*1 procedures; Court by Truancy the earlier Jennifer et al. SWAIN ongoing controversy
this Court finds no which have articulable Collins, 990 stake. See H.V. A.2d at 848 outcome). (requiring articulable stake ESTATE A. TYRE and OF Granting requested the plaintiffs’ relief through REILLY James H.
would not have
effect.
significant
d.b.n,
Administrator
c.t.a.
Lynch,
(explaining
Conclusion
For the forth in opinion, reasons set quash Superior
we order of Court tribunal,
and remand the to that record
with our decision endorsed thereon and
with directions a final judgment to enter
dismissing the civil plaintiffs’ action as
moot.
Justice did not participate. GOLDBERG however, Id.; that, acknowledge, pause 36. We Nippon courts.” see States v. United Pa- Co., although grounds (1st per Cir.1997) we decide this case on Industries F.3d mootness, existing it based on is our belief ("Comity aspiration is more an than a fixed Family record that the Court would have rule, been grace more a matter of than a matter of appropriate the more forum to review the obligation.”). acknowledge We further challenges plaintiffs' complaint. raised in justice may the trial well come to the Comity permits, require, but does a court same conclusions in case as did this stay pending proceeding if a case involv- However, Court. was reviewed case subject the same and matter is stage early this Court at an to our pending in overlapping another court issuance of a writ of certiorari. jurisdiction. Lippitt Realty See Halliwell v. Here, Superior was asked to Co., (1978). 121 R.I. ruling prior make a have found could Comity is a flexible doctrine that rests on proceedings Family in the Court to have been principles, including “foster[ing] several co- opinion, although invalid. In our do operation, promoting] harmony, basis, not decide the matter on that this cuts build[ing] goodwill” among co-equal courts. against grain of the effective administra- 16 Am.Jur.2d Law 11 at 25 Conflict (2009). justice necessary principle respect tion of and the expedient It serves as "a preserve power among ju- the delicate the various courts concomitant balance among the risdiction. harmonious relations various
mine whether the Rhode Island Act, 1.1 chapter G.L.1956 (Slay- title 33 *3 Act, Act), er’s prohibits the testatrix’s stepchildren, and Jeremy Jennifer Swain (plaintiffs), from inheriting as named con- (contin- tingent testamentary beneficiaries beneficiaries) gent because this inheritance father, would confer a benefit on their (David). David, David pur- Swain a slayer Act, suant has been adjudicated responsible for intentionally causing testatrix, death of the Shelley Tyre Arden (Shelley).1 appeal from a grant of summary judgment defendant, in favor of (Estate of Shelley Tyre Estate A. or de- fendant), holding were barred as of law matter from inheriting under the Slayer’s Act. This case came before the argument Court for Sep- oral 20, 2012,2 tember to an order directing appear and show why cause the issues raised in this summarily should not be decided. After reviewing the and considering record par- written and oral submissions of the Providence, Jackvony, Esq., Bernard A. ties, we are appeal may satisfied this for Plaintiffs. be briefing resolved without further Warwick, For DeMagistris, Esq., argument. Martin K. the reasons set forth in opinion, we affirm the Defendant. Superior Court. SUTTELL, C.J., Present: GOLDBERG, FLAHERTY, ROBINSON, I INDEGLIA, JJ. Facts and Travel OPINION The essential facts of this case are not in INDEGLIA, Justice for the Court. dispute. Shelley ques- executed the will in question contemplation Before this Court is a of first tion on October in impression. upon marriage We are called of her deter- to David.3 She married disrespect Shelley 1. par- This Court means no to the 3.The Estate notes that and David also referring by their ties to them first names. agreement prenuptial executed