I. INTRODUCTION
On January 19, 2017, Tony Jennings commenced this
II. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
The supporting materials submitted in connection with the Motion make clear that Plaintiff and Defendants endorse substantially different versions of the events that occurred on January 5, 2016. Their differing narratives are set out below.
1. Defendants' Version of Events
On January 5, 2016, Officers Decker and Ettinger were on patrol together in Syracuse, New York, near the Pioneer Homes housing complex. Defs.' SMF ¶ 4. Both Decker and Ettinger were members of the Syracuse Police Department's Crime Reduction Team, Dkt. Nos. 53-10 ("Decker Affidavit") ¶ 1,
At approximately 6:45 PM during Decker's and Ettinger's patrol, they encountered an occupied vehicle parked in a lot near "the 100 block of Radisson Court." Ettinger Supp'n Hr'g Test. at 10, 25. Using the patrol car's spotlight, Decker "illuminated" the vehicle, and the officers "noticed the occupants," two black men, "making furtive movements[,] as if the[y] were trying to conceal items." Defs.' SMF ¶ 4. According to Ettinger, those "furtive
Finding the occupants' behavior suspicious, Decker and Ettinger parked their patrol car behind the vehicle "at an angle," but without fully blocking its path. Decker Supp'n Hr'g Test. at 9, 22. The officers then got out and approached the vehicle-Decker on the driver's side and Ettinger on the passenger's side, Defs.' SMF ¶ 5-6-and, looking through the open driver's side window, Decker noticed a digital scale near the center console covered in a "white residue" that he believed to be cocaine, Decker Supp'n Hr'g Test. at 10-11. Decker asked the vehicle's driver, later identified as Plaintiff, and its passenger, later identified as Willy Jones, whether there were any drugs in the vehicle.
Ettinger asked Jones to step out of the vehicle, then put him in handcuffs and "searched him for contraband." Defs.' SMF ¶ 6; Ettinger Supp'n Hr'g Test. at 13. Simultaneously, Decker asked Plaintiff to get out of the vehicle and began to search him as well. Defs.' SMF ¶ 7. Before Decker's search could get underway, however, Plaintiff "violently pulled away and fled on foot ... eastbound [away] from Officer Decker." Ettinger Supp'n Hr'g Test. at 14. Decker ran after Plaintiff, tackled him from behind, and ordered him to put his hands behind his back. Decker Supp'n Hr'g Test. at 13. But Plaintiff continued to struggle with Decker, "and 'kept his hands under his body rather than putting them behind his back' " while trying to "push up off the ground and keep going." Defs.' SMF ¶ 9-10 (quoting Dkt. No. 53-5 ("Omnibus Order") at 4);
Once Plaintiff had been handcuffed, Decker resumed his search and Ettinger returned to Jones. Ettinger Supp'n Hr'g Test. at 15. In Plaintiff's front left pants pocket, Decker found "a clear knotted section of plastic containing a beige chunky substance" that he identified as crack cocaine. Decker Supp'n Hr'g Test. at 13-14. A field test later confirmed that identification.
Decker and Ettinger took Plaintiff to the Onondaga Justice Center, where he was charged with criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third and fifth degree.
2. Plaintiff's Version of Events
At approximately 5:00 PM on January 5, 2017, Plaintiff was at home when he received a phone call from Jones. Jennings Supp'n Hr'g Test. at 33-34; Dkt. No. 53-4 ("50-h Hearing Testimony") at 21.
Plaintiff left his home and picked up Jones, who had with him a gas can, tire inflator, and some other tools.
When they arrived back at Pioneer Homes, the Radisson Court parking lot was nearly full. Jennings Supp'n Hr'g Test. at 36. Plaintiff parked in one of the few remaining open parking spots-sandwiched between a truck and another car-then he and Jones remained in Plaintiff's car for another "five to seven minutes" "making small talk."
After Jones and Plaintiff noticed the patrol car, Officers Decker and Ettinger got out and "rushed" Jones, instructing him to place his hands on the hood of Plaintiff's car. Jennings Supp'n Hr'g Test. at 39; 50-h Hr'g Test. at 26-27. The officers then searched Jones, looking through his pockets and asking whether he had any drugs or guns. Jennings Supp'n Hr'g Test. at 39; 50-h Hr'g Test. at 26-27. One of the officers also got out his flashlight, using it to look through the windows of Plaintiff's car. Jennings Supp'n Hr'g Test. at 39; 50-h Hr'g Test. at 32. However, Plaintiff claims that such a search would not have revealed any contraband, and specifically denies that there was a digital scale in his car when the officers arrived. Resp. Defs.' SMF ¶ 5; (noting that "[l]aboratory reports confirmed that a digital scale with cocain[e] residue on it[ ]s surface was never received at the lab ... [and the officers] never charged [ ] Plaintiff ... for the crime of criminal possession of drug paraphernalia in the second degree"); see also 50-h Hr'g Test. at 54.
