127 Neb. 599 | Neb. | 1934
The plaintiff, Ruth M. Jensen, appellee, bases her right of action upon the allegations that the defendant, Omaha & Council Bluffs Street Railway Company, a corporation, appellant, prior to July 17, 1932, had maintained a pole, about 14 inches in diameter, between the curb and sidewalk on the east side of Twenty-second street a few feet north of the intersection of said street and sidewalk with the paving on Burt street in Omaha, and that at some period before that date the defendant removed the pole and negligently permitted the hole, about 23 inches deep and 14 inches in diameter, thereby made to remain open and uncovered, which hole became obscured by growing
As to the first proposition, it is admitted that the defendant company, in the summer of 1925, removed its tracks and poles from Twenty-second street and Burt street near the scene of plaintiff’s accident. It is plaintiff’s claim that, in removing its lines, it took up the pole at the place in question and neglected to fill the hole where the pole stood. The defendant contends that it never had a pole at that place and never removed any pole at that place, and it is further the contention of defendant that there was not sufficient evidence introduced to sustain a finding that the hole into which plaintiff stepped resulted from the removal of a pole by defendant in 1925.
The plaintiff called only two witnesses who attempted to fix definitely the location of the pole which resulted in leaving the hole. Mr. Richards testified he had lived on Burt street since 1920 (he does not state how near he lived to the place in question) ; that he is a night watchman and works from 5:30 in the evening until 5 in the morning; that the defendant company removed its tracks and poles at Twenty-second and Burt streets about 1925; that there were red poles on each side of the street that supported the trolleys; that there was a pole on the northeast corner of Twenty-second and Burt streets, and that the pole was taken away by men using equipment upon which appeared the name Omaha Street Railway Company. He was then asked this question: “Mr. Richards, do you
Mr. Harry B. Symes, who has lived at the southwest corner of the intersection of Twenty-second and Burt streets since 1905, and is in the fuel business, was asked if he knew where the hole in controversy was, and answered, “Yes.” Then was asked: “Do you know whether there was ever a post in it? A. Yes. Q. If you can, please tell, just tell where it was and what it was, just describe the post. A. Well, it was a red post, it was not as tall as some of the larger poles are, just to hold the guy wires over the top.” He further stated that the post was used to hold the wires in position on the turn; that is, this was close to the turn there and it served to complete that turn and hold the wires in position, and the wire from the pole was attached to the trolley line. He did not know what became of that particular pole; the post was removed about eight years ago; he saw gangs removing the poles but did not watch all of the poles being removed. Then he was asked: “Was the pole that stood where the hole in controversy was located removed at the same time as you described ? A. They were removed, but I did not watch any particular one being pulled out at any time, but I know they were all taken away.” He did not notice the hole until later. On cross-examination he stated he could not give the exact location of the pole nor the distance from either curb; that there is a Nebraska Power Company pole there now, and that pole has been changed.
It was definitely proved by the evidence that the hole in question was 36 feet north of the north curb of Burt street on the east side of Twenty-second street in the parking. The Nebraska Power Company’s pole is 24 feet north of the north curb of Burt street, and the hole was 2 feet north of this pole. Defendant’s proof shows that the only
The second assignment, that the verdict is so excessive as to show that the verdict was the result of passion and prejudice, will not be further referred to inasmuch as the case is to be reversed. It is well, however, to state that,
Instruction No. 3 gives the measure of damages for loss of earnings and for pain and suffering. The instruction stated that, if the jury found for plaintiff, they should award her such damages as will adequately compensate her for her injuries received and which she has proved and established by a preponderance of the evidence, and goes on to state that the jury should “award her such sum as will adequately compensate her for such time lost as a beautician, and which she has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that in all probability she would have earned had she not received her said injuries,” and further it is stated that she should be awarded compensation for her pain and suffering endured, “and that it is reasonably established will in all probability be endured by her as a result of her said injuries.” Similar language was used in an instruction as to probable future damages, in Burkamp v. Roberts Sanitary Dairy, 117 Neb. 60, and was held to be erroneous. The court said: “This was error in so far as it permitted the jury to allow damages for pain which the plaintiff will ‘probably suffer in the future.’ This language is too indefinite and conjectural. The only future pain and suffering which the jury is entitled to consider is such as the evidence shows with reasonable certainty he will experience.”
In Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. McDowell, 66 Neb. 170, this rule is laid down: “In an action for personal injuries compensation can be recovered for only such future damages as are shown with reasonable certainty to be consequent thereon.”
After the defendant had rested its case, the plaintiff offered in rebuttal a witness who had during that day made observations as to the location of certain poles at Twenty-second and Cuming streets, Twenty-second and Izzard streets, and Sixteenth and Webster streets. The purport of his testimony was to show that at those places
Because of the errors above stated, the judgment of the district court is reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial.
Reversed.