶ 29, which in turn bundlеd the loan with others to be sold as a mortgage-backed security. See id. ¶¶ 11(g), 30,108.
A. Foreclosure Proceedings
On August 23, 2005, WaMu initiated foreclosure proceedings in the Court of Common Pleas for Cuyahoga County, Ohio against Darryl Jerdine, ALJ Holdings Group, Ltd., and Citibank Federal Savings Bank “alleging breach of a promissory note for a 2005 mortgage secured by a mortgage deed for Ohio real property.” Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of the [FDIC’s] Motion to Dismiss (“FDIC Mem.”) at 4;
see id.,
Ex. 1 (Docket,
Wash. Mut. Bank v. Jerdine,
No. CV-05-570626 (Cuyahoga County Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Oct. 23, 2005)) at 13. On February 12, 2007, a judge of the Court of Common Pleas adopted a magistrate’s decision, decreed foreclosure for WaMu, and entered judgment in WaMu’s favor in the amount of $1,017,663.33 plus interest.
Id.,
Ex. 1 (Journal Entry,
Wash. Mut. Bank v. Jerdine,
No. CV-05-570626 (Cuyahoga
Darryl Jerdine twice appealed this decision. FDIC Mem., Ex. 1 (Dockets, Wash. Mut. Bank v. Jerdine, No. CA-08-091823 (Ohio 8th Dist.Ct.App. July 18, 2008) and Wash. Mut. Bank v. Darryl Jerdine, No. 08-091444 (Ohio 8th Dist. Ct.App. filed May 16, 2008)) at 25-26, 29-30. Both appeals were dismissed. Id., Ex. 1 (Journal Entries, Wash. Mut. Bank v. Darryl Jerdine, No. CA-08-091823 (Ohio 8th Dist.Ct.App. August 18, 2008), and Wash. Mut. Bank v. Darryl Jerdine, No. CA-08-091444 (Ohio 8th Dist.Ct.App. filed June 2, 2008)) at 27, 29.
B. Challenges to Foreclosure Proceedings
In October 2007, Anthony Jerdine filed a civil action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio against WaMu, Judge Bridget M. McCafferty, the judge who presided over the foreclosure proceedings, and Cuyahoga County Sheriff Gerald T. McFaul, who sold the Pepper Pike property. See FDIC Mem., Ex. 2 (Civil Docket, Jerdine v. Wash. Mut. Bank, No. 07-cv-02984 (NJD.Ohio Oct. 1, 2007)). SPS and DLJ characterized the complaint as one to “[qjuiet [tjitle which included allegations of racketeering and alleging a private nuisance against [WaMu], Magistrate McCafferty and the sheriff who was to conduct the sale of the [Pepper Pike] [property.” Defs.’ [SLS] and [DLJ] Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion to Dismiss Plаintiffs’ Complaint (“Defs.’ Mem.”) at 2-3. Anthony Jerdine alleged that the Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga County had not been created by law, that the Ohio Revised Code had not been enacted, that Judge McCafferty did not properly hold her position, and that Sheriff McFaul had no authority to sell off the Pepper Pike property, suсh that the foreclosure sale was void. Complaint, Jerdine v. Wash. Mut. Bank, No. 07-cv-02984 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 1, 2007). Among other relief, plaintiff demanded that the district court void the Ohio Court of Common Pleas’ January 12, 2007 decision, quiet title in plaintiffs favor, and enjoin the sale of the Pepper Pike property, which was to occur later in the month of October 2007. See id.
The district court dismissed the action sua sponte on the grоund that a federal district court has no jurisdiction over challenges to state court decisions. Its opinion stated in relevant part:
In the present action, plaintiff directly attacks a state court’s decision, and the action is clearly predicated on his belief that the state court was mistaken in rendering its decision against him. Any review of plaintiffs claims would require the court to review the specific issues addressed in the state court proceedings. This court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to conduct such a review or grant the relief as requested. In light of the foregoing, this action is appropriately subject to summary dismissal.
Jerdine v. Wash. Mut. Bank,
No. 1:07-cv-2984,
In March 2008, Darryl Jerdine filеd a petition for a writ of mandamus in the Court of Appeals of Ohio, Eighth District, seeking to stay the underlying foreclosure proceedings. FDIC Mem., Ex. 3 (Docket,
In re Darryl Jerdine,
No. CA-08-091172 (Ohio 8th Dist.Ct.App. Mar. 19, 2008)) at 2. The court struck the pleading because Jerdine “failed to establish that he [was] entitled to a writ of mandamus.”