Plaintiff watched Jones and the officers for about a minute, then "opened [his] car door to ... step out of [his] car." Jennings Supp'n Hr'g Test. at 39-40, 50-51; 50-h Hr'g Test. at 32. But before he could do so,
Eventually, Decker asked Plaintiff for identification. Jennings Supp'n Hr'g Test. at 41; 50-h Hr'g Test. at 34. Plaintiff handed Decker his driver's license, as well as his registration and insurance information. Jennings Supp'n Hr'g Test. at 41; 50-h Hr'g Test. at 34-35. Decker told Plaintiff to step out and place his hands on the hood of his car, then began to search inside Plaintiff's coat and pants pockets. Jennings Supp'n Hr'g Test. at 42-43; 50-h Hr'g Test. at 35-36. Plaintiff objected to the search, and told Decker that it was "unnecessary" because he "didn't do [any]thing wrong." Jennings Supp'n Hr'g Test. at 43. Decker then "st[u]ck[ ] his hand underneath [Plaintiff's] coat[,] ... down the back of [his] pants," and "in[-]between [his] buttocks," prompting Plaintiff to "turn around, to get [Decker] to stop."
After Decker and Ettinger had successfully detained Plaintiff, Sergeant Ocker arrived at the scene. Resp. Defs.' SMF ¶ 13. Ocker spoke to Plaintiff about the severity of his injuries and asked whether he needed medical attention, which Plaintiff declined. 50-h Hr'g Test. at 11-12, 42. Ocker also took photographs of Plaintiff's face, head, and hands, Compl. at 4; see also Dkt. No. 59-2 at 10-15 ("Photographs"), and filed a Use of Force report documenting the incident, Dkt. No. 59-2 at 2-3 ("CRB Disposition").
The officers then brought Plaintiff to Onondaga Justice Center, where he was charged with "criminal possession of a controlled substance in the 3rd, 5th, and 7th degrees and resisting arrest." Resp. Defs.' SMF ¶ 14. While there, Plaintiff "did not receive medical treatment for his eye"-which had swollen as a result of Ettinger's punch, Compl. at 4-though Plaintiff denies refusing treatment.
B. Procedural History
1. Criminal Proceedings
Plaintiff was indicted in 2016 in state court for criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fourth degree. Order Hon. Walter W. Harner at 2. That indictment was later superseded, and the second count changed to criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fifth degree. Dkt. No. 53-6 at 2-3. Following the May 17 and May 19, 2016 suppression hearing, the Honorable Walter W. Hafner, Onondaga County Court Judge, denied Plaintiff's omnibus motion to, among other things, "suppress[ ] evidence consisting of tangible property on the grounds that such tangible property was obtained by means of an unlawful search and seizure." Omnibus Order at 2. In so doing, Judge Hafner found that "the cocaine and money recovered from [Plaintiff's] person were obtained during a lawful search ... incident to arrest."
2. Administrative Proceedings
At some point prior to his criminal trial, Plaintiff filed an administrative complaint before the City of Syracuse's Citizen Review Board ("CRB"), raising allegations of excessive force, illegal search, and racial profiling against Officers Decker and Ettinger, as well as allegations of false reporting against Sergeant Ocker. CRB Disposition at 2.