on the same clarity only purposes It is for that first names day Shelley executed her will. Pursuant throughout opinion. are used prenuptial agreement, to the neither right party’s nor David to either 2. The travel in this Court extended is dis- upon alimony assets or divorce. fully cussed more below. trial, February held will named After Her shortly thereafter. David of her beneficiary estate. of Shel jury as the sole returned a verdict favor David both counts, named Jennifer specifically ley’s finding She on all three parents ** * only contingent as the Swain “intentionally killed Shel that David They her will. stood beneficiaries under ley aforethought” that he malice prede- that David in the event to inherit met set therefore the definition of ceased her.4 Shelley’s parents forth in the Act.8 untimely drowning damages compensatory were awarded *4 $2,815,085.46, the administration of triggered well as the amount as will, to her David was estate.5 Pursuant damages Af punitive totaling million. $2 However, executor. named as the justice ter denied his motion for a the trial 2002, 1,May On role was short-lived. trial, to appealed new David this Court. a claim wrongful-death bringing after first 13, 2008, lower May On we affirmed the Newport County in the Su- against David ruling, holding Superi- that “once the court * * * Court, Shelley’s filed parents peti- a perior or has made a declaration Court Probate to tion the Jamestown Court respect to whether a defendant is a with probate as executor. The remove David slayer province then it is within 2002, July 3, granted petition on judge effect, if probate court to what determine executor, ap- David as and then removed any, that declaration has on the distribu (Reilly or pointed Reilly James H. admin- a will tion of the decedent’s assets under istrator) d.b.n., e.t.a., the administrator as Swain, Tyre or instrument.” other Additionally, pro- estate. Shelley’s 1189, 1198 judge bate ordered David return $152,568.19, Thereafter, 20, 2008, which the probate May Reilly sum on filed wrongfully court he taken deemed had petition a in the Probate Jamestown Court from estate.7 light of this construe Court’s On probate decision.9 June above, As noted March Shel- declaring issued written order judge ley’s parents brought wrongful-death ac- “[njeither Swain, David A. nor his heirs at (1) against David that he was alleging tion law, directly indirectly receive (2) 33-1.1-1(3); slayer § pursuant Shelley (3) Tyre.” from the Estate of Arden death; Shelley’s wrongful caused and order, Accordingly, based on that Jennifer subject liability to civil for a should be act, Jeremy and were inherit- precluded criminal to G.L.1956 9-1- Shelley’s paid. 4. III of Last Will Testa- 7. sum was never As we note be- Clause and This low, give my tangible discharged ment reads as follows: "I all it was later in the United husband, personal property my Bankruptcy if he is States the District death, (30) living thirty days my not after then Rhode Island. substantially equal my shares to such of children, 33-1.1-1(3) husband's Jennifer Swain and Jere- 8. Section states that a (hereinafter my 'my Swain husband’s chil- willfully unlawfully "any person who dren'), living.” are then as procures takes or to be taken the life of anoth- er.” 5. On died March while scu- diving David ba with off the coast of Tortola Reilly previously petition had filed a Virgin in the British Islands. probate in 2006 David was court after adjudged However, Superior in the Court. stayed pending Reilly currently petition remains ad- was 6. James H. d.b.n., c.t.a., Shelley’s Court. ministrator estate. David’s to this import, Shelley’s wrongdoing.” will as ben- Of hearing jus- tice noted that Jennifer and Jeremy eficiaries. were minors, ability not therefore “ha[d] plaintiffs timely pro- appealed control the distribution of the property County Superi- to the Newport bate order * * * they would be entitled if Court, arguing Act did permitted by this action.” With that their taking not them from share un- bar mind, the hearing justice based his deci- They will. der contended plaintiffs’ taking sion to bar under Shel- they were named as specifically since con- (1) ley’s undisputed will on the facts that: beneficiaries, therefore tingent they were Jeremy personally had contributed and father, their inheriting “through” money raised to finance his father’s de- Slay- otherwise be prohibited (2) fense; Jennifer and Jeremy had In opposition, er’s Act. the Estate main- both stated that would use pro- allowing Jennifer and tained ceeds inherited from estate be, would, to inherit in fact benefit to *5 defense, their for father’s criminal if neces- David, in of the Slayer’s direct violation sary. Estate, the According Legisla- Act.10 to the The interpretation ap- ture “intended both a broad then filed a notice of when a slayer peal and discretion to determine to this On appeal, they Court.12 con- taking directly will benefit either tend that the justice trial erred in deter- indirectly as a mining result of the of the that the bequest to Jennifer and death Jeremy Shelley’s decedent.” under will violated the Furthermore, Slayer’s Act. they maintain summary judg- On cross-motions for Slayer’s Act does not bar them ment, hearing justice found in favor of taking Shelley’s under will since Estate, holding that the specifically named as were ben- barred Jennifer and from inherit- eficiaries and are therefore not “claiming Shelley’s Referring will. through” David. 33-1.1-15, prescribes which interpreted “broadly 3, Act be At the argument oral held on October 2011, effectuate the of this State that concerning issues emerged. mootness profit shall be allowed to from his This Court deferred consideration of the wrongs,” hearing justice or her deter- merits of the issued an order that “allowing] directing parties mined Jennifer and Jere- to file joint state- my to take judgment [under would ment as to will]” whether directly violate the Act their in- because Jamestown Probate Court (holding David improperly responsible heritance would allow paying “the the Estate profit $152,568.19) David Swain discharged [to] his had been in bank- conference, 33-1.1-2 12.Following prebriefing 10. Section states that "[n]either any person claiming through nor him remanding Court issued an order the case to acquire any way shall in Superior entry judg- Court for final receive benefit as the result that, specified ment. The order further there- * * of the decedent after, assigned regular the file would be to the briefing argument. calendar for full time, 11. At the David was convicted of mur- entry judgment thereby later of final cured Virgin der for death in the British premature appeal. defect in the Merri- This Islands. conviction has since been over- Dufault, mack Mutual Fire Co. v. Insurance Queen, turned. David Swain and the HCRAP 620, 958 A.2d 4 623 n. 2008/09, (B.V.I. 29, 2011). Sept. Inc., Works, order, parties Sansone v. Morton Machine to our ruptcy. Pursuant (R.I.2008)). confirming “Summary A.2d joint statement submitted had, fact, been when no judgment appropriate genuine that the entire by the United bankruptcy discharged of material fact is evident from ‘the for the Bankruptcy Court District States depositions, answers to inter- pleadings, statement, joint file, In this of Rhode Island. rogatories, together and admissions on approxi- indicated if any,’ and the motion with affidavits $5,571.99 in the estate for mately remained moving party is enti- justice finds distribution. prevail as a matter of Id. tled law.” Inc. v. (quoting Refrigeration, National Thereafter, is- October America, Indemnity Travelers Co. referring this matter sued an order (R.I.2008)); Rule see also Pro- Mediation Appellate Court 56(c) of Superior Rules of Civil In the event that gram for resolution. Procedure. failed, the order directed the mediation file parties to additional briefs Additionally, this Court conducts justiciable contro-
