Case Information
*1 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS DALLAS DIVISION DAPHNEY JENNINGS AND §
DEANDRE JENNINGS, §
§
Plaintiffs, §
§ Civil Action No. 3:20-cv-00583-E v. §
§
GREGORY WAYNE ABBOTT, in §
his Official Capacity as Governor §
of Texas, et al., §
§
Defendants. §
§
§ AMENDED MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER [1]
Before the Court is defendant Amber Davidson’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Original Complaint (Doc. 6). Plaintiffs Daphney Jennings and Deandre Jennings did not respond to the motion. Having considered the motion, Davidson’s briefing, and applicable law, the Court finds that motion should be granted for the reasons below.
B ACKGROUND
The following is taken from plaintiffs’ Original Complaint (Doc. 1). On or about February 26, 2018, Davidson, an agent of the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services (DFPS), executed an affidavit in support of a petition for the protection of Daphney in state district court. [2] The following day, the state court entered an Order for Protection of a Child in an Emergency and Notice of Hearing and an Order for Issuance of a Writ of Attachment, along with the Writ of Attachment, commanding law enforcement to take custody of Daphney. *2 Daphne, who was 16-years-old and six-months pregnant, was placed into foster care. A week later, Daphney and Deandre, her boyfriend and the father of her child, married in Oklahoma. Daphney was returned to foster care on or about March 6, 2018 and, on March 9, 2018, DFPS filed a petition to annul the marriage or, alternatively, to declare it void. The court proceedings ultimately were dismissed and plaintiffs’ marriage was found to be valid.
According to the petition, Davidson, as caseworker, was responsible for, “among other things, conducting an investigation in accordance with the laws, procedure, and standard established by DFPS, [the Texas Health and Human Services Commission (HHSC)], and the State of Texas.” Further, “the court proceedings were prosecuted or the prosecution of [sic] was supported due to the actions or inactions” of Davidson.
Davidson attached to her motion to dismiss various documents from the state court proceedings (Doc. 6-1). The documents reflect that DFPS learned in late February 2018 that Daphney was pregnant and living with her father in violation of DFPS’s prior resolution of a 2016 investigation, which provided for her placement outside the home with a guardian ( Id . at 22-23, 25). Davidson investigated the 2018 allegations, and DFPS petitioned for emergency custody of Daphney ( Id . at 2-29). The state court found “continuation in the home of [her mother] or [father] would be contrary to [her] welfare” ( Id . at 30). Finding no time for a full adversary hearing and “reasonable efforts consistent with the circumstances and providing for the safety of [Daphney] were made to prevent or eliminate the need” for her removal, the court named DFPS her temporary sole managing conservator until a full adversary hearing could be held on March 9, 2018 ( . at 31, 34, 45-46). DFPS employees, including Davison, and law enforcement officials took custody of Daphney at her school. ( Id. at 40-42, 45-46).
*3 Shortly thereafter, Daphney left DFPS custody and was reported as a runaway with local law enforcement (Doc. 6-1 at 44). On March 5, 2018, with the assistance of Daphney’s father, [4] plaintiffs traveled to Oklahoma to marry ( Id . at 42). The same day, the Court Clerk of Choctaw County, Oklahoma, issued plaintiffs a marriage license and a pastor married them ( Id . at 48). Daphney’s father served as a witness ( Id .). As temporary sole managing conservator, DFPS sought to annul or void the marriage on the grounds that it was performed without a court order as required by law ( Id . at 46-47). On May 16, 2018, the state court entered an Agreed Order, which included, among other things, a finding that the marriage was valid and provisions enjoining Daphney’s father from unsupervised access to Daphney, and any children of Daphney, until they turned 18 ( . at 40-42).
Plaintiffs assert claims against Davidson, both individually and as a DFPS agent, and other defendants [5] for false imprisonment and interference with the right of familial association under color of state law under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. They also assert state law claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and false imprisonment. Plaintiffs complain that they were separated, and Daphney remained in foster care and DFPS custody, while defendants failed or refused to recognize plaintiffs’ marriage and litigated for its annulment. Davidson moves to dismiss all of plaintiffs’ claims against her.