3. Civil Proceedings
After receiving a favorable decision from the CRB, but before his criminal trial, Plaintiff filed the present Complaint. In it, Plaintiff brings six claims: (1) a Fourteenth Amendment racial profiling claim against Decker and Ettinger; (2) a Monell claim against the City of Syracuse; (3) a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim against Decker and Ettinger; (4) a Fourth Amendment illegal search claim against Decker and Ettinger; (5) a Fourth Amendment false arrest claim against Decker and Ettinger; and (6) a conspiracy claim against Decker, Ettinger, and Ocker,
Judge Peebles's March 2017 Report-Recommendation conducted a preliminary analysis of the Complaint pursuant to
On June 29, 2018, Defendants filed the instant Motion for summary judgment, which has since been fully briefed. Defendants argue that (1) Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment excessive force claim "should be dismissed because [the] officers used reasonable force ... and the alleged injury sustained is de minimis ," Mem. at 2; (2) Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment illegal search and false arrest claims should be dismissed as "barred by [Plaintiff's] criminal conviction,"
III. LEGAL STANDARD
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure instructs courts to grant summary judgment if "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is "material" if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law," and a dispute is " 'genuine' ... if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
The party seeking summary judgment bears the burden of informing the court of the basis for the motion and identifying those portions of the record that the moving party claims will demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
In attempting to repel a motion for summary judgment after the moving party has met its initial burden, the nonmoving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Preliminary Matters-Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment and Monell Claims
Although not expressly stated in the Complaint, Plaintiff appears to bring a claim against Decker and Ettinger for racial profiling in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment,
B. Fourth Amendment-Excessive Force
The Fourth Amendment provides that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated." U.S. Const. amend. IV. That language has been interpreted as "protect[ing] persons from the use of excessive force by state police officers incident to an arrest." Messina v. Mazzeo,
Defendants raise two arguments in favor of their motion for summary judgment
As the parties' arguments make clear, there are substantial differences between their characterization of the facts material to Plaintiff's excessive force claim. In Defendants' version of events, Plaintiff fled from Decker and continued to resist arrest until after Ettinger punched him. Because "the use of force may be reasonable against a suspect who is fleeing," Soto v. Gaudett,
Second, Defendants argue that the Court should grant their motion for summary judgment because "Plaintiff cannot establish that his injury was anything more than de minimis. " Mem. at 4. "[O]n an excessive force claim a plaintiff must present sufficient evidence to establish that the alleged use of force is 'objectively sufficiently serious or harmful enough' to be actionable." Washpon v. Parr,
Nonetheless, multiple courts in this Circuit have held at the summary judgment stage "that even minor injuries, including scrapes and bruises, can support an excessive-force claim." Wang v. Vahldieck, No. 09-CV-3783,
[w]hile [the plaintiff] did not seek medical treatment for her injuries, and this fact may ultimately weigh against her in the minds of the jury in assessing whether the force used was excessive, this failure is not fatal to her claim. If the force used was unreasonable and excessive, the plaintiff may recover even if the injuries inflicted were not permanent or severe.
It is undisputed that Plaintiff suffered no lacerations or bleeding as a result of Ettinger's punch-though the Complaint does note that Plaintiff suffered "[s]welling around [his] right eye, Compl. at 4-and the pictures taken by Ocker immediately following the arrest do not show any obvious injury, Resp. Defs.' SMF ¶ 17; Photographs. The parties also agree that Plaintiff received no medical treatment for any of his claimed injuries, and that any pain in Plaintiff's face resulting from the arrest lasted no more than one week. Resp. Defs.' SMF ¶¶ 18, 20-21. However, Plaintiff asserts that the arrest aggravated an existing injury to his ribs and caused long-term pain and discomfort in his knee, 50-h Hr'g Test. at 13-14, 49-50, injuries that a reasonable jury could find to be neither "temporary [n]or minor in severity," Smith,
C. Fourth Amendment-Illegal Search
The Fourth Amendment also protects against illegal searches. U.S. Const. amend. IV. "A 'search' in the context of the Fourth Amendment occurs when the police intrude upon a person's reasonable expectation of privacy or if the police otherwise trespass upon one's person,
Defendants contend that "[t]he Court should dismiss Plaintiff's illegal search ... claim because his conviction in a New York State criminal court bars th[at] claim as a matter of law." Mem. at 5. In so arguing, Defendants rely heavily on the Supreme Court's holding in Heck v. Humphrey, that
in order to recover damages for [an] allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983.