Court as whether justice’s ruling de review of novo a trial versy remained. concerning interpretation of a statute. attempt After unsuccessful (R.I. Marsich, State v. mediation, through this case resolve 2010) Burke, (citing State v. *6 ad additional briefs submitted (R.I.2002)). 1167 “It well settled that is mootness, pursuant dressing issue of of language when a statute is clear and 2, 2012, May to On we issued our order. unambiguous, must interpret this Court assigning order the case to the subsequent literally give the statute and must calendar, and we indicated that show-cause of plain words the statute their and ordi “may the parties file additional memoran nary meanings.” Caprio, Waterman v. da, desired, to if so in order address (R.I.2009) 841, (quoting 983 A.2d 844 Ise supplementary may issues that have aris Employees’ lin v. Retirement Board of appearance en since the date of their last Island, System 943 Retirement Rhode of added.) (Emphasis before this Court.”13 (R.I.2008)). 1045, such, A.2d 1049 As is to in Legislature presumed “[t]he II of provision tended each word a statute Standard of Review express meaning, significant to and the [Cjourt word, give every will effect “It is well established that this clause, sentence, possible.” whenever justice’s grant Court reviews a trial of 558, (R.I.2009) Clark, v. 974 571 summary judgment State A.2d de novo.” Beacon 776, Brothers, Spino (quoting Bryant, v. State v. 670 A.2d 779 Mutual Insurance Co. Inc., (R.I.1996)). (R.I.2011) 645, 11 A.3d (citing 648 brief, (R.I.2008). 13. In its supplemental the Estate 828 We that our on raises note order May Shelley’s publicity provide pass the novel issue did a free of whether not such, rights, any, As we if survive her death and therefore avoid the raise-or-waive rule. However, appeal. are inheritable. the Estate could will not address this issue on I, 16(a) have raised this below failed to Article Rule and do ("Errors Appellate so. It is well that "this Court’s ‘raise- Rules of Procedure not settled claimed, precludes questions points or-waive' rule our not raised not consideration ordinarily an as issue that has not been and articu- made be treated waived raised Bido, Court.”). 822, by A.2d not be [below].” th[is] lated State v. 941 considered
289 However, moot, abstract, not we [C]ourt will address aca- “[t]his demic, questions.” an absurd re hypothetical construe a statute reach Morris 1074, D'Amario, Dell, Inc., 137, v. 984 A.2d v. 416 Long sult.” A.2d 139 (R.I.2009) Shepard Moreover, (quoting 1081 v. Har “long recognized ha[ve] Co., Insurance 944 leysville need, Worcester apart exceptional certain cir- (R.I.2008)). 167, Further, “[a] A.2d 170 cumstances, judicial only confine review * * * may not construed in a statute be cases present ripe those case or * * * underly way that would defeat Cranston, controversy.” City 960 A.2d ing purpose enactment.” Brennan Industries, at v. (citing 533 State Lead (R.I.1987) (cit 638, Kirby, v. A.2d 637 529 Inc., (R.I.2006)). 1234, 898 A.2d 1238 Ac- 721, ing v. 497 A.2d City Aptt, Warwick moot,” cordingly, and there- “[a]n (R.I.1985)). goal 724 ultimate “[0]ur Court, properly fore not before this “when give purpose effect to act by ‘a decision on the merits [C]ourt v. Legislature.” intended Webster not have a practical effect [would] (R.I.2001) Perrotta, 68, (citing A.2d 75 controversy.’” underlying Town Houses Corp. Re: Nar Brewing Matter Falstaff at Bonnet Shores Condominium Associa Fire, ragansett Brewery (R.I. Langlois, tion v. 45 A.3d (R.I.1994)). 2012) v. (quoting Campbell Tiverton Zon Board, (R.I.2011)).
Ill
Furthermore,
“later
deprive
when
events
litigants
ongoing personal
stake
Discussion
controversy,
in the
the action is
moot”
A
is not
Campbell,
reviewable
this Court.
