Matter of Jensen
- Reporters:
EXCLUDABLE: Act of 1952—Section 212(a)(9) [8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(9)]—Convicted of crime involving moral turpitude: forgery, section 310(1); and uttering, section 311(a), Canadian Criminal Code.
The applicant, a native and citizen of Canada, applied for admission to the United States at the port of Piegan, Montana on August 11, 1964. He presented a nonquota immigration visa issued by the United States Consul at Calgary, Alberta, Canada on the same day. He was held for a hearing before a special inquiry officer because of a conviction in Canada on December 6, 1957 for wilfully and knowingly forging and uttering a check in the amount of $20.00. The special inquiry officer concludes that the applicant‘s conviction for forgery and uttering constitutes the commission of a single crime involving moral turpitude within the meaning of the exception to
The applicant applied for a visa at the Calgary Consulate on June 30, 1964. He applied for admission to the United States on August 11, 1964. He was approximately 16 years and 11 months of age when he committed the offense here under consideration. It is well established that the crimes of forgery and uttering involve moral turpitude.2 The only issue presented by the case is whether under standards prevailing in the United States the applicant has committed “only one such crime” within the meaning of
The Canadian Criminal Code defines the forging and uttering of a document as two separate offenses (supra, footnote 1). The Criminal Codes of some of our States have separate provisions for the crimes of forging and uttering a document.3 Notwithstanding this fact it has been generally held in the United States that the making of a forged written instrument and the uttering of it by the same person, at the time, as one transaction, constitute but one offense.4 It is also the general rule in the Federal Courts that where the several counts of
It is not clear from the record before us as to whether the Canadian Court imposed a separate sentence for each offense committed by the applicant. The records of conviction merely show that he was given a “one year suspended sentence.” Regardless of this fact we conclude that under standards prevailing in the United States6 the applicant “committed only one such crime” within the meaning of the exception set forth in
ORDER: The decision and order admitting the applicant to the United States for permanent residence, entered by the special inquiry officer on August 28, 1964 is hereby affirmed.