L EGAL S TANDARDS
A district court properly dismisses a claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(1) if the court “lacks the statutory or constitutional
power to adjudicate the claim.”
In re FEMA Trailer Formaldehyde Prods. Liab. Litig. (Miss.
*4
Plaintiffs)
,
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a complaint must contain “a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P.
8(a)(2). Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes a court to dismiss a plaintiff’s complaint for “failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted.”
Id.
12(b)(6). In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss, “[t]he court accepts all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff.”
In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig.
, 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir.
2007) (citations omitted). “The court’s review is limited to the complaint, any documents
attached to the complaint, and any documents attached to the motion to dismiss that are central to
the claim and referenced by the complaint.”
Lone Star Fund V (U.S.), L.P. v. Barclays Bank
PLC
,
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly
, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “The plausibility
standard ... asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”
Id.
Thus, a claim “is implausible on its face when ‘the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to
infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct.’”
Harold H. Huggins Realty, Inc. v. FNC,
Inc.
, 634 F.3d 787, 796 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting
Iqbal
, 556 U.S. at 679);
see also Inclusive
Communities Project, Inc. v. Lincoln Prop. Co.
,
A NALYSIS
1. Standing
Davidson first contends plaintiffs lack standing to pursue this action against her. Specifically, Davidson asserts there is an absence of allegations that she engaged in any conduct that violated the law. Further, “it is clear that the plaintiffs’ alleged injuries were caused by the state court’s orders and writ of attachment,” and plaintiffs did not allege that either were unlawful.
The Court has no subject-matter jurisdiction over a case when a plaintiff lacks Article III standing. Crane v. Johnson , 783 F.3d 244, 251, 255 (5th Cir. 2015). A party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of proof to establish standing, which consists of three elements: (1) the plaintiff must have suffered an “injury-in-fact,” which is “an invasion of a legally protected interest” that is “concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent”; (2) a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of; and (3) a likelihood the plaintiff’s injury will be redressed by a favorable judicial decision. . at 251–52. “At the pleading stage, general factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant’s conduct may suffice, for on a motion to dismiss we presum[e] that general allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim.” Lujan v. Defs. Of Wildlife , 504 U.S. 555, 560–61(1992) (internal quotations marks and citation omitted).
Here, plaintiffs have sufficiently stated a concrete and particularized injury by alleging that they were separated and Daphney remained in foster care for a time following their marriage in violation of their constitutional rights and Texas law. Second, plaintiffs allege the injury is attributable to Davidson’s conduct in investigating and “supporting” the court proceedings. Therefore, there is some causal connection alleged between the complained-of conduct and the *6 injury. Third, plaintiffs seek redress through payment of monetary damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Texas law.
To be sure, the factual support for plaintiffs’ claims against Davidson is, at best, scant. The Court, however, finds that Davidson’s argument is better suited to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. See, e.g., Foley v. Texas Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs. , No. 1:12-CV-270, 2012 WL 6803598, at *5–6 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 14, 2012), report & recommendation adopted , 2013 WL 84852 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 7, 2013). Accordingly, the Court finds plaintiffs have standing to seek damages relief, if such relief is actually available and provable in fact.
2. Eleventh Amendment Immunity
Davidson next asserts that plaintiffs’ claims against her in her official capacity are barred
by the Eleventh Amendment. Unless immunity is waived by Congress or a state, the Eleventh
Amendment bars suit in federal court by a private citizen against a state agency or a state actor in
her official capacity.
Kentucky v. Graham
,
The State of Texas has not waived its sovereign immunity from section 1983 claims. Nor
has Congress abrogated sovereign immunity from section 1983 claims.
See NiGen Biotech,
L.L.C. v. Paxton
, 804 F.3d 389, 394 (5th Cir. 2015). Although
the Ex Parte Young
doctrine
allows a state official to be sued in her official capacity for prospective, injunctive or declaratory
relief under section 1983,
see Ex Parte Young
,
Nor has Texas waived Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity for state tort claims in
federal court.