Justiciability
This Court has A.2d Sundlun, only held rule v. general (quoting we Pontbriand “[a]s (R.I.1997)). involving dispute; consider 862 cases issues merits, Although holding steadfastly contending our not relevant to on that the mootness, we note that both is not moot. urged to render a decision this Court 290 the distri- receiving property under
Moreover, is settled that it well of a estate. for bution victim’s demarcating the standard the line a substantial between “is not mootness later The United States Constitution The injury. insubstantial injury and an substantially these common-law abolished injury.” injury and line is between doctrines;16 however, premise that no McKenna, (quoting A.2d at 226 874 her own from his or person shall benefit 862). Here, Pontbriand, plain at A.2d 699 In late nine- wrongdoing endured. to as they are entitled tiffs contend century, teenth the United States benefi estate sets from the of a rights the inheritance Court addressed Shelley’s will. This Court’s ciaries under Mutu- slayer and issue. See New York his “prac therefore have Armstrong, al Insurance Co. Life controversy,” existing tical effect on (1886). S.Ct. L.Ed. U.S. opinion on to render an which enables us case, company insurance re- In that Cranston, at City the matter. of pay policy proceeds the victim’s fused thus satisfied 538. We are estate, slayer’s even the vic- though us justiciable. before policy stated policy explicitly tim’s Re- slayer. to the proceeds payable were person on the maxim that no lying B the Court wrong, benefit from his own History Policy Rationale The and slayer’s held that estate was barred of victim’s collecting proceeds though estate’s policy, insurance even exam- analysis, briefly To aid in our potentially of inno- beneficiaries consisted rationale history ine heirs. at 877. The cent Id. S.Ct. notion The Act. Court stated: his or her or benefit from profit should not “[IJndependently any proof [sic] common law. own derives wrong slayer] obtaining incorporated [the in the doc- motives The axiom was attainder, estate, policy, assuming and even forfeiture of trines Pehush, all just proper, L. were he forfeited corruption blood.15 Tara when, imme- rights it to secure its Slayer Statute: Maryland Dying payment, he murdered the as- the Common Law diate Ineffectiveness of *8 It a to the reproach Balt. sured. would be Slayer 35 U. Maryland, Rule in (2005); Sneddon, if one jurisprudence country, of the L.Rev. Karen J. money payable insurance Inherit could recover Should Cain’s Abel’s Children party on the of a whose life he had Wading Into the Extended Property?: feloniously he re- might taken. As well Slayer Quagmire, 76 UMKC L.Rev. Rule (2007). money upon building doctrines cover insurance a Together, these willfully he fired.” or her that had Id. prohibited slayer and his heirs a ability pass extinguishing property inherit or as a a the 15. "Attainder” is "the act of person's rights when to death being civil sentenced of result of an attainder or declared committing felony a or for declared an outlaw civilly dead.” Id. at 348. (7th Dictionary Law or ed.1999). Black’s treason.” of is loss a "[t]he "Forfeiture” III, sec. 16. United States Constitution Art. right, privilege, crime, property because of or (”[N]o of shall work cl. attainder treason neglect obligation, of or breach blood, except corruption or dur forfeiture duty.” "Corruption blood” is Id. at 661. attainted.”). ing person life person doctrine to which "a loses Later, Additionally, highest precludes slayer court dis- the Act New York’s under slayer inheriting qualified inheriting an or spousal intestate will, declaring: share, the decedent’s thereby slayer’s precluding than more unreasonable issue from such Section “What could be inheritance. 33- legislative that it was the suppose 1.1-3. general passed laws intention orderly, peaceable, just devolu C have property tion of should
operation in favor of one who murdered Arguments of the Parties come might speedily his ancestor that he plaintiffs The contend the Slayer’s possession into the of his estate?” preclude Act does not them from inherit- 506], N.E. Riggs v. Palmer N.Y. [115 ing under will as contin- named (1889). 188, 190 gent beneficiaries. The language majority Today, the vast of states Slayer’s explicitly person Act states that a statute, adopted slayer form of a some ” “claiming through prohibit- slayer thereby entrenching principle further “acquiring] any ed from or property re- kill- that no shall benefit from the ceiving] any as a result benefit Having of another.17 own enacted its death of the decedent.” 