250 N.W. 815 | Minn. | 1933
Lead Opinion
For some time before May 7, 1932, relator was employed by the Kunz Oil Company as a sales agent. He was to give his employer the use of his automobile, which, impliedly at least, he agreed to keep in repair but which was used as needed for his own purposes and those of his family. While driving one day in the course of his employment a defect developed in the braking mechanism. He got home late in the afternoon and soon went about the repair and adjustment of the brakes. While doing so he observed a loose burr on the oil pan. In tightening it he received an injury to his eye so serious that loss of sight resulted. It was Saturday, and there is no suggestion that he had more work to do for his employer that day or any on the following Sabbath.
Relator relies on Manley v. Harvey Lbr. Co.
The burden of proof was on relator. Apparently the industrial commission's conclusion was that relator had failed to show that the work upon which he was engaged when injured was in the course of his master's business rather than in the preparation of the car for his personal use or that of his family. Our function is not to say whether on the facts the decision of the industrial commission *43
is correct or even preferable to another, but rather, and only, to ascertain whether it has sufficient basis of inference reasonably to be drawn from the facts. Unless we can say that there is no such basis (Green v. County of Chippewa,
Order affirmed.
Addendum
Relator's petition for rehearing is denied. Its criticism is that there is no ground for the implication indulged, favorably to relator, that he "agreed to keep in repair" his own automobile while used in his employer's business. The criticism is well founded in that the conclusion challenged does not rest on implication. Relator himself testified that he did "have to keep it [his automobile] in repair."
The other criticism is that we "imply" erroneously that relator was through with his day's work. We but noted the absence of evidence, relator having the burden of proof, "that he had more work to do for his employer that day or any on the following Sabbath." This point also is beyond implication, relator himself having testified that for "that day" he "had finished work * * * and came home." *44