Sherwinski v. Peterson
,
3. TTCA Bars Plaintiffs’ State Law Tort Claims
Davidson contends she is entitled to dismissal of plaintiffs’ state tort claims against her in her individual capacity pursuant to section 101.106(f) of the TTCA. See CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 101.006(f). Section 101.106(f), an election of remedies provision, provides:
If a suit is filed against an employee of a governmental unit based on conduct within the general scope of that employee’s employment and if it could have been brought under this chapter against the governmental unit, the suit is considered to be against the employee in the employee’s official capacity only. On the *8 employee’s motion, the suit against the employee shall be dismissed unless the plaintiff files amended pleadings dismissing the employee and naming the governmental unit as defendant on or before the 30th day after the date the motion is filed.
CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 101.006(f). Thus, a defendant is entitled to dismissal under section
101.106(f) if the plaintiff’s claim (1) is based on conduct within the general scope of the
defendant’s employment with a governmental unit and (2) could have been brought against the
governmental unit under the TTCA.
Garza v. Harrison
,
The TTCA defines “scope of employment” as “the performance for a governmental unit
of the duties of an employee’s office or employment and includes being in or about the
performance of a task lawfully assigned to an employee by a competent authority.” CIV. PRAC.
& REM. § 101.001(5). Even wrongful or negligently performed conduct may be within an
employee’s scope of employment as long as the conduct was “related to the performance of [the
employee’s] job.”
Hopkins v. Strickland
, No. 01-12-000315-CV,
Here, plaintiffs allege Davidson, a DFPS caseworker, was “acting under the color of the law of the State of Texas” and appear to complain about Davidson’s investigation “in accordance with the laws, procedures, and standards established by DFPS, HHSC, and the state of Texas.” Accordingly, accepting the complaint’s allegations and viewing them in the light most favorable plaintiffs, the Court finds the state law claims are based on conduct by Davidson that is within the general scope of her employment and, thus, satisfy the first element for application of section 101.106(f).
As to the second element, the Texas Supreme Court has held that “all [common-law] tort theories alleged against a governmental unit ... are assumed to be ‘under [the Tort Claims Act]’ for the purposes of section 101.106.” Franka v. Velasquez , 332 S.W.3d 367, 369 (Tex. 2011) (brackets in original) (citing Mission Consol. Sch. Dist. v. Garcia , 253 S.W.3d 653, 659 (Tex. 2008)). Therefore, the Court finds the state tort claims against Davidson are claims that could have been brought against DFPS in this case. See id . at 369, 381. Both elements required for section 101.106(f) to apply being satisfied, statutory immunity applies and the Court must dismiss the state tort claims asserted against Davidson in her individual capacity.
4. Rooker-Feldman
Davidson next assert that, because plaintiffs’ lawsuit appears to arise out of their
dissatisfaction with the state court orders and proceedings, the finality of those proceedings
triggers application of the
Rooker-Feldman
doctrine, requiring dismissal of plaintiffs’ claims.
“Absent specific law otherwise providing, [the
Rooker–Feldman
] doctrine directs that federal
district courts lack jurisdiction to entertain collateral attacks on state court judgments.”
Liedtke v.
State Bar of Tex.,
Although their allegations are exceedingly general, the Court finds plaintiffs do not seek
a review or rejection of the state court’s orders and challenge, among other things, conduct by
*10
Davidson before entry of the orders. Accordingly, the Court finds the claims are not barred by
the
Rooker–Feldman
doctrine.
See id.
;
e.g., Saloom v. Texas Dep’t of Family & Child Protective
Servs.
,
5. Qualified Immunity
Finally, Davidson asserts that, even if the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over
plaintiffs’ section 1983 claims against her, she is entitled to qualified immunity. Qualified
immunity is a defense available to government officials sued for constitutional violations
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
See Glenn v. City of Tyler
,
When a defendant asserts qualified immunity, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to
demonstrate the defense’s inapplicability.
McClendon v. City of Columbia
, 305 F.3d 314, 323
(5th Cir. 2002) (en banc). The plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to show (1) the defendant
violated a federal statutory or constitutional right, and (2) the unlawfulness of the defendant’s
conduct was clearly established at the time.