33-1.1-2 Section slayer statute in Rhode is no Island added). Here, (emphasis it is clear that exception. not claiming through are Slayer’s provides Act part Rather, slayer. they seek share ex- their slayer any person nor claim- “[n]either plicitly the terms of will. ing through any way him her shall in They applying Slayer’s maintain that acquire any or receive bene- property Act to their preclude directly inheritance fit as the result the death of the dece- Shelley’s testamentary contravenes intent. dent, pass but the as property provid- They never note Estate has refut- ed in chapter.” G.L.1956 33-1.1-2. plaintiffs’ ed assertion that valued slayer A defined under the as statute relationship with them and that “any person willfully unlawfully who strong shared a familial bond. takes procures be taken the life of Further, plaintiffs emphasize there 33-1.1-1(3). another.” Section When the language specifi- is no Act as a beneficiary is named in- cally precluding slayer’s issue from will, decedent’s shall be “[t]he named heriting as beneficiaries. deemed to have predeceased decedent Thus, according plaintiffs, as to passed which would have only applies slayer’s to disinherit a slayer by legacy devise decedent, they have not named issue when been except provisions *9 in the will. § G.L.1956 stat- beneficiaries decedent’s Addi- anti-lapse [the 33-6-1918 they Section apply.” tionally, Legislature ute] not 33-1.1-4. contend that the See, (West e.g., provides § § Cal. Prob.Code 18. General Laws 1956 33-6-19 (West 2002); gift lapse beneficiary § Conn. Gen.Stat. Ann. 45a-447 that a does not if the testator; instead, 2004); (2007); gift § predeceases the the Del.Code Ann. tit. (West 2010); passes predeceased § Fla. Stat. Ann. 732.802 Me. to the issue of the benefi- 18-A, (1964); Conversely, Slayer’s § ciary. Rev.Stat. Ann. tit. 2-803 to (West Act, apply. §§ § Pa. Cons.Stat. Ann. 33-6-19 does not Section 33- 8801-8815 Thus, 2005); (2009); slayer’s § Ann. tit. would be Vt. Stat. 1.1-4. issue 64.2-2501(2012). inheriting Va.Code Ann. barred from in such fashion. appeal, in this Slayer’s Act to strike are successful carefully drafted for their competing any inter- would use assets obtained between two a balance Thus, defense, a prohibiting necessary. if the interest father’s ests: wrongs, or her a benefitting precluding slay- from his the language from inclusion of carrying together out the wishes benefiting any way,” the interest in “in er from terms their wills. under the required by of testators with the broad construction then, Act such, Slayer’s explicitly Act, plaintiffs As to bar from operates slayer’s language preclude a carves out contingent inheriting as beneficiaries. anti-lapse under the inheriting that, Additionally, the maintains Estate intestacy, while other- through statute was [Shelley’s] “it is that made clear issue to inherit as allowing slayer’s wise knowing the benefit of that without the testator. Fur- named beneficiaries her, legal kill and the fiction would [David] thermore, Leg- plaintiffs contend her, not predeceased despite being that he bar contingent not intend to islature did dead, taking result his children in- inheriting when such beneficiaries from Thus, that, her the Estate asserts estate.” may “indirectly” only benefit heritance Jeremy Jennifer and stood to although slayer. Shelley’s inherit under will as maintains, however, The Estate pre- in the David beneficiaries event that language and construction of broad her, she did not intend for them deceased Slayer’s taking Act bar un- “predeceased” if David otherwise inherit Shelley’s explicitly pro- Act der will. The Act. by virtue of any way “in ac- hibits any quir[ing] receiving] D benefit as result of the death of the * * (em- decedent *.” Section 33-1.1-2 Analysis added). Moreover, the Act states phasis Slay In reviewing language broadly that it “shall be construed in order Act, may repeat er’s that a statute no policy to effect of this state that way in a “would be construed defeat profit shall be his or person by allowed underlying purpose of the enactment.” wrong.” her own Section 33-1.1-15. Brennan, at ultimate 637. “[O]ur Therefore, argues, plaintiffs’ the Estate goal give purpose effect to the taking directly will would act the Legislature.” as intended Web the Slayer’s conferring contravene Act ster, A.2d at 75. a benefit David. Since the Act does not is, explicitly cites define what benefit Estate definitions, broadly all it “shall construed dictionary various which states that be effect the of this state generally advantage define “benefit” as order to gain. points profit by