In re Jerdine,
No. CA-08-091172,
Returning to the Court of Common Pleas, Darryl Jerdine filеd a new civil action against WaMu and others. FDIC Mem., Ex. 4 (Docket, Jerdine v. Select Portfolio Servs., No. CV-08-668159 (Cuyahoga County Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Aug. 19, 2008)). The court dismissed these proceedings without prejudice because of plaintiffs failure to comply with two court orders. Id., Ex. 4 at 1. Darryl Jerdine appealed, but the appeal was dismissed on March 20, 2009. Id., Ex. 4 (Docket, Jerdine v. Select Portfolio Servs., No. CA-09-092890 (Ohio 8th Dist.Ct.App. Mar. 20, 2009)) at 11.
On February 10, 2009, Anthоny Jerdine and Darryl Jerdine filed a civil action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio against the FDIC, WaMu, SLS and DLJ. Complaint, Jerdine v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., No. 1:09-cv-00307-JG (N.D.Ohio Feb. 10, 2009). 2 The court dismissed the complaint on the ground that the doctrine of res judicata barred Anthony Jerdine’s “third attempt to collaterally attack the foreclosure judgment issued against him in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas.” Memorandum Opinion and Order, Jerdine v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., No. 1:09-cv-00307 (N.D. Ohio June 18, 2009) at 4. The Jerdines appealed the decision to the Sixth Circuit. Notice of Appeal, Jerdine v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., No. 1:09-cv-00307 (N.D. Ohio June 18, 2009). The appeal subsequently was dismissed for want of prosecution, that is, for failure to pay the filing fee within the time period set by the Circuit. Order, Jerdine v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., No. 09-3955 (6th Cir. July 14, 2010).
On March 23, 2009, Anthony Jеrdine and Darryl Jerdine filed yet another complaint in the Court of Common Pleas against the FDIC. FDIC Mem., Ex. 6 (Docket, Case No. CV-09-688130) (Cuyahoga County Ohio Ct. Com. PI. Mar. 23, 2009) at 6. The matter was dismissed on July 30, 2009 because plaintiffs had not appeared for a pre-trial conference. See id. at 2.
Thereafter, Anthony Jerdine and Darryl Jerdine filed a civil action against the FDIC in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington. Complaint, Jerdine v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., No. 09-cv-01596 (W.D.Wash. Nov. 9, 2009). As of the date of this Opinion, this civil action is still pending.
C. Administrative Claims to the FDIC
The FDIC became WaMu’s receiver on September 25, 2008. In December 2008, plaintiffs submitted two administrative claims to the FDIC. FDIC Mem., Ex. 8 (Proof of Claim) at 1-2. By letters of notice dated June 22, 2009, the FDIC notified plaintiffs of the disallowance of their claims.
Id.,
Ex. 8 (Notices of Disallowance of Claims) at 3-4. In neither instance did
Pursuant to [12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(6) ], if you do not agree with this disallowance, you have the right to file a lawsuit on your claim ... in the United States District ... Court within which the failed institutiоn’s principal place of business was located or the United States District Court for the District of Columbia within 60 days from the date of this notice. IF YOU DO NOT FILE A LAWSUIT ... BEFORE THE END OF THE 60-DAY PERIOD, THE DISALLOWANCE WILL BE FINAL, YOUR CLAIM WILL BE FOREVER BARRED AND YOU WILL HAVE NO FURTHER RIGHTS OR REMEDIES WITH RESPECT TO YOUR CLAIM.
Id., Ex. 8 at 8 (emphasis in original); see id., Ex. 8 at 9.
D. Civil Action No. 09-18^0
The Clerk of this Court received plaintiffs’ complaint on August 31, 2009, evidenced by the date stamp on the first page of the original pleading. On that date the Clerk also received Anthony Jerdine’s application to proceed in forma pauperis. The Clerk provisionally filed these items on the Court’s electronic docket on September 28, 2009, pending receipt of a certified copy of Anthony Jerdine’s trust fund account statement. 3 The application permitting plaintiffs to proceed informa pauperis was approved on November 3, 2009.
Generally, plaintiffs allege that defendants have violated the Home Ownership Equity Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1639 et seq.; the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 12 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq.; the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq.; the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq.; and various provisions of Ohio law. Plaintiffs also assert common law tort claims of fraudulent misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, unjust enrichment, and civil conspiracy. Among other relief, plaintiffs demand a declaratory judgment rendering the mortgage loan transaction void and finding that WaMu lacked standing to bring the underlying foreclosure action, in addition to an award of $27.4 million in damages.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction Under FIRREA
The FDIC moves to dismiss the complaint under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on the ground that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. “Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction ... [and it] is to be presumed that a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction.”
Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America,
Under the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act (“FIRREA”),
see
12 U.S.C. § 1821(d), the Director of the Office of Thrift Supervision may appoint a receiver “for the purpose of liquidation or winding up any savings association’s affairs.” 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(6). In its capacity as WaMu’s receiver, the FDIC is obligated to “publish a notice to the depository institution’s creditors to present their claims, together with proof, to the receiver by a date specified in the notice.” 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(3)(B). Under FIRREA, the FDIC is authorized “after the declaration of an institution’s insolvency, [to] settle all uninsured and unsecured claims on the receivership with a final settlement payment which shall constitute full payment and disposition of the [FDIC’s] obligations to such claimants.” 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(4)(B)(i);
see City of New York v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp.,
The FDIC argues that plaintiffs’ complaint must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the pleading was not timely filed. FDIC Mem. at 8-10. According to the FDIC, plaintiffs filed their complaint on September 28, 2009, “more than 90 days after the FDIC-Receiver’s letter disallowing their administrative сlaims,” id. at 10, and, therefore, plaintiffs “have no further rights or remedies as to any claim against WaMu.” Id.
On June 2, 2009, the FDIC requested an extension until December 17, 2009 to make its determination on plaintiffs’ administrative claim. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of the Plaintiffs’ Motion to Oppose Dismissal (“Pis.’ Opp’n to FDIC Mot.”), Ex. A (Request for Extension) at 1. Plaintiffs argue that they “had until December 17, 2009” to file their complaint in a federal district court because the FDIC requested, and plaintiffs agreed to, an extension of the 180-day period within which a decision on the claim was to be made. Pis.’ Opp’n to FDIC Mot. at 2. Plaintiffs apparently consider the FDIC’s extended deadline, December 17, 2009, аs the filing deadline for this lawsuit. Their position is untenable.
By consenting to the FDIC’s request for an extension of time for the receiver to allow or disallow plaintiffs’ claims, plaintiffs agreed to the following provision:
If you agree to the requested extension of time, your statutory rights will remain in full force, including the right to file a lawsuit on your claim during the 60-day period beginning on the earlier of (1) the expiration of the ExtendedDetermination Date; or (2) the date the claim is disallowed by the Receiver, if it is disallowed.
Id, Ex. A at 1 (emphasis in original). By virtue of this extension the FDIC had until December 17, 2009 to make its determination, but the FDIC in fact made its decision denying plaintiffs’ claims on June 22, 2009. The 60-day period within which plaintiffs were required to file a civil action therefore began to run on June 22, 2009, the date of the FDIC’s written notice of the denial of their claims. It ended sixty days later on or about August 21, 2009. Based on the Clerk’s “received” stamp on the original pleading, plaintiffs’ complaint was deemed filed on August 31, 2009, 70 days after the datе on which the FDIC disallowed their claims. Plaintiffs’ complaint therefore was untimely.
Because plaintiffs did not file their lawsuit within sixty days as required by Congress under the FIRREA, the FDIC’s determination is final and not reviewable by this Court.
See Hanson v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp.,
B. Lack of Subjeсt Matter Jurisdiction Under Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
“The
Rooker-Feldman
doctrine prevents lower federal courts from hearing cases that amount to the functional equivalent of an appeal from a state court” because they are without jurisdiction to do so.
Gray v. Poole,
In this case, it is apparent that plaintiffs, yet again, ask a federal court to оverturn the Ohio courts’ rulings with respect to the foreclosure proceedings and thus to reestablish their legal rights with respect to the Pepper Pike property. Notwithstanding plaintiffs’ allegations of violations of federal law, the
Rooker-Feldman
doctrine Is jurisdictional,
see Stanton v.
III. CONCLUSION
The Court concludes that plaintiffs’ claims against the FDIC are barred by operation of 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(6), and that their claims against all defendants are barred under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Accordingly, defendants’ motions to dismiss will be granted and plaintiffs’ summary judgment motion will be denied. An appropriate Order accompanies this Opinion.
Notes
. Also before the Court is the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s Motion to Strike or Disregard Plaintiffs’ Notice of Deposit of General Service Administration Bonds [Dkt. # 29]. The motion will be granted, as the plaintiffs’ Notice is not relevant to the issues presented in this action. Plaintiffs' Notice [Dkt. # 28] will be stricken.
. The Court concurs with defendants’ assessment, see FDIC Mem. at 6 n. 4; Defs.' Mem. at 4, that the Supplemental Complaint filed in the Northern District of Ohio is practicаlly identical to the complaint filed in the instant civil action.
. Anthony Jerdine was incarcerated at the time ■ plaintiffs filed their complaint. As a prisoner, he was required to submit a certified copy of his trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent), including the supporting ledger sheets, for the six-month period immediately prеceding the filing of this complaint, obtained from the appropriate official of each prison at which plaintiff is or was confined. 28 U.S.C. § 1915. The Court approved his application to proceed in forma pauperis on review of his trust fund account statement. Darryl Jerdine did not submit a separate application to proceed in forma pauperis.