Garza v. Briones
,
Plaintiffs first allege Daphney’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable
search and seizure was violated when defendants “failed or refused to recognize the marital
union between [p]laintiffs, and perpetuated litigation by petitioning for the annulment” of the
marriage. The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures,
U.S. CONST. AMEND. IV, and applies to social workers’ civil investigations. See
Roe v. Texas
Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs.
,
*12
Plaintiffs also contend Davidson’s conduct resulted in their physical separation and, thus,
interfered with their rights of familial association. There is a due process right to family integrity
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Morris v. Dearborne
, 181 F.3d 657, 667 (5th Cir.
1999). There also is a First Amendment constitutional right of free association in the context of
“certain intimate human relationships.”
Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees
,
The “right of the family to remain together without the coercive interference of the
awesome power of the state” is strong, but the state also has a strong interest in preventing child
abuse.
Hodorowski v. Ray
,
The Fifth Circuit has yet to find a clearly established violation of the right to family
integrity in any case against a child welfare worker. . (citing
Kiser v. Garrett
,
With respect to Davidson, plaintiffs allege only that, as a caseworker, she was responsible for, “among other things, conducting an investigation in accordance with the laws, procedure, and standard established by DFPS, HHSC, and the State of Texas” and her “actions or inactions” supported the court proceedings. To the extent that plaintiffs’ one-day marriage gave rise to a right to family integrity, DFPS, as Daphney’s temporary sole managing conservator, did not consent to the marriage and the marriage’s validity was a matter of genuine dispute. Under the circumstances, Daphney’s return to DFPS custody following the marriage, again in compliance with a court order, was reasonable. Plaintiffs do not provide, and this Court has not found, any authority to show Davidson should have acted otherwise or that her actions did not fall squarely in the middle of the continuum between the state’s clear interest in protecting children and a family’s clear interest in privacy. Accordingly, the Court finds plaintiffs fail to satisfy their burden to show Davidson violated a clearly established Fourteenth Amendment due process rights to family integrity. Likewise, plaintiffs do not show, and the Court has found no authority *14 to support a finding that, Davidson violated a clearly established First Amendment right to familial association under these circumstances. As a result, the qualified immunity defense applies as to plaintiffs’ section 1983 claim against Davidson for violation of family association rights, and the claim must be dismissed.
C ONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Davidson’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Original Complaint (Doc. 6) is GRANTED . Plaintiffs’ claims against Davidson in her official capacity are DISMISSED without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction. Plaintiffs’ claims against Davidson in her individual capacity are DISMISSED with prejudice .
SO ORDERED ; signed May 11, 2021.
_________________________________ ADA BROWN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Notes
[1] This Amendment to the Court’s Memorandum Opinion and Order (Doc. 10), entered on December 31, 2020, properly reflects that the dismissal of plaintiffs’ claims against defendant Amber Davidson in her official capacity is without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
[2] Cause No. 85768, in the 354th Judicial District Court of Hunt County, Texas.
[3] Cause No. 85830, in the 354th Judicial District Court of Hunt County, Texas.
[4] Daphney’s father subsequently was convicted on a charge of interfering with child custody for secreting Daphney after she escaped DFPS custody (Doc. 6-1 at 40-42).
[5] Plaintiffs also have sued Rhonda West, another DFPS caseworker, Amanda Haines, a DFPS supervisor, Governor Greg Abbott, Attorney General Kenneth Paxton, Jr., HHSC Executive Commissioner Courtney A. Phillips, and DFPS Commissioner Jamie Masters.
[6] Specifically, the TTCA expressly waives sovereign immunity in the instance of: (1) injury resulting from the operation of a publicly-owned automobile by the employee; (2) injury arising out of a condition or use of tangible personal property; or (3) injury arising from a premises defect. Sampson v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin ,500 S.W.3d 380 , 384 (Tex. 2016) (citing T EX . C IV . P RAC . & R EM . C ODE A NN . § § 101.021, 101.025).
[7] For example, a social worker violates the Fourth Amendment by “knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless
disregard for the truth” mak[ing] a false statement or omission that results in the issuance of a court order removing
a child from her home without adequate grounds.
Wernecke v. Garcia
,
[8] A district court has discretion whether to dismiss a claim with or without prejudice,
see Club Retro L.L.C. v.
Hilton
,