shall be allowed to or a The Estate out his or her own Section 33-1.1-1 undisputed wrong.” facts that both Jennifer and language mandating in 5.19 Jeremy deny their father’s involvement We consider be the Act to cru death. has broad construction of contributed Clark, defense; analysis. cial 974 A.2d at financially father’s criminal to our his (“[T]he stipulated Legislature presumed if 571 siblings and both *10 Instead, punishment. reinforce it be it serves to 19. The also states that “shall not penal the of this state that no considered in nature.” Section 33—1.1— Thus, wrongdoing. his or her own the the will is not a benefit from forfeiture under provision or of a multimillion-dollar civil in favor each word have intended Shelley’s against significant meaning, parents of remains David express a statute to Shelley’s wrongful every death. It is fore- give will effect to and the [C]ourt plaintiffs to conclude that clause, sentence, seeable would word, possi- whenever ble.”). Shelley’s use assets obtained from estate is axiomatic that ‘this Court “[I]t help relieve their father’s burden statutory provisions by will not broaden satisfying obligation. inter- judicial interpretation unless such in pretation necessary appropriate directly Such a benefit David would defining the clear intent or carrying out contravene both the in- language and the ” Iselin, 943 the terms the statute.’ Indeed, Slayer’s tent of the Act. the on Santos, (quoting State v. A.2d at 1049-50 presented, allowing plaintiffs facts to in- (R.I.2005) (emphasis Shelley’s herit under will would allow added)). Here, clear intent the David to obtain benefit direct contra- that a Slayer’s slayer Act is to ensure does Therefore, vention of the Act. we hold that wrongdoing. from not benefit his plaintiffs Act bars from inher- Thus, although the Act does not iting contingent as beneficiaries. language barring specifically include pause respond We to the dissent’s inheriting contingent slayer’s from as issue suggestion that we have created a third (cid:127)beneficiaries, unequivocal the clear and di- category prohibited beneficiaries not Court, requires the Act rection of contemplated by the Slayer’s Act. We have us,20 interpret facts before based on the above, no thing. done such As stated slayer it benefit- prevent so as to from that, § 33-1.1-2 provides “[n]either ting. slayer any person claiming through nor Here, undisputed it is that David in any way acquire any him her shall murdering benefit from if Jennifer any or receive benefit as ** Jeremy are to inherit under allowed result of the of the decedent on plaintiffs put her will. The have the Thus, the Act explicitly forbids a they any money record that would use Here, obtaining a benefit. both from their share of the estate to finance have stated that use plaintiffs defense, necessary.21 if defense, their father’s pay the assets to for their father’s They Thus, that their father vigorously maintain necessary. presented, if on the facts tragic was not involved death. David question there will obtain Further, although probate judgment a benefit if are take permitted to $152,568.19 against directly David has dis- been will—a result at outstanding express language with the Act. charged bankruptcy, odds ríes, acknowledge may slay- there be situa- would use such 20. We inheritance apply Slayer’s Act tions in which the does not er’s benefit. inheriting slayer’s to bar the issue from testamentary beneficiaries. For although 21. We note that David’s murder murder-suicide, example, of a situation overturned, since conviction has see su- been living reap longer is no pra, thereby nullifying note the need for Thus, Slayer's wrongdoing. benefit of his any spent funds to crimi- additional be his preclude slayer's Act would defense, plaintiffs already nal contribut- inheriting, since such inheritance would not financially ed to their father's defense. slayer. Similarly, confer benefit on the Therefore, any share obtain question might there be a factual as to wheth- money be estate could reimbursement for al- estranged slayer, er children of ready spent for David’s benefit. contingent testamentary named as beneficia- *11 respect- we have concluded that must the we concedes that The dissent broadly,” in accor- agree construed are unable to fully Act “shall be dissent. We How- intent. Legislature’s with the dance Slayer majority requires the Act applies a ever, analysis own the dissent’s Tyre’s reading nullify a as to Ms. so broad Indeed, Act. narrow construction intent. testimonial explicit reach Act’s the dissent restricts statutory construc general As a rule of slay- prohibit it does not concluding tion, is benefit, language of a statute “when the receiving provided er from step from “one removed” such benefit is may unambiguous, statute clear doing, decedent. In so the death of the or extended but must be not be construed language of explicit ignores the dissent literally.” Citizens Preserva applied from bene- slayer Act forbids which Davis, Lake v. tion Waterman any way property or “in fitting acquiring (R.I.1980); see Castelli Carc * * * the dece- of the death of as a result (R.I.2008) (“It ieri, 277, 285 added). § (emphasis 33-1.1-2 dent.” See judiciary of the proper not the role Thus, of the reading the dissent’s rights away.”); to take bestow them Legislature’s with the incompatible Act is America, Pastore, 519 Pizza Hut Inc. v. the Act be construed broad- mandate that ly- con- that we have suggests The dissent in statute at ambiguity There no “limitlessly” rather than strued the pro- issue. General Laws 33-1.1-2 broadly. respectfully disagree with We slay- pertinent part: vides in “Neither holding. of our As this characterization him or any person claiming through er nor opinion, 20 of this we stated footnote in any way acquire any property her shall be fac- may that there indeed acknowledge receive benefit as the result of the benefi- tual situations which * * statute death of decedent slayer, on a ciaries will not confer benefit benefitting two from “as groups forbids in- precluded are not and therefore result the death of decedent”: this, we heriting. Noting expressly limited (2) (1) “any “slayer[s];” claim- case, the facts this holding our ing through slayer].” (emphasis Id. [a dispute plain- which there is added). First, simply the statute does not unques- taking tiffs’ slayer receiving a benefit. forbid tionably upon confer would a benefit Instead, slayer receiving it forbids a David, Slay- of the direct contravention a benefit “as the result of the death of er’s Act. added). (emphasis id. This decedent.” See IV slayer occurs when a takes under a will by intestacy. simply This is not the case Conclusion If were Jeremy here. Jennifer and Swain opinion, For the set in this reasons forth to take under a will and then transfer Superior we affirm the property slayer, to a Court, to the record in which remand “as the result of receive case. Rather, decedent.” ROBINSON, Justice with whom Justice as a result Jennifer would benefit joins, dissenting. FLAHERTY prop- of their own disposal Swain’s clearly one removed erty. step That is con- After no small amount of reflection case, admittedly from the “death of decedent.” cerning challenging *12 Second, Therefore, in this case the beneficiaries that the majority’s believe Swain) (Jennifer holding departs Swain and do not the plain and unam- prohibited either bene- category biguous § fall into language of 33-1.1-2. language in the clear
ficiaries described reasons, For these we respectfully dis- They certainly slay- § 33-1.1-2. are not sent. ers, they claiming and neither are (their “through” father David
Swain). Instead, Tyre Ms. named David specific
Swain’s children as beneficiaries in It is noteworthy majori-
her will. much,
ty opinion expressly concedes as
noting that “it is clear that are (Em- claiming through slayer.” STATE added.) § The 33- phasis provisions simply 1.1-2 do not apply. Geronimo COSME.
Although Assembly’s the General man- Slayer date that Act must be “con- No. 2010-225-C.A. broadly”22 certainly be re- strued should of Rhode Court Island. “broadly” spected, by word no synonym “limitlessly.” means This 14, 2012. Dec. previously has stated that is not “[i]t Court language the function of the add otherwise unambiguous
to an clear and Fuller-Balletta, See
enactment.” State v. (R.I.2010); see also Lit- Commission,
tle v. Interest Conflict of (1979). 232, 237, 884, 887
R.I.
Moreover, a legisla- clause that reflects a apply broadly
tive intent to a statute “is
not an invitation to apply [that statute] purposes legislature]
new never [the Ernst & Young,
intended.” Reves v. U.S. 113 S.Ct. (1993). majority’s
L.Ed.2d 525 hold- just purpose[ by creates such a “new ]”
adding category to the statute a third viz.,
prohibited per- those beneficiaries — might who what opt
sons to use has or legacy proper-
devise become their own
ty way confer a benefit on slayer. These beneficiaries fall outside categories prohibited
the two beneficia- Assembly. named General
ries General Laws 33-1.1-15 reads: der to effect the of this state that chapter penal profit by “This considered shall be not be allowed his or her nature, broadly wrong.” own but shall be construed in or-