107 Me. 408 | Me. | 1910
These are actions brought against the Maine Eye and Ear Infirmary by Julius Jensen in his own behalf and as administrator of the estate of Mary J. Jensen, charging the defendant with negligence of its servants in allowing the plaintiff’s decedent, while an inmate of the Infirmary, to evade the supervision of her attendants and fall through a window to the sidewalk, the accident resulting in fatal injuries. The case shows that Mary J. Jensen was ill with typhoid fever and that her attending physician had arranged with the defendant for her to occupy a private room in one of the wards of its building. But she was not a patient of the infirmary. She remained the private patient of Dr. Comiedan, who had full charge of her case and attended her daily while she was in the insti
The case also clearly shows that the defendant was not a money making corporation; nor a business corporation organized for profit; but purely a charitable institution, having no stockholders and paying no dividends. All its receipts are consigned to the general fund for the benefit of charity. Upon this state of facts the presiding Justice at the conclusion of the testimony directed a verdict in each case for the defendant. To this ruling the case comes to the Law Court on exceptions.
The defendant in its brief sets up two grounds of defense: 1. That defendant is not a corporation for the treatment of sick and injured persons for hire, as the plaintiff in his writ has alleged against it. 2. The defendant is a corporation organized and existing solely as a public charity, its organization having been ratified, confirmed and declared to be legal and valid as such by chapter 519 of the Private and Special Laws of Maine approved March 25, 1897.
It is the opinion of the court that the order of the presiding Justice can be sustained upon both grounds, but the second being conclusive as a matter of law, the first need not be considered. No principle of law seems to be better established both upon reason and authority than that which declares that a purely charitable
The defendant is a charitable institution. It is so declared by a decision of our own court. In Farrington v. Putman, 90 Maine, 405, it is said referring to this very defendant: "Here is an institution, and the only one of the kind in the state, and virtually a state charitable institution of the most beneficent kind, seeking money for supporting its very life and existence, and to enable it to render assistance free of charge to the poor of the state suffering from diseases of the eye and ear.” The constituent elements which are regarded as characteristic of charitable institutions are defined in Hospital Association v. McKenzie, 104 Maine, 320, as follows: "It comes within the letter and the spirit of a charitable corporation whose distinctive feature is that it has no capital and no provision for making dividends or profits, deriving its funds mainly from public and private charity and holding them in trust for the object of the institution.” The same doctrine is also emphatically established in Massachusetts. In McDonald v. Mass. Gen. Hospital, 120 Mass. 432, the court say : "The corporation has no capital stock, no provision for making dividends or profits, and whatever it may receive from any source it holds in trust to be devoted to the object of sustaining the hospital and increasing its benefit to the public, by extending or improving its accommodations and diminishing its expenses. Its funds are derived mainly from public and private charity; its affairs are conducted for a great public purpose, that of administering to the comfort of the sick, without any expectation, on the part of those immediately interested in the corporation, of receiving any compensation which will enure to their own benefit, and without any right to receive such compensation. This establishes its character as a public charity.”
It is claimed, however, that the defendant charges a compensation for the use of its rooms to those who are able to pay, and
Exceptions in each case overruled.