However, Defendants' argument overlooks an essential corollary to the holding in Heck: that "a suit for damages attributable to an allegedly unreasonable search may lie even if the challenged search produced evidence that was introduced in a state criminal trial resulting in the § 1983 plaintiff's still-outstanding conviction." Heck,
Plaintiff's illegal search claim can easily be distinguished from the exceptional evidentiary circumstances contemplated in Heck. Plaintiff was convicted on two counts of possessing a controlled substance, charges which hinged on Decker's discovery of drugs through his allegedly unlawful search. Sentencing Disposition at 2. Plaintiff does not argue that any exception to the Heck exclusionary rule applied in his case, nor does it appear to the Court that the doctrines of independent source, inevitable discovery, and/or harmless error would be relevant. Therefore, if the Court found Decker's search to be unconstitutional, it would necessarily imply that Plaintiff's conviction is invalid. See Black v. Blackmun, No. 11-CV-2372,
D. Fourth Amendment-False Arrest
"A § 1983 claim for false arrest, resting on the Fourth Amendment right of an individual to be free from unreasonable seizures, including arrest without probable cause, is substantially the same as a claim for false arrest under New York law." Weyant v. Okst,
In order to properly evaluate Plaintiff's false arrest claim, the Court must first analyze the Fourth Amendment implications of his interactions with Decker and Ettinger on the evening of January 5, 2016. In Posr v. Doherty,
when an officer even briefly detains an individual and restrains that person[']s right to walk away, he has effected a seizure and the limitations of the Fourth Amendment become applicable.... [But] not every seizure is an arrest. Whether an arrest supportable by probable cause occurs, as distinct from a form of Fourth Amendment intrusion supportable by less than probable cause, depends on the seizure's level of intrusiveness, and on the corresponding degree of justification required to effect each level of intrusiveness.
Although the Posr framework does not provide a bright-line rule, the caselaw nonetheless makes clear that, on the night of January 5, 2016, Plaintiff was arrested at least as of the moment that Decker tackled him to the ground. See, e.g.,
Thus, summary judgment will not lie as to Plaintiff's false arrest claim if (1) a reasonable jury could find that at any point after Decker's tackle, Plaintiff's continued detention was not supported by probable cause; and (2) such a claim would not constitute "a collateral attack on [his] conviction through the vehicle of a civil suit." Heck,
In order to evaluate Defendants' arguments and determine whether the two relevant conditions have been met in Plaintiff's case, it is useful to divide his arrest into two time periods: (1) the period after Decker's tackle but before his search (the "Initial Arrest Period"); and (2) the period during and after Decker's search that led to the discovery of cocaine (the "Post-Discovery Period"). The Court will begin by analyzing the Post-Discovery Period, since it is the more straightforward of the two.
1. The Post-Discovery Period
Plaintiff cannot maintain a false arrest claim for the period of his detention that occurred during and after Decker's search, because such a claim would collaterally attack Plaintiff's conviction in violation of Heck.
As already noted above, the Supreme Court's holding in Heck requires dismissal of any § 1983 claim which would "necessarily imply the invalidity of [the plaintiff's] conviction or sentence."
2. The Initial Arrest Period
Plaintiff's false arrest claim for the Initial Arrest Period, however, requires a considerably more nuanced analysis. Of the two events identified in Defendants' Motion as providing Decker and Ettinger probable cause to arrest Plaintiff, Mem. at 6-7, only one occurred prior to Decker's search: Decker's discovery of the digital scale inside Plaintiff's car. But the parties dispute whether any such scale existed. While Decker and Ettinger agree that a scale covered in "a white residue" was visibly resting on Plaintiff's center console, Decker Aff. ¶ 8; Ettinger Aff. ¶ 8, Plaintiff asserts that "there was no digital scale ... in [his] vehicle" at all that night, Resp. Defs.' SMF ¶ 5. In support, Plaintiff also points out that he was never charged with possessing drug paraphernalia, that neither Decker nor Ettinger claimed to have conducted any field tests on the scale, and that no scale was ever "received at the lab for any form of testing as contraband/evidence."
However, Plaintiff's false arrest claim for the Initial Arrest Period nonetheless falls afoul of Heck, even though, as noted above, it was Decker's Post-Discovery Period search that was primarily responsible for Plaintiff's conviction. This is true because Plaintiff was prosecuted under New York law, which provides that "[t]he fruit of an illegal search cannot give rise, in a juristic sense, to probable cause to arrest." Ostrover v. City of New York,
Therefore, Plaintiff's false arrest claim against Decker and Ettinger is precluded in its entirety by Heck and must be dismissed.
E. Section 1985(3)-Conspiracy Claim
A conspiracy claim brought pursuant to § 1985(3) requires a showing of "(1) a conspiracy (2) for the purpose of depriving a person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or the equal privileges and immunities under the laws; (3) an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy; and (4) an injury to the plaintiff's person or property, or a deprivation of a right or privilege of a citizen of the United States." Thomas v. Roach,
Although the Complaint does not explicitly allege the existence of a conspiracy between Decker, Ettinger, and/or Ocker, Plaintiff does accuse those defendants of using "false report[ing]" to "substantiat[e] criminal charges" against him. Compl. at 5. That phrasing mirrors the language used in the CRB Disposition, which faulted Ocker for issuing an "incomplete and untruthful" Use of Force report and for "substantiat[ing] the investigation of an occupied suspicious vehicle without conducting a thorough examination of his own." CRB Disposition at 3 (internal quotation marks omitted). Recalling that "[a] document filed pro se is 'to be liberally construed,' and 'a pro se complaint, however artfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,' " the Court interprets those statements as forming the foundation of Plaintiff's § 1985(3) conspiracy claim. Erickson v. Pardus,
Defendants appear to have drawn a similar conclusion, and devote two pages in their Memorandum to addressing such a claim. See Mem. at 7-8. Specifically, Defendants argue that Plaintiff "has not pleaded any evidence of conspiracy," and has therefore failed to show that Defendants entered into an agreement and/or achieved a meeting of the minds. Mem. at 7. In addition, Defendants contend that
1. Existence of a Conspiracy
The Court disagrees with Defendants' first argument, and instead finds that the current record could persuade a reasonable jury to find that a conspiracy existed in Plaintiff's case. The Second Circuit "has repeatedly held [at the motion to dismiss stage] that complaints containing only 'conclusory,' 'vague,' or 'general allegations' of a conspiracy to deprive a person of constitutional rights will be dismissed," and that "[d]iffuse and expansive allegations are insufficient, unless amplified by specific instances of misconduct." Ostrer v. Aronwald,
The Court has already determined that a reasonable jury could accept Plaintiff's version of the events that occurred on January 5, 2016. See supra Part IV.B. Doing so would inevitably require that jury to reject the version of events described by Decker's and Ettinger's testimony, see generally Ettinger Supp'n Hr'g Test.; Decker Supp'n Hr'g Test., as well as by Ocker's Use of Force report.
The Court therefore rejects Defendants' first argument, and holds that a reasonable jury could find the existence of a conspiracy in the present matter.
2. Racial Animus
In asserting that "Plaintiff has not alleged any facts ... that show that [Plaintiff's] conspiratorial harm flowed from 'some racial or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidious discriminatory animus,' " Mem. at 8, Defendants appear to overlook Plaintiff's "racial profiling/false report[ing]" claim in the Complaint, which forms the basis for his § 1985(3) allegations, Compl. at 5. There, Plaintiff explicitly states that "Jeremy Decker and Darren Ettinger target[ed] inner city minorit[ies] and substantiat[ed] criminal charges as such [sic]."
That said, the Court nonetheless finds that the record evidence is insufficient to support a finding of racial animus sufficient to support a § 1985(3) conspiracy claim. Although Plaintiff claims he was "target[ed]" on account of his race, the record evidence does not indicate that Defendants used racial slurs or epithets during the course of Plaintiff's arrest, nor does it provide any explicit evidence of racial bias. True, Plaintiff claims that Defendants mistreated and used excessive force against him, but while "mistreatment by defendants is not irrelevant in assessing the strength of plaintiff's circumstantial evidence of race-based animus, it is certainly not sufficient to establish it." Lizardo v. Denny's, Inc.,
Therefore, because Plaintiff has failed to offer sufficient evidence suggesting that Defendants' actions were racially motivated, Plaintiff's § 1985(3) claim fails.
3. Civil v. Race-Based Conspiracies
As a final point, it is worth noting that the Court could interpret Plaintiff's Complaint as attempting to allege both a "civil" conspiracy pursuant to § 1983 and a "race-based" conspiracy pursuant to § 1985. Biswas v. City of New York,
The allegations giving rise to Plaintiff's conspiracy claim-that Defendants used "false report[ing]" to "substantiat[e] criminal charges" against him, Compl. at 5-only concern whether Defendants conspired to cover up Decker's and Ettinger's allegedly illegal use of force and arrest. But while police cover-ups can, in certain circumstances, constitute a deprivation of
V. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is hereby:
ORDERED , that Defendants' Motion (Dkt. No. 53) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part ; and it is further
ORDERED , that the following claims are dismissed from this action: (1) Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment illegal search claim against Decker and Ettinger; (2) Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment false arrest claim against Decker and Ettinger; (3) Plaintiff's § 1985(3) conspiracy claim against Decker, Ettinger, and Ocker; and (4) Plaintiff's § 1983 conspiracy claim against Decker, Ettinger, and Ocker; and it is further
ORDERED , that the following claims survive Defendants' Motion: (1) Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment racial profiling claim against Decker and Ettinger; (2) Plaintiff's Monell claim against the City of Syracuse; and (3) Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment excessive force claim against Decker and Ettinger; and it is further
ORDERED , that Sergeant Robert Ocker is DISMISSED as a defendant in this action; and it is further
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Notes
Plaintiff's initial pleading actually named the Syracuse Police Department as a defendant, not the City of Syracuse. Dkt. No. 1 at 1. However, in a Mary 2017 report-recommendation, the Honorable David E. Peebles, U.S. Magistrate Judge, determined that "[t]he Syracuse Police Department is an agency of the City of Syracuse and not an independent entity subject to suit." Dkt. No. 7 ("Report-Recommendation") at 6. Judge Peebles therefore recommended that the Syracuse Police Department be dismissed as a defendant and replaced with the City of Syracuse,
The Decker Affidavit was attached to Defendants' Motion as Exhibit I.
The Ettinger Affidavit was attached to Defendants' Motion as Exhibit J.
Exhibits C and D to Defendants' Motion (docket entries 53-6 and 53-7) contain transcripts of the two-day suppression hearing held in connection with Plaintiff's criminal trial, on May 17 and May 19, 2016. Those documents will be referred to by the testifying individual. See, e.g., Dkt. Nos. 53-6 at 8:9-32:20 ("Ettinger Suppression Hearing Testimony"), 53-6 at 33:2-57:25 ("Jennings Suppression Hearing Testimony"), 53-7 at 4:4-38:16 ("Decker Suppression Hearing Testimony").
The Order of Hon. Walter W. Harner was attached to Defendant's Motion as Exhibit B. The cited page numbers for that document refer to those generated by the Court's electronic filing system ("ECF").
Plaintiff's 50-h Hearing Testimony was attached to Defendants' Motion as Exhibit A.
The CRB Disposition was attached to Plaintiff's papers as Exhibit X.
The Sentencing Disposition was attached to Defendants' Motion as Exhibit F.
The Sentencing Hearing Transcript was attached to Defendants' Motion as Exhibit E.
The CRB Disposition names the complained-against officers only as "Officer 1," "Officer 2," and "Officer 3," but the factual context provided in the CRB's decision indicates to the Court that Officers 1 and 2 are Decker and Ettinger, and that Officer 3 is Sergeant Ocker.
As explained in more detail below, see infra Part IV.E.3, Plaintiff's conspiracy claim could also be interpreted as being brought pursuant to § 1983.
One of the claims listed in Plaintiff's Complaint accuses Decker and Ettinger of "racial profiling," insofar as they "target[ed] inner city minorit[ies] and substantiat[ed] criminal charges as such [sic]." Compl. at 5. Such a claim is "properly subject to equal protection analysis." Marshall v. Town of Middlefield, No. 10-CV-1009,
When a plaintiff seeks to hold a municipality liable under § 1983, he must plead-pursuant to the Supreme Court's decision in Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York,
The only other pre-search event that could feasibly give rise to probable cause was Plaintiff's alleged flight from Decker. But Plaintiff's version of events contradicts that any such flight occurred, and in any event, though a suspect's flight can, "under certain circumstances, provide reasonable suspicion to warrant a Terry stop, it does not, without more, provide probable cause to arrest."Jenkins v. City of New York,
Federal law-which formed the basis for the district courts' decisions in Lust and Gonzalez-takes the contrary stance that the "fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine is not available to assist a § 1983 claimant," Townes v. City of New York,
According to New York's People v. De Bour paradigm,
Defendants also raise a third argument, that "[e]ven if Plaintiff had alleged sufficient facts ... [his] conspiracy claim is nevertheless barred by the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine, which provides that 'officers, agents, and employees of a single corporate entity are legally incapable of conspiring together.' "
Ocker's Use of Force report has not been made available in the record, so the Court can only speculate as to its exact contents. However, the description of that report provided in the CRB Disposition-which Plaintiff submitted with his opposition papers-indicates that it generally supports the version of events reported by Decker and Ettinger. CRB Disposition at 2.
The same may also be true in the case of § 1985(3) cases, but in Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Novotny,