110 Misc. 632 | City of New York Municipal Court | 1920
The plaintiff shipped as a seaman on one of the defendant’s steamships, the Sagaporack, on July 1, 1919. The usual shipping articles were signed by the parties. The plaintiff agreed to work as an able bodied seaman at the rate of seventy-five dollars a month and board. The articles contained the following clause in the handwriting of the United States shipping commissioner: “ In event of a general change in wages while vessel is away, said change to take effect from date of change.” The shipping articles contained no provision specifying the hours which the plaintiff was required to work. The plaintiff did work twelve hours a day at sea and nine hours a day in port, which seems to have been the system in vogue at the time the articles were signed.
On July 28, 1919, while the vessel on which the plaintiff was employed was at sea the Eastern and Gulf Sailors’ Association, of which the plaintiff was at that time a member, and the American Steamship Association, of which the defendant was at that time a member, entered into an agreement wherein among other things it was provided that the rate of wages for an able seaman should be eighty-five dollars a month. The agreement further specified under the heading “ working rules” in effect that there should be three watches of eight hours each instead of a system of two watches of twelve hours each, and also provided for an eight hour day and no work on Sundays and holidays while the vessel was in port. The agreement provides for an over time rate of sixty cents per hour for all work performed before or after
The plaintiff was paid on November 5, 1919, after the return of the vessel to the port of New York at the rate of eighty-five dollars per month, the wage rate for able seamen as provided in the agreement of July 28, 1919. At that time there was executed by the various seamen employed on the vessel Sagaporack and by the master of the vessel, in the presence of a United States shipping commissioner, the following mutual release as provided by the federal statute (U. S. B. S. § 4552): “ We, the undersigned, seamen on board the S. S. Sagaporack on her late voyage from N. Y. to Kobe, Japan, do hereby, each one for himself, by our signatures herewith given, in consideration of settlements made before the shipping commissioner at this port, release the master and owners of said vessel from all claims for wages in respect of the said past voyage or engagement, and I, master of said vessel, do also release each of the seamen signing said release from all claims, in consideration of this release signed by them.”
The plaintiff now sues to recover $206.40, representing an amount figured on the basis of over time work beyond the eight hour day specified in the agreement of July twenty-eighth both while the vessel was in port and while at sea at the rate of sixty cents per hour.
The plaintiff would undoubtedly be entitled to over time at the rate of sixty cents an hour while the vessel was in port under the agreement of July 28, 1919, but I am in doubt whether he would be entitled to over time pay while the vessel was at sea because of the fact, as I have already pointed out, that the agreement
The plaintiff, therefore, according to the view I take of the situation, would be entitled to a recovery in this case but for the defense that he executed the release before quoted. The plaintiff seeks to avoid the effect
I am asked by the plaintiff to disregard this release which he signed on the authority of a number of cases decided by the United States District Court, in various districts, sitting as a court of admiralty. These cases are: The David Pratt, 7 Fed. Cas. 24; Leak v. Isaacson, 15 id. No. 8160; The Rajah, 20 id. 193, No. 11538; Savin v. The Juno, 21 id. No. 12390.
The principle underlying all these cases is stated in the case of Domenico v. Alaska Packers’ Assn., 112 Fed. Repr. 554-560 (reversed on another point in 117 id. 99) as follows: “ That courts of admiralty are not bound in the decision of cases before them by technical rules, but are governed by enlarged views of equity and justice; and as seamen are usually improvident, and often ignorant of their rights, they are frequently tempted by their necessities to take less than is due them. ’ ’
In the present case it does not appear that the plaintiff was either ignorant or improvident. He seemed to be a man of intelligence and while perhaps not versed in his legal rights apparently had knowledge
Unfortunately the Municipal Court is not a court possessing equity jurisdiction, and however much I am of the opinion that this court ought to possess jurisdiction whether at law or in equity which would permit it to do full justice disregarding the antiquated distinction between actions at law and in equity, nevertheless up to the present time equity jurisdiction has not been conferred upon this court. While, however, this court does not possess general equity jurisdiction equitable defenses may be set up and this court may take cognizance of such defenses
“The following rules shall be observed with respect to the settlement of wages:
“ First. Upon the completion, before a shipping commissioner, of any discharge and settlement, the master or owner and each seaman, respectively, in the presence of the shipping commissioner, shall sign a mutual release of all claims for wages in respect of the past voyage or engagement, and the shipping commissioner shall also sign and attest it, and shall retain it in a book to be kept for that purpose, provided both the master and seamen assent to such settlement, or the settlement has been adjusted by the shipping commissioner.
“ Second. Such release, so signed and attested, shall operate as a mutual discharge and settlement of all demands for wages between the parties thereto, on account of wages, in respect of the past voyage or engagement. ’ ’
The language of Mr. Justice Holmes, then a justice of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, now a justice of the United States Supreme Court, in Rosenberg v. Doe, supra, seems to me to be most pertinent and is expressive of my opinion as to the plaintiff’s claim in the present action: “ The statute means to make the release conclusive, if it is executed and attested as required, without fraud or coercion.”
Having reached the conclusion that the plaintiff has established neither fraud nor mutual mistake I must
I have given expression to my views somewhat at length because of the fact that I have been led to believe by counsel that this case was in the nature of a test case and that other actions of a similar nature were either pending or contemplated.
It follows that entertaining these views judgment must be for the defendant.
Judgment